DEFENDING DEMOCRACY:

A Global Survey of Foreign Policy Trends 1992-2002

Edited by Robert G. Herman & Theodore J. Piccone

DEMOCRACY COALITION PROJECT

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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As seen from the endnotes, the survey team relied on a range of public sources for information and analysis. These were supplemented by input from expert reviewers as well as interviews with government officials. The editors, however, take responsibility for any errors readers may find.

Ted Piccone and Robert Herman
October 11, 2002

ABOUT THE DEMOCRACY COALITION PROJECT

Mission

"Build open democratic societies by supporting civil society coalitions around the world that promote democratic reforms at home and abroad."

The unprecedented growth of democracy over the past fifteen years has created far-reaching opportunities and challenges for the development of a peaceful and sustainable world. For both newer and more established democracies, however, progress towards more open democratic society is fragile or in retreat. The ability of these countries to sustain and nurture democratic reforms depends on an informed citizenry actively involved in holding political leaders accountable and on support from citizens and governments in other democracies.

Created in June 2001, the **Democracy Coalition Project** works with coalitions of civil society actors around the world who are engaged in promoting democratic reforms in their own countries and abroad. Working with leading organizations and individuals in the democracy movements of selected countries, the Project supports partners in their efforts to inform and influence public debate on issues critical to strengthening more democratic processes and outcomes. These issues include:

- Strengthening citizen access to information and independent media
- Improving accountability, independent judiciaries and the rule of law
- Bolstering civil society
- Supporting democracy in neighboring countries
- Democratizing global and regional institutions
- Strengthening the Community of Democracies (CD)

Through its alliance with like-minded organizations in different regions of the world, the Democracy Coalition Project endeavors to expand the influence of democratic forces on regional and global policy decisions. The Project was inspired by the Community of Democracies meeting in Warsaw in June 2000, the first-ever global gathering of governments committed to the democratic path. Over 100 governments have endorsed the Warsaw Declaration, committing themselves to cooperate to strengthen democratic institutions, processes and values domestically and internationally. A second meeting of the Community of Democracies will be held in Seoul, Korea in November 2002; at a parallel nongovernmental forum, democracy activists and thinkers will assemble to discuss the most pressing issues on the democracy-building agenda and to meet with government officials.

Democracy Coalition Project Activities

Defending Democracy Survey Project

The Democracy Coalition Project conducts surveys of how various nations promote democracy through their foreign policy. The survey project is a key component of DCP's plan to assess states' adherence to their commitments to promote and defend democracy, as set forth in the Warsaw

Declaration, particularly the commitment to *"work together to promote and strengthen democracy"* at home and abroad.

The survey report assesses the commitment of 40 governments to integrating democracy promotion in foreign policy decisions as demonstrated in four "opportunity" areas: response to the overthrow of democratically-elected governments; response to flawed elections that undermine democracy; support for international democracy efforts, including through foreign assistance; and policy towards entrenched dictatorships. The final report chronicles recent events in countries such as Zimbabwe, Pakistan and Venezuela, and assesses how governments responded and whether they met evolving norms of international law and practice. The Survey Project Team is composed of specialists in international affairs from around the world, whose work is reviewed by a team of senior experts. The Survey Project's final report will be published in the fall of 2002.

Working with National Partners

The Democracy Coalition Project initially seeks to support national democracy coalitions in two to three countries in six regions of the world (Africa, Asia, Europe, former Soviet Union, Latin America and Caribbean and Middle East/North Africa). Exploratory coalition-building work has begun in over a dozen countries (Peru, Chile, Mexico, Ukraine, Turkey, Sweden, Georgia, Czech Republic, Poland, Portugal, South Africa, Jordan, India, Japan, Korea).

On April 8, 2002, the first national partner affiliated with the Democracy Coalition Project was established in Peru. Three leading organizations in the field -- Transparencia, the Peruvian Press Council, and the National Human Rights NGO Coordinating body -- have joined efforts to work as the Coalition for Democracy in Peru, which will initially carry out the following tasks: Monitor implementation of Peru's National Accord; promote citizen access to information under state control; act as a watchdog for human rights; and develop mechanisms for citizen vigilance.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Theodore J. Piccone and Robert G. Herman

Many democratic governments say they care about promoting democracy beyond their borders. This survey of the foreign policy records of 40 countries from around the world looks at how well they have lived up to the commitments they have made to each other to defend and promote democracy. It concludes that, while the international community has helped advance the cause of democracy and human freedom around the world, democratic states have largely failed to incorporate the defense and promotion of democracy as a central element of their foreign policies. Nonetheless, in more places than not, the gap between rhetoric and reality is closing. As the global movement towards open democratic societies takes hold, and citizens raise their voice to demand change, governments likely will be called upon to expand their efforts to promote democracy. If they heed that call, the democratic gains of the 20th century will stand a much better chance of flourishing and spreading to places where the right to democracy does not yet exist.

Rationale for a Defending Democracy Survey

The rising tide of democracy around the world continues to pose new and complex challenges and opportunities for the international community of democracies. One of the most important tasks for this growing community, one which its members have pledged to undertake, is to defend democracy when under attack from forces determined to usurp power for their own ends.

This mutual obligation to protect and extend democratic gains is at the heart of the Warsaw Declaration of the Community of Democracies, a gathering of over 100 governments that took place in Poland in June 2000 and will meet again in Seoul, Korea in November 2002. The Warsaw Declaration commits governments to abide by a core set of democratic principles and to cooperate with one another to promote and consolidate democratic progress. It symbolizes a new doctrine in international affairs, as described by United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan to the foreign ministers gathered in Warsaw: "[W]herever democracy has taken root, it will not be reversed."

This new principle in international relations was not invented in Warsaw. It can be found in the core documents of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Council of Europe and the Organization of American States. It is enshrined in the articles of the Commonwealth, the Organization of African Unity, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. With the adoption of the Warsaw Declaration, the principle of mutual cooperation to defend democracy is extending even further to incorporate democratizing states in Asia and the Middle East. More importantly, states are putting this principle into practice in ways that have helped deter threats to democracy and restored the peoples' right to govern themselves in every corner of the world, from Venezuela to Cambodia, from Fiji and Cote d'Ivoire to the Former Republic of Yugoslavia.

The meeting of the Community of Democracies in Seoul marks an important milestone in the slow but steady march toward building an international architecture founded on universal values of democracy and human rights. It also offers a logical occasion for releasing the results of the first-ever independent survey to chronicle how governments have adhered to their commitments to promote and defend democracy beyond their national borders over the past ten years.

How the Survey Was Conducted

The Defending Democracy Survey examines the foreign policy records of a representative sample of 40 countries from every region of the world, at different stages of democratic development, against four principal criteria:

1) Response to the overthrow of democratically elected government;
2) Response to manipulation of electoral processes;
3) Promotion of international norms and values of democracy and human rights and the institutions that sustain them; and
4) Policy toward entrenched dictatorships.

These criteria were chosen because they offered a way to assess how governments responded to a range of situations in which their rhetorical commitments to promote democracy were put to the test. A set of exemplary cases was chosen for each criterion as a way to gauge how governments reacted to a particular event of seminal importance. For example, the April 2002 coup in Venezuela against President Hugo Chavez triggered mechanisms established by the 34 governments of the Americas for dealing with interruptions to democratic rule. How did these governments respond? Or take the flawed elections held in Zimbabwe in March 2002, which violated electoral standards which Zimbabwe and its fellow members of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) had adopted. Did governments continue to recognize the Mugabe regime as the legitimate authority of the country? Governments also were given credit -- or not -- based on how they advanced norms of democracy and human rights in other ways, for example by voting for binding "democracy clauses" in the charters of regional organizations, or helping to build democratic institutions through their development assistance strategies. Based on their performance against these criteria, and taking account of disparities in resources and power, governments were awarded a composite score -- very good, good, fair or poor -- that tries to capture their overall record. The survey also provides an analysis of each country's competing priorities and future foreign policy trends.

While reports assessing the quality of democracy and respect for human rights in individual countries have proliferated, no systematic study of states' foreign policies examined through the prism of democracy promotion has ever been attempted. During the Cold War, popular aspirations for democracy in many places were smothered by the superpower clash between East and West. This made it virtually pointless to evaluate whether a government was genuinely concerned about promoting democracy when its more urgent desire was to contain or defeat the opposing side. The military overthrow of Salvador Allende in Chile in 1973, or the violent suppression of the Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia in 1968, come to mind as examples where external actors directly subverted democratic rights and aspirations in the name of national security. But with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the international climate has dramatically changed. A growing number of governments have identified the promotion of democracy as a foreign policy priority and have entered mutual cooperation agreements designed to prevent a return to authoritarian civilian or military rule. Regional and international norms are being established and mechanisms created to enforce them. And with the spread of open media, new technologies, an increasingly vocal civil society, and new leaders who came to power with help from democratic forces abroad, a body of evidence has developed that allows for a credible investigation and evaluation of the behavior of states on these grounds.

Nonetheless, despite the greater flow of information that globalization has fostered, we found that the motives underlying foreign policy decisions remain remarkably opaque, too often hidden behind the diplomatic niceties of communiqués. Foreign policy formulation is still influenced by ruling elites, negotiated through secret deals in diplomatic backrooms and military headquarters. Legislatures, the press, scholars, businesses, nongovernmental organizations and concerned citizens

face many obstacles to collect and analyze basic information about how their elected officials, as well as the unappointed bureaucrats who more often than not actually devise foreign policies, are conducting the nation's business abroad. Government officials retain the upper hand in controlling the flow of information, and too often invoke "national security" as a way to avoid public scrutiny. To overcome this deficit, it is critical that government representatives, journalists, parliamentarians and concerned citizens do more to ask and answer the hard questions about how foreign policy is, and should be, conducted. We need to democratize foreign policy so that both process and content reflect the values inherent in open democratic societies.

The difficulty in researching a subject of this complexity required us to make certain adjustments to the survey methodology:

- First, we decided early on that any evaluation of a country's foreign policy must be undertaken in the context of that country's unique history and circumstances. Each essay is meant to capture the competing forces that influence a government's definition and pursuit of national interests so that its democracy promotion policy is not analyzed in a vacuum. Therefore, we eschewed the notion of a numerical ranking or other quantitative indicia in favor of qualitative analysis. At the same time, while we recognized the enormous disparities in each country's power and influence to effect democratic change abroad, we started from the premise that even small, weaker democracies can take steps to contribute to a pro-democracy outcome.

- Second, we sought to hold governments accountable to commitments they themselves have made, rather than imposing an external set of prescriptions. For example, each government surveyed, except France, has endorsed the Warsaw Declaration. Therefore, to avoid any contentious debate over terms like "democracy," we relied on the definitions contained in the Warsaw Declaration and other documents widely adopted by governments (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UN General Assembly Resolution on Promoting and Consolidating Democracy, etc.). We also sought to hold governments accountable to the democracy clauses found in such instruments as the Inter-American Democratic Charter (and its predecessors), the Copenhagen Document of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the Harare Declaration of the Commonwealth states.

- Third, to guard against bias, we asked noted experts in the fields of international relations, democracy and human rights, to review and critique each essay. In some cases, we also approached government officials of the surveyed states to solicit information, although not all of them replied.

- Fourth, because this is the first systematic attempt to document governments' willingness to defend democracy abroad since the end of the Cold War, we looked back over the past ten years as a way to establish a benchmark for future surveys.

- Finally, we did not try to measure the effectiveness of the pro-democracy strategies pursued by governments, a subject of intense debate, particularly regarding sanctions against entrenched dictatorships. Rather, we sought to analyze a government's demonstrated willingness to pursue a pro-democracy approach, as evidenced by its own statements and actions. In reaching judgments about each country's performance, we started from the premise that, in diplomacy, words matter, but actions matter more.

Key Findings: Cause for Celebration and Concern

One overarching observation can be made about the trends over the past decade: governments are beginning to see democracy promotion abroad not only as the right thing to do, but also the smart thing to do. A consensus is forming that there is no inevitable split between democratic ideals and pragmatic interests, especially when governments take the longer-term view. A growing body of literature has demonstrated, for example, that over time democracies tend to be more stable, do not experience famine, and do not go to war with one another. Donor governments, and expert agencies such as the United Nations Development Program, are concluding that democratic governance is an essential condition for human development and, therefore, building sustainable democracies should be a priority for development assistance. In the age of transnational threats like terrorism, financial crises, and nuclear proliferation, the international community is slowly recognizing that there is only one kind of durable stability – one founded on democratic governance, respect for human rights and the rule of law.

- There is a strong, direct correlation between the level of a country's internal democratic development and its support for democracy abroad. Using Freedom House rankings of political rights and civil liberties for 2001 as one guide, nearly all states rated "free" earned scores as "good" or "very good" promoters of democracy abroad. Similarly, states rated "not free" or "partly free" have only a "fair" or "poor" record of defending democratic principles in their foreign relations.

- While established democracies do a better job than other states of promoting and defending democracy abroad, in practice few regard democracy promotion as in their vital national interests. Security and economic considerations usually trump democracy promotion concerns, even among those most genuinely committed to enlarging the community of democracies.

- Most democratic states increasingly are speaking out in favor of democratic norms and against violations of democratic rule, but action to punish transgressors or reward democratizing states still lags behind the rhetoric, particularly when other vital interests are at stake.

- The more powerful or strategically important the state experiencing a democratic crisis, the less likely the international community will intervene.

- Overall, surveyed states scored higher on their responses to gross violations of democratic norms (e.g., coups), and in their efforts to promote democracy through international institutions, and lower on their responses to flawed elections and policies toward entrenched dictatorships. This finding held true across all regions and regardless of the level of internal democratic development.

- Newer democracies are eager to enter into mutually binding commitments to defend democracy, and to support their application to specific situations, in part as a way to deter would-be transgressors of the democratic order. This is particularly true for democratic leaders elected after decades of military dictatorship. For them, democracy clauses are seen as an insurance policy against the risk of a future coup.

- States that belong to multilateral organizations with pro-democracy clauses in their charters are more likely to respond favorably to challenges to democracy abroad. The more egregious the violation of democratic norms, the more likely states will reach a consensus to act.

- States that belong to multilateral organizations that do not have pro-democracy clauses, like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations or the Arab League, are the least likely to respond to challenges to democracy abroad.

- Membership in multilateral organizations often serves as a cover for states unable or unwilling to act unilaterally in support of democracy abroad. Such nations tend to defend democracy only under the umbrella of the relevant grouping.

- One reason states with flawed or weak democratic institutions refrain from criticizing undemocratic practices elsewhere is because it would expose their own shortcomings to international scrutiny.

- Even when countries have few competing interests at stake, giving them greater latitude to criticize other governments without fear of reprisal, they often avoid doing so. Reasons for this include: ideological solidarity against "neo-colonialists"; adherence to traditional notions of non-interference in others' internal affairs; and fears that Western-style democracy would deepen ethnic or other cleavages, give rise to fundamentalism, or in other ways destabilize and thereby threaten other interests.

How Have States Responded to Overthrows of Democratically-Elected Government?

- Most democratic states surveyed condemned coups and other types of unconstitutional overthrows of freely-elected leaders and called for a prompt return to democratic rule, but few took further action against offending regimes.

- Timely threats from the international community to isolate or punish coup-plotters have helped to deter coups in some countries.

- Smaller states tend to defer to bigger states in reacting to illegal overthrows.

- Surveyed states' reactions to coups vary according to national interests at stake, perception of the alternative government, and short-term calculations of the benefits of standing on the sidelines.

- States generally are less critical of coups against unfriendly democratically-elected regimes, although the regional response to the coup against Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez in April 2002 stands out as an exception to this rule.

- Coups are more likely to be tolerated if they topple unpopular rulers, e.g., Nawaz Sharif in Pakistan or Henri Konan Bedie in Cote d'Ivoire, or if the new leadership is seen as bringing greater stability to the country and/or region.

- Condemnation of, or action against, coup leaders is less likely to be sustained if they promise to organize elections within a reasonable time. Usually, members of the junta leadership are allowed to contest such elections and often win, thereby encouraging future unconstitutional coups.

How Have States Responded to Manipulation of Electoral Processes?

- Most states surveyed participate in some type of electoral monitoring activities and are willing to criticize blatant electoral malpractices, but avoid tougher actions.

- States frequently respond to polling-day fraud but do little about pre-polling electoral malpractice and gradual erosion of electoral processes. However, there is a trend in some regions toward giving electoral monitors a mandate to investigate the climate for free and fair elections before election day; if conditions warrant, states are more willing to withdraw before ballots are cast so as not to confer legitimacy on a flawed electoral process.

- Newer democracies that have benefited from international electoral monitoring assistance, and that are confident of their own balloting processes, more readily offer assistance to other democratizing states. Some of these states do so as a way of building international legitimacy or currying favor with donor governments.

- Despite years of efforts to improve electoral processes, there remains a surprising lack of detailed electoral standards that have been formally adopted by governments. The lack of consensus concerning what constitutes a "free and fair" election, and what enforcement mechanisms may be appropriate, allows incumbent regimes to extend their rule even when electoral outcomes are in doubt.

- Even when governments have adopted a set of clear electoral standards, as in the case of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), other interests and values usually trump the goal of conducting free and fair elections, as in the case of Zimbabwe.

How Have States Promoted the Norms and Institutions of Democracy?

- There are a growing number of multilateral organizations that require members to have democratic systems of government (e.g., the European Union, the Organization of American States), or which have taken on democracy promotion activities as a core element of the organization's mandate.

- Most states surveyed have voted for "democracy clauses" in international and regional agreements. A growing number of these democracy clauses are found in trade agreements, development assistance pacts, customs unions and other regional integration schemes (e.g., Mercosur, EU-ACP Cotonou accord).

- The European Union's accession process, which requires aspiring members to fulfill detailed conditions relating to respect for democratic norms and values, serves as an effective magnet for encouraging political and economic reforms in the region.

- Democracy-related resolutions at the UN General Assembly and other UN bodies have followed traditional North-South voting patterns in which more established democracies are opposed by those defending the principle of non-interference in internal affairs, even in the face of gross human rights abuses.

- However, there are some signs that this pattern is beginning to change, as evidenced by the UN General Assembly's approval in December 2000 of a Resolution on Promoting and

Consolidating Democracy, which passed without objection. Nearly all the governments that did not vote for the resolution were non-democracies. The formation of an ad hoc UN "democracy caucus" was instrumental in drafting and sponsoring the resolution.

- A number of the wealthier democracies have established nongovernmental institutions that specialize in promoting democracy abroad through technical assistance or direct grant-making.

- Newer democracies which received diplomatic or development support to help consolidate democratic rule are increasingly becoming donor nations active in democracy promotion efforts in third countries (e.g., Poland, Chile, Czech Republic, Republic of Korea). Those not in a position to provide funding are offering technical assistance, particularly in elections management (e.g., Mexico, Benin).

- The extent to which development assistance contributes to international democracy is difficult to assess because:

  a) Most donor and recipient states do not maintain separate budgetary records on democracy assistance, which gets lumped together with other types of development and humanitarian assistance.

  b) Several donor states (particularly those in the EU) channel extra assistance through multilateral organizations. Disaggregating such contributions can be difficult.

  c) Some donor states channel significant amounts of their democracy assistance through NGOs working in recipient states.

What Kind of Policies Do Democratic States Pursue towards Entrenched Dictatorships?

- We found two dominant policy approaches toward entrenched dictatorships. In practice, surveyed states often employed elements of both:

  - "Constructive Engagement" – used across regions, and regardless of the level of democratic development, the constructive engagement policy is designed to use ongoing diplomatic and economic relations as leverage in persuading authoritarian leaders to liberalize their regimes. Some governments, such as Japan, as a result of their societies' own experience with democracy, genuinely believe that economic development is the logical path to eventual political liberalization. These governments in turn apply this policy to their relations with other countries, particularly China. They may at times make respect for democracy and human rights part of the bilateral dialogue, but do so in a low profile way. Most others, however, have used "engagement" as a cover to protect economic and other interests, and make no effort to raise democracy-related concerns with the regime or to support the democratic opposition.

  - Economic/ diplomatic sanctions or isolation – this approach is favored by more powerful states that are willing to pressure dictators to liberalize or even surrender power. In cases where there is a strong political consensus and effective enforcement of the sanctions regime, this approach has been effective in pressuring governments to change, as in apartheid South Africa. On the other hand, where consensus is lacking, such an approach has frequently divided the democracy community,

prompting concerted opposition from a number of states. The most obvious example of this phenomenon is the U.S. embargo of Cuba, which has diverted attention away from Fidel Castro's repressive policies and solidified opposition towards measures like sanctions.

Policy Recommendations

The findings identified above point to an overarching conclusion: *It is in the self-interest of democracies to promote democratic values abroad because new democracies tend to reform their foreign policies to favor interests shared by the wider community of democratic nations.* In that light, there are a series of recommendations for diplomats, policymakers, civil society activists, researchers and educators to consider. We believe the extent to which the community of democracies chooses to promote and defend the right to democracy along these lines will determine whether the 21st century is an era of lasting peace and prosperity.

- To promote democracy effectively, the international community should increase development assistance to democratizing states, make democracy-building assistance a higher priority, and otherwise give preferences to democracies in their foreign aid strategies.

- States participating in the Community of Democracies should develop concrete action plans designed to deepen cooperation on issues of democracy promotion abroad. They should also establish a secretariat to help coordinate common activities and programs.

- Democracies should organize themselves as caucuses in international organizations like the United Nations, the World Bank and relevant regional organizations. They should agree to coordinate policies that favor strengthening democracies and protecting them from economic collapse and other threats.

- Foreign ministries in democratic states should integrate democracy promotion into all aspects of their foreign policies by:

    - Establishing senior level positions with dedicated professional staff drawn from the career diplomatic corps with the mandate to develop and implement foreign policies that will promote and strengthen democracy abroad.
    - Strengthening the capacity of civilians to manage and oversee military establishments and national security decision-making, as a way to counter the vestiges of military rule.

- Civil society should undertake systematic, independent monitoring of foreign policies of democratic states to ensure they reflect democratic values and more effectively defend and promote democratic institutions and respect for human rights.

- Foreign policy decision-making should be made more transparent, more inclusive of civil society participation and more responsive to the needs of emerging democracies. Legislatures, in particular, should play a more active role in overseeing the resources and policies managed by foreign policy leaders and managers.

- Educators should address the alarming deficiencies in the public's understanding of world geography, foreign languages, international law, and other cultures. These deficiencies are widespread and persist even in advanced democracies with interests throughout the world.

Defending Democracy Rating

VERY GOOD
CANADA
NETHERLANDS
SWEDEN

GOOD
ARGENTINA
AUSTRALIA
BOTSWANA
BRAZIL
CHILE
CZECH REPUBLIC
GERMANY
GHANA
HUNGARY
KOREA
POLAND
PORTUGAL
SENEGAL
SPAIN
UNITED KINGDOM
UNITED STATES

FAIR
BENIN
FRANCE
INDIA
JAPAN
MALI
MEXICO
NIGERIA
PERU
PHILIPPINES
SOUTH AFRICA
TANZANIA
THAILAND
TURKEY
UKRAINE
VENEZUELA

POOR
GEORGIA
INDONESIA
JORDAN
KENYA
MOROCCO
RUSSIA

DEFENDING DEMOCRACY ABROAD ASSESSMENT[1]								
COUNTRY	Defending Democracy Score	Trend	Response to Overthrow of Democratically Elected Gov'ts	Response to Electoral Malpractices	Promotion of International Democracy	Policy toward Entrenched Dictatorships	Freedom House Rating (2001-2002)	
							Freedom Rating	Trend
ARGENTINA	Good	⇔	Good	Fair	Good	Good	Partly Free	
AUSTRALIA	Good	⇔	Good	Good	Very Good	Fair	Free	
BENIN	Fair	⇔	Good	Fair	Good	Fair	Free	
BOTSWANA	Good	⇔	Good	Good	Good	Fair	Free	
BRAZIL	Good	⇔	Good	Fair	Good	Fair	Partly Free	
CANADA	Very Good	⇔	Good	Good	Very Good	Good	Free	
CHILE	Good	⇔	Good	Fair	Good	Fair	Free	
CZECH REPUBLIC	Good	⇔	Good	Good	Good	Good	Free	
FRANCE	Fair	⇔	Fair	Fair	Good	Fair	Free	
GEORGIA	Poor	⇔	Fair	Poor	Fair	Poor	Partly Free	
GERMANY	Good	⇔	Good	Good	Very Good	Good	Free	
GHANA	Good	⇑	Fair	Good	Good	Fair	Free	
HUNGARY	Good	⇔	Good	Good	Good	Good	Free	
INDIA	Fair	⇑	Good	Poor	Good	Fair	Free	
INDONESIA	Poor	⇔	Poor	Poor	Poor	Poor	Partly Free	
JAPAN	Fair	⇑	Good	Fair	Good	Fair	Free	
JORDAN	Poor	⇔	Poor	Poor	Fair	Poor	Partly Free	
KENYA	Poor	⇔	Fair	Poor	Poor	Poor	Not Free	
KOREA	Good	⇔	Good	Fair	Good	Fair	Free	
MALI	Fair	⇔	Fair	Fair	Good	Poor	Free	
MEXICO	Fair	⇑	Fair	Fair	Fair	Fair	Free	⇑
MOROCCO	Poor	⇑	Poor	Poor	Fair	Poor	Partly Free	
NETHERLANDS	Very Good	⇔	Good	Good	Very Good	Good	Free	
NIGERIA	Fair	⇑	Good	Fair	Good	Fair	Partly Free	
PERU	Fair	⇑	Fair	Poor	Fair	Fair	Free	
PHILIPPINES	Fair	⇔	Fair	Fair	Fair	Poor	Free	
POLAND	Good	⇔	Good	Very Good	Very Good	Fair	Free	
PORTUGAL	Good	⇔	Fair	Good	Very Good	Fair	Free	
RUSSIA	Poor	⇔	Fair	Poor	Poor	Poor	Partly Free	
SENEGAL	Good	⇑	Good	Fair	Good	Fair	Partly Free	⇑
SOUTH AFRICA	Fair	⇔	Good	Poor	Good	Fair	Free	
SPAIN	Good	⇑	Good	Good	Good	Fair	Free	
SWEDEN	Very Good	⇔	Good	Very Good	Very Good	Good	Free	
TANZANIA	Fair	⇔	Good	Poor	Fair	Poor	Partly Free	⇑
THAILAND	Fair	⇓	Fair	Fair	Good	Fair	Free	
TURKEY	Fair	⇔	Fair	Fair	Good	Fair	Partly Free	⇑
UKRAINE	Fair	⇔	Poor	Poor	Fair	Poor	Partly Free	⇓
UNITED KINGDOM	Good	⇔	Good	Good	Good	Fair	Free	
UNITED STATES	Good	⇓	Fair	Good	Good	Fair	Free	⇓
VENEZUELA	Fair	⇓	Good	Poor	Good	Poor	Partly Free	⇓

[1] Trend arrows indicate whether, based on recent evidence of foreign policy decisions and projected trends, a government is moving toward or away from more active defense and promotion of democracy abroad.

Chart 1A
AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST:
DEFENDING DMOCRACY RATNG vs. FREEDOM HOUSE RATING



Chart 1B
AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST: BY ISSUE



Chart 2A
THE AMERICAS: DEFENDING DEMOCRACY RATING vs. FREEDOM HOUSE RATING



Chart 2B
THE AMERICAS: BY ISSUE



Chart 3A
ASIA: DEFENDING DEMOCRACY RATING vs. FREEDOM HOUSE RATING



Chart 3B
ASIA: BY ISSUE



Chart 4A
EUROPE AND THE FORMER SOVIET UNION:
DEFENDING DEMOCRACY RATING vs. FREEDOM HOUSE RATING



Chart 4B
EUROPE AND THE FORMER SOVIET UNION: BY ISSUE



CASE STUDIES[1]

ALGERIA

In October 1988, widespread frustration with the political and economic situation in Algeria generated some of the most violent and extensive public demonstrations since independence. These protests prompted then President Chadli Benjedid to begin implementing democratic reforms over the following two years, a number of which were approved in a national referendum. These included the separation of party and state, free representation in local and national elections, and some redefinition of the powers of the executive.

A new constitution, approved by national referendum in February 1989, brought significant changes to the ideological and political structure. The explicit commitment to socialism disappeared, and the separation between the National Liberation Front (Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) -- the dominant party since independence in 1962 -- and the bureaucracy was formalized. The new constitution also allowed for the existence of opposing political associations, and diminished the role of the military. When it came time to prepare for the first multiparty elections, political parties were officially registered and a system of proportional representation was created. This system of representation in effect benefited the Islamist party Islamic Salvation Front (Front-Islamique du Salut-FIS) instead of the traditional FLN. In the local and regional elections of June 1990 the FIS garnered a majority of the vote, which was interpreted by many as a protest against the FLN.

Despite the defeat, the FLN did not contest the results. However, in March of 1991, and in preparation for the national legislative elections, the government passed further electoral reforms that favored the FLN, increasing the number of parliamentary seats and altering their distribution to obtain over-representation of rural areas. In addition, a two round system of voting was instituted. This also was expected to favor the FLN because of high probability they would make it to the second round, where they would offer a secular option to the Islamic fundamentalist FIS. There were public protests as the campaigns for the June 1991 legislative elections got underway. President Benjedid declared martial law and postponed the elections indefinitely. Finally, the date for the elections was set for December 1991. However, the competitive conditions were tainted. In October, the government issued a new electoral law that was still biased in favor of the FLN. Moreover, by this point most of the FIS leadership was in prison as a result of the June protests, and all newspapers had been banned.

Nearly fifty political parties participated in the first round of the elections on 26 December 1991. The FIS once again won a majority of the vote and was almost certain of obtaining the necessary seats needed to ensure passage of constitutional reform. The runoff elections were set for 16 January 1992. However, the military, not happy with the possibility of an Islamic party having the legislative majority, called for the President's resignation and the suspension of the second-round of voting. Benjedid resigned on 11 January 1992 and a High Security Council was established. The Council discarded the results of the December elections and effectively suspended all other political institutions. The High Security Council was soon replaced by the High State Council, which was to function as a transitional government, but that was in reality dominated by the military.

Initially there was no challenge to the coup. However, the Islamists responded soon after and the country came to the edge of a civil war. The government imposed a state of emergency, declared the FIS illegal, and dissolved the communal assemblies that had been under the control of the FIS since the June 1990 elections. All political activity in or around mosques was banned and Islamist activists were arrested on diverse charges. The conflict radicalized some factions of the Islamists'

[1] The following 16 case studies were used by the Survey Project Team as seminal events which tested the democratic community's willingness to promote and defend democracy abroad.

supporters.

For almost two years after the coup, the country was dominated by the escalation of the confrontation between the government and the Islamists. In 1994, Lamine Zeroual was appointed Head of State for a three-year term. During this period, armed Islamist groups engaged in terrorist campaigns in protest of the banning of Islamist political parties. Zeroual called for presidential elections in 1995, though some parties objected to holding elections that excluded the FIS. Zeroual was elected president with 75% of the vote.

In 1997, Zeroual announced that presidential elections would be held in early 1999. The elections took place in April 1999 with seven contenders for the presidency. On the eve of the election, all candidates, except Abdelaziz Bouteflika, pulled out amid charges of electoral fraud. Bouteflika, who appeared to have the support of the military, as well as FLN and its more progressive offshoot the Rassemblement National Democratique (RND), officially won 70% of the vote.

Following his inauguration, Bouteflika proposed an official amnesty for those who opposed the government during the 1990s unless they had engaged in "blood crimes." FIS's armed wing, the Islamic Salvation Army, disbanded in January 2000 and many armed militants surrendered but fighting continues.

AUSTRIA

In February 2000 the conservative People's Party, which won third place in the October 1999 national elections, formed a coalition to govern with the far-right Freedom Party, headed by Jörg Haider, which came in second. Haider, a nationalist vehemently opposed to immigration, had sparked controversy after several remarks praising some Nazi policies, though he later recanted them. His gradual rise to power—from 5% in 1983 to 28% in the October 1999 election—was credited to voters weary of decades of stasis under the rule of the Social Democrats.

The European Union condemned Austria's new coalition, froze diplomatic contacts, and imposed sanctions, accusing Haider of being a racist, xenophobe, and Nazi-sympathizer. Austria responded by criticizing the EU for interfering in the affairs of a democratically-elected government. In light of the controversy, however, Haider chose not to join the government and resigned from the party's leadership in May 2000, though he continued to wield influence from the sidelines. Wolfgang Schuessel, of the People's Party, became Chancellor of Austria. By September 2000, the EU lifted the sanctions against Austria after a special panel concluded that the new government was abiding by democratic principles and that minorities' rights were being observed. The popularity of the Freedom Party began to decline markedly in 2001: in Vienna's state election in March the party pulled in just 20.3% of the vote.

The concern about Haider's rise to power in Austria was largely based on his anti-immigrant, anti-EU discourse, as well as on comments he made praising certain Nazi policies. In 1991, Haider, the son of former Nazi sympathizers, praised the "orderly" nazi employment policies when discussing the possibilities of applying penalties to people on unemployment who refuse to take jobs they are qualified to perform. He later retracted the remark, but as a result had to resign from his post as the governor of the province of Carinthia (he was re-elected in 1999). In 1995, he referred to the Nazi concentration camps as "punishment" camps, implying that those inside were guilty of some crime. Later that year, he praised members of the Nazi Waffen SS as "decent people of good character who also stick to their convictions" and declared that, as a part of the German army, the Waffen SS deserved honors and respect. After his electoral success in 1999, and faced with the possibility of being a part of the Austrian government, Haider acknowledged that his remarks had been insensitive. He further stated that the Freedom Party stands for democracy and freedom, and expressed the need to ensure that the crimes committed by the Third Reich are never repeated.

Haider also strongly opposed immigration. In his stated views, immigrants take jobs that would otherwise go to Austrians, and bring crime and insecurity. He has been quoted as saying: "The Africans who come here are drug dealers and they seduce our youth;" and "We've got the Poles who concentrate on car theft...We've got the people from the former Yugoslavia who are burglary experts. We've got the Turks who are superbly organized in the heroin trade. And we've got the Russians who are experts in blackmail and mugging." In February 1993, Haider and the Freedom Party launched a twelve-point petition campaign for ending foreign immigration and keeping the proportion of non-German speaking children in schools at fewer than 30%. In what was viewed as a major defeat, only 417,000 people, or 7.5% of the population, signed the petition.

Although Haider did not become a part of the Austrian government in early 2000, and later resigned the presidency of the Freedom Party, he continues to be a very active force in Austrian politics. After two years of coalition government, Chancellor Schuessel announced on 9 September 2002 that his party would not continue in the coalition, forcing resignation of the cabinet and dissolution of Parliament. New elections were called for mid to late November. Divisions within the Freedom Party between its members in the government and Haider, who was constantly critical of government policies, had caused fractures in the coalition. The most recent confrontation was over proposed tax cuts, which Haider wanted to implement as planned and Freedom Party members in the government wanted to postpone in the wake of recent flooding.

BELARUS

In 1994, Belarus held its first elections in the post-Soviet era. Aleksandr Lukashenko, a former collective farm manager, won by a landslide with a man-of-the-people approach. Soon after he was elected, Lukashenko began to concentrate power in the executive. There were constant attacks on freedom of expression and repeated arrests and disappearances of opposition figures. A police state in the tradition of the Soviet era was established. In 1996, Lukashenko called a referendum to reform the constitution and expand his powers. In anticipation of the vote, Lukashenko severely reduced public access to opposition views, and used propaganda to encourage people to vote early, even though they had not yet seen the proposed text for the new constitution. The referendum took place on 24 November 1996 among repeated allegations that it had not been conducted fairly.

The constitution that emerged from the referendum further weakened the independence of the judiciary by allowing Lukashenko to appoint six out of the twelve members of the constitutional court. In addition, Lukashenko's term, which was supposed to end in 1999, was extended by two years. The parliament was disbanded and replaced by a new loyalist legislature. Moreover, Lukashenko ordered that the results of the referendum be binding, despite the fact that earlier that month the constitutional court had ruled that the constitution could not be amended or changed through a referendum.

The legitimacy of this exercise was widely questioned both by the international community and by Belarusian opposition forces. The relations between Belarus and the international community were further damaged when, in 1998, Lukashenko forced ambassadors from Western nations to leave their residences. Since 1999, the year in which Lukashenko's term was supposed to expire, many countries have refused to recognize him as the legitimate president of Belarus.

Parliamentary elections took place in October of 2000. Opposition forces had agreed to participate in the elections on the condition that Lukashenko took action to ensure fair competition. However, Lukashenko failed to comply with these demands and the environment became even more repressive, with continued raids on opposition headquarters, detention of journalists and suppression of opposition views in the media. The elections were held, even though seven opposition parties boycotted them. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, having monitored the campaign process, decided not to send an observation mission and concluded that there had been repeated violations of the electoral code.

Finally, and again among repeated allegations of irregularities, repression and intimidation, presidential elections took place in September 2001. Lukashenko was declared winner with 75.6 percent of the vote, while his closest competitor received only 15.4 percent.

BURMA

Burma achieved independence from British colonial rule in 1948 and the state that emerged survived as a parliamentary democracy until a military coup in 1962. Following the coup, General Ne Win led a military regime under the guise of the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) through 1998. During this period there were no free elections, and freedom of expression and association were almost entirely denied. Torture, political imprisonment, and other human rights abuses were common.

The BSPP's isolationist economic policy devastated the Burmese economy, and by mid-1988, rice shortages and popular discontent reached crisis levels. The slaying of a student by police sparked student demonstrations that were soon joined by monks, civil servants, workers, and even policemen and soldiers in cities and towns all over Burma. On 8 August 1988 hundreds of thousands of people nationwide marched to demand that an elected civilian government replace the BSPP regime. Soldiers fired on crowds of unarmed protesters, killing thousands.

On 18 September 1988, the army finally responded to demands for democratic change by announcing a coup by the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) (renamed the State Peace and Development Council in November 1997). The junta then opened fire with machine guns on demonstrators in Rangoon and other cities. It is estimated that as many as 10,000 people were killed. Thousands more were arrested. Many were - and continue to be - tortured. The SLORC pledged that elections would be held after "peace and tranquility" were restored in Burma.

The run-up to the elections inspired little confidence in the process. Aung San Suu Kyi, leader of the most popular opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), was placed under house arrest in July 1989 making her ineligible to run for office. Many other senior NLD officials were jailed. The NLD had little access to media and few resources compared to the SLORC-backed National Unity Party (NUP).

To the surprise of most observers, free and fair elections took place on 27 May 1990. Of 485 contested parliamentary seats, the NLD won 392 (over 80%). Ethnic minority parties opposed to the SLORC won 65 more seats. The army-front NUP won only ten seats. In response to this defeat, the junta changed the rules and nullified the election results. Repression intensified. Many NLD and other elected pro-democracy representatives were arrested, some of whom died in prison, while others fled into exile. Throughout 1999 and 2000, the junta widened its campaign of intimidation against grassroots organizers of the NLD, as well as its leadership. After six years of house arrest, during which she was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, Suu Kyi was released in July 1995. In October of 2000, she was again placed under house arrest after repeatedly being blocked from visiting NLD supporters outside Rangoon. The junta released Suu Kyi from house arrest on 6 May 2002 -- a move credited to the SPDC-Suu Kyi dialogue catalyzed by UN Special Envoy to Burma Tan Sri Razali Ismail, a Malaysian diplomat. Though some regional observers hailed this as a sign that the junta was prepared to move towards democratic transition, after nearly five months, the talks remain stalled. While political prisoners are sporadically released - usually preceding diplomatic visits from powerful nations - it is estimated that more than 1,500 prisoners of conscience still languish in Burma's prisons. Democratic norms such as freedom of religion and expression also remain non-existent, and even fax machines or an internet connection are considered illegal.

CAMBODIA

The 1991 Paris Peace Accords ended more than twenty years of civil war in Cambodia and laid the foundation for free and fair elections under the oversight of the United Nations in 1993. A coalition government was formed, albeit with some difficulty, between Hun Sen, of the Cambodian People's Party (CPP), and his fierce rival, Prince Norodom Ranariddh, of the royalist party Cooperative Cambodia, better known as FUNCINPEC. Though the following years were filled with disputes and impasses between the coalition partners, overall peace was restored to the country and democratization proceeded.

However, by 1997 it had become clear that the top two political leaders were not content to continue sharing power, and as tensions mounted, intense political maneuvering was mounting. This struggle for power culminated in what effectively turned out to be a coup led by Hun Sen. On 5-6 July 1997, Hun Sen ordered his troops to remove his political rival by force. The royalist army was subsequently defeated, and Prince Ranariddh, along with several other FUNCINPEC and other opposition party leaders, fled the country, while a number of those who remained in Cambodia were either arrested or executed. In an effort to prevent Ranariddh from returning to power, Hun Sen sought to prosecute him for treason for having conducted secret negotiations with the Khmer Rouge, and warned him that he would be arrested if he tried to return to Cambodia.

Despite what was effectively the ousting of a democratically-elected leader, the CPP reiterated that it was committed to free and fair elections, and strongly supported two new laws regarding the formation of political parties and the governing of elections. The National Assembly passed these laws in December 1997, and soon afterwards the government announced that parliamentary elections would be held in July 1998.

The period leading up to the July elections was marked by political turmoil. Opposition party leaders began returning to Phnom Penh early in the year to prepare for the elections. There they faced numerous challenges, including the destruction of almost all provincial party offices and organizations, election supervisory organizations made up primarily of CPP supporters, and the virtual denial of access to

the media (particularly the radio, which was largely controlled by Hun Sen) until thirty days before the election. Throughout the six months leading up to the election there was widespread intimidation of voters. Yet even as election-related violence increased, the government failed to intervene. Though frustrated by the 1997 coup, and by the malfeasance that characterized the pre-election period, the international community viewed the July elections as an opportunity to recommit the country and its political leaders to reconciliation and the strengthening of democracy. Therefore, extensive foreign resources were provided for a wide range of activities, including voter education, national and international monitoring efforts, and various forms of election-related technical support.

The elections appeared to take place without any serious incidents. Cambodians and the international community alike described the elections as professional and transparent, and the Joint International Observer Group, which was coordinated by the United Nations, declared that they were a genuine expression of the people's choice. However, controversies began to emerge with the collecting and counting of ballots, and suspicions of electoral fraud led opposition parties to file complaints with the National Elections Commission (NEC). When the NEC and the Constitutional Council failed to review these complaints in accordance with dispute procedures, opposition parties called for Hun Sen's resignation and declared that they would work with the CPP only if he was replaced as leader. Widespread demonstrations broke out, led by students, Buddhist monks, and opposition activists, and ended with a violent, government-supported crackdown, during which dozens of demonstrators were killed.

The post-election political stalemate was finally resolved in November 1998, when King Sihanouk and the international community intervened to broker a political compromise. A coalition government was formed between CPP and FUNCINPEC that placed Hun Sen in charge of the government as prime minister, and named Prince Ranariddh chairman of the National Assembly.

ECUADOR

In January 2000, massive demonstrations by indigenous groups filled the streets of Ecuador's capital city, Quito. The demonstrators were protesting President Jamil Mahuad's decision to adopt the U.S. dollar, instead of the sucre, as Ecuador's official currency. However, this was just one of a series of macroeconomic decisions that had sparked protests during Mahuad's presidency.

Mahuad was sworn in as president in August 1998, one year after the previous democratically-elected president, Abdalá Bucaram, had been forced out of office by the Congress. Early in his administration, under pressure from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Mahuad adopted a strict liberal approach to economic policy and devaluated the sucre, liberalized oil prices, eliminated subsidies to electricity consumption and introduced several austerity measures that directly impacted the life of the average person. Mahuad's popularity kept falling, and in March 1999 the country was paralyzed by a general strike. On 5 July of that same year, more protests erupted and another general strike paralyzed the country, just as Mahuad was negotiating an $800 million loan from the IMF. The crisis continued for nearly two weeks, when Mahuad agreed to postpone an increase to the price of gasoline.

Social unrest had been a constant of Mahuad's administration, and finally in January 2000, he faced the definitive test of his administration. On 9 January he announced the decision to adopt the dollar as the official currency of Ecuador. Protests erupted in Guayaquil, Quito and in other cities throughout the country. A state of emergency was declared once again. On 12 January the self-denominated "Parliament of the Peoples of Ecuador" called for civil disobedience and for the taking of the executive power.

Mahuad resisted the attempted ouster, but on 21 January indigenous organizations together with army officers took over the Congress. A junta was formed under the leadership of Colonel Lucio Gutiérrez Borbúa, the indigenous leader Antonio Vargas Huatatoca and Carlos Solórzano Constantine, the former president of the Supreme Court. That evening, Mahuad fled the presidential palace and sought refuge at an air force base. The junta was short-lived and dissolved under pressure from the international community, including threats by the United States to cut foreign aid and discourage investment. The Organization of American States, with the exception of Venezuela, gave full backing to Mahuad as the constitutionally-elected president.

On 22 January, Vice President Gustavo Noboa, who had run against Mahuad in the 1998 elections and who was supposedly Bucaram's protégé, was sworn in as president after Congress determined that Mahuad had abandoned his position. Ironically, Noboa upheld Mahuad's decision to

dollarize the Ecuadorian economy and is, at present, still the president of Ecuador. Mahuad finally went into exile on February 26.

FIJI

On May 19 2000 George Speight, a failed businessman and Fijian supremacist, stormed the Parliament building in Suva, together with his armed men, and took Prime Minister Mahendra Chaudhry and most of his government hostage. This coup attempt was a result of the ethnic tension that had dominated the political culture of the country.

Fiji was under British control between 1874, when the culturally and politically important Fijian Great Council of Chiefs ceded their sovereignty to the Crown, and 1970, when the country became independent. In the 1880s the British administration started large-scale cultivation of sugarcane, and brought Indians to Fiji to work on the sugar plantations. This immigrant population became a significant part of the Fijian population, making up 44% of the country's population of approximately 830,000. The indigenous Fijians adamantly resented the Indian influence in the country.

A constitution passed in 1997 provided equal access to political participation by all Fijians, regardless of their ethnic background. In 1999, Mahendra Chaudry, an ethnic Indian and the leader of the Indo-Fijian *Fijian Labour Party*, was elected Prime Minister of the country. He formed a cabinet composed mostly of ethnic Indians. On 19 May 2000 – the first anniversary of the election – Speight staged his coup and took Chaudry and most of his cabinet hostage for 56 days. Speight's main goal was to get rid of Fiji's multiracial constitution and to replace it with one that would permit only indigenous Fijians to hold the posts of prime minister and president. The crisis created by the coup was further complicated when, on 29 May, military commander Commodore Frank Bainimarama deposed President Ratu Mara, apparently to lend support to Speight. The Great Council of Chiefs became an important center of political power during this period of political confusion, and the plotters of the coup negotiated with the Council to normalize the political climate in the country. While Speight continued to hold the hostages, his supporters destroyed villages and businesses that belonged to ethnic Indians. On 13 July, Speight released the remaining hostages in return for an amnesty agreement and influence in the new government. However, two weeks later, he was arrested on grounds of violating the amnesty agreement by not surrendering his arms and charged with treason. At a highly political court hearing, Speight pleaded guilty to treason and was sentenced to death. Later the same day, the President of Fiji reduced Speight's sentence to life imprisonment.

When the hostage crisis ended, the deposed Prime Minister, Mahendra Chaudry, and his democratically-elected government were not restored to power. Instead, the military and the Great Council of Chiefs appointed an interim government dominated by ethnic Fijians. Elections were held in August – September 2001, and Laisenia Quarase's *Fijian United Party* narrowly defeated Chaudry's party. Quarase became Prime Minister, leading a cabinet that consists entirely of ethnic Fijians.

The strongest reactions to the coup attempt in Fiji came from Australia and, to a lesser extent, from New Zealand. Australia condemned the coup and recalled its High Commissioner. It also terminated most non-humanitarian aid and imposed bilateral sanctions and travel bans on coup participants. Fiji was suspended from the British Commonwealth, and the UN Human Rights Commission and the UN General Assembly passed resolutions condemning the coup. The European Union postponed the signing of the Suva Convention, due to be held in the Fijian capital, which would have continued preferential prices for Fijian sugar exports. The United States temporarily closed its embassy and issued a travel warning, which crippled the island's heavily tourism-based economy. The United Kingdom recalled its High Commissioner, and suspended, along with the U.S., all naval visits and joint military exercises. In addition to the condemnation and sanctions, Australia was directly involved in diplomatic efforts to return constitutional rule and democracy to Fiji. The 2001 elections were financed by Australia and New Zealand, and were monitored by members from the Commonwealth, the United Nations and the European Union.

HAITI

After living under dictatorial regimes during most of its independent life, the government of Haiti, in response to international pressure, held its first presidential elections in 1990. Haiti's first democratically-elected president was Jean Bertrand Aristide, a left-wing Catholic priest who had achieved great popularity opposing the Duvalier regime and the subsequent military dictatorships. Aristide won by a landslide obtaining 67.5 percent of

the votes. However, even before his inauguration on 7 January 1991, the elite and the military establishment were conspiring to overthrow him. Aristide was finally ousted on 30 September 1991, and Haiti came under the control of a military junta composed of Generals Raoul Cédras, Philippe Biamby and Colonel Michel François.

Aristide was forced into exile, first in Venezuela and then in the United States. Both the United States and the United Nations imposed trade and oil embargoes. In July 1993, an agreement was reached that would have allowed Aristide to return to Haiti as the Constitutional president, but at the last minute the military junta backed down on its commitments. These events led ultimately to a total embargo in May 1994 and in July of that same year, the United Nations Security Council authorized military intervention to restore democratic order. A contingent of 20,000 troops, mostly American, entered the country on 19 September. Aristide returned triumphant to Haiti on 15 October 1994 and the members of the military junta fled to Panama.

The next round of elections took place in 1995. Under some pressure from the United States, Aristide resisted the temptation to "discount" the years he had spent in exile, and did not run for president again. Nevertheless, Aristide's political party, Fanmi Lavalas, obtained a clear victory in the legislative elections in June and July of 1995. The Lavalas presidential candidate, René Preval, won the December election by an astonishing 87.9 percent (though the turnout was less than one third of eligible voters). However, by 1997, Aristide and Preval no longer saw eye to eye. In June 1997, the Prime Minister, Rony Smarth, resigned amidst intense criticism of Preval's economic reform plans, and due to internal strife. Parliament did not approve a substitute for the position. In January 1999, President Preval decided not to extend the mandate of parliament, thus leaving Haiti without a functioning body for more than a year.

Senatorial elections carried out on 21 May 2000 were widely contested within Haiti and criticized by the international community. The elections resulted in a landslide victory for senators from the Lavalas party; however, the process was considered to be flawed. León Manus, the president of the Provisional Electoral Council, contested the results and ultimately fled the country in the face of death threats for failing to certify the results. The OAS withdrew its electoral observation mission from the second round of elections, arguing that the first round was "fundamentally flawed."

The irregularities were not limited to the day of the election. The campaign period was plagued with violent incidents. The OAS recorded some seventy violent incidents between January and May. Electoral candidates were assassinated, as was Jean Dominique, a prominent radio journalist and defender of human rights and the rule of law. In early April, the headquarters of the opposition coalition, Space for Dialogue (Espace de Concertacion) was burned down. Much of the violence was attributed to Lavalas militants with collusion on the part of the police.

Finally, on 26 November, Haiti held presidential elections in which Jean-Bertrand Aristide was declared the winner, obtaining a significant 60 to 70 percent of the vote. Aristide was practically unopposed, however, as the opposition boycotted the electoral process. Once again these elections were considered flawed, and the OAS denounced irregularities in the counting of the vote. Nonetheless, Aristide was inaugurated in February 2001. The opposition coalition Democratic Convergence, meanwhile, conducted the inauguration of an alternate provisional president, human rights activist Gérard Gourge and called for new legislative elections. The negotiations between democratic Convergence and the Fanmi Lavalas party to resolve Haiti's political crisis have been slow and complicated.

CÔTE D'IVOIRE

Côte d'Ivoire's reputation as one of the most politically stable countries in Africa was shaken by the military coup of 1999. After independence from France in 1960, Côte d'Ivoire was governed by the one-party rule of *Parti Democratique de la Côte d'Ivoire* (PDCI) under the leadership of Félix Houphouët-Boigny. Upon his death in 1993, the then-speaker of the National Assembly, Henri Konan Bédié, took over.

During the early 1990s, opposition was legalized in the country, and there was mounting criticism of the government. In the face of a strong challenge from the opposition, Bédié adopted a policy of promoting the notion of "Ivorité" or "Ivorianness." This policy ran counter to the principles of Félix Houphouët-Boigny who had tried to include different segments of the society in the government." Bédié's policy was an attempt to isolate and eliminate his most powerful opponent, Alassane Ouattara, who drew most of his support from the Muslim northern regions of the country. Ouattara had been prime minister during the rule of

Houphouët-Boigny, and during the 1990s he started bidding for the presidency of the country as the leader of the *Rassemblement des Républicains* (RDR). Claiming that Ouattara was not a native Ivorian, but was instead from the neighboring Burkina Faso, Bédié managed to prevent him from participating in the 1995 elections, where Bédié was elected as the president of Côte d'Ivoire.

Bédié's rule was plagued by allegations of corruption and bad governance, as a result of which the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the European Union suspended economic aid in 1998. Widespread corruption, economic problems and low pay created dissatisfaction in the army. On 24 December 1999, the military overthrew Bédié in a bloodless coup under the command of his chief-of-staff, General Robert Guei. General Guei immediately suspended the constitution and dissolved the National Assembly. He formed a broad-based junta called *Comite National de Salut Public* (CNPS) in which he included members of the opposition parties, such as the RDR and Laurent Gbagbo's *Front Populaire Ivorien* (FPI), and pledged to eliminate corruption and to write a new constitution.

The coup seems to have been generally welcomed by the Ivorians, who wanted to get rid of the corrupt and authoritarian government. The strongest reaction came from African states and the OAU, which called on General Guei to return the country to constitutional rule and barred him from the 2000 Lome Summit. South Africa and Nigeria strongly condemned the coup as an "illegal and unacceptable takeover of government," and called for the restoration of President Bédié. Outside of Africa, the international community was also quick to condemn General Guei's takover. The Organization of the Francophonie called for the prompt restoration of democratic rule in Côte d'Ivoire. The president of the UN General Assembly called for the speedy restoration of the legitimate government. The European Union, United States, Britain and Canada also condemned the coup, but their action was limited since economic aid to Côte d'Ivoire previously had been suspended.

The interruption of democracy by the coup ultimately led to other problems. Although General Guei had promised to return the country to civilian rule, it soon became evident that he had his own political ambitions. Adopting Bédié's xenophobic theme, General Guei sought to promote ethnic and religious differences in order to eliminate political rivals. He introduced a new constitution, approved by 86% of the electorate in a referendum, under which any Ivorian who wished to contest a presidential election had to be of parents born in Côte d'Ivoire – a requirement clearly designed to exclude Ouattara. In October 2000, in a controversial decision, the Supreme Court disqualified fourteen of nineteen presidential candidates from running. In the presidential elections held that same month, General Guei, upon learning of early results that showed Gbagbo to be leading the poll, dissolved the National Electoral Commission and proclaimed himself the winner. In the face of violent protests that followed this development, Guei fled the country, and Gbagbo declared himself president of Côte d'Ivoire.

The RDR then demanded fresh elections, claiming that Ouattara and other candidates had been arbitrarily barred from running, but Gbagbo did not respond. Violent and bloody clashes followed, and were characterized by religious and ethnic tensions as security forces and Gbagbo supporters clashed with Muslim northerners. In the meantime, Gbagbo maintained the law on citizenship, and the Supreme Court barred Ouattara from standing at the parliamentary elections.

The country was once again shaken by protests and clashes, and the RDR boycotted the elections (The RDR participated in the national municipal elections in February 2001, where they won the majority of council seats.) The following period was marked by constant unrest, particularly within the army, which carried out a failed coup attempt in January 2001. In June 2002, the Justice Court of Abidjan issued Ouattara a nationality certificate, which many hope will diffuse the tension between Ouattara's activists and Gbagbo's followers.

The international community was critical of the irregularities in the October 2000 presidential elections, which were accompanied by brutal killings. The OAU, the United States, South Africa, and the United Nations called for new elections after Guei fled the country, but Gbagbo maintained his position as the president. France's reaction to the coup and the electoral irregularities was ambiguous due to France's significant economic interests in, and historical closeness to, Côte d'Ivoire. France did cut off some French aid to Cote d'Ivoire in response to the coup (mainly the assistance of technical advisors attached to the ministries and to the senior military command), but it otherwise maintained bilateral relations. France tried to tone down the level of EU reaction, and gave full support to the resumption of ties between the European Union and Côte d'Ivoire.

Although Ouattara has been granted an Ivorian nationality certificate, this does not automatically make him eligible for presidential candidacy. The constitution holds that such a candidate should never have held any other citizenship but Ivorian. Since Ouattara once held a Burkina Faso passport, his candidacy in the 2005 presidential elections may be problematic, and could in turn cause further ethnic clashes.

NIGERIA

In June 1993, General Babangida unilaterally annulled the results of the presidential election that would have transferred power from his military regime to a civilian administration led by Mashood Abiola. In response, the United States and the United Kingdom scaled back diplomatic and military contact with the regime, curtailed aid, and imposed travel sanctions. Both states also withdrew support for Nigeria's bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.

In September, amidst labor strikes and protests by democracy activists, Babangida ceded power to an interim administration, appointing Chief Ernest Shonekan president, and naming the leader of the 1985 coup, General Sani Abacha, vice-president. Although Shonekan pledged to hold elections the following spring, he was widely viewed as a puppet of the military leadership and the public outcry continued. Turmoil increased throughout the fall. Violent clashes between protestors and the army resulted in over 100 civilian deaths and ultimately led to Shonekan's November resignation. Abacha assumed control, abolishing political parties and replacing elected governors with military appointees. He also jailed notable political dissidents, including Abiola and a former general turned democracy advocate named Olusegun Obasanjo.

In November 1995, Abacha executed nine members of an opposition group, the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People, including the well-known playwright Ken Saro-Wiwa. The executions were carried out despite pleas by the Commonwealth Heads of State to pardon the men, and elicited widespread international outrage. The Commonwealth subsequently suspended Nigeria's membership, and threatened expulsion and the imposition of greater sanctions if democracy was not restored. The EU withdrew diplomatic envoys, imposed travel and visa restrictions, suspended development assistance, and considered an arms embargo. Calls by the U.K. for harsher sanctions, however, met resistance from France, which also issued travel visas in violation of EU policy. The U.S. responded to the executions by withdrawing its ambassador. It also sought to freeze the financial assets of regime leaders, but later abandoned the initiative due to limited international support. Due to Nigeria's role in resolving the conflict in Liberia, the OAU and ECOWAS were conspicuously absent from these international efforts to confront the Abacha regime and did not bow to pressures to exclude Nigeria from their programs of political and military coordination.

Abacha announced elections for August of 1998. However, his coercion of the two government-approved political parties cast doubt on the legitimacy of the elections even before they were held. In any event, Abacha suddenly died in June 1998, and his successor General Abdulsalami Abubakar postponed the elections until early 1999. Abubakar used this time to negotiate inclusive election guidelines, resolving that each party would nominate a civilian candidate from the underrepresented southern regions. Abubakar also was planning to release Abiola when the latter unexpectedly died in July 1998 while still in prison. Obasanjo, on the other hand, was successfully released in June of 1998.

Obasanjo won the 1999 elections, ending nearly 16 years of military rule and realizing a successful transition from military to civilian power. Although Obasanjo's opponent contested the election results and independent observers noted widespread irregularities with the vote, flaws were not found to be systematic and Obasanjo's victory was generally agreed to represent the will of the people.

PAKISTAN

The political instability that has dominated much of Pakistan's recent history resulted in yet another interruption of democracy, when Chief of Army Staff Pervez Musharraf orchestrated a coup d'etat on October 12, 1999. After its independence in 1947, Pakistan was principally governed by military regimes, and the last transition to democracy prior to this coup had taken place in 1988 after the death of General Zia-ul-Haq. In 1989, Benazir Bhutto was elected prime minister, leading a coalition of her Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and the Mohajir National Movement (MQM). During the next decade, ethnic clashes, poverty, and tension

with India marked Pakistan's troubled journey towards a democratic state.

Only a year after coming to power, Bhutto was dismissed by then President Ishaq Khan on grounds of corruption. Nawaz Sharif, the leader of the Islamic Democratic Alliance (IDA), was elected the prime minister. Sharif's efforts to introduce reforms were met with resistance and his attempt to limit the power of the executive resulted in a confrontation with the president, as a result of which both resigned. After the elections of 1993, Benazir Bhutto returned as the prime minister. In this period, violence among militant political, ethnic and religious groups escalated. Bhutto's government was again dismissed by the president on charges of corruption and mismanagement. The elections of 1997 brought back Nawaz Sharif, who sought to introduce market-oriented economic reforms and limits on the power of the executive. However, Sharif's rule proved to be autocratic, with frequent accounts of threats to the press, detention of liberal journalists and harassment of local NGOs.

Sharif, as a part of his efforts to subjugate different institutions to his rule, attempted to replace the Chief of Army Staff, Pervez Musharraf. While Musharraf was on a foreign visit, Sharif announced his dismissal and replacement by Lt. Gen. Ziauddin Butt. Shariff's attempt to remove Musharraf in this fashion created a tension between the civilian and military spheres in Pakistan. Military commanders loyal to Musharraf took control of the state run TV and radio stations and surrounded the Prime Minister's residence, eventually arresting him. Upon his return to the country, Musharraf announced his coup.

While Musharraf allowed the president to remain in office, he appointed himself to the newly created position of the chief executive, whose recommendations to the president were binding. Musharraf suspended the 1973 constitution and dismissed the federal and provincial governments. He convened an advisory National Security Council that included both military and civilian members. Musharraf declared the coup, which was welcomed throughout the country, to be "another path to democracy."

In a ruling of 12th May 2000, the Supreme Court of Pakistan accepted the constitutional deviation had taken place in pursuit of noble objectives, which included economic reforms and control over corrupt politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen. The Court held that the there was no other way to remove a corrupt government except through the intervention of the armed forces, and directed Musharraf to hold general elections by the end of 2002. Following this decision, and in the face of international pressure, Musharraf declared 1 October 2002 as the date for provincial and federal elections. In the meantime, on 20th June 2001, Musharraf declared himself president, and confirmed his position with the referendum of April 2002, whereby he extended his term for another five years. According to official sources, there was a turnout of 70% for this referendum, of whom 97.7% voted "yes" for Musharraf. Others, however, strongly criticized the referendum, alleging widespread fraud and abuse and a significantly lower turnout than what was declared.

The strongest reaction to Musharraf's coup came from the European Union and the Commonwealth. The European Union's cooperation pact with Pakistan was shelved, and Pakistan was expelled from the Commonwealth. The U.S. response was cautious, but Washington pressed for the restoration of civilian democratic rule. The IMF also reacted by cutting off funding. Although there was widespread condemnation of the coup, the strength of reactions varied, and the international community, particularly the U.S., seemed reluctant to go back to the Sharif regime, and hoped that Musharraf's coup might give way to democracy in Pakistan. The western reaction to Musharraf's rule assumed a different tone after 11 September 2001, in face of the need for Pakistani support for the campaign in Afghanistan. It was in this context that Musharraf was able to consolidate his power in Pakistan, and it seems that he will be able to postpone a full return to democracy for as long as the present international political conditions prevail.

PARAGUAY

In February 1989, after a 32 year military dictatorship, General Alfredo Stroessner was ousted in a coup organized by General Andrés Rodríguez, who subsequently became president in May 1989, representing the Colorado Party (Paraguay's hegemonic party). The first free municipal and parliamentary elections took place in 1991, and presidential elections were held in May 1993. Juan Carlos Wasmosy, a successful businessman with close ties to Rodríguez, represented the Colorado Party and won with 40.9 percent of the vote.

The Colorado party and the armed forces had been closely linked since the Stroessner era. Thus, Wasmosy's attempt to depoliticize the army precipitated a crisis in 1996. Paraguay's Army

General Lino Oviedo refused to give up his command after being asked to resign by President Wasmosy because of violating a constitutional ban on military participation in politics. His actions sparked a tense confrontation between the military and the government, and gave cause for great concern among a number of Paraguay's neighbors, particularly those with whom they had close trade relations. Strong international pressure (including threats of trade sanctions and severance of diplomatic relations), coupled with intense domestic opposition to any attempts by Wasmosy to negotiate with Oviedo, effectively prevented what would have been South America's first successful military take-over in two decades. Wasmosy remained in power with the support of his own loyal troops and the police, as well as of the Organization of American States and the American, Argentine and Brazilian embassies. Wasmosy promised Oviedo that if he resigned his position, he would be named Minister of Defense -- but he did not keep his word. Instead, in December 1997, just as he was aiming for the candidacy of the Colorado party for the 1998 elections, Oviedo was tried by a special military tribunal for sedition and mutiny and was sentenced to ten years in prison.

Raúl Cubas, an Oviedo protégé, stood in his place as presidential candidate for the Colorado Party in the 1998 elections. Cubas won the run-off with 54 percent of the vote and took office in August 1998. Almost immediately he decreed the release of Oviedo, prompting a split in the Colorado Party in which Vice President Luis Argaña sided against the Cubas-Oviedo faction. Argaña was assassinated in March 1999, and shortly thereafter, Cubas resigned in the face of a possible impeachment and fled to Brazil. Oviedo sought refuge in Argentina. At present, Luis Gonzalez Macchi, senate leader at the time of Argaña's assassination, is still the president of the country.

PERU

On 5 April 1992, Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori, with the support of the army, orchestrated an *autogolpe*, or self-coup, by dissolving the National Congress, suspending the Constitution, and placing the country under a state of emergency. Fujimori argued that he was forced to take this measure in response to the economic, social and political chaos that had engulfed Peru when he had taken office in 1990. Terrorist activities of guerrilla groups such as Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) and Tupac Amaru had threatened the Peruvians for years, and had led to emergency measures that included severe restrictions of civil liberties. During this period human rights violations were committed both by the government and by terrorist movements. In the economic arena, inflation soared to 1,700 percent in 1988; 2,800 percent in 1989; and an estimated 8,200 percent in 1990. This soaring inflation was accompanied by recession and increased foreign debt.

Fujimori's *autogolpe* prompted condemnations from the Organization of American States and threats of economic sanctions from the United States. Fujimori was quick to present a plan for reestablishing democratic rule aimed at quelling international concerns and by 1993, his plan had led to a normalization of foreign relations. This "return to democracy" was, however, limited principally to formal electoral mechanisms. Repressive authoritarian practices were still being carried out by the National Intelligence Service (SIN), which was headed by Vladimiro Montesinos. The judiciary also suffered from increasing control by the executive power. Judges and prosecutors were given a "provisional" status, instead of being confirmed, which gave the president increased control over political cases. Fujimori also dismantled the Constitutional Tribunal (the equivalent of a Supreme Court), which could have provided a check on the decisions of a mostly pro-Fujimori Congress. The new Constitution allowed the president to hold two five-year terms, and Fujimori thus ran in the 1995 general elections, winning a comfortable 64.4 percent of the vote.

Although the Constitution limited the president to two terms, in December 1999 Fujimori expressed his interest in running for a third term in the 2000 elections. He countered claims that this was unconstitutional with the argument that he had served only one term since the new Constitution had been in effect. Fujimori's rival was Alejandro Toledo, head of the Peru Posible movement. Toledo, of indigenous origins, capitalized on widespread discontent with Fujimori's excessive repression of the opposition and continuous human rights violations, as well as with Peru's continued economic decline.

Fujimori's re-election campaign was marked by scandals and irregularities. Constant harassment of journalists took the form of false criminal accusations against prestigious newspapers such as *El Comercio* – which had documented irregularities - and even physical attacks against journalists in the provinces who voiced opposition opinions. The

Peruvian ombudsman and the non-governmental group Transparencia monitored the campaign, and reported distortions in news coverage, disruption and violent repression of opposition rallies, the inability of opposition candidates to obtain access to open television channels, and the misuse of state resources for supporting Fujimori's campaign.

On 9 April 2000, the first round of elections took place and, after an inexplicable delay in presenting the results, Fujimori was declared to have obtained 49.8 percent of the vote. During the delay, the computing centers remained closed, preventing international observers from validating the process. Because of blatant irregularities, and in the face of firm international pressure, the electoral authorities agreed to carry out some reforms for the second round of elections, which was to begin on 28 May. The international community and Toledo, the opposition candidate, found this date unacceptable, as it did not provide sufficient time to carry out the reforms needed to ensure legitimate elections. However, the electoral authorities would not postpone the elections, and Toledo withdrew from the race leaving Fujimori as the only candidate.

On 28 May, the unopposed Fujimori was declared winner. However, his presidency started to fall apart just a few months later. In September 2000, a video was released to the public showing Fujimori's top advisor and intelligence chief, Montesinos, bribing an opposition congressman. Fujimori tried to distance himself from Montesinos, but finally called for new elections in April 2001 and announced that he would not run. In mid-November 2000, Fujimori resigned the presidency and fled to Japan. One of the most important reactions to the 2000 elections came from the Organization of American States. The chief of the electoral observation mission to Peru stated that the "election process did not assure a fair and equitable contest and they were plagued with repeated inadequacies, irregularities, inconsistencies, and inequities." After the April elections, the OAS tried -- unsuccessfully --to push for a second round of voting and the elimination of some of the reported irregularities. When Peruvian electoral authorities refused to postpone the elections, the OAS, along with the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the Carter Center, and the European Union, withdrew their observers.

VENEZUELA

On April 11, 2002, the elected president of Venezuela, Hugo Chavez, was overthrown in a military coup d'etat. Chavez's control of all key governing institutions, his controversial policies on the management of the state oil monopoly, land reform measures, and his aggressive leadership style had led to strong opposition from important sectors of the business elite, the middle class, labor and the private media. Opposition to Chavez was further provoked by his decision to appoint a new board of directors to the state oil monopoly, Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA). On 9 April 2002 the opposition, mainly composed of the employers organization (Fedecamaras), the Venezuelan Confederation of Workers, the Church, the middle classes and elements of the private media, called for a general strike to support the PDVSA dissidents. and started a campaign against Chavez. On 11 April, approximately 150,000 people rallied in support of the striking oil workers. Anti-Chavez demonstrators marched to the presidential palace and exchanged gunfire with Chavez supporters, as a result of which people on both sides were killed. Members of the military then arrested Chavez, on the grounds that Chavez had ordered the military to open fire on an unarmed demonstration. The leaders of the coup circulated the rumor that Chavez had resigned, when in fact he had not, and declared Pedro Carmona, business leader and one of the strike organizers, as the president of the country. Hugo Chavez was imprisoned.

Carmona immediately dissolved the national assembly, all the constituent bodies and the Supreme Court, and dismissed the governors and democratically-elected mayors. He then declared the 1999 Constitution null and void, though it had been approved overwhelmingly by 90% of the Venezuelan public. Carmona also nullified 49 laws that Chavez had passed to increase state control in many sectors, and he announced a conservative government. The United States welcomed the change, claiming that Chavez had resigned in response to the will of the people and that there had not been a coup d'etat. The IMF also declared that it would assist the Carmona government. Despite the fact that the U.S. deplored Chavez, U.S. officials denied having had any part in overthrowing the Venezuelan president.

Meanwhile, the governments of Mexico, Argentina, Peru, Paraguay and Cuba refused to recognize the Carmona government, and the Organization of American States issued a statement condemning the coup. Thus when Chavez's wife announced that her husband had not resigned, pro-Chavez groups, encouraged by the reaction of the international community launched large-scale

demonstrations. On 13th April, hundreds of thousands of people occupied roads and squares throughout the country. They also occupied a major television station and surrounded the presidential palace. Middle-ranking members of the military still loyal to Chavez, influenced both by the fresh demonstrations and the international response, mobilized to reverse the coup and Carmona was forced to resign. Chavez was flown back to Caracas, and on 14 April 2002 he triumphantly returned to office as president. The tension between the Chavez government and the opposition still continues, as do the international efforts to mediate between the two opposing political camps.

YUGOSLAVIA

On 24 September 2000, Yugoslavia held presidential and parliamentary elections. President Slobodan Milosevic ran against opposition leader Vojislav Kostunica, who had widespread popular support. The international community predicted the sound defeat of Milosevic in these elections. After years of authoritarian-style rule and human rights abuses, Milosevic lacked support both at home and abroad. In fact, while the electoral process unfolded, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia for war crimes was indicting Milosevic.

In the days following the elections and prior to an official result, thousands of people took to the streets celebrating the end of Milosevic. European leaders from countries such as Britain, France and Italy also believed Kostunica would be the new president of Yugoslavia. However, the Electoral Commission announced that neither candidate had achieved an absolute majority and declared that a second round of elections would be necessary. This announcement was vigorously opposed both in Yugoslavia and throughout the international community. Montenegro, an area seeking independence, had called for a boycott of the elections and claimed that there had only been a turnout of 20 to 25 percent of voters. Milosevic claimed he had received 140,000 votes in Kosovo, when it was documented that no more than 45,000 voters came to the polling stations.

The irregularities sparked protests and civil disobedience campaigns. Three days after the elections, a quarter of a million people demonstrated in Belgrade demanding that Milosevic step down. In spite of this, on 28 September the Electoral Commission claimed that Milosevic and a coalition of allies had obtained an absolute majority. Once again, these results were called into question by the international community as well as inside Yugoslavia.

On 30 September, Russia joined in to the wave of international pressure and offered to serve as a mediator among the parties. In the meantime, the demonstrations against Milosevic brought the country to a halt. On 4 October, the Yugoslav Constitutional Court annulled part of the presidential election, which effectively would have allowed Milosevic to remain in power -- at least until June when new elections would take place. However, on 5 October demonstrators took over the parliament building, the state television station and even some police stations. The response from the police and army was minimal. Milosevic had to flee, and in a televised message the following day he conceded Kostunica's victory. The United States and the European Union pledged to lift sanctions on Yugoslavia once the new democratically-elected president took office.

ZIMBABWE

President Mugabe, a leader of the revolutionary movement against white-controlled Rhodesia, came to power in 1980 after the elections that followed independence. Since then, Mugabe has governed the country as the leader of the *Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front* (ZANU-PF) without serious opposition. During the 1990s, however, serious economic problems and mounting discontent, especially among the Zimbabwean youth and labor unions, led to the strengthening of the opposition *Movement for Democratic Change* (MDC). In February 2000, a referendum was held on a new constitution proposed by Mugabe, which would have further concentrated power in his hands, and provided a legal basis for the government's policy of seizing white-owned commercial lands without compensation. The MDC, led by Morgan Tsvangarai, opposed the proposal, and in a surprise result, 53% of the electorate voted to reject Mugabe's proposal.

Tensions between the ZANU-PF and MDC continued to grow in the aftermath of the parliamentary elections of June 2000, during which many observers reported that the government resorted to violence and intimidation. Nonetheless, ZANU-PF could not repeat its past electoral successes, and received only 51.7% of the votes. This result led to still further tension between the government and the opposition, which was manifested in the presidential elections of March 2002. According to the majority of the electoral

observers, these elections were held under the shadow of widespread harassment, intimidation and even torture of opposition supporters. In addition, as a result of outdated electoral polls, young supporters of the MDC, as well as those living outside the country, could not vote. In addition, gross irregularities at the polling stations on the day of the elections prevented thousands more from voting. Despite reports of these gross irregularities, and allegations that the vote was rigged, Zimbabwean officials did not respond, in fact, they prevented the EU mission from monitoring the elections.

The Zimbabwean presidential elections provoked a split reaction from the international community. Many observers concluded that they were 'neither free nor fair, and the International Crisis Group stated in its report that "the strategic use of state violence and extra-legal electoral tinkering authorized by President Mugabe effectively thwarted the will of the people from being heard." However, leaders of southern African states – particularly long time allies South Africa and Namibia - claimed that the elections had indeed been fair. In its statement on the presidential elections in Zimbabwe, the Southern African Development Community Parliamentary Forum (SADC PF) concluded that "the outcome of the elections is a reflection of the will of the people of Zimbabwe who turned out in large numbers to vote and elect leaders of their choice."

Britain, the European Union, and the United States, responded to the elections not merely with condemnation, but also with sanctions. The Commonwealth, already outraged by the seizure of the white-owned farmlands, reacted by suspending Zimbabwe's membership shortly after the elections. The EU and the U.S. imposed travel sanctions on Zimbabwe's ruling elite and, in addition, the EU froze the European assets of Mugabe and all Cabinet ministers, politburo secretaries and deputy ministers. As a response to the electoral malpractices during the parliamentary elections, the EU had already implemented 'smart sanctions' against Mugabe's regime, banning the sale and supply of all arms and equipment that could be used for internal repression.

The Mugabe regime dismissed the sanctions as "organized economic terrorism whose aim (...) is to unseat a legitimately elected government." Mugabe and his officials rejected calls for a new election, and continue their repressive policies against white farmers and the political opposition.

Argentina

Assessment: Good
Trend: ⇔
Capital: Buenos Aires
Type of Government: Republic
Head of Government: President Eduardo Alberto Duhalde (since 10 December 1999)
Minister of Foreign Relations: Carlos Federico Ruckauf
Population: 37,384,816
Human Development Index Ranking: 34

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Argentina has a **good** record of support for democracy abroad since the restoration of democracy at home in 1983. Argentina has played a critical role in strengthening regional mechanisms for collective action against attempted coups, and subsequently took the lead in applying these mechanisms to specific cases of democratic breakdown, thereby significantly increasing its own influence and leverage. However, in reacting to more insidious instances of democratic decay such as flawed elections, Argentina has shown some ambivalence, especially during the presidency of Carlos Menem (1989-1999). Nevertheless, and despite the current economic, financial and institutional crisis, Argentina's commitment to democracy at home and abroad remains solid.

FOREIGN POLICY BACKGROUND

Argentina's commitment to democracy at home and abroad has grown gradually stronger over the last two decades. There is a direct correlation between the re-democratization of Argentina, initiated in 1983, and the elevation of democracy as a defining element of Argentina's foreign policy. The election of Carlos Menem to the presidency in 1989 represented an especially critical juncture in this evolution of Argentina's foreign policy. The country's experience with military dictatorship acted as a decisive impetus for its efforts to strengthen democracy both within Argentina and abroad, and over the last decade the influence of the armed forces in defining and conducting foreign policy has significantly been reduced. Argentina's democracy promotion efforts have been further strengthened by the progressive re-democratization of many Latin American countries in the late 1980s, and the converging interests of these countries in the promotion of democracy in the region. In general, Argentina's foreign policy uses unilateral measures, bilateral diplomacy and multilateral instruments to promote and protect democracy, while at the same time giving high priority to the pursuit of its legitimate economic interests.

Despite the instability of the first years of the administration of Raúl Alfonsín (1983-89), Argentina made impressive progress to consolidate democracy at home. It is an achievement in itself that the financial, economic and political crisis now engulfing the country has, thus far, been managed within the boundaries of the rule of law. However, certain institutional flaws exist, such as executive predominance on economic policymaking and the excessive use of executive decrees. This paradox partially explains Argentina's cautious response to alterations of democracy in neighboring countries and has tended to inhibit the effectiveness of its democracy promotion policy.

Argentina has significantly altered its foreign policy and reassessed its geo-strategic interests since the restoration of democracy in 1983. Under the Alfonsín administration (1983-1989), Argentina reentered the world system seeking to maximize its autonomy under Foreign Minister Dante Caputo. The current foreign policy of constructive multilateralism is based on a new understanding of the country's geo-economic interests.

It is designed to make full use of regional and multilateral institutions to reposition itself internationally and to further its foreign policy objectives. For example, Argentina has become a strong proponent of making the Organization of American States (OAS) a more effective organization in the promotion and defense of democracy in the hemisphere.[1] In addition, in 1989 Argentina initiated a *'rapprochement'* with the U.S. This was sealed in January 1998 when the U.S. designated Argentina as a major non-NATO ally. [2] For Guido di Tella, Foreign Minister under President Menem, this shift reflected a more 'pragmatic approach' in the conduct of foreign policy.[3]

The main purpose of Argentine foreign policy remains, however, to further the country's economic and trade interests. Upon assuming office, Menem asserted that his principal concern was economic policy and thus 'foreign policy was designed to follow and strengthen the economic model'.[4] Argentina subsequently left the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in the early 1990s and has pursued relationships with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). It also restored diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom and agreed to settle the Falkland Islands issue by peaceful means. By the end of President Menem's first term in office, 'it was clear that the multilateral card had become crucial to the strategy for redefining the country's place in the world'.[5]

One other aspect of Argentina's foreign policy has been its strong support of regional stability. Argentina has revitalized its relationship with Brazil and settled lingering border disputes with Chile through international arbitration. It has also served with the U.S., Brazil, and Chile as one of the four guarantors of the Ecuador-Peru peace process. Consistent with its policy of constructive multilateral engagement, Argentina has actively supported UN peacekeeping and post-conflict peace building efforts in a dozen countries, often in countries in which Argentina has no strategic interest to defend. In part, Argentina's participation in UN peacekeeping missions may have also been motivated by economic factors linked to remuneration of military personnel.

RESPONSE TO OVERTHROW OF DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED GOVERNMENTS

Over the past decade, Argentina has responded swiftly to the interruption of democratic governance in neighboring countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. It has increasingly resorted to multilateral response mechanisms, often strengthening them decisively.

Argentina actively participated in all phases of the international response to the coup d'etat in Haiti in September 1991. In 1994, Argentina voted positively on all UN resolutions concerning the situation in Haiti (including Resolution 940, which authorized the use of force) and expended diplomatic resources to help resolve the standoff.[6] Its engagement in the Haitian crisis was particularly critical as it sat on the UN Security Council. Argentina participated actively in the Group of Friends of the Secretary-General on Haiti, which was established during the tenure of Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in early 1993. Former Foreign Minister Dante Caputo acted as a special envoy of both the UN and OAS Secretaries General between 1993 and September 1994, when he resigned in protest over the adoption of Resolution 940 and over the U.S. role in promoting the use of force to restore President Aristide to power.[7]

Argentina's response to the institutional crisis in Peru in April 1992 also reflected its willingness to use regional mechanisms for collective defense of democracy. Argentina backed the OAS response and subsequent handling of the crisis. It severed diplomatic ties with Peru and supported Peru's temporary suspension from the Rio Group in 1992-93. Argentina's position was nevertheless somewhat equivocal, as Menem expressed some understanding for Fujimori's actions. Argentina adopted a more assertive response to the attempted coup in Guatemala in May 1993. It expressed grave concern at the disruption of constitutional rule and energetically condemned President Serrano's *autogolpe* (self-coup). It severed diplomatic ties, recalled its ambassador to Guatemala and cancelled a planned visit of President Serrano to Argentina.[8]

The political crisis in Paraguay in April 1996 constituted a critical juncture in sub-regional affairs. While Haiti, Peru and Guatemala may not have been considered within the immediate sphere of influence of Argentina, the Paraguayan crisis threatened the integrity and credibility of the Southern Cone Common Market (Mercosur). Together with the United States and Brazil, Argentina deployed all its diplomatic instruments to avert an open political confrontation and find a

peaceful solution to the institutional crisis. Throughout the crisis, Ambassador Ahuad of Argentina and President Menem reiterated their support to President Wasmosy and their commitment to protect democratic institutions and the rule of law in Paraguay, stressing that Argentina and its Mercosur partners would not tolerate a disruption of the constitutional order in a member state. Although the recourse to Resolution 1080, the OAS democracy clause, was problematic, Argentina supported its invocation by the OAS. By activating the sanction mechanisms of the OAS, Mercosur and the Rio Group, Argentina raised the potential costs of an interruption of democracy in Paraguay and thereby effectively helped deter it.

Argentina responded with the same resolve to the eruption of political turmoil in Paraguay following the assassination of Vice President Argaña on 23 March 1999. A few weeks later, meeting in Asuncion, Mercosur member states 'energetically condemned' the events in Paraguay and expressed their support of the 'process of democratic normalization and strengthening.' However, relations between Argentina and Paraguay became tense when Argentina granted exile to General Oviedo. The Argentine government justified its decision by arguing that it would help reduce tensions in Paraguay. However, as a 'guest' of the Argentine government, Oviedo continued to plot against the Paraguayan constitutional authorities and, after clandestinely leaving Argentina in December 1999, attempted another coup on 18-19 May 2000. President Fernando de la Rúa, who had just visited Paraguay on 13-15 May, immediately issued a statement condemning the coup attempt and reiterating his country's support for Paraguay's fragile democratization process.[9] Former Presidents Menem and Alfonsín also joined de la Rúa in his condemnation of the coup attempt.[10]

Similarly, Argentina expressed concern with the successive institutional crises in Ecuador in 1997 and 2000. Argentina lamented the encroachment on the rule of law and democratic principles that the overthrow of President Jamil Mahuad on 22 January 2000 entailed. The same day, Mercosur member states issued a communiqué condemning the coup and calling for the restoration of constitutional rule.

Argentina reacted swiftly to condemn the attempted coup d'état in Venezuela on 11-14 April 2002, both through multilateral and bilateral channels. The events in Venezuela unfolded as the heads of states of the Rio Group gathered for their annual meeting in San José, Costa Rica. In a joint statement on the situation in Venezuela on 12 April, Rio Group member states condemned the 'interruption of constitutional order' and called for the 'normalization of democratic institutions'.[11] Unlike his counterpart in the U.S., Argentine President Eduardo Duhalde clearly interpreted the confusing events in Venezuela as a 'coup d'état'. Duhalde stated "There was definitely a coup in Venezuela and I hope it has a democratic resolution, that they call for elections and that the Venezuelan people are the ones to elect a new president. Coups do not help anyone."

RESPONSE TO MANIPULATION OF ELECTORAL PROCESSES

Argentina's response to manipulation of electoral processes has been less vocal but nonetheless conducive to a pro-active policy of regional intervention. Argentina's response to the Peruvian institutional and political crisis in 2000-01 was undertaken mainly through multilateral channels. The equivocal response of the international community to Peru's flawed elections in 2000 reflected, among other things, a general discontent with the lack of government-endorsed benchmarks and standards by which to evaluate them. Like many other Latin American countries, Argentina cautioned against framing the flawed Peruvian elections as a "sudden interruption" in the constitutional order, which would require invoking the mechanisms provided for by OAS Resolution 1080. Despite persistent efforts by the U.S. to build support for invoking Resolution 1080, only Costa Rica was willing to back its use. Nevertheless, as a compromise solution, Resolution 1753 adopted at the OAS General Assembly in Windsor, Ontario, in June 2000, recognized the 'credibility' problem surrounding the Peruvian electoral process and set in motion a series of important steps that ultimately led to the democratic transition in Peru. At Windsor, then Argentine Foreign Minister Rodriguez Giavirini declared that the traditional policy of non-intervention does not mean "non-indifference" to the clear evidence of electoral fraud.

PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRACY

Consistent with its strong support for multilateral approaches and international

institutions, Argentina has, since the early 1990s, used its leverage and influence to strengthen the effectiveness of the OAS as a credible mechanism for the promotion and protection of democracy. Argentina has been an active supporter of the inclusion of 'democracy clauses' in regional and sub-regional agreements and in the by-laws of multilateral institutions. The Peruvian crisis of 2000 generated a new impetus to refine OAS instruments with which to respond to the erosion of democratic governance, and led to the adoption in September 2001 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, which Argentina strongly supported. A core element of Argentine foreign policy at present is the strengthening of the Southern Cone Common Market (Mercosur), established in 1991, not only as a mechanism for economic integration, but also as a tool for coordinating political positions. Accession to, and continued membership in, Mercosur is now conditional on upholding democratic rule. The 1996 Paraguayan crisis, in particular, increased the resolve of Mercosur member states to strengthen its institutional mechanisms to respond to reversals of democracy. In June 1996, under Argentine chairmanship, Mercosur adopted a 'democracy clause' in its bylaws, which states that any interruption of the constitutional order in a member country 'constitutes an unacceptable obstacle for the continuation of the process of integration.' The 1998 summit of the group, chaired by Argentina, adopted the Ushuaia Protocol on the Commitment to Democracy – a Paraguayan initiative, which explicitly linked the process of regional integration to the preservation and consolidation of democracy.

Similarly, Argentina has been a strong proponent of the inclusion of democracy promotion on the agenda of the Ibero-American Summits. It has also strengthened the political foundations of the Rio Group, which has progressively intensified its commitment to the promotion and defense of democracy, as demonstrated by its quick response to the April 2002 coup in Venezuela.

POLICY TOWARDS ENTRENCHED DICTATORSHIPS

Like most Latin American countries, Argentina pursues a policy of 'constructive engagement' with the region's only entrenched autocratic regime, Cuba. Argentina's relations with Cuba have evolved during the past twenty years. While the Alfonsín administration had developed close ties with Cuba, President Menem adopted a more critical stance towards the Castro regime. While Argentina maintains diplomatic relations with the Cuban government, it has repeatedly condemned the human rights situation there, endorsing the corresponding resolutions of the UN Human Rights Commission, most recently in 2002. Nevertheless, it has simultaneously condemned the economic blockade imposed by the United States.

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1 "The Quality of Democracy," address by Adolfo Naclares, Argentinean Undersecretary of Latin American Policy at the Conference of the Carter Center on Challenges to Democracy in the Americas, Atlanta, United States, 16-18 October 2000.

2 Jorge Osella and María Julia Rodríguez, "El Nuevo aliado extra-OTAN." Archivos del Presente (1999): 143-151; and Alberto De Núñez and Jorge Osella, "Argentina y Estados Unidos: Del Desencuentro a la Cooperación." Archivos del Presente (1999): 163-175.

3 Joseph Tulchin, "Continuity and Change in Argentine Foreign Policy" in Heraldo Muñoz and Joseph Tulchin, eds. Latin American Nations in World Politics. Boulder: Westview Press, 1996.

4 Ibid. p. 185.

5 Ibid. p.167.

6 United States. Department of State. Voting Practices in the United Nations, 1994. Washington DC: US Department of State, 31 March 1995:101-167.

7 New York Times 22 September 1994: A15.

8 Rubén Perina, "El regimen democrático interamericano: el papel de la OEA," in Arlene Tickner et. al., Sistema Interamericano y Democracia: Antecedentes Históricos y Tendencias Futuras. Washington: OAS UPD, November 2000: 311-376.

9 "De la Rúa: 'Hay que respaldar a la democracia del Paraguay'." Clarín. 15 May 2002.

10 "Unánime repudio en Argentina a la intentona golpista." Clarín. 20 May 2002.

11 Ortiz, Fiona. "Latam Leaders Express Concern, Discuss Venezuela." Reuters. 12 April 2002; "Chavez Ouster Criticized at Summit." Associated Press. 12 April 2002. < http://www.grupoderio.go.cr>.



Australia

Assessment: Good
Trend: ⇔
Capital: Canberra
Type of Government: Democratic, Federal-State system recognizing the British monarch as sovereign
Head of Government: Prime Minister John Howard (since 11 March 1996)
Minister of Foreign Affairs: Alexander Downer
Population: 19,357,594
Human Development Index Ranking: 5

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Australia has a **good** overall record of support for democracy abroad. It has shown a commitment to providing electoral assistance, to supporting local democracy promotion through bilateral aid, and to strongly criticizing and sanctioning many of those regimes engaged in the most serious infractions of democracy. This is consistent with Australia's status as one of the world's oldest democracies, and as a nation that takes pride in being a consistent advocate for democracy and the rule of law within the international system.

Australia takes an expansive and holistic approach to democratization. Democracy promotion is considered to require not only a commitment to free and fair elections, but also an effective and dependable legal system, an independent judiciary, honest and transparent government, respect for human rights, and strong civilian control over the military.

In promoting these goals, Australia has typically preferred, in very general terms, to work through bilateral relationships within the Asia-Pacific region, and to work through multilateral fora, especially the Commonwealth and the UN, everywhere else in the world. When pursuing democratization through bilateral relationships, Australia has frequently (although not universally) employed a soft-touch policy of "constructive engagement," rather than a more vigorous and belligerent approach such as the use of sanctions.

As with the foreign policies of many countries, however, there is a strong dose of expediency in Australia's use of constructive engagement to promote democracy within the Asia-Pacific. While it may be a legitimate approach to democratization, Australia has, nonetheless, been far more willing to take a tougher stand with countries outside the Asia-Pacific, or with countries having little or no economic or security bearing on Australia.

FOREIGN RELATIONS BACKGROUND

Australia structures its foreign relations around three major foreign policy priorities: the promotion of its economic and commercial interests through a stable multilateral trading system; the promotion of a safe and peaceful international community; and the projection of its fundamental values throughout the world, including first and foremost, a respect for democracy and the rule of law. Australia's commitment to democracy promotion abroad is deeply shared and supported by all major political parties in Australia. The Australian media and the Australian public have also played important roles in demanding that Australian governments construct and articulate foreign policy goals with democracy promotion firmly in mind.

Australia's democracy promotion efforts have tended to focus on the Asia-Pacific region. This reflects Australia's geopolitical circumstances and its national security and trade interests. In the early 1990s, under the leadership of Prime Minister Keating, Australia sought to distance itself from American policy in the Asia-Pacific and looked to carve out a "uniquely Australian" position within the region. This move was

seen by many to enhance Australia's ability to exercise political and economic influence in Asia. In recent years, however, there has been a subtle refocusing of Australian foreign policy priorities away from the Asia-Pacific and toward the U.S. This move has been characterized by Prime Minister Howard as a shift from an *Asia-only* policy to an *Asia-first* policy. Nonetheless, Australia is now commonly perceived within the region as looking to play "deputy sheriff" to the Americans. As a result, some have questioned whether Australia presently exercises the same degree of backdoor influence in the region as it did in the mid 1990s.

Australia's emphasis on strong and resolute bilateral relationships within the Asia-Pacific region is said to result in part from the view that democracy promotion --with its inevitable generation of friction and difficulty-- can be best managed through such relationships. This approach is frequently referred to in Australian policy circles as "constructive engagement," and it has been frequently and strongly criticized by some NGOs and human rights groups. Australia's policy of constructive engagement reflects both an expedient view of its economic and security interests, together with a genuine conviction, borne of experience, that bilateral engagement represents the best chance for Australia to promote democratic reform. Outside of the Asia-Pacific region, however, Australia nearly always prefers to utilize multilateral fora such as the Commonwealth and the UN to promote democratization.

RESPONSE TO OVERTHROW OF DEMOCRATICALLY-ELECTED GOVERNMENTS

The Australian government has repeatedly moved quickly and forthrightly to condemn the assumption of power, or the threat thereof, through military means especially in the Asia-Pacific region, or when involving a member state of the Commonwealth. However, the manner with which Australia has backed up its rhetoric with sanctions has depended, in large part, on an assessment of whether Australian economic or political interests are likely to be damaged. There are three pertinent examples: Fiji, the Solomon Islands, and Pakistan.

In response to the overthrow of the democratically-elected Fijian government in May 2000, the Australian Government immediately expressed deep displeasure and recalled its Australian High Commissioner. It also terminated most non-humanitarian aid activities --representing a halving of Australia's aid activities in Fiji-- and imposed bilateral sanctions, including the suspension of defense ties, in an effort to encourage Fiji to quickly return to constitutional rule and democracy. Australia played an important role in having Fiji suspended from the Councils of the Commonwealth (as it had with Nigeria in 1995 and Pakistan in 1999) and was instrumental in drafting resolutions against Fiji at the UN. The Australian response was firm, and through its diplomatic efforts it placed Fiji on the path to holding internationally endorsed elections in 2001 (to which Australia gave significant financial and technical assistance).

The Australian government also issued a firm response to the abduction and forced-resignation of the Solomon Islands Prime Minister and the subsequent election of a new Prime Minister amid violence and intimidation. The government expressed its deep concern with the manner of the removal of the previous prime minister, but nonetheless agreed to work with the new prime minister in an effort to provide a framework for peace among the various militia groups and to further consolidate democracy in the country. Australia provided, and continues to provide, significant technical and administrative assistance to these efforts. The Australian response, while not as strong as with Fiji, appears to have been successfully conceived and executed.

The 1999 coup in Pakistan elicited a strong rhetorical response from the Australian government, which immediately urged General Musharaf to respect its constitution and the rule of law. The Australian government strongly supported the expulsion of Pakistan from the Councils of the Commonwealth, but did not impose further sanctions beyond those sanctions already imposed following Pakistan's nuclear tests in May 1998. Those sanctions had included suspension of all ties with Pakistan's military, including the withdrawal of Australian defense attaches from Islamabad. According to the Australian government, the unwillingness to impose additional sanctions reflected the view that such sanctions would hurt the Pakistani people rather than the coup leaders. However, it seems clear that Australia's economic and security interests with Pakistan were equally as important.[1]

RESPONSE TO MANIPULATION OF ELECTORAL PROCESSES

Australia has typically responded robustly to suggestions of the manipulation of electoral processes and has also been forthcoming in its efforts

to provide technical and administrative assistance for countries to properly stage and monitor elections. The focus of Australia's activity in this respect has been within the Asia-Pacific region and also certain member states of the Commonwealth.

The Australian government was quick to condemn Zimbabwean President Mugabe's tactics of electoral intimidation and outright manipulation during the 2000 election campaign. The Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, played an important role in having Zimbabwe suspended from the Councils of the Commonwealth, both before and after the election. The Australian government has been criticized from many quarters for not imposing smart sanctions against President Mugabe. However, the government, despite having repeatedly argued for such sanctions in various Commonwealth fora, chose instead to adopt the official Commonwealth response, typically expected of member countries, rather than to proceed independently.

In the run-up to Cambodia's national elections in July 1998, the Australian government, which had played an important role in the establishment of Cambodian democracy, deployed Australian electoral observers for a period of weeks leading up to the elections. The observers reported widespread violence and intimidation in the lead-up to the poll, although they declared the polling process itself as "satisfactory." In the period of instability that followed, Australia opted to work to persuade the various political factions to resume dialogue and to participate in the inauguration of the National Assembly. While this course was not perhaps in the best interests of democracy, there is a good case that this was a necessary and appropriate step for national stability.

Australia's role in the promotion of East Timorese democracy is complex, but ultimately highly successful. In August 1999, prior to the independence ballot, the Australian government informed the Indonesian government that interference in the ballot would severely jeopardize bilateral relations between Australia and Indonesia. In an effort to monitor the ballot, Australia led, and largely funded, the first UN election-monitoring mission, UNAMET, and following the later outbreak of violence, Australia led the UN peacekeeping mission, INTERFET. Australia's efforts to protect the nascent East Timorese democracy were costly both in terms of resources and in terms of Australia's strategic and economic relationship with Indonesia. Since January 2001, the Australian Electoral Commission has been helping develop skills and resources for managing electoral processes in East Timor.

PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRACY

Australia is an active and constructive participant in international democracy fora, and a strong voice for democracy in multilateral fora such as the UN and the Commonwealth. Australia also has an excellent ratification record on international protocols dealing with respect for democratic values, although Australia has justifiably come under fire for its recent treatment of asylum seekers and indigenous Australians.

Australia thinks of itself, with some justification, as a country whose comparative advantage in diplomacy is having innovative ideas and the willingness to put them into practice. Thus, Australia has taken significant pride in its successful leadership of international efforts to establish democracy in Cambodia in the early-mid 1990s, and in East Timor. In monetary terms, Australia's commitment to Cambodian democratization was approximately A$250 million (US$150 million) over four years, while Australia's total commitment to East Timor will be roughly A$1.7 billion (US$1 billion) (A$1.4 billion representing Australia's contribution to the peacekeeping effort). However, one area in which Australia has not improved is the amount of foreign assistance it provides to democracy promotion through its development aid. At present, around A$355 million (US$210 million), or 20 percent of Australia's aid budget, goes to so-called "governance aid" every year, placing it only slightly above the OECD median. This is a significantly lower amount than under the Labor Government of the mid-1990s.

In the late 1990s, the Australian Government established the Center for Democratic Institutions (CDI) at the Australian National University (ANU). The CDI is an NGO that receives most of its funding from the government. Its mandate is to think through and implement forms of democratic assistance, while working closely with the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID). In particular, the CDI is charged with providing practical training and technical assistance with regard to electoral and parliamentary procedures, as well as the rule of law. In this sense, through the creation of the CDI, the Australian Government is seeking to leverage the benefits and expertise of the NGO community for the

purposes of government policy-making. This is an important development, and has already delivered positive new ideas for Vietnam and Burma.

POLICY TOWARD ENTRENCHED DICTATORSHIPS

Australian policy toward authoritarian regimes tends to favor diplomatic and economic engagement rather than diplomatic isolation and sanctions often advocated by the United States.[2] This approach, however, owes as much to the economic and security necessities of the region as it does to a belief that playing Australian 'good cop' to the American 'bad cop' will affect positive democratic reform. In particular, Australia has been concerned to show Asian nations that it is not just another hectoring Western country, but one that understands the "Asian way" of doing diplomacy.

The most notable example of the policy of constructive engagement is Burma. In the early 1990s, the Australian government declined to impose economic sanctions against Burma following the decision of the military State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) to discard the outcome of the election for a Constituent Assembly.[3] The Australian Government did, however, strongly protest the actions of the Burmese government and conveyed its displeasure to the military government via the normal bilateral and multilateral diplomatic channels.[4] It also suspended its development aid program and the supply of defense related goods. At the same time, it sought to constructively engage with the SLORC in an attempt to accelerate the process of reform. It did this by utilizing the "benchmarks approach" in relation to Burma, which linked greater bilateral contact with moves toward greater regard for democracy and the rule of law.[5] While this policy was attacked by Aung San Suu Kyi and various NGOs as simply serving to extend the dictatorship's grip on power, Australian policymakers have defended it, claiming it has helped to facilitate the release of Suu Kyi and other signs of economic and political liberalization.[6]

Australia has adopted a similar diplomatic approach to China. In economic and security terms, China is a major concern for Australia. If China chose to hurt Australia, it could do so very badly. Thus, Australia's own national interests preclude it from taking an especially hard line with China with regard to democratic reform and the rule of law issues.

Instead, Australia, through its bilateral relationship with China, has established an annual human rights dialogue, which provides the Australian Government with an opportunity to discuss with the Chinese government the full range of Australian concerns. While this dialogue has facilitated some important exchange of technical assistance aimed at promoting civil society and legal reform, it is in substance little more than a charade.

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[1] In September 2001, following the terrorist attacks on the United States, Australia resumed its defense links with Pakistan.

[2] Outside of the Asia-Pacific region, however, Australia's approach to entrenched dictatorships is much tougher (e.g. Iraq, Zimbabwe). In many of these instances, Australia has played a leading role within international fora in seeking to bring about reform.

[3] The policy of the Keating government was to neither encourage nor discourage trade with or investment in Burma.

[4] Australian governments have consistently co-sponsored resolutions on Burma in the UN Commission on Human Rights and at the UN General Assembly.

[5] In 1997 the U.S. introduced sanctions on new trade and investment by U.S. companies in Burma and called on other nations to do likewise. The Australian government refused to support this call.

[6] Australia (though the CDI) has conducted nine workshops since 2000, which are said to have been successful in raising awareness of democratic reform and human rights. Australia has also consistently and strongly called for greater dialogue between the SLORC and Aung San Suu Kyi, and welcomed the confidence-building processes between the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) and Suu Kyi since October 2000, which resulted in the unconditional release of Suu Kyi from de facto house arrest.

Benin

Assessment: Fair
Trend: ⇔
Capital: Porto-Novo is the official capital; Cotonou is the seat of government
Type of Government: republic under multiparty democratic rule
Head of Government: President Mathieu Kerekou (since 4 April 1996)
Minister of Foreign Affairs and African Integration: Antoine Kolawole Idji
Population: 6,590,782
Human Development Index Ranking 2002: 158

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Benin has a **fair** record of support for democracy abroad. Benin is often credited with initiating the wave of democratization in Africa in the 1990s by virtue of its 1990 Sovereign National Conference and its subsequent elections.[1] This assessment is partially accurate, as several other African countries followed Benin's lead with their own conferences, though most produced less dramatic results. But in the past decade Benin has not been consistent in its efforts to promote democracy in Africa and elsewhere.

Benin has been quick to condemn attempts to overthrow democratically-elected governments, but at the same time it has been hesitant to criticize non-democratic regimes. For example, it has maintained close relations with a number of dictators, including Sani Abacha of Nigeria and Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo. Internationally, Benin has made some substantial efforts to promote democracy, such as sponsoring the Fourth International Conference of New and Restored Democracies in Cotonou in 2000, and has made all the appropriate statements concerning democracy, but has not backed up those statements through its votes in the United Nations.

FOREIGN RELATIONS BACKGROUND

Benin is a small country wedged between two larger states, Ghana and Nigeria, the latter the regional hegemon. Benin's economy is small with limited public resources and, therefore, the government does not support an active democracy promotion policy abroad. Benin's foreign policy priorities are limited to the West African sub-region and deal primarily with neighboring states: Nigeria, Niger, Togo and Burkina Faso. The country is heavily dependent on Nigeria economically, so it avoids criticizing the neighboring giant. Relations with Togo are mixed, as Benin is clearly more democratically advanced than Togo, and Beninois leaders have not always coexisted peacefully with Togo's entrenched President Eyadema. Given its size, one of Benin's foreign policy priorities is protecting its security and borders (it is currently engaged in a dispute with Niger over the island of Lete in the Niger river). Promoting democracy abroad is a foreign policy objective, but it cannot be said to be among Benin's priorities.

Benin's capacity to influence events in other countries is limited. Its leaders have few carrots to dangle in front of leaders from other states, nor do they have the sticks with which to punish them. Benin's prominent leaders of the past decade, Presidents Kerekou and Soglo, enjoy some degree of credibility and influence in the region, but significantly less than do other leaders, such as Mali's former President Alpha Oumar Konare.

Foreign policy in Benin is generally formed by a small handful of elites near the top of government, as it is in many African states, and there is little input from outside the government in the foreign policy making process, though the former colonial power, France, remains very influential in Benin's foreign and domestic policy-making. French bilateral development assistance totals more than one-third of all such assistance flowing into Benin, much of which relates to democracy promotion, and French businessmen play an important role in the Beninois economy.

RESPONSE TO OVERTHROW OF DEMOCRATICALLY-ELECTED GOVERNMENTS

Beninois officials have used forceful rhetoric in response to the overthrow of democratically-elected governments. In the words of one diplomat, "Wherever there will be a coup, we will condemn. We want

people to accept the rules of the game."[3] In reality, Benin has been outspoken in condemning coups, but has been reluctant to take the next step and put words into action, for example by severing diplomatic ties with the illegitimate regime or supporting the imposition of economic sanctions.

When General Robert Guei staged a military coup in Cote d'Ivoire in December 1999, ousting freely-elected President Henri Konan Bedie, Benin was quick to condemn the act. But there was little further action: diplomatic relations between Benin and Cote d'Ivoire remained intact and economic sanctions were never seriously considered. There was a similar response from Benin to the coup in Niger in 1996, when Colonel Mainassara seized power from President Mahamadou Ousmane and won subsequent elections. Benin condemned the act but then did little else.

To his credit, President Kerekou involved himself in efforts to mediate the leadership dispute in Madagascar, in which challenger Marc Ravalomanana declared himself president after disputed elections. Along with the heads of state of Senegal, Mozambique and Cote d'Ivoire, Kerekou participated in negotiations between Madagascar's rival presidents, Didier Ratsiraka and Ravalomanana in Dakar in April 2002.[2]

RESPONSE TO MANIPULATION OF ELECTORAL PROCESSES

There is little evidence of Benin responding adequately to the manipulation of electoral processes abroad. This is perhaps due to the questionable character of Benin's own 2000 elections, which were won by Kerekou amidst allegations of fraud and corruption. Former President Soglo boycotted the run-off election between himself and Kerekou. The third place candidate boycotted as well, and Kerekou ended up contesting the run-off against the fourth place candidate from the first round, who happened to be one of his ministers. Kerekou won easily in a run-off marked by very low turnout. "We still have democracy even though we had bad elections," asserted one Beninois diplomat. Given the questionable character of these elections, though, Benin's leaders have put themselves in a more difficult position to criticize unfair elections in other countries.

Though there was some response from Benin to Guei's successful coup in Cote d'Ivoire, there was minimal response to his attempt to rig the subsequent elections by disqualifying virtually all of the viable opposition candidates. (Guei eventually lost to one of the few remaining candidates, Laurent Ghagbo.) Benin maintained relations with Guei while he was in power. According to one Beninois official, Kerekou told Guei behind closed doors to behave in a democratic manner, but there is no evidence of sustained pressure on Guei to change his ways.

Benin reacted poorly to a series of manipulated and annulled elections in Nigeria. Even during the worst abuses of the Sani Abacha regime in 1995, Benin maintained cordial relations, and Presidents Kerekou and Abacha were known to be particularly close. This friendship, according to the Beninois diplomat, "doesn't mean that Kerekou was supporting dictatorship." But Benin has not been willing to risk its dependency on Nigeria by using direct channels to influence the anti-democratic behavior of its friends in Abuja. Similarly, Benin recognized Nigeria's 1999 elections, in which it is widely understood that the major parties engaged in fraudulent activities.[4]

There was no response from Benin to Zimbabwe's recent elections, in which President Robert Mugabe blatantly manipulated the vote in his favor both before and on election day. Unlike Nigeria, Zimbabwe is of little strategic or economic importance to Benin, and therefore Benin's leaders had little to lose if they were to speak out against Mugabe (as Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade did). Beninois officials claimed that Benin does not want to be seen as the overbearing parent. "We are reluctant [to criticize] because we don't want to be seen as a giver of lessons" according to one diplomat.

PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRACY

Benin has contributed positively to international democracy promotion by offering its internal democratization process as an example to others. "Benin has set the political pace for much of Francophone Africa," according to Christopher Fomunyoh, Regional Director for Africa at the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs. "It was the first of many countries to use a National Conference as a political rite of passage in the transition from one-party or military rule to democracy."[5] National Conferences, in various forms yielding various results, were subsequently attempted in the Central African Republic, Congo (Brazzaville), Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Gabon, Ghana, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Togo and Zaire (now Democratic Republic of the Congo).[6] Notably, the leaders of Cote D'Ivoire and Cameroon refused to allow National Conferences.

Benin's former President Nicephore Soglo (1992-1996) made important contributions to promoting conflict resolution and democracy within the international community, particularly concerning the situation in Liberia. After he was elected to head the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1992, Soglo "immediately started working on elevating awareness of the Liberian conflict in the international community beyond Africa"[7] and he continued with these efforts throughout his term.

More recently, Benin hosted the *Fourth International Conference on New and Restored Democracies* in December 2000. It is important to note that the conference was organized by the Government of Benin (as opposed to conferences organized by international organizations or NGOs) with the assistance of the United Nations Development Programme and the financial and logistic assistance of a handful of developed countries. Participants came from across the globe, and included states (some of which are decidedly undemocratic, such as Togo, Equatorial Guinea, Libya and Sudan), regional and international organizations and non-governmental organizations. Such conferences elevate the subject of democracy on the international agenda and make it increasingly difficult for authoritarians to hide behind the shield of non-intervention in sovereign affairs.

In the UN, however, Benin has a recent record of abstaining or voting "no" on several important resolutions relating to democracy and human rights.[8] For example, in 2001 Benin abstained on Resolution 56/173 concerning the "Situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo" (Benin had voted in favor of a similar resolution offered in 2000 (Res 55/117)). Benin voted "no" on resolutions concerning human rights in Nigeria under Abacha in both 1997 (Res 52/144) and 1996 (Res 51/109), and abstained in 1995 (Res 50/199), which is tantamount to a "no" vote in this context. On resolutions on human rights in Sudan, Benin voted "no" in 2001 (Res 56/175) and abstained in 2000 (Res 55/116), 1999 (Res 54/182) and 1997 (Res 52/140). Further from home, Benin abstained on a 1997 resolution on human rights in Iraq (Res 52/141). It did, however, vote for a 1997 resolution recognizing the necessity of periodic and genuine elections (Res 52/129).

POLICY TOWARDS ENTRENCHED DICTATORSHIPS

Benin's commitment to promoting democracy abroad is further drawn into question upon an examination of its relations with its other immediate neighbor, Togo. Under President Eyadema, Togo is essentially an authoritarian state (rated "partly free" by Freedom House[9]) in which only modest moves towards democratization have occurred. Nonetheless, Presidents Kerekou and Eyadema remain close friends, even if they do not always behave the same politically. Benin has made some efforts to mediate in Togo and encourage its move towards democracy, primarily under President Soglo. This angered Eyadema, who actively worked to destabilize the Soglo government and supported Kerekou in the 1996 elections. For this reason Kerekou is hesitant to meddle in Togolese affairs both because he is indebted to Eyadema, and because he is aware of Eyadema's ability to disrupt Beninois affairs.

As mentioned earlier, Benin has maintained cordial and at times close relations with Nigeria, including under Sani Abacha, as a result of its dependence on this large, more powerful and wealthier neighbor.

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[1] Fomunyoh, Christopher. "Democratization in Fits and Starts." Journal of Democracy. 12:3 (2001), 37-50.

[2] Quist-Arcton, Ofeibea. "African Leaders Open Mediation Efforts, Meet Rival Presidents." <http://allafrica.com/stories/200204170001.html>.

[3] Interview with Mr. Charles Borromee Todjinou, Minister Counselor, Embassy of Benin, Washington, D.C. (23 May 2003, Embassy of Benin, Washington, D.C.)

[4] Ibid.

[5] Fomunyoh, p. 37.

[6] Zartman, I. William, ed. "Governance as Conflict Management: Politics and Violence in West Africa." Washington: Brookings Institution Press. 1997. p. 41.

[7] Heilbrunn, John R. "The Flea on Nigeria's Back: The Foreign Policy of Benin." in Wright, Stephen. African Foreign Policies. Boulder: Westview Press, 1999.

[8] UN voting records from <http://www.libraries.psu.edu/crsweb/docs/unvote.pdf & http://unbisnet.un.org/webpac-bin/wgbroker?new+-access+top.vote>.

[9] Freedom House. "Freedom in the World." <http://freedomhouse.org/research/survey2002.htm>.

Botswana

Assessment: Good
Trend: ⇔
Capital: Gaborone
Type of Government: Parliamentary Republic
Head of Government: President Festus Mogae (since 1 April 1998)
Minister of Foreign Affairs: Mompati Merahfe
Population: 1,586,119
Human Development Index Ranking 2002: 126

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Botswana's overall record of support for democratic governance abroad is **good**, particularly within the southern African sub-region. Since its independence in 1966, Botswana's sound governance, peaceful transitions of power, and well-regarded political leaders have given the country domestic credibility and stability. This internal strength, which has contributed to Botswana's image internationally as Africa's longest continuous multiparty democracy, has enabled it to speak out against anti-democratic violations abroad and to engage in effective conflict management during constitutional crises in other countries. The country's strong democratic record also makes up for a lack of geopolitical clout and military might, and allows Botswana to assume a leadership role on the continent that belies its small size.

Botswana's support for international democracy has been relatively consistent since 1992, with successive administrations becoming somewhat more willing to involve themselves at the diplomatic level in ongoing controversies and democratic challenges. To some extent, this trend has tracked changes in world political opinion, which has increasingly favored the policing of gross infractions of democracy and human rights in other countries, and retreated from strict interpretations of the principles of self-determination and of "non-interference" in the internal affairs of states.

FOREIGN RELATIONS BACKGROUND

While Botswana is one of Africa's most highly-developed constitutional democracies, its foreign policy centers on the pragmatic objectives of security and economic development through regional integration and diversification of trade and technology sources. As such, it has sought to enhance the effectiveness of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) as a working vehicle for economic development, preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution, based on the principles of collective action and responsibility. Botswana seeks to play a role in reducing Africa's vulnerabilities and restoring its importance in the global economy through regional cooperation and growth-oriented strategies.

Botswana frequently has drawn on the prestige and capital it has acquired as a regional model of stability and democratic governance to exercise diplomatic leadership in the African and southern African region.[1] Over the past decade, Botswana has used a range of policy tools to express its disapproval of violations of democratic governance. These tools have included behind-the-scenes diplomatic pressure, credible threats of economic sanctions, participation in peacekeeping forces, and even military intervention. To enhance the effectiveness of its opposition to illegal overthrows, Botswana often has teamed up with other neighboring SADC members, particularly South Africa and Zimbabwe, to exert collective pressure. It has also supported multilateral efforts to impose sanctions on undemocratic regimes.

Given the turbulent history of southern Africa, regional stability and peacekeeping have featured heavily in Botswana's foreign policy, and they often have been the primary motives for its opposition to violations and reversals of democracy. The country is also concerned with perceived attempts by western or former colonial powers to dominate regional political affairs. Thus, as a way to signal its refusal to cave in to diplomatic prescriptions developed outside the continent, Botswana sometimes has been less willing to join

western nations in condemning anti-democratic actions. Botswana's weak response to the political crisis in Zimbabwe is a prime example of this.

Botswana rarely has severed diplomatic or trade relations in response to a state's violation of democratic principles, reflecting both the pragmatic nature of its economic policies, as well as the reality of its geopolitical position as a state with far less military capacity than, for example, its neighbors in South Africa and Zimbabwe. For example, although the government was openly critical of South African apartheid and of white minority governments in general, it never cut trade ties with South Africa, feeling that such a move might have unhinged or even devastated the Botswanan economy. With his background as a former IMF economist and governor of the Bank of Botswana, current President Festus Mogae is one of a line of technocratic Botswanan leaders who, since independence, have tried to manage the challenges facing this diamond-driven, middle-income economy primarily in terms of economic development and sound fiscal and monetary policy.[2]

A special circumstance facing Botswana is its burden of having one of the world's highest HIV/AIDS infection rates, which is forcing the government to address the mounting challenge of remaining fiscally solvent in the face of rapidly rising health costs and a shrinking workforce.[3] In the near- and medium-terms, this urgent concern is likely to continue to influence Botswana's policy agenda in the direction of greater pragmatism, as well as to preoccupy its leaders with domestic rather than foreign issues.

RESPONSE TO OVERTHROW OF DEMOCRATICALLY-ELECTED GOVERNMENTS

Botswana's response to the illegal overthrow of democratic governments abroad has been good overall, particularly within the southern African region where it has more political leverage.

When Lesotho's King Letsie III seized power in a military-backed coup, Botswana, together with leaders from South Africa and Zimbabwe, intervened by using diplomatic pressure and the threat of sanctions to force Letsie to back down and ultimately restore constitutional government in 1996. Two years later, civil war broke out again in Lesotho following elections. In addition to meeting behind the scenes with Lesotho leaders in concerted negotiations, Botswana and South Africa sent a joint military force into Lesotho to restore order, working under the auspices of SADC as a legitimizing structure.

The international community, including the Organization of African Unity (OAU), widely condemned Colonel Ibrahim Mainassara's overthrow of Niger President Mahamane Ousmane in 1996. However, other than including its voice in denunciations expressed by different organizations, such as that of the OAU, Botswana did not issue its own separate condemnation of the coup, nor did it downgrade its ties with the new regime. Botswana's response to the 1999 coup in Cote d'Ivoire, in which President Henri Konan Bédié was overthrown and the political opposition was persecuted, was similar to its reaction to the coup in Niger. The OAU immediately issued a strong condemnation of the coup as "a serious and unacceptable step backwards" and urged "a rapid return to constitutional order." Yet the Mogae Administration played no visible role in the continental expression of disapproval, even though the OAU also called on member-states to individually denounce the coup. Botswana has, however, been relatively critical of regime overthrows in Nigeria. In addition, during the Abacha regime, it condemned the killing of innocent civilians.

These reactions reflect a typical pattern for Botswana: in opposing overthrows of democratic rule, it has tended to respond more vigorously to democratic infractions in neighboring states, and less so or not at all in countries further away. Botswana has regarded regional democratic reversals not only as actions that undermine democratic norms but also as potentially destabilizing and threatening to its own security.

RESPONSE TO MANIPULATION OF ELECTORAL PROCESSES

Botswana has played an active role in opposing electoral manipulations abroad. Its record of condemning stolen elections, criticizing flawed voting, and helping to monitor voter registration and other electoral processes has been good, although disappointing in the case of Zimbabwe. As a member of the Electoral Commissions Forum (ECF) of SADC countries, Botswana has participated in numerous election observation missions within the region, as well as received them. It has also sought to improve and professionalize the ECF's monitoring and evaluation processes.

In May 2001 President Mogae, together with South Africa's Thabo Mbeki, began to exert collective diplomatic pressure on Zambian President

Frederick Chiluba after Chiluba expelled his vice-president and eight other cabinet ministers from the ruling party for opposing his plans to specially amend party rules so he could run for an unconstitutional third term. Eventually Chiluba relinquished his plan.

In Nigeria, Botswana has played an active role in promoting electoral transparency. For example, in 1999 former Botswanan president Sir Ketumile Masire led a 23-member Commonwealth Election Observer Group to monitor Nigeria's first independently conducted parliamentary and presidential elections since 1983. The flawed elections and violence that erupted in Cote d'Ivoire in 1999 and 2000 did not attract the same kind of concern from Botswana. Cote d'Ivoire has neither the strategic importance of Nigeria nor the regional proximity of Zambia.

Though most other democracies outside southern Africa strongly criticized the controversial Zimbabwean election in March 2002, the Mogae Administration took a more ambivalent stance on the entire controversy. Foreign Affairs Minister Mompati Merafhe was more vocal and critical than his colleagues in both SADC and Commonwealth meetings. At a SADC summit in September 2001 to discuss Zimbabwe, Mogae joined Mbeki, Namibia's Sam Nujoma, and others to set up a Ministerial Task Force to monitor party interactions in Zimbabwe. Despite earlier tough statements, however, the task force's final communiqué in December offered a glowing assessment of the situation in Zimbabwe. Overlooking arbitrary detentions of journalists and members of parliament, widely reported torture, attacks on white farmers, and the negative report of the Parliamentary Forum, it welcomed "the improved atmosphere of calm and stability" and said "the few reported incidents were being dealt with under the criminal justice system, in accordance with the rule of law." [4] President Mogae, along with Namibian Prime Minister Hage Geingob and Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, also declared his country's support for Mugabe. SADC has been unable to reach a consensus on whether there were ballot irregularities during the presidential election process in Zimbabwe and, in April 2002, formally announced its support for Mugabe's controversial land reform policy.

Botswana's reluctance to condemn Mugabe more forthrightly seems to reflect larger issues, however. First, the land expropriation issue is laden with high levels of emotional symbolism, and Britain's strong opposition appears to have triggered old feelings of resentment against colonialism, with formerly colonized states instinctively rejecting the idea of diplomacy prescribed from outside the region by western powers.[5] A second factor affecting Botswana's position with regards to Zimbabwe is its traditionally strong preference for proceeding under the auspices of SADC, or some subset of it. With SADC succumbing to the pro-Mugabe, anti-colonialist line, Botswanan policy has followed suit.

PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRACY

Botswana has frequently capitalized on its international status as a model democracy to promote democracy abroad, and its record on this note is good. Former president Ketumile Masire, as the facilitator of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, has been extensively involved in peace talks in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and has launched mediation efforts between the country's warring parties, a critical step toward building a democratic peace.[6] Botswana has hosted several international conferences on democracy and human rights, and is a member of the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) with like-minded states such as Sweden, Denmark, and Norway. It has received large numbers of anti-apartheid activists as political refugees from both Namibia and South Africa, and is an active member of many organizations that have democracy-related activities, including the Global Coalition for Africa and the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group, of which it has served in the past as chair.[7] Within the southern African region, Botswana has worked actively toward economic and political integration and, often in conjunction with South Africa, has sought to make SADC a viable vehicle for economic development, preventive diplomacy, conflict resolution, and good governance. Finally, Botswana is a party to most international human rights treaties, including the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. It is also a signatory to the Harare Declaration of 1992 on non-acceptance of Non-Democratically Elected Governments and the OAU Algiers Declaration.

Botswana's voting record at the United Nations on democracy promotion is mixed. In the General Assembly, it has sometimes voted to condemn human rights abuses, but sometimes not. For example, in 1999 it joined 88 other states to pass

a UN resolution condemning the human rights situation in the Sudan, and it has also voted to condemn the human rights situation in Nigeria. However, it joined several other African states in abstaining from a resolution adopted in 1995 to condemn the human rights situation in Kosovo. It endorsed the Warsaw Declaration and the December 2001 UNGA Resolution on Promoting Democracy.

POLICY TOWARDS ENTRENCHED DICTATORSHIPS

Botswana has not shown as much concern about entrenched dictatorships as it has towards other kinds of anti-democratic infractions. As a southern African state, Botswana is keenly aware that some western democracies at one point supported divisive regimes such as apartheid South Africa. This set of background issues, along with the fact that the country has felt itself somewhat in the shadow of the region's bigger players, has led it to express disapproval of entrenched or repressive dictatorships more through formal resolutions in collective bodies such as the UN, than via unilateral condemnations.

Even at the UN, Botswana has tended to abstain from condemnations of some entrenched dictatorships, abstaining for example from voting in a December 2000 General Assembly resolution to condemn Iran's human rights record.[8] In a November 1992 resolution to end the U.S. economic embargo against Cuba, Botswana, along with 45 other states, refrained from voting.[9] However, on the same issue eight years later, with world opinion increasingly turning against the continuance of a U.S. embargo, Botswana joined a very large majority (including such previous abstainers as South Africa) to vote for the resolution. Thus, in addition to an ideological outlook that differs somewhat from that of western countries, international opinion, prior history, trade dependence, and the relative power of the state against whom one is voting are all factors that help explain the willingness or reluctance of Botswana to criticize an entrenched dictatorship.

The Masire and Mogae regimes have supported democracy-promoting activities such as electoral monitoring in Nigeria, but they have not sought to isolate or impose economic sanctions on Nigeria during its periods of dictatorship. The same is true for the dictatorship in the Sudan, a country where civil war has killed more than two million.

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[1] In Botswana, foreign policy is managed and overseen by the office of the president, which has been occupied by democratically-elected leaders. The current President, Festus Mogae, recently was recognized by the Africa-America Institute with its highest honor—the National Leadership Award, conferred only once before, to Nelson Mandela—at its Annual Awards Dinner at the UN on 17 Sep. 2002, for serving as "a model of democratic, responsive and courageous political leadership." http://allafrica.com/stories/200209060275.html.

[2] Botswana's well-known Five-Year Rolling National Development Plans powerfully suggest the centrality of economics to its policy agenda, the long-term continuity of these policies, and the linkages between good governance and economic development.

[3] Nicholas Eberstadt. "The Population Implosion." Foreign Policy (March-April 2001). Between 1990 and 2000, life expectancy in Botswana fell from approximately 64 years to approximately 39 years. Recent projections envision a life expectancy of about 33 years by 2025.

[4] Amnesty International. Zimbabwe Memorandum to the SADC on the Deteriorating Human Rights Situation in Zimbabwe. AFR 46/004/2002. London: 2002. A report released by Human Rights Forum in December 2001 also stated that there had been 115 cases of torture and six political killings in Zimbabwe in November.

[5] "Recent SADC Meeting Crucial." The Herald Harare: 8 Feb. 2002. Mbeki has criticized what he says is a narrow focus on Zimbabwe at the expense of the Angolan war, the conflict in the DRC, and western control of international commodity prices. At a SADC summit in Blantyre, Malawi in February 2002, Tanzanian president Benjamin Mkapa recounted, with some satisfaction, that Baroness Amos, the British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, had personally telephoned him and tried but failed to persuade him not to support Zimbabwe at the meeting or at the upcoming Commonwealth summit in Australia, and that following her failure, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw had personally called him and also been soundly rebuffed.

[6] In the conflict resolution area, Botswana has also offered its Permanent Representative to the UN, Joseph Legwaila, to the UN Secretary General to serve as the Secretary General's Special Representative for the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea. In the early 1990s, Legwaila served a similar role in Namibia.

[7] The Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group consists of foreign affairs ministers charged with investigating violations of democratic governance principles that contravene the Harare Declaration of 1991. The Global Coalition for Africa is an intergovernmental policy forum consisting of an alliance of African and industrialized countries that works to promote African development.

[8] Analysis reveals that the voting pattern on this resolution roughly followed geopolitical lines, with northern industrialized economies generally voting in favor of the condemnation, and Mideast and other countries with large Muslim populations, together with many African and Latin American states, voting against it or choosing to abstain.

[9] It should be noted that many other African states did vote to end the embargo, including: Angola, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

Brazil

Assessment: Good
Trend: ⇔
Capital: Brasilia
Type of Government: Federative Republic
Head of Government: President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (since 1 January 1995)
Minister of Foreign Affairs: Celso Lafer
Population: 174,468,575
Human Development Index Ranking 2002: 73

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Brazil has a **good** but uneven record of support for democracy abroad. The promotion and protection of democracy has gradually become a core objective of Brazil's foreign policy and multilateral diplomacy since the restoration of democracy in 1985. Nevertheless, Brazil has had to balance its commitment to democracy with its commitment to the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states.

Under President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2003), a more proactive stance towards the defense of democracy abroad has been incorporated into Brazilian foreign policy, especially but not exclusively in South America. Brazil has used its leverage and leadership to further the cause of democracy in multilateral institutions such as the Organization of American States (OAS), the Southern Cone Common Market (Mercosur) and the Rio Group. However, this principled approach to foreign policy has not become fully institutionalized, in part because of the continuing, competing commitment to the more traditional principle of national sovereignty. A key test of Brazil's commitment to democracy abroad will be how it responds to threats to democracy using new mechanisms such as the OAS Inter-American Democratic Charter, adopted in 2001, and the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).

FOREIGN RELATIONS BACKGROUND

Brazilian foreign policy has evolved significantly during the past two decades, displaying both continuity and change. There is a strong correlation between the re-democratization of Brazil and the promotion of democracy and protection of human rights as core features of its foreign policy, both of which are now enshrined in the 1988 Constitution. However, Brazil's foreign policy remains marked by a continuing, steadfast belief in the principles of national sovereignty and noninterference in the affairs of other states. And while new leaders, such as President Cardoso, have strengthened Brazil's commitment to the promotion of democracy, traditional elites and power groups, such as the military and the diplomatic bureaucracy, have retained significant influence in defining the country's national interests and shaping its foreign policy with little input from parliament or civil society. In addition, economic and trade interests tend to dominate Brazil's foreign policy, though again, under President Cardoso, democracy promotion has gained greater prominence.

As the largest economy, population and landmass in South America, Brazil has positioned itself as a regional diplomatic power, strengthening its role within regional institutions such as the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Rio Group.[1] As a regional hegemon, Brazil has acquired an increasingly independent and assertive voice in international affairs. It has been particularly instrumental in strengthening 'democracy clauses' in regional institutions. Indeed, any effective response to a democratic crisis depends, to a great extent, on Brazil taking a leadership role in -- or, at least, lending its tacit consent to -- activating regional mechanisms for the collective defense of democracy, especially in the context of Mercosur and the Rio Group.

President Cardoso, who served as Foreign Minister from 1992 to 1993 before his election to the presidency, has been credited with solidifying democracy and political stability in Brazil, as well as with reforming the state and restructuring the economy. He has been the principal advocate of using Brazil's economic leverage to advance democracy, especially, but not exclusively, in Latin America and the Caribbean.[2] For example, regional integration has become as much a political endeavor as an economic imperative, as evidenced by the adoption of a strong democracy clause in the Mercosur customs union. His activism in foreign policy has given rise to what analysts have described as 'presidential diplomacy,'[3] a trend that may or may not endure beyond his second and final term in office. The elections of October 2002 are thus likely to be decisive in determining the permanence of democracy promotion in Brazil's foreign policy.

Despite the evolution in Brazil's foreign policy towards greater commitments to the principles of democracy, at times Brazil's defense of democracy abroad has been hemmed in by its traditional adherence to the principle of national sovereignty. The more subtle threats to democracy, such as flawed elections and insidious erosions of democratic governance, are those that are most likely to exacerbate the tension between these two guiding principles. Brazil's cautious pragmatism has, at times, inhibited effective multilateral responses to these sorts of crises of democratic governance.

RESPONSE TO OVERTHROW OF DEMOCRATICALLY-ELECTED GOVERNMENTS

Brazil has responded swiftly to overt interruptions of democracy in neighboring countries like Guatemala and Ecuador, although its record in responding to more subtle threats to democracy is more mixed. Overall, since the mid-1990s Brazil has been moving gradually towards greater activism, with the 1996 crisis in Paraguay constituting a turning point in this evolution.

In response to the coup d'état in Haiti in September 1991, Brazil lent its support to the initiatives taken by the OAS Permanent Council in the context of the mechanisms of Resolution 1080. Furthermore, Brazil endorsed a 1991 Rio Group statement condemning the coup and entrusting the United Nations (UN) with its resolution. However, Brazil expressed reservations about the use of force to restore democracy in Haiti because of the encroachment on Haiti's national sovereignty that such an action would entail. As a member of the UN Security Council in 1994, Brazil abstained from voting on the resolutions regarding Haiti.[4]

In the case of the *autogolpe* (self-coup) by President Alberto Fujimori in Peru in April 1992, Brazil argued that a strict application of the sanctions mechanisms of Resolution 1080 would further destabilize Peru and lead to further deterioration in its ability to overcome its internal economic and security situation. Brazil's cautious stance probably inhibited the effective use of the OAS mechanisms, sending mixed signals to President Fujimori.

Brazil responded more decisively to President Serrano's attempted coup in Guatemala in May 1993. Brazil consented to the OAS immediately invoking Resolution 1080 to condemn the alteration of constitutional rule, and to sending a fact-finding mission to Guatemala. Brazil clearly announced that it would not allow a derailment of the peace process in which it had been involved as a member of the Support Group to the Contadora process. While in the case of Peru, Brazil was principally concerned for the stability of the country, in Guatemala, it was anxious to protect Guatemala's fragile democratic transition and to prevent Serrano from endangering the peace process.

Brazilian diplomacy was particularly effective in resolving the constitutional crisis in Paraguay in April 1996. While Haiti, Peru and Guatemala may not have been considered in Brazil's immediate sphere of influence, the Paraguayan crisis threatened its interests more directly and undermined the credibility of Mercosur. Although Brazil found the recourse to Resolution 1080 problematic because a coup had not actually occurred, Brazil agreed with the broad interpretation of other governments at the OAS of defining the crisis as an interruption of the democratic institutional process.

Prior to the onset of the crisis, during a secret trip of President Wasmosy to Brasilia on 20 April, President Cardoso pledged Brazil's support for Wasmosy's decision to dismiss General Oviedo. Shortly thereafter, Brazil's Deputy Foreign Minister traveled to Asuncion to demonstrate Brazil's support to Wasmosy.[5] Cardoso repeatedly assured Wasmosy that its Mercosur partners opposed Oviedo's direct challenge to constitutional rule, and that they would not tolerate a disruption of democracy in a member state. On April 22, following a statement by the Brazilian Ambassador, the Brazilian government issued a communiqué noting its profound concern regarding the events in Paraguay, which they characterized as constituting 'a serious menace to

democratic institutions and the constitutional order.' It expressed the Brazilian government's 'total support' for Wasmosy, warning that any rupture in the constitutional and democratic order would 'gravely compromise the cooperation between Brazil and Paraguay in all of its aspects.' Brazil significantly raised the stakes of a potential disruption of the democratization process, thus altering the domestic actors' perceptions and positions.

Similarly, Brazil reacted swiftly to the re-emergence of political turmoil in Paraguay following the assassination of Vice President Argaña in March 1999. As in 1996, President Cardoso and the Brazilian Ambassador played a key role in resolving the crisis, urging President Raúl Cubas to resign as the Senate proceeded to impeach him. By the end of March, the crisis was resolved as Luis Gonzaléz Macchi was sworn in as president. Cubas left for Brazil and Oviedo for Argentina, where they each received asylum. Although granting Cubas asylum strained relations with Paraguay, Brazil argued that such an act would help reduce tensions. Troubles continued, however, after Oviedo clandestinely left Argentina and attempted another coup attempt in May 2000. Oviedo then fled to Brazil, where he was arrested. Brazil's judiciary, however, rejected Paraguay's petition to extradite Oviedo to stand trial.

Brazil strongly objected to the irregular overthrow of Ecuadorian President Jamil Mahuad on 22 January 2000 and, in a communiqué, warned against the disruption of democratic principles and constitutional rule.[6] In a separate Mercosur communiqué, Brazil and fellow member countries condemned the coup and called for the preservation of the rule of law and the upholding of the constitutional process. Furthermore, the Rio Group, of which Brazil is a member, expressed its grave concern and denounced 'any attempt to disrupt constitutional order and democratic institutions.' International pressure probably influenced the armed forces' decision to facilitate the return of civilian rule.

Brazil reacted promptly to the attempted coup d'état in Venezuela in April 2002, both through bilateral and multilateral channels. On 12 April, immediately after the crisis erupted, the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a communiqué expressing its concern, 'lamenting the rupture of constitutional order' and calling for a rapid 'return to democratic normalcy.'[7] In the afternoon of the same day, President Cardoso issued a statement in which he declared that the government of Brazil would not recognize Venezuela's *de facto* government unless and until new elections were held. Cardoso closely monitored the developments in Venezuela, and engaged in intense diplomatic negotiations to identify a common position among Latin American countries.[8] He instructed his Foreign Minister, Celso Lafer, to address the Venezuela crisis in the context of the 'democratic clause' of the Rio Group, which happened to be meeting at the same time the coup was unfolding. The Rio Group governments reacted strongly to the attempted coup in Venezuela issuing a joint statement on 12 April, which firmly condemned the 'interruption of constitutional order' and called for the 'normalization of democratic institutions'.[9] The Brazilian government clearly indicated that the rupture of the constitutional order would jeopardize Venezuela's participation in regional institutions and the process of regional integration.

RESPONSE TO MANIPULATION OF ELECTORAL PROCESSES

Brazil has been ambivalent in its response to flawed elections in other countries. In such cases, Brazil's concern for the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs has tended to override its commitment to promoting democracy, including free and fair elections, in the region. Brazil has shown increasing willingness to resort to regional mechanisms for collective action when democracy is under stress, but it has also urged caution against their abuse and misuse.

The controversial presidential elections in Peru in April 2000, and the subsequent institutional crisis, illustrate the challenges to Brazilian diplomacy posed by its dual commitments to national sovereignty and the promotion of democracy. The elections in April and May 2000 in Peru were clearly flawed, and recognized as such by the OAS, which ultimately suspended its electoral observation mission. However, the ambiguous nature of the situation in Peru did not represent a 'sudden and irregular interruption' of democracy, but rather a more insidious assault on the rule of law and constitutional democracy.[10] Consistent with its attachment to the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other sovereign states, Brazil resisted collective action under the mechanisms of Resolution 1080. Despite continued efforts by the United States to impose sanctions on Peru, only Costa Rica was willing to back the use of Resolution 1080. At the OAS General Assembly in Windsor, Ontario, in early June 2000, representatives of

Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela argued that Resolution 1080 did not apply to the Peruvian situation. Brazil followed a policy of cautious pragmatism, aimed at not ostracizing Peru. While it recognized Fujimori as the legitimate president for a third consecutive term, and even invited him to the first Summit of South American Presidents convened by Cardoso in late August 2000, it also called for greater political pluralism and institutional reforms in Peru.[11]

PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRACY

Brazil has played an active role in the democracy promotion efforts of key regional institutions such as the OAS, Mercosur, and the Rio Group. It has also been a strong voice for democracy promotion efforts at the Ibero-American Summits, and has been a signatory to the most important UN and OAS international treaties on human rights.

Brazil has played a particularly critical role in strengthening regional mechanisms for collective action. For example, Brazil was instrumental in securing the inclusion of 'democracy promotion and protection clauses' in the OAS bylaws in 1991, 1992 and 2001.[12] In addition, Brazil has assumed the leadership role of Mercosur, and supported the inclusion of a 'democracy clause' into the organization's charter in June 1996, as a partial response to the Paraguayan crisis. Brazil's leadership role in enforcing Mercosur's collective action mechanisms has been critical to their effectiveness, although the strength of Mercosur itself will determine whether its democracy clause continues to deter future democratic crises.

Brazil has also assumed a leadership role in the Rio Group, created in 1986 in Rio de Janeiro. Since 1995, the Rio Group has adopted a series of declarations to promote and protect democracy, albeit mostly on a re-active basis.[13] However, while President Cardoso insists that nations can not hide behind a shield of sovereignty, he has also repeatedly cautioned against any infringements on national sovereignty.

Brazil has been a strong proponent of the inclusion of democracy promotion in the agenda of the Ibero-American Summits, a forum established in 1991. The consolidation of democratic governance was the main focus of the Summit in Santiago and Viña del Mar, Chile, in November 1996 (following the events in Paraguay earlier that year). Similarly, Brazil has been the driving force behind the creation of the Summit of South American Presidents, which held its first meeting in Brazil in September-October 2000. At that meeting, it was decided that participation in future summits would hinge upon respect for democratic institutions and the preservation of the rule of law. South American presidents agreed to hold consultations in the event of a threat to democracy.[14]

Brazil has consistently supported UN efforts in the fields of conflict management, post- conflict reconstruction, and the strengthening of democracy. During its tenure on the UN Security Council in 1998-99, Brazil was especially concerned with securing peace in Angola and promoting the independence of a democratic East Timor.[15] Brazil has also developed a modest foreign aid program managed by the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC), which occasionally provides technical assistance to developing countries in areas such as administrative reform and state modernization.

POLICY TOWARDS ENTRENCHED DICTATORSHIPS

Brazil's relations with entrenched dictatorships are characterized by cautious pragmatism. In the past, Brazil has been an active member of the Group of 77, and remains an observer in the Non Aligned Movement (NAM), whose democratic credentials are, at best, feeble.

Its relations with Cuba, the only authoritarian regime in Latin America, are characterized by a policy of constructive engagement, paralleling those of most Latin American and European countries.[16] Diplomatic relations with Cuba resumed in 1986 after having been halted in 1964 by Brazil's military regime. Brazil and Cuba concluded a series of economic cooperation agreements in 1998 and 1999, following a 1998 visit to Cuba by the Brazilian Foreign Minister. Today Cuba is one of the main recipients of ABC technical cooperation. Brazil has historically abstained from officially condemning the violation of human rights in countries such as Cuba, China or Iran, and in both 2000 and 2002 abstained from voting on the UN Human Rights Commission resolutions condemning human rights violations in Cuba. It has also generally endorsed the UN General Assembly's repeated calls for an end to the U.S. economic blockade on Cuba.

[1] A fact recently acknowledged by US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, in his Remarks at the Annual Conference of the Council of the Americas. Washington DC, United States. 6 May 2002.

[2] Cardoso, Fernando Henrique. "Democracy as a Starting Point." Journal of Democracy 12:1 (2001): 5-14; and Cardoso, Fernando Henrique. "Brazil and a New South America" Valor 30 Aug. 2000.

[3] Danese, Sérgio. Diplomacia Presidencial. (Rio de Janeiro: Topbooks, 1999; and Goertzel, Ted. Fernando Henrique Cardoso: Reinventing Democracy in Brazil Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999. In November 2000, Brazil hosted the second assembly of the *World Movement for Democracy*, an initiative launched in 1999 and sponsored by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). It has also hosted the *World Social Forum* in Porto Alegre in 2001 and 2002. In recognition of his contribution to the furthering of democracy, President Cardoso has been designated to lead the *Club of Madrid* as of 1 January 2003, a recently established network of former presidents and heads of states committed to promote and protect democracy around the world coordinated by the Madrid-based Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE).

[4] United States. State Depart. Voting Practices in the United Nations, 1994, Report to Congress Submitted Pursuant to Public Law. Washington DC: US Department of State. 31 March 1995.

[5] For a detailed account of the Paraguayan crisis, see: Valenzuela, Atruro. The Collective Defense of Democracy. Lessons from the Paraguayan Crisis of 1996. New York: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1999; and Valenzuela, Arturo. "Paraguay: The Coup That Didn't Happen." Journal of Democracy 8:1 (1997).

[6] "Insurrección en Ecuador: La OEA respalda a Mahuad, fuerte condena de EE.UU." Clarín, 22 Jan. 2002.

[7] Zimmerman, Patricia. "Itamaraty diz que Brasil está preocupado com situação da Venezuela." Folha do Brasil Online. 12 April 2002.

[8] Grabois, Ana Paula. "FHC diz que Venezuela deve ter novas eleições." Folha do Brasil Online. 12 April 2002.

[9] The Rio Group statement on the situation in Venezuela can be obtained at: <www.grupoderio.go.cr> See also: Ortiz, Fiona. "Latam Leaders Express Concern, Discuss Venezuela" Reuter. 12 April 2002; "Chavez Ouster Criticized at Summit." The Associated Press. 12 April 2002.

[10] Analysts compared the situation emerging from Peru's 2000 presidential elections to that of the Dominican Republic in 1994, making Peru ripe for a 'Balaguer solution' to Peru's political crisis. After a fraudulent re-election in 1994, the US government and the OAS pressured President Joaquín Balaguer into an agreement that shortened his term to 18 months in office and forced new elections.

[11] "Interview of Foreign Minister Luiz Felipe Lampreia." Correio Braziliense 1 June 2000.

[12] Farer, Tom, ed., Beyond Sovereignty: Collectively Defending Democracy in the Americas Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996; and Tickner, Arlene, et al., Sistema Interamericano y Democracia: Antecedentes Históricos y Tendencias Futuras. Washington DC: OAS UPD. Novèmber 2000.

[13] These declarations include the *Quito Statement* of 1995, the *Asuncion Statement* and the *Statement Regarding the Maintenance of Democracy* of 1997, and the *Democratic Commitment of Cartagena* of 2000.

[14] Statement by Ambassador Luiz Felipe Pampreia, Minister of Foreign Relations of Brazil at the General Debate of the 55th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, New York, United States, 12 Sep. 2000.

[15] Permanent Mission of Brazil to the United Nations, Brazil in the Security Council 1998-99. (2000).

[16] Hoffman, Bert. "Continuidad y cambio en la nueva política exterior de Brasil: El caso de Cuba." Síntesis 31 (1999).

Canada

Assessment: Very Good
Trend: ⇔
Capital: Ottawa
Type of Government: Confederation with Parliamentary Democracy
Head of Government: Prime Minister Jean Chretien (since 4 November 1993)
Minister of Foreign Affairs: Bill Graham
Population: 31,592,805
Human Development Index Ranking 2002: 3

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Canada has a **very good** record of support for democracy abroad, as evidenced by its willingness to provide electoral assistance to fledging democracies, to support grassroots democracy programs through bilateral aid and to criticize regimes engaged in the most egregious abuses of democracy. Canada has preferred to work through multilateral fora in these efforts, in the belief that a middle-ranking power acting unilaterally would have limited influence. Within these organizations, Canada has played a leadership role in encouraging electoral reform and democratic development.

In general, Canada has sought to avoid highly confrontational approaches when responding to concerns about democracy in other countries, seeking to balance its genuine concern for democracy abroad against other national interests. On occasion, Canada has been willing to support sanctions and diplomatic isolation when other vital national interests were not at stake. This preference for the "carrot" rather than "stick" approach has been consistent with Canada's foreign policy goals. Having accumulated a fair amount of good will abroad due to its strong peacekeeping tradition, its liberal immigration policies and reputation for fairness, Canada seeks to preserve its influence as a trusted partner in democratic development.

FOREIGN RELATIONS BACKGROUND

Canada identifies its primary foreign policy priorities as: promoting its economic interests through an open and stable global economic system; combating transnational security threats such as crime, disease, and environmental degradation; and projecting its values and culture throughout the world, including respect for democracy. As one of the world's most stable democracies, Canada has made the promotion of democracy a key priority in its foreign policy agenda during the last decade.[1] From the government's perspective, democratization is firmly linked to the complementary aims of peace-building, human rights promotion and security.

Although Canadian foreign policy increasingly has focused attention on hemispheric issues during the past decade – it entered the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994 and became full members of the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1990 – Canada has pursued an activist "internationalist" approach to democratization, particularly with members of international organizations to which Canada belongs. This approach has been consistent with Canada's longstanding efforts to work collaboratively with a range of actors, as a way to counterbalance its close relationship with the United States.[2]

The Canadian government, through both its Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), has generally taken a flexible and holistic approach to democratization, recognizing that free and fair elections are but one component of effective governance. As articulated in official policy, effective governance includes a legal and institutional framework, an independent judiciary, honest and open government, respect for human rights and the subordination of military force to civilian rule.[3] Essential foreign policy tools have included election monitoring, technical assistance to support institutional development (e.g. media and judicial training), application of sanctions on certain entrenched dictatorships and aid for local civil society organizations.

In applying these tools, Canada's preferred approach has been multilateral, allowing it to gain greater leverage with both fellow aid-donors and recipient countries. Key multilateral institutions through which

Canada has sought to achieve its policy aims include the Commonwealth, la Francophonie, the Organization of American States (OAS), the United Nations (UN) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Working through these fora, Canada has exercised considerable leadership both in highlighting abuses of democracy and working for their eradication in countries far beyond its geographical reach.

RESPONSE TO OVERTHROW OF DEMOCRATICALLY-ELECTED GOVERNMENTS

Canada has generally condemned the overthrow of democratically-elected governments. In some cases it has cut off assistance or applied some other sanction to the new regimes particularly when other Canadian interests were not impaired by such actions.

In Africa, where Canada has less strategic interests, it has principally utilized two mechanisms in response to military coups or other overthrows of democratically elected governments: the suspension of bilateral aid programs and strong condemnation through diplomatic channels. Immediately following the 1996 military coup in Niger, for example, Canada announced a moratorium on new official Canadian aid (approximately Cdn$6 million per year) to the government and suspended all bilateral cooperation. A similar approach was applied to Côte d'Ivoire (1999) two days after the military coup, when Canada exerted leadership within la Francophonie to demand a return to constitutional order. In both instances, the Canadian government made a conscious effort to distinguish between humanitarian support, which continued largely through non-governmental organizations, and official government assistance, which was suspended until civilian rule was restored.

Canada's strong response to unconstitutional overthrows of governments in Latin America and Asia generally has been through multilateral diplomatic channels. In response to undemocratic developments in Ecuador in late 1999 and the Paraguayan constitutional crisis in 1996, Canada worked through the Permanent Council of the OAS to advocate restoration of democracy. It also pledged support to the democratically-elected leaders of both countries. During the 1991-94 military regime in Haiti, Canada suspended bilateral aid and subsequently worked through the United Nations to support judicial reform, police training and the development of civil society. In the case of anti-democratic developments in Pakistan (1999) and Fiji (2000), Canada worked through the Commonwealth for collective condemnation of these states and their suspension from that organization. In the case of Pakistan, Canada also suspended all official visits, declined to recognize the Musharraf regime, publicly considered cutting development aid, and suggested that international financial assistance be suspended. While it pushed the Commonwealth to impose stiffer penalties, it did not call for the reinstatement of deposed Prime Minister Sharif.

After the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, however, Canada lifted all sanctions on Pakistan, except the ban on military exports that had been imposed as a result of Pakistan's nuclear weapons tests of May 1998. It also proposed to convert approximately $447 million in outstanding loans, that Pakistan owed to the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), into development aid to be used in the social sector.[4] Canada justified these actions as a result of the "courageous stand that Pakistan is taking against terrorism" and claimed that it "welcomed President Musharraf's 14 August 2001 announcement of a 'Road Map for Democracy' in which he outlined a phased restoration of democracy in Pakistan culminating in national and provincial elections" in October 2002, and that it would be closely monitoring it.[5] Nonetheless, when Musharraf extended his stay in power via a much critical referendum on 1 May 2002, and subsequently postponed presidential elections, Canada failed to issue an official statement.

In the case of the coup in Fiji, Canada helped advocate Fiji's suspension from the councils of the Commonwealth pending the restoration of democracy and the rule of law. Canada's response to the short-lived coup in Venezuela in April 2002 was more muted, however, offering no official condemnation of the coup plotters except to support the OAS statements and actions. This reflected uncertainty about the success of the coup and the overall effectiveness of President Chavez's leadership.

RESPONSE TO MANIPULATION OF ELECTORAL PROCESSES

Canada has consistently condemned fraudulent elections, largely through multilateral channels. As a component of this approach, it has been especially supportive of independent election monitoring missions when manipulation of electoral processes is considered a strong possibility.

During the Zimbabwe elections in 2002, Canada supported Commonwealth electoral observers and provided Canadian expertise. Following evidence of electoral fraud and intimidation, it withdrew all funding to the Zimbabwean government and approved measures to

prevent members of the Mugabe regime from visiting Canada.[6] In the case of the contested Peruvian election of 2000, then Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy helped broker an OAS compromise to send a high-level mission to "strengthen democratic institutions," but with no mandate to investigate or contest the outcome of the elections themselves, thereby ratifying Fujimori's victory. The OAS mission resulted in a 29-point agenda for democratic reform, which was subsequently accepted as a basis for discussion by the Fujimori government, the democratic opposition and civil society.[7] Following local Yugoslav elections in December 1996, Canada sent an elections specialist on the OSCE mission and subsequently endorsed its report calling on President Milosevic to respect the results of the election. Under the auspices of NATO and the G-8, Canada strongly advocated increased sanctions and further action against Milosevic as electoral abuses and ethnic cleansing became evident from 1998 onwards.

Canada has made efforts to forestall the manipulation of electoral processes through professional and technical support for elections and projects related to institutional capacity-building. Elections Canada, the government agency responsible for administering electoral processes domestically, has organized more than 300 international democratic development missions in approximately 80 countries since 1990.[8] Missions have taken place in South Africa (1993), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1996), the Dominican Republic (1996), the regional election in Chiapas, Mexico (1998) and the East Timor referendum (1999).

PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRACY

The promotion of international democracy has been an important tenet of Canadian foreign policy over the past decade. Ottawa's activities fall into three general categories: professional and technical assistance missions, aid to international NGOs involved in democracy promotion, and support for international protocols and institutions addressing human rights and democratic values.

Canada has been at the forefront of developed democracies in providing technical support for transitional states.[9] Elections Canada's international activities are undertaken in response to requests from the Canadian Foreign Ministry and foreign aid agency, various international organizations and individual countries. International projects include advising on constitutional and election law provisions, conducting pre-election evaluations, providing professional support (such as preparing elections materials or determining district boundaries), and briefing delegations visiting Canada.[10] In 1996, Elections Canada and Mexico's elections agency (Instituto Federal Electoral) signed a five-year agreement for information exchange. Similarly, Canada entered into an agreement in 1995 with the Russian Federation to strengthen its institutional capacity to administer elections. Numerous countries have been open to Canadian electoral assistance, particularly given its lack of identification as a former colonial power or as a superpower. Other facilitating factors include its bilingual character and its common and civil law traditions.

Aware of the influence of civil society in promoting democratic change, Canada has supported numerous international NGOs engaged in these efforts. It has consciously made an effort to support local initiatives and ideas on how to strengthen democracy, while ensuring that outside expertise is available to support change.[11] In 1988, the Canadian government established the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development, which works to strengthen democratic institutions and to enhance access of civil society organizations to public policy debate and decision-making. In 1998, Canada formally joined, and provided financing to, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), which brings together both governments and NGOs to improve and consolidate electoral processes Canada has also provided funding for domestic NGOs to support their democratization efforts abroad. In 1999, for example, the Canadian Catholic Organization for Development received significant government funding to assist a coalition of non-governmental groups working together to ensure grassroots participation in the elections in Nigeria through e.g., education and mobilization of voters and monitoring the election process.[12]

Finally, Canada has been a vigorous advocate of international protocols and mechanisms to support democracy building. At the OAS, Canada played the lead role in the establishment of the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy, which provides guidance and assistance to member states in strengthening their democratic institutions and processes.[13] Through the OAS, Canada also championed the establishment of a Special Fund for Strengthening Democracy, designed to assist member states faced with threats to the democratic process. In 1995, the Commonwealth heads of government accepted a Canadian initiative to put their democratic principles into action by creating the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG). CMAG's mandate – created under the Millbrook Action Program – is to recommend collective

Commonwealth responses to serious or persistent violations of democracy aimed at the speedy restoration of democracy and constitutional rule. Since its creation, CMAG has held numerous meetings at the ministerial level and has sent senior-level missions to the Gambia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Pakistan, Fiji and the Solomon Islands. Canada also hosted the 1999 meeting of la Francophonie, an association of 51 French-speaking countries, including 30 African nations. The meeting resulted in the adoption of the Moncton Plan of Action, which enshrined principles of democracy to which all member states pledged to adhere.

POLICY TOWARDS ENTRENCHED DICTATORSHIPS

Canada has generally pursued a nuanced policy of limited but constructive engagement with undemocratic regimes, particularly where economic and trade interests are a significant factor. In the case of China, Canada has pursued cordial diplomatic relations, including high-level trade missions and bilateral assistance aimed at the reform of legal and judicial structures (e.g. through the training of judges and the development of a legal aid system). Canada has been criticized by some democratic activists for not being sufficiently disapproving of China's lack of democratic practices. Canada has also tempered its traditional concern for the security threat posed by North Korea by helping the Kim Chong-il regime integrate into the international community, with official diplomatic recognition in 2000 preceded by a number of bilateral missions beginning in 1998. Canada's relations with Burma's military regime have been considerably less cordial, with repeated calls for the release of members of the National League of Democracy and targeted economic sanctions against the government. In all three cases, Canada has worked both bilaterally and through the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) to support constructive dialogue.

Canada's relations with Cuba illustrate the tensions inherent in its constructive engagement approach. Canada and Cuba have maintained an uninterrupted bilateral relationship since 1945, despite substantial cooling in the 1980s as a result of Cuba's military intervention in Africa. Since the mid-1990s, Canada has reopened foreign aid and worked with the Cuban government and society to encourage institutional change, bilateral trade, tourism and political opening.[14] The 1997 Canada-Cuba Joint Declaration identified 14 areas of cooperation, allowing the two countries to broach topics of considerable sensitivity, such as political and human rights.[15] In 1998, Prime Minister Chretien visited Cuba, the first Canadian leader to do so since 1976. Since then, relations have deteriorated somewhat, largely as a result of Castro's lack of commitment to political reform. In March of 1999, shortly after Chretien's celebrated visit to the island, four prominent dissidents were sentenced to prison, forcing Chretien to declare that Canada would "review the range" of bilateral relations with Cuba. Canada then postponed indefinitely a series of ministerial visits to the island. It nevertheless unsuccessfully sought to invite Cuba to the third Summit of the Americas in Quebec, a gathering that had excluded Cuba as a non-democratic regime. Castro, however, rejected Canada's suggestion that he endorse the UN Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights before the Summit, and relations between the two deteriorated further. Canada's approach to Cuba has not been considered successful in fostering political reform in Castro's regime, although it has permitted the Canadian government to accentuate its independence from US policy towards Cuba, thereby serving domestic political ends.

In responding to other entrenched dictatorships – including Iraq, Libya and the Milosevic regime in Yugoslavia – Canada has typically followed the lead of the US and the United Nations Security Council in imposing sanctions to influence regime change, largely motivated by perceived threats to international security, and not by concerns about democracy. Direct diplomatic engagement has been limited largely due to Canada's lack of either historic or strategic ties with these countries and their disengagement from most international fora. In the case of Yugoslavia, Canada announced the provision of $10 million in October 2000 to support the country's transition towards democracy. A proportion of this funding supports the independent media, pro-democratic civil society groups and opposition-held municipalities working to bring democratic change to Yugoslavia. In the case of the Middle East, Canada has generally subordinated concerns over democratic practices in a number of Arab states – such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt – to the interests of trade promotion and regional stability.

[1] Canada. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. Canada in the World: Canadian Foreign Policy Review. Ottawa: 1995. Additionally, supporting human rights, democracy and good governance is one of the Canadian government's six program priorities for its official development assistance. Also available at: www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign_policy/cnd-world/chap5-en.asp.

[2] Cooper, Andrew. Canadian Foreign Policy: Old Habits and New Directions. Scarborough: Prentice Hall Allyn and Bacon Canada, 1997, p. 269.

[3] Ibid., p. 269.

[4] Canada. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade., "Canada Announces Measures to Assist Pakistan" 1 October 2001.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Canada had first condemned the Mugabe regime in April 2000, expressing dismay at the increasing numbers of land invasions and urging the government to ensure free and fair elections. DFAIT News Release, "Canada Concerned about escalating violence in Zimbabwe" (April 18, 2000).

[7] For the 2001 elections, CIDA provided Cdn$865,000 to support technical electoral expertise, electoral observation efforts, and civil society projects related to democratization, electoral awareness and education.

[8] Kingsley, Jean-Pierre. "Support for Democratic Development: Sharing Canada's Expertise." International Journal, 53.2 (Spring 1998): 221-32.

[9] Despite Canada's global and multi-faceted support for democratic development, no consolidated government statistics are available to quantify its overall support for this goal. Although the Canadian International Development Agency provides a comprehensive yearly compendium of official development assistance, support for democracy-building falls under a number of categories that render aggregation of such projects difficult. Relevant categories include disbursements to international organizations (e.g. Commonwealth, la Francophonie), bilateral "peace-building" envelopes and grants to NGOs.

[10] Ibid. Elections Canada is also a founding member of the Partnership for Electoral and Democratic Development (PEDD). PEDD was created in April 1999 and involves the following organizations: the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), the United Nations Electoral Assistance Division (UN-EAD), the Federal Electoral Institute of Mexico (IFE), and Elections Canada.

[11] The Honourable David Kilgour, Secretary of State (Latin American and Africa), Speech at the Towards a Community of Democracy Conference (June 26, 2000). See also Canadian International Development Agency, "Government of Canada Policy for CIDA on Human Rights, Democratization and Good Governance" (1996). Available at www.acdi-cida.gc.ca.

[12] Canada. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade., "Axworthy Announces Canada's Contribution in Support of Nigerian Elections." 27 Jan, 1999.

[13] Mace, Gordon and Martin Roy. "Canadá y la OEA: Promocíon de la Democracia," Sistema Interamericano y Democracia. Organizacíon de Estados Americanos, 2000, pp. 259-89.

[14] Fletcher, Pascal. "Cuba, Canada Aim to Cement Growing Investment Ties." 28 April 1998. Reuters 3 October 2002 <http://64.21.33.164/CNews/y98/apr98/28e4.htm>.

[15] The 1997 Canada-Cuba Joint Declaration includes judicial cooperation, exchanges between legislators and support of non-governmental organizations. For more, see: www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/english/foreignp/jd_w_cba.htm.

Chile

Assessment: Good
Trend: ⇔
Capitol: Santiago
Type of Government: Republic
Head of Government: President Ricardo Lagos (since 11 March 2000)
Minister of Foreign Relations: Maria Soledad Alvear Valenzuela
Population: 15,328,467
Human Development Index Ranking: 38

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Following its return to democratic rule in 1990, Chile has established a **good** record of democracy promotion. It has contributed consistently to the growing dialogue on democracy in the region, advocated codifying democratic norms in international and multilateral organizations, and has regularly, though not always, spoken out against transgressions of these norms in neighboring countries. Chile has been less consistent, however, in putting these words into action. Often hesitant to lead the international response, Chile's advocacy has faltered when democratic values have collided with other foreign policy concerns. Specifically, considerations of security, economics, and domestic politics have all occasionally compromised Chile's promotion of international democracy.

FOREIGN RELATIONS BACKGROUND

The reestablishment of democracy in 1990 after 17 years of military rule under General Augusto Pinochet allowed Chile to reengage the international community on new terms. Between 1992 and 2002, Chilean foreign policy demonstrated a renewed commitment to pursuing regional cooperation, establishing peace and security along its borders, and developing new trade opportunities. Accordingly, the nation became a partner in the Asia-Pacific Economic Conference (APEC) in 1994, and an associate member of the Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR) in 1996. It also has negotiated significant trade agreements with Canada, the European Union, and the U.S. (still under negotiation). Furthermore, civilian-led governments have made significant progress toward resolving the country's outstanding border disputes with Argentina, Peru, and Bolivia. Its expanding economy and relatively stable political system have afforded Chile a measure of influence in regional affairs, which it has exercised through international fora such as the Organization of American States (OAS) and the smaller Rio Group.

Consolidation of Chilean democracy, which facilitated all these developments, has dominated the domestic agenda throughout the decade. Though the nation elected three civilian presidents (Patricio Aylwin, Eduardo Frei and Ricardo Lagos) and made important strides away from many of Pinochet's repressive policies, legacies of military involvement in politics and restrictions on the press have persisted. While its own democratic transition gave Chile a natural interest in democratic developments abroad, contradictions and tensions at home occasionally restrained Chile's activism in this area. It primarily fashioned itself as a Latin American role model and advocated formal endorsements of democratic norms. Outside of such dialogue, Chile tended to avoid leadership roles, shying away from democracy promotion when it threatened to compromise other national interests.

RESPONSE TO OVERTHROW OF DEMOCRATICALLY-ELECTED GOVERNMENTS

As a civilian government emerging out of nearly two decades of authoritarian rule, Chile's civilian leadership was particularly attuned to the threat posed by military governments. Accordingly, the Chilean government consistently spoke out against overthrows of the democratic process in the region, offered support to legitimate, deposed governments, and coordinated with multilateral and regional organizations to advocate for the restoration of democracy. However, while ready to apply rhetorical and political pressure, Chile regularly steered clear of economic sanctions or military action.

As host to the 1991 OAS General Assembly, Chile wielded great influence in the creation of one of the region's most significant commitments to democracy. The Santiago Resolution (OAS Resolution 1080) affirmed each OAS member state's commitment to democratic governance and established a mechanism by which the OAS would respond to coups in the region. In announcing that coups were not just domestic disturbances but also transgressions of regionally agreed upon norms and values, Chile clearly sought to shore up its recently restored democracy. In the process, it also helped to establish an influential protocol that would shape regional responses to democratic challenges over the course of the next decade.

When Peruvian President Fujimori executed his *autogolpe (self-coup)* in April 1992, Chile was quick to demand an immediate return to democracy. Chile further announced its intention to work within the Rio Group and the OAS to encourage this restoration. Chile also joined Argentina in requesting that Peru be suspended from the OAS, and that suspension from the organization be the response to any future coups as well. While this initiative did not succeed, the OAS did adopt more limited measures calling for censure (not condemnation) and monitoring, while the smaller Rio Group suspended Peruvian participation. Over time, however, Chile's public stance against the Fujimori regime weakened in favor of accommodating other issues on the bilateral agenda and it gradually strengthened its ties to Lima in the following years.

Chile's immediate reaction to Guatemalan President Serrano's copycat *autogolpe* in 1993 was an expression of concern. Clearly less emphatic than the demands voiced a year earlier during the Peruvian crisis, Chile's muted response may have reflected domestic tensions between the government and the military, still under Pinochet's control, which flared in May and June 1993 over allegations of military corruption and increasing civilian government control over the military. In any event, Chile was supportive of the OAS response initiatives, including a resolution calling for the return to democracy, a diplomatic mission to pressure Serrano out of power, and a Foreign Ministers meeting to contemplate the imposition of economic sanctions on Guatemala. Chile's limited reaction may also reflect the brevity of the crisis; the coup dissolved within days, even before the Foreign Ministers could assemble.

The extended debate over how to respond to the unconstitutional coup in Haiti exposed indecision and disagreement on the part of the Chilean coalition government. As worsening conditions in the island state sent waves of refugees seeking asylum throughout the Caribbean, Chile backed a UN resolution condemning the growing threats to Haitian democracy and human rights. It further voiced support for a Security Council resolution authorizing a US-led military mission to restore democracy, although it declined to contribute troops. However, the Chilean legislature overwhelmingly rejected the UN authorization of military force and pressured the administration to amend its position significantly. Chile then stepped forward in support of a Venezuelan-led diplomatic mission to talk the military leadership out of power and coordinated with the Rio Group to issue a weaker condemnation of the Haitian crisis that did not endorse a military response. Despite its equivocal support for a forced transition of power, Chile remained steadfast in its commitment to the restoration of democracy in Haiti and eventually contributed 50 police officers for technical assistance projects once Aristade returned to power.

When the head of the army staged a coup in Paraguay in 1996, Chile was quick to firmly show support for the legitimate elected leadership. The Chilean Foreign Minister personally traveled to Asuncion to consult with President Wasmosy, and Chile joined the OAS in backing President Wasmosy against unconstitutional interference. The coup quickly dissolved under intense international pressure; however, Chile largely followed the lead of Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay, which effectively used the democracy clause of Mercosur to facilitate an end to the crisis.[1]

A close relationship between newly elected President Lagos and Ecuadorian President Jamil Mahuad prompted Chile to more forceful displays of support for the legitimate government during a coup in that country in January 2000. Lagos made a personal call of support to Mahuad, offering him asylum in Chile and inviting him as a guest into the Chilean embassy in Quito during tense moments of the struggle. The Chilean foreign minister further convened a Rio Group meeting of regional leaders, and worked with the OAS to issue a unanimous condemnation of the coup and a threat of political or economic repercussions if constitutional order was not restored. These measures helped stem the crisis. The unpopular Mahuad was forced to resign and civilian leadership was restored under the democratically elected vice president.

Chile's reaction to the most recent unconstitutional seizure of power in the region was less proactive. When military leaders helped drive Venezuelan President Chavez from power in April 2002, Chile refused to recognize the de facto government and instead urged elections for new Venezuelan leadership as soon as possible; however, like many other governments, Chile declined to call for Chavez's immediate reinstatement. Chile again joined the OAS consensus in issuing a rebuke and assigning a fact-finding mission to investigate the short-lived coup.

RESPONSE TO MANIPULATION OF ELECTORAL PROCESSES

Two seminal cases, both from 2000, demonstrate the limited role Chile has assumed in insisting upon legitimate elections in the region. While it acknowledges incidences of electoral misconduct, Chile has opted to engage de facto governments, rather than to press for new elections or to impose penalties. The case of Haiti seems to reflect a sincere effort at constructive engagement, while Chile's reaction to the Peruvian elections was clearly influenced by other foreign policy concerns.

As controversy over Haiti's spring 2000 elections extended through the summer, Chile, representing the Friends of the UN Secretary General for Haiti, joined an OAS mission to the island in August. The mission's report noted the "political and democratic-institutional crisis in the country," but failed to elicit a punitive response from the OAS. The OAS, however, has remained engaged in resolving the political tension in Haiti, acting as the primary broker in negotiations between the government and the opposition.[2]

Chile spoke out when Peruvian President Fujimori ran for an unconstitutional third term. However, the brunt of its criticism was directed not at Fujimori, but at the United States. When the United States advocated invoking the Santiago Resolution, in an extension of its established application for coups, Chile joined with several other Latin American nations in rejecting outside interference in domestic political processes. Instead, Chile joined an OAS resolution that, while acknowledging deficiencies in the 2000 election, implicitly recognized Fujimori's presidency; this despite the OAS Electoral Observation Mission's finding that "the Peruvian election process falls far short of what could be called free and fair."[3] Furthermore, while Chile avoided Fujimori's inauguration, it accepted his participation at the 2000 Rio Group Summit and his signature on the Declaration of Cartegena, a commitment to democratic principles and practices, which included an explicit reference to legitimate elections.[4]

Chile's lackluster response to the electoral misconduct in Peru derived from its concern for protecting recently strengthened ties with that country. Having resolved troublesome border disputes only the year before, Chile sought to avoid provoking any further conflict with the Peruvian leadership. These same concerns for smooth relations with its neighbor led Chile to compromise its leadership role in democracy advocacy later that year when it blocked a U.S.-led effort to disinvite Peru from the Community of Democracies conference (see below).

Despite its frequent affirmations of democratic values, Chile accepted leaders in both Haiti and Peru who were elected in circumstances deemed highly questionable by the OAS and other independent observers. It did, however, recognize the electoral misconduct and supported OAS diplomatic efforts to resolve the problems through engagement. To this end, Chile has been consistently supportive of OAS election monitoring initiatives, commenting that they are well suited to the promotion and reinforcement of democracy in the Americas.

PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRACY

The protection and expansion of international democracy is widely endorsed as official policy throughout the Chilean government. Accordingly, Chile regularly participates in the regional dialogue on democracy and has signed

many important international protocols and declarations. Its record of political stability and economic prosperity at home further adds to the Chileans' vision of promoting democracy abroad by setting a good example.

Recognizing the exemplary value of this Latin American success story, Poland and the United States invited Chile to serve as a co-convening country for the inaugural Community of Democracies ministerial conference in 2000. The invitation to join the leadership of an initiative dedicated to the consolidation and promotion of democracy worldwide demonstrated both other states' high regard for Chile's democracy and Chile's own commitment to democracy promotion. However, as alluded to above, Chile's performance within this forum was partially compromised by other foreign policy concerns, as it blocked efforts to bar Peru's attendance at the conference despite its flawed elections. Chile is also slated to host the 3rd Community of Democracies conference in 2004.

Beyond the Community of Democracies, Chile is an active member of many regional organizations. However, its record of democracy promotion here is mixed as well, as it has pressed for democratic assurances in some fora, yet totally ignored democratic values in others. Within the OAS, Chile has demonstrated particular leadership in formal democracy promotion. In addition to its major role in crafting the Santiago Resolution, Chile played a leadership role in hosting the Second Summit of the Americas in 1998 at which governments endorsed measures to strengthen democracy and promote human rights. Furthermore, Chile was a significant collaborator in the drafting of the OAS Inter-American Democratic Charter in 2001. This charter details the organization's expectations for democratic governance in the region and refines its mechanisms for institutional responses to disruptions of democracy. During the drafting of this agreement, Chile lobbied to incorporate into it specific democratic norms and standards regarding elections, transparency, and other fundamental democratic principles.[5] Also in 2001, the Chilean ambassador, as Chair of the OAS Permanent Council, led an international conference on "The Role of Regional and Multilateral Organizations in Strengthening Democracy." Outside the OAS, Chile has developed a substantial partnership with MERCOSUR, a customs union with formal commitments to democracy and democracy promotion.

Outside of Latin America, however, Chile's membership in regional fora primarily reflects its economic interests. In 1994, it joined APEC, seeking to develop ties with the Asian economies. This group has no formal commitment to democracy; in fact, several prominent APEC member states are recognized as non-democratic regimes, and Chile has shown no interest in taking a leadership role to encourage its Asian partners to undertake democratic reforms. This mixed record reflects how Chile's policies balance a sincere interest in international democracy promotion with competing considerations for security and economic development. That its democracy promotion activities are largely centered in Latin America reflects both Chile's stronger political ties in that region and its greater stake in political stability and good governance there.

POLICY TOWARDS ENTRENCHED DICTATORSHIPS

Despite its vocal support for democracy, Chile maintains active relations with several noted dictatorships around the world. This ambivalence reflects domestic political debates, as well as Chile's tendency to give higher priority to its economic pursuits outside of Latin America.

Of all its relations with dictatorships, Chile's ties with Cuba are understandably the most complex. Chile has recognized Castro's regime as the legitimate government in Cuba since 1991. However, center-left governments in Santiago have had to balance pressures from those within their own coalition who favor normal ties with Cuba, against pressure from more conservative elements (including the military) who want to diminish ties with the island nation. The United States has also pressured the Chilean government to join it in condemning Castro's regime.

These pressures, in part, account for Chile's mixed record regarding Cuba. Within the UN, Chile has both opposed U.S. sanctions on Cuba and condemned human rights abuses in Cuba in equal measure, although it abstained from the UN Human Rights Commission vote in 1998, contributing to the failure of that resolution. Chile also hosted Cuba at the Sixth Ibero-American Summit, securing Castro's signature on the Declaration of Vina del Mar, which affirmed each state's commitment to democracy. The government in Santiago has held Cuba to its obligation under that declaration, declining to invite Cuba to the Second Summit of the Americas in Santiago and

refusing to attend the Ninth Ibero-American Summit in Havana on the grounds that Cuba had failed to produce any meaningful reforms in the area of democratization. In all likelihood, Chile's on-going dispute with Spain over that country's prosecution of former Chilean dictator Pinochet also factored into its decision to skip the Cuban summit. In short, domestic politics and Chilean relations with the U.S. and other third-party states have been the determining factor in Chile's policy toward Cuban dictatorship.

Chile also maintains substantial relationships with several entrenched dictatorships in Asia. These primarily reflect its interest in developing strong economic ties in that region, as evidenced already by its accession to APEC. Notably, China is Chile's fourth largest trade partner, underscoring the economic importance of this relationship. Beyond China, Chile also has taken no visible steps to react to the coups in Fiji, Pakistan, or the Philippines.

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[1] "Joint Effort Helps Head Off Coup Threat in Paraguay; U.S., South Americans Pressure General Aside." The Washington Post 26 April 1996; "Failed Coup Made Trade Bloc Stronger." Journal of Commerce 1 May 1996.
[2] "Negotiations: the Game that is so Hard to Play." Institute for Research in the Sciences of Politics; Organization of American States. Report of the Mission of the OAS to Haiti; August 17-20, 2000.8 Aug. 2000.
[3] "OAS Looks for United Response to Flawed Peru Election." Agence France Presse 5 June 2000; Organization of American States. "Electoral Observation Mission, General Elections, Republic of Peru, 2000: Executive Summary of the Final Report of the Chief of Mission." (AG/doc.3936/00). 5 June 2000.
[4] "Latin American Presidents Bow out of Peru President's Inauguration." AP Worldstream 20 July 2000.
[5] Organization of American States. "Comparative Table on the Draft Inter-American Democratic Charter (Rev. 7) with the Proposals, Amendments, and Comments Submitted by Member States." (GT/CDI-6/01). 14 Aug. 2001.

Czech Republic

Assessment: Good
Trend: ⇔
Capital: Prague
Type of Government: Parliamentary Democracy
Head of Government: President Vaclav Havel (since 2 February 1993)
Minister of Foreign Affairs: Cyril Svoboda
Population: 10,264,212
Human Development Index Ranking 2002: 33

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Czech Republic has a **good** overall record of support for democracy abroad. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has undertaken initiatives to promote democratic development in other European countries, and has exhibited a commitment to cooperate with major international agencies in devising effective ways to allocate aid to emerging democracies.[1] The Czech Republic has participated in election monitoring missions throughout the European and Central Asian post-communist area. It has criticized the manipulation of the electoral process in Belarus and in the former Yugoslavia during the presidency of Slobodan Milosevic. As a member of both the UN and NATO, it has supported actions ranging from imposing sanctions to issuing verbal condemnations intended to isolate and punish dictators and their repressive regimes. Czech soldiers have participated in many NATO operations, including in the Balkans, where the international military presence has sought to bolster the prospects for democratic stability.

Following the Velvet Revolution that swept away the communist regime in 1989, Czechoslovakia formally broke into the two countries of the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1993. After an initial period of turbulence the Czech Republic has made significant strides toward consolidating democratic rule and has been eager to help extend democratic principles and practices around the world. As a member of NATO and a candidate for European Union (EU) membership, the Czech Republic is integrating into Euro-Atlantic structures and continuing its economic transition while setting a sound example for other "awakening" democracies in the post-communist world and elsewhere.

The Czech Republic's record in promoting democracy internationally is likely to remain stable or steadily improve, as its own democratic development deepens and its capacity for broader international involvement increases.

FOREIGN RELATIONS BACKGROUND

The top foreign policy priority of the Czech Republic has been the country's reintegration with the West while building a robust, dynamic economy. It has achieved good results on both fronts. Since 1992, its political institutions have matured rapidly with successive elections meeting international standards. Internationally recognized human rights are guaranteed in the Czech Constitution and observed in practice. President Vaclav Havel, a former political prisoner under the communist regime, is a world-renowned advocate of human rights and social justice. He draws frequently on this moral authority to promote democratic values and practices abroad.

The Czech Republic's integration into the world economy has moved forward rapidly. The country entered the Organization for European Cooperation and Development (OECD) in December 1995, the first former communist country to do so. It has concluded an association agreement with the EU and is a prime candidate for early accession. The country also is a member of the World Trade Organization, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

Since the fall of communism in 1989, the EU has been providing both technical and financial assistance to the Czech Republic.[2] During the first few years, assistance focused on the transformation of the centrally planned economy to a functioning market system. Funding from the EU and the U.S. also helped the Czech Republic to consolidate its new democratic institutions. More recently, EU aid has been geared to prepare the country for EU accession.

The goal of reintegrating with the West, and promoting democratic development both in the country and abroad, has been largely carried out through the government's effort to join major international organizations. The Czechs were founding members of NATO's Partnership for Peace, and have participated in numerous joint exercises with the U.S. and other allies. Czech soldiers served alongside U.S. soldiers in the Gulf War and in the British-supervised sector in Bosnia. They took active part in Operation Desert Storm and have participated in UN peacekeeping operations in Croatia and Kosovo.

However, residual democracy-related challenges at home, over and above expected resource constraints, are impeding the Czech Republic's ability to take a more active role in promoting democracy abroad. Certainly the basic foundations and institutions of democracy and the rule of law are firmly in place. Yet many observers have criticized the country's political system for being too centralized, retarding the growth of a civil society and limiting the ability of citizens to influence both national and local politics. While numerous civic groups have been established, most have suffered from inadequate resources and poor organizational and planning skills, according to a 1993 analysis by the National Democratic Institute. Also, the NGO sector as a whole has not been held in high regard by the government or by the public-at-large, thereby limiting citizen impact on public policy.[3]

Another persistent problem revolves around discrimination against the Roma population and other minorities. Even though the Czech government launched a major campaign against racism in the country, the Roma population still does not enjoy in practice the same liberties as other citizens. The hope is that this campaign will raise awareness and improve living conditions for Roma and other minority groups in the Czech Republic.[4]

The transformation of the Czech Republic from a recipient of international assistance, including in the democracy sphere, to a modest donor is a significant and inspiring turn. The government has used humanitarian and development aid to help alleviate suffering and strengthen nascent democratic institutions in Europe and other regions.

At the same time, the Czech Republic's preoccupation with its ties to the more powerful economies of the EU and NATO member states also has diverted policymakers' attention away from urgent democracy and human rights situations such as East Timor, Tibet, and the Kurds in Turkey and Iraq. Government support for international democracy often does not go beyond the boundaries established by the international community's dominant actors and their narrowly drawn economic and political interests. That is to say, the Czech Republic has tended to follow the lead of the large, established democracies such that extensive violations of democracy and human rights norms in many countries very often do not appear on Prague's foreign policy agenda unless the issue first becomes part of the agenda of the Czech Republic's more influential allies.

RESPONSE TO OVERTHROW OF DEMOCRATICALLY-ELECTED GOVERNMENTS

Since Vaclav Havel's Civic Forum movement won national elections in 1990, the Czech Republic has issued strong public statements condemning coups d'etat around the world and has supported UN sanctions against the offending regimes. President Havel declared the 1999 military coup in Pakistan an unconstitutional measure and reiterated the importance of a rapid restoration of democracy. The Foreign Ministry, which closely monitored events as they unfolded, condemned the coup and called on the military leaders to respect democratic principles and parliamentary procedure.[5] The Czech Republic also has supported EU declarations on threats to democracy, such as that regarding the 1999 military coup in Cote d'Ivoire.[6]

In the European region there have been no instances of coups or major, sudden disruptions in the democratic order, although some leaders have misused democratic processes to subsequently undermine democratic governance. In Yugoslavia and Belarus, the Milosevic and Lukashenko regimes, respectively, came to power through elections but quickly moved to consolidate autocratic power and undermine democratic norms, prompting blunt criticism from President Havel and other Czech government officials. These cases are dealt with in

subsequent sections.

RESPONSE TO MANIPULATION OF ELECTORAL PROCESSES

Once the integrity of their own domestic national electoral process was ensured, the Czech Republic became more confident in promoting democratic reform beyond its borders. Eager to share lessons learned from its own experience, the government became an active participant in election monitoring missions throughout Central and Eastern Europe and the new countries of the former Soviet Union. It joined fellow members of the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the UN in speaking out against electoral malpractice.

The Czech Republic, along with many Western governments, strongly criticized the manipulations of the electoral process by the Lukashenko regime in Belarus during both presidential and parliamentary elections. It has continued to condemn the repressive practices of the Belarus government. In a recent visit to Belarus, Czech Prime Minister Milos Zeman refused to meet with President Lukashenko unless dissidents were invited to, and attended, the meeting.[7]

The Czech Republic also worked within the UN framework to condemn electoral malfeasance in the former Yugoslavia during the presidency of Slobodan Milosevic. Later, in concert with other Western governments, the Czech Republic supported the opposition student movement, which finally succeeded in ousting Milosevic. In part because of limited resources and capacity, the Czech Republic has tended to rely more on public criticism than on creating or directly financing actual programs to combat electoral fraud.

In Ukraine, President Kuchma has presided over deteriorating political conditions that have weakened the country's fledgling democratic institutions and processes. The electoral process has suffered, as well as irregularities in both parliamentary and presidential elections have been documented and questions have been raised about the lack of a level playing field. The Czech Republic has expressed its concern over the concentration of political power in the presidency, the erosion of basic rights and electoral shortcomings in Ukraine.

PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRACY

The Czech Republic has participated in many initiatives and actions taken by international organizations in promoting democracy around the world. It has forged particularly close links with Poland, another former communist country that likewise has sought to play a significant role in democracy promotion beyond its borders.

Czech foreign policy emphasizes support for political and economic development, including poverty reduction, access to education and health care, gender equality, and promoting sustainable development.[8] These are viewed as essential conditions in which democracy can flourish. Its success in integrating into Euro-Atlantic and other international institutional structures has given the Czech Republic mechanisms through which to play a more active role in the diffusion of democratic ideals and practices.

In one notable example, the Czech Republic is a member of the convening group, or steering committee, of the Community of Democracies, the first-ever gathering of the world's democratic governments that met in Warsaw, Poland in June 2000. In that capacity, the Czech Republic helped to organize the Warsaw gathering and is involved in planning the next ministerial meeting to be held in Seoul, Korea in November 2002. A major goal of the Community of Democracies is to increase inter-governmental cooperation to strengthen democratic institutions and practices where they have already begun to take hold.

The Czech government also provides modest funding to, and works cooperatively with, some indigenous NGOs that are engaged in humanitarian and democracy building efforts internationally. For example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of the Interior have supported various projects and activities of the People in Need Foundation, a Czech nonprofit, nongovernmental organization that promotes democracy and provides humanitarian assistance in twenty-five countries throughout the world.[9]

POLICY TOWARDS ENTRENCHED DICTATORSHIPS

Primarily through its membership in international organizations, the Czech Republic has supported policies and resolutions, including the imposition of sanctions, in order to isolate authoritarian regimes and/or attempt to leverage political change.

In the case of Belarus, President Lukashenko has steadily enhanced his personal power while violating human rights and limiting

civil and political rights such as freedom of assembly and freedom of speech.[10] President Havel has, on numerous occasions, expressed concern about the concentration of authoritarian power in Belarus, criticizing Lukashenko by name, and expressing solidarity with the opposition democratic forces by issuing public statements of support. Some Czech NGOs have worked with their counterparts in Belarus to strengthen civil society and grassroots democracy efforts.

Outside of the European region, the Czech Republic has forcefully condemned the repressive Cuban Government for violating basic human rights and played a prominent role at the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva in calling attention to the denial of human rights in Cuba and spearheading, along with Poland, resolutions criticizing the Castro regime.[11]

In 1999, as a brand new member of NATO, the Czech Republic participated in the military operation against the Milosevic regime and had previously been a staunch backer of UN sanctions. The Czech government later became a very supportive voice on behalf of the Kostunica government and reconstruction efforts in Serbia.

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[1] One example of Czech activity within this area is a MFA-sponsored conference held in September 2002 to launch a broad discussion on foreign development assistance in the Czech Republic and other EU accession countries. Official Government web site for the Czech Republic Accessed June 1, 2002

[2] Official European Web Site <http://europa.eu.int> 24 June 2002

[3] National Democratic Institute for International Affairs Online <www.ndi.org > 14 June 2002.

[4] Information obtained at the Embassy of the Czech Republic, Washington, DC, 10 July 2002.

[5] "President Havel is disturbed by the situation in Pakistan." Czech News Agency 13 Oct. 1999.

[6] Declaration of the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on the military coup in Ivory Coast. Brussels 7 Jan. 2000. <http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/01_00/pesc_99_129.htm>

[7] Interview with Press Secretary at the Embassy of the Czech Republic, 25 June 2002 Washington, D.C.

[8] Official web cite of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic < http://www.mzv.cz/> 5 June 2002.

[9] People in Need Foundation. Annual Report 2000.

[10] Available at <www.belcentrum.org >

[11] Information obtained from the Embassy of the Czech Republic in Washington D.C., Press Office, 10 June 2002.

France

Assessment: Fair

Trend: ⇔

Capital: Paris

Type of Government: Republic

Head of State: President Jacques Chirac (since 17 May 1995)

Foreign Minister: Dominique de Villepin

Population: 59,551,227

Human Development Index Ranking 2002: 12

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

France has a **fair** record of support for democracy abroad. With a rich democratic tradition, energetic and influential diplomacy, and robust economy, France is well-positioned to support and foster democracy throughout the world. But while the country has done a good deal to advance democratic ideals, it has at times been indifferent or pursued policies that impeded democratic consolidation. Like most other Western powers, France has been willing to criticize the poor democratic performance of foes, but is far more reluctant to apply similar standards to countries with which it enjoys close political and/or economic ties, including in the Middle East and Francophone Africa. A major foreign aid donor, France has shown only modest enthusiasm for devoting substantial resources to democracy-strengthening programs. In sum, promoting democratic institutions and practices internationally has not been a consistent guiding principle of French foreign policy over the past decade.

FOREIGN RELATIONS BACKGROUND

France has long seen itself as the birthplace of "liberté, egalité, and fraternité," with the central government historically playing the role of the protector of democracy. For modern France, the principle of democratic governance has been more than just an abstract idea. It is widely viewed as a concrete concept that can foster peaceful coexistence among its European neighbors and ensure national survival.

Contemporary French foreign policy has its roots in the de Gaulle era. As war raged on the continent, de Gaulle called on Europeans to "join together in a practical and lasting fashion."[1] De Gaulle is closely associated with advancing French power and prestige, as well as with relinquishing much of France's colonial empire. Yet, he must also be recognized for quickly grasping the need for a unified, integrated Europe in which to anchor Germany in order to prevent another epoch of rising German nationalism and military power.

In many ways, the foreign policy framework constructed by de Gaulle has been followed by every subsequent president from Pompidou and d'Estaing to Mitterand and Chirac, though the influence of the Foreign Ministry has waxed and waned. France has been in the forefront of the push toward European unity since the 1950s. Relations with Germany have been central to this strategy. Despite some difficulties along the way, Franco-German cooperation has been the cornerstone of an expanding democratic European community[2] -- with France as the political center and Germany as the economic core.

French foreign policy since 1992 can be characterized as cautious pragmatism grounded in self-interest, often narrowly defined along traditional economic and strategic lines. Enhancing France's stature and influence within Europe, and within the international arena more broadly, remains a paramount goal. France generally has worked to strengthen the global economic and political influence of the EU and its role in building a common European defense, often viewed as a counterbalance to U.S. hegemony. It continues to view Franco-German cooperation and more recently, the development of a European Security and development of a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), as the foundation of efforts to enhance European democracy and security.

RESPONSE TO THE OVERTHROW OF DEMOCRATICALLY-ELECTED GOVERNMENTS

France's response to the overthrow of democratically-elected governments has been mixed. The government's reaction to the coup in Haiti, which ousted President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 1991, was swift and unambiguous. The French government condemned the military coup and called for a quick return to democracy. It also supported the 1993 UN-imposed sanctions against the military regime. Soon after the successful U.S.-led effort to restore democratic rule, France provided financial support and dispatched experts for election monitoring missions.

A military coup in the Cote d'Ivoire in 1999 swept aside the democratic Parti Democratique de la Cote d'Ivoire, and brought to power a military junta headed by former Army Chief of Staff, General Robert Guei. Both President Chirac and Prime Minister Jospin condemned the coup and issued strong warnings to the junta, although the two differed on the wisdom of military intervention. Beyond these blunt statements, and the suspension of some minor technical assistance programs, the French government failed to take action. With 500 troops based in the country, many observers thought that France could have done more had it been so inclined. More commonly, the presence of French troops in Senegal and Cote d'Ivoire have often served to bolster authoritarian but friendly regimes in these countries.

France was a vocal critic of the inclusion of the far-right Freedom Party, led by Joerg Haider, in Austria's coalition government. The French government, while not wanting to interfere directly with Austrian politics, was "'very worried' by the prospect of Haider in power."[3] Chirac, mindful of the emergence of Jean Marie le Pen, the leader of France's own right-wing party, was one of the strongest proponents of imposing sanctions against Austria, which went into effect when the Freedom Party was sworn into government. When France took over the presidency of the EU, Chirac was again very vocal in his desire to maintain sanctions against the Austrian government. Just a few months into the presidency, Chirac lifted sanctions when Austria was given a clean bill of health on its human rights record by an EU-appointed committee.

France was not as vocal after the coup in Pakistan. While it expressed concern over the situation in Pakistan, and called for a return to constitutional order and civilian rule, it did not formally sanction or rebuke General Musharraf. The EU was considerably more vehement in its insistence that democracy be restored and suspended all political dialogue with Pakistan immediately after the coup.

RESPONSE TO MANIPULATION OF ELECTORAL PROCESSES

France's response to the manipulation of electoral processes has been good in Europe, where it has been a steadfast opponent of electoral misconduct. In Africa, however, successive French governments have often disregarded electoral manipulations.

France joined the rest of the EU and OSCE in speaking out against flawed elections in Belarus and other former Soviet republics. The same was also true in Yugoslavia. Following the defeat of Slobodan Milosevic by Vojislav Kostunica, the candidate of the democratic opposition of Serbia in the 2000 presidential elections, Milosevic attempted to ignore the result and stay in power. As strikes intensified, the EU made clear its view that Kostunica was the legitimate winner. When Milosevic did step aside, France took the lead in resuming diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia and argued forcefully for emergency assistance from the EU. Subsequent EU-Balkans summit meetings led to a larger, longer-term aid package and confirmed France's influence in getting the EU to play a greater role in the region.

In Algeria, French reaction to the 1991 elections underscored the selective approach and occasional double standard that France and other Western countries have toward democratic practices, particularly in the developing world. In 1989, amid student protests, riots, and popular demands for governmental reform, Algeria moved toward a more liberalized political system. In December 1991, the FIS, the main Islamic opposition party, won a majority of seats in the National Assembly in the first round of voting and stood poised to win the final round. President Benjedid declared the elections invalid, banned the FIS and dissolved the National Assembly. One week later Benjedid resigned under pressure, and authority passed to General Mohammed Boudiaf,[4] who was assassinated by the FIS soon after, igniting armed conflict. Not only did France fail to condemn the manipulation of the electoral process, it also lent full support to the military regime. France has long had a vested interest in maintaining a stable pro-French government in Algeria in order to guarantee the

supply of natural gas and oil. In a broader sense, French strategy has been to preserve the political status quo in the Maghreb region, regardless of how undemocratic and repressive the regimes proved to be.

More recently, the French reaction to gross electoral manipulation in Zimbabwe was appreciably different. There, France responded within the framework set forth by the EU and strongly condemned President Mugabe's blatant electoral misconduct and the ensuing violence it spawned. France led the effort to impose sanctions designed to isolate the regime.

PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRACY

France has built an uneven record of promoting democracy internationally. French governments have steered clear of prescribing general principles, preferring the flexibility of action tailored to specific circumstances—much to the dismay of civil society activists in authoritarian countries with governments friendly toward Paris. France often chooses to advance democracy through a combination of bilateral programs and participation in international organizations. But the country's involvement in the same international organizations has been strongly shaped by de Gaulle's priority of restoring France's prominent position on the world stage, rather than becoming a force for democracy globally.

France has been a member of the UN Security Council since its inception, a powerful perch from which it helps shape UN priorities and programs. Indeed, French support for the UN has been unwavering. France is the fourth largest contributor to the global body and a willing backer of UN peacekeeping operations. France also helped to initiate annual regular meetings of the G-7 group of leading industrial democracies and has often been successful in winning top posts in some of the world's most influential international organizations. These have included the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and the Secretariat of the Council of Europe.[5] Finally, France has been an integral part of NATO, and has been deeply involved in its military operations, most notably in the Balkans.

Despite France's influential role in these institutions, it has not consistently advanced democracy- promoting objectives. Moreover, France was the only one of over 100 participating governments that refused to endorse the historic Warsaw Declaration of the Community of Democracies, essentially isolating itself from the world's democratic countries, including its former colonies. Explaining its decision not to endorse this document, then French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine stated that democracy is "not a matter which allows sweeping generalizations....the specifics of each case should be taken into consideration."[6] In response to criticism that French foreign policy is largely driven by cynical power politics, Vedrine wrote that the French approach to fostering democracy "....can, admittedly, involve us cooperating with regimes, which are still quite unsatisfactory. But we are working for their peoples and the future, and the movement thus set in train can but increase pressure on the leaders."[7]

One region where French efforts to promote democracy are evident is Southeast Asia. A former colonial power, France still wields influence in the region. In 1996, the French National Assembly took the lead in forming the French Committee for Democracy in Vietnam. The committee has three goals: 1) advocating on behalf of democratization in Vietnam, 2) developing French and European support for Vietnamese aspirations for freedom and democracy, and 3) supporting organizations that are working to promote democracy in Vietnam. In Cambodia, France facilitated the signing of the Paris Accords in 1991 designed to start the process of national reconciliation and contributed 1,500 blue berets to the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). In the run-up to the elections in 1998, France, along with Japan, sent an envoy to facilitate negotiations between Hun Sen's party and the main opposition. The EU also conditionally pledged $12 million in aid for election observation unit. France also participated, with nine other nations, in the creation of guidelines given to the government of Cambodia to ensure free and fair elections.

In the Middle East, France has been a vocal supporter of the Arab-Israeli peace process, particularly the 1991 Madrid conference. In this context, France backed the establishment of a Palestinian homeland and Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories. Recognizing the need for a comprehensive peace agreement, France supports the involvement of all Arab parties and Israel in a multilateral peace process. France has been active in promoting a regional economic dialogue, and has played an active role in providing assistance to the Palestinian Authority. But again, as with the other

Western powers involved in the Middle East, France has generally been reluctant to condemn the human rights abuses and anti-democratic practices of countries with which it is aligned or seek to curry favor.

POLICY TOWARDS ENTRENCHED DICTATORSHIPS

France's record with respect to entrenched dictatorships has been only fair. France has generally pursued a policy of constructive engagement with undemocratic regimes, particularly where economic and trade interests are a significant factor. While France was active within the EU in applying pressure on the Milosevic regime, and instrumental in providing aid to the democratically-elected Kostunica government, its track record towards entrenched dictatorships in other parts of the world has not been nearly as positive.

French economic interests in China have been the paramount factor in Franco-Chinese relations. In 1999, a lucrative $2.5 billion Airbus deal with China was sealed with an official state visit by Chinese leader Jiang Zemin that was widely criticized by human rights organizations as helping to legitimize the repressive regime. The following year, France refused to back a resolution in the UN Human Rights Commission criticizing China for its terrible human rights record. The French government asserted that its preferred strategy of closer engagement with China would be more effective in bringing about greater political liberalization. Detractors denounced the French stance as a self-serving excuse to cozy up to the Chinese in order to procure lucrative business deals and doubt that democracy and human rights issues are part of the bilateral agenda.

In Burma, the pro-democracy activist Aung San Suu Kyi has criticized the French government for supporting France's major petroleum company, Total, in a project to develop a $200 million pipeline to Thailand. Human rights groups in France and around the world have decried French support for commercial projects, such as these, that serve to legitimize and indirectly finance authoritarian regimes. The Federation International des Ligues des Droits de l'Homme (FIDH), the Paris-based independent international human rights organization, has called on the French government to pressure Total to discontinue its Burma operations, but no action has yet been taken.

France's strategy on Cuba has been similar to that towards other dictatorial regimes. France has long been a proponent of strengthening trade ties with Cuba as an effective means to foster economic and political reform. But there is little evidence that France has pressed the Cuban government to ease its repressive rule.

With regard to Iraq, France has taken an increasingly tougher line against Saddam Hussein's regime even at the risk of potential economic harm. Since the inception of the UN oil-for-food program, France was the single largest beneficiary, signing deals with the Iraqi government worth over $3 billion. But despite significant commercial interests, France has supported the U.S.-British position that Iraq not be allowed to impose illegal surcharges on oil exports. Paris' backing of this plan has drawn severe criticism from Baghdad, with Iraqi government officials warning France that it is jeopardizing profitable business interests in the country.

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[1] De Gaulle, Charles. War Memoirs : Unity (1942-1944), Salvation (1944-1946). New York: Simon and Schuster, 1959-1960.

[2] The two countries codified bilateral ties in 1963. The Treaty of Franco-German Cooperation has served as a framework for wide-ranging institutionalized cooperation for over 40 years. Many of the key components of EU integration, in particular the 1992 Treaty of European Union (the Maastricht Treaty) have resulted from Franco-German initiatives.

[3] "French leaders worried over talks for far-right role in Austria." Agence France-Presse 27 Jan. 2000.

[4] General Boudiaf declared that new elections would be held in two years. The FIS rejected this unilaterally imposed arrangement.

[5] More recently, France's grip on key international posts has loosened somewhat, although the presidency of the European Central bank should pass into French hands in 2003.

[6] Vedrine, Hubert. "La diplomatie au service de la democratie (Diplomacy Serving Democracy)." Le Monde 22 Feb. 2001.

[7] Ibid.

Georgia

Assessment: Poor
Trend: ⇔
Capital: Tbilisi
Type of Government: Republic
Head of State: President Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze (since 26 November 1995)
Foreign Minister: Irakli Menagharishvili
Population: 4,989,285
Human Development Index Ranking 2002: 81

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Georgia has a **poor** record of support for democracy abroad whether in terms of responding to flawed electoral processes, promoting democracy in international fora, or dealing with entrenched dictatorships. During the past decade, Georgian foreign policy has been preoccupied with security concerns as the government of President Eduard Shevardnadze confronts serious challenges to central authority and related external threats. The country's political leadership does not appear to draw any causal links between prospective democratic progress in neighboring countries and greater regional stability.

Georgia's disappointing performance is a reflection of formidable domestic challenges to democratic consolidation --including civil armed conflict and secessionist movements-- and a demonstrable lack of interest in democracy promotion abroad despite the country's own achievements on this front, particularly compared to the other countries in the trans-Caspian region. As a new country, Georgia also faced the task of erecting an entire foreign policy infrastructure as well as a steep learning curve in international affairs.

FOREIGN RELATIONS BACKGROUND

Since gaining independence following the break-up of the Soviet Union, Georgia experienced a sequence of debilitating developments that inhibited the establishment of a rule-based democratic society. The country was plunged into civil conflict and steep economic decline while having to contend with heavy-handed efforts by Moscow to reassert its long standing influence over Georgian affairs. The citizenry was ill prepared to cope with the multiple convulsions engulfing the country. Fledgling democratic governance remains weak and rampant corruption continues to undermine the prospects for second-generation political reforms and economic revival. The present political system in Georgia has many of the formal attributes of democracy, but its institutions and processes are underdeveloped. Ensuring Georgia's security in part by integrating into European structures, establishing central authority, and building a functioning market-based democracy has commanded the attention and resources of the political leadership, leaving little room on the national agenda for democracy promotion abroad.

Georgia is widely acknowledged as the most democratically developed country in the trans-Caspian region but it does little to advance the cause of democratic stability in neighboring countries despite the benefits Tbilisi could be expected to reap.[1] Georgian foreign policy has centered on security and economic cooperation, much of the latter tied to pipeline and transportation routes for the oil and mineral rich trans-Caspian region. Vulnerability due in part to Russian meddling has made Georgia even more inclined to embrace the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. This is the case even where democracy and human rights norms are routinely transgressed and despite Georgia's enthusiastic membership in pan-European organizations such as the OSCE, which is deeply concerned about democracy and human rights standards.

As a small country in a volatile region that has rendered security a scarce commodity, Georgia must constantly take into account the interests of its neighbors: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkey, and above all Russia.

That Georgia does not have any territorial claims against its neighbors eliminates one source of friction in the region and permits Georgia to use its territory as a neutral site for bringing together feuding Armenians and Azerbaijanis.

In addition to its membership in OSCE, Georgia also joined the Russia-dominated Commonwealth of Independent States, perhaps because its physical distance from the West precluded the kind of strategic alliance that the Shevardnadze leadership would prefer. Simple geography preordains that Russia will be a major factor in Georgian foreign policy calculations and provides Tbilisi with every incentive to reach accommodation with Moscow.[2]

Russia has intervened intermittently in ethnic-regional conflicts in Georgia since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Beginning in 1992-93, Tbilisi accused Moscow of lending support to Abkhazian separatists, while ostensibly trying to play a mediating role in the conflict. In South Ossetia, another area threatening secession, Moscow again sought a role that Georgia did not find helpful. The continuing presence of Russian troops in the Caucasus reflects Moscow's determination to safeguard Russia's broader geopolitical and economic interests in the region, particularly in light of the growing involvement of Turkey (which has lobbied for a Baku-Supsa-Jeikhan pipeline) and the West because of energy resources.[3]

Georgia has also managed to attract considerable support --political, diplomatic and financial-- from the West, a testament both to Shevardnadze's earlier role as Soviet Foreign Minister skillfully negotiating a peaceful dénouement to the Cold War and, to a lesser degree, the country's strategic location and credible progress in building a democratic system.

RESPONSE TO OVERTHROW OF DEMOCRATICALLY-ELECTED GOVERNMENTS

During the period under review, the broadly defined European region did not experience a case of an overthrown democracy, although some nominally elected leaders in the former Soviet Republics resorted to undemocratic measures to retain control. This was of little consequence to Tbilisi. Likewise, coups in major countries such as Pakistan, a country with which Georgia has only weak ties, did not cause any deviation in Tbilisi's international posture. The Georgian government did not react to the overthrow of the elected government in Pakistan or in more distant countries such as Nigeria and Peru.

RESPONSE TO MANIPULATION OF ELECTORAL PROCESSES

Georgia said little and did even less in the face of electoral malpractice, which was rampant in the former Soviet Union, including Georgia's own share of shortcomings.[4] Governing elites in many of the former Soviet republics found it difficult to discontinue the tradition of electoral manipulation inherited from the communist period. OSCE, Council of Europe and local monitors dutifully chronicled pre-election and voting day violations but Georgian officials offered neither criticism nor endorsement of the reports.

Not only did the Georgian government refrain from any criticism of electoral irregularities or outright fraud in countries such as Belarus, Uzbekistan, Ukraine Azerbaijan and Armenia, but in many instances it willingly congratulated the perpetrators on their tainted victories.[5] Georgia was even less inclined to take any action, such as joining in sanctions imposed on any of these countries, especially its fellow members of the GUUAM alliance. For example, Georgia supported the Kuchma government in the face of international criticism on democracy and human rights issues, appreciative of Ukraine's constructive efforts to mediate conflicts in the Caucasus.[6]

PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRACY

The newly independent countries of the former Soviet Union were eager to become integrated into the international political system, which also meant membership in regional and global institutions. Aware that the country's successful transition would depend in large part on support from the international community, Georgia's political leadership wanted to play an active role in these institutions, a number of which have a mandate to promote democratic political development and adherence to international human rights norms.[7]

Georgia has signed numerous conventions and multilateral agreements in the democracy sphere but has done little to distinguish itself as an active promoter of democracy strengthening on an international basis. In 1999 Georgia became the first among the three Caucasian countries states to be admitted into the Council of Europe, which required

the Georgian parliament (regarded as one of the most reform minded in the former Soviet Union) to ratify various European conventions on human rights and to bring domestic law in conformity with its international legal commitments.[8]

Georgia's weak record on democracy and human rights, a fact documented in the U.S. State Department's annual report and findings by the Council of Europe, explains some of the reluctance on the part of the Georgian government to judge the democratic shortcomings of other countries. Even in the egregious case of Russia's resort to indiscriminate force in the war in Chechnya, Georgia considers it an internal matter and voted to restore Moscow's voting rights after they were suspended by the Council of Europe over the conflict in Chechnya.[9]

Georgia's poor record of promoting international democracy comes against the backdrop of substantial development assistance flowing to Georgia from the U.S. and the European Union, a modest portion of which was to support programs to bolster the rule of law, strengthen the judiciary and parliament, empower civil society, and fight corruption. This assistance did not translate into meaningful Georgian support for democracy promotion efforts in international fora. For its part, Georgia's comparatively well developed non-governmental sector also has been inwardly focused in terms of pressing for deeper political reform. It is only just beginning to explore opportunities to encourage the government to use Georgia's participation in regional and global organizations to work on behalf of democracy beyond the country's borders.

POLICY TOWARDS ENTRENCHED DICTATORSHIPS

Since attaining independence, Georgia has taken few if any steps aimed at loosening the grip of dictatorial regimes in its region. Despite ample opportunities given the democracy deficit in the region and Georgia's membership in organizations involved in democracy building, Tbilisi has issued no statements condemning entrenched dictatorship.

For reasons discussed throughout this essay, the Georgian government has not moved to criticize or otherwise undertake measures to confront authoritarian leaders and regimes in the region or elsewhere. Concerns over security and economic relations trump any thought that Tbilisi might have about lending support to efforts to create more open societies in countries such as Belarus, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. It is not clear that the political elite feels any sense of responsibility to help promote democracy, even rhetorically, despite the external assistance Georgians have received to help them move away from communist authoritarianism.

With regard to Belarus, Georgia did not criticize Lukashenko's repressive rule and never countenanced following the lead of Western countries in imposing sanctions. On the contrary, the Georgian government has publicly congratulated the leader on the occasion of his dubious electoral victory and looked to broaden discussions on economic relations.[10]

Democracy-related crises in Ukraine, a country like Georgia that had registered substantial progress in constructing a democratic political order, did not elicit any comment from Tbilisi other than these were internal matters and that Georgia hoped the resignation of reformist Prime Minister Yushenko would not lead to any change in Ukraine's policy toward Georgia.[11]

In the case of Yugoslavia during the dictatorship of Slobodan Milosevic, Georgia did observe sanctions imposed by the international community and Georgian military forces did participate in the peacekeeping operation in Kosovo within the framework of collaboration with NATO. President Shevardnadze welcomed the demise of the Milosevic regime and expressed Georgia's readiness to collaborate with democratic Yugoslavia while acknowledging the importance of the democratic choice made by the Serbian people.[12]

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[1] Karatnycky, Adrian. Nations in Transit: Civil Society, Democracy, and Markets in East Central Europe and the Newly Independent States. New York: Transaction Pub, 2001.
[2] Smith, Graham. The Post-Soviet States: Mapping the Politics of Transition. Edward Arnold, 1999.
[3] Glonti, Georgi. Georgia at the Crossroads. Demokratizatsiya, 2000.
[4] Daily News. 17 April 2000. President Clinton sent a letter to his Georgian counterpart expressing the hope that President Shevardnadze "will cooperate with the OSCE to review all remarks on the violations. ...and will make the appropriate adjustments to the [electoral] legislation."
[5] Daily News. 10 September 2001.

[6] Sarke. 4 April 2000. According to the head of the Georgian delegation, M. Saakashvili, Georgia assured Ukraine, as its strategic partner and a friendly nation, that Georgia would lend support on the question of Ukraine maintaining its membership in the Council of Europe.
[7] Foreign Minister I. Menagarishvili speech at press conference. 10 January 2002.
[8] Statement made by the Chairman Hans-Christian Kruger at press conference, Tbilisi, 30 March 2000.
[9] Georgia will hold an active position on Chechnya at the forthcoming OSCE summit - Statement from the Georgian Foreign Ministry's Public Information Department, 12 Nov. 1999; Daily News. 26 January 2001.
[10] Sarke Info 27 June 2001, 10 September 2001.
[11] Sarke Info 27 April 2001.
[12] Radio Interview of President Shevardnadze. 9 October 2000.

Germany

Assessment: Good

Trend: ⇔

Capital: Berlin
Type of Government: Federal Republic
Head of Government: Chancellor Gerard Schroeder (since 27 October 1998)
Minister of Foreign Affairs: Joschka Fischer
Population: 83,029,536
Human Development Index Ranking 2002: 17

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Germany has a **good** record of support for democracy abroad, and has taken increasingly assertive steps to become an honest broker in international conflicts and a benevolent promoter and financier of democratic principles and governance. Such efforts are driven by Germany's dual quests for sovereign consolidation following reunification and for more active international engagement. Germany has conducted its democracy support policy through bilateral assistance to grassroots activities and intense involvement in multilateral organizations, particularly the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU). Unilateral responses to democratic threats in Africa, Latin America or Asia, however, are chosen carefully. Economic sanctions, in particular, have gained German support only if imposed by multilateral bodies. Germany has publicly supported democratic opposition movements to dislodge entrenched dictatorships, granted asylum to many democratic activists and been the main driving force for the promotion of democratic principles in the EU and the accession countries as well as in the EU's international policy.[1]

Germany's commitment to the promotion of democracy is subject to some criticism, however, in light of its close ties to non-democratic regimes, including continued weapons exports.[2] The team of Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, while reducing the primacy of shorter-term economic interests in the conduct of Germany's international relations, has still made such self-serving considerations an important dimension of foreign policy, sometimes at the expense of democratic principles.[3]

FOREIGN RELATIONS BACKGROUND

Following reunification, Germany took its place in the international system as a more "normal" country, less constrained to change in world affairs. Under the Social Democratic/Green coalition of Chancellor Schroeder and Foreign Minister Fischer, Germany has participated in military operations outside the NATO area (Kosovo, Afghanistan) for the first time since World War II. Especially since 1998, Germany has pursued a more active role in Europe and the rest of the world.[4]

Since the defeat of the Nazi regime in 1945, German foreign policy has sought to balance national self-restraint with staunch support for multilateralism. For historical reasons, this approach has been manifested in the promotion of collective solutions rather than isolationism, and in preventive action rather than full-fledged interventionism. Germany's most important foreign policy platforms are the EU, NATO, OSCE, the Council of Europe (CoE), and the UN, where Germany has been pushing for a permanent seat on the Security Council. Through these institutions and in its bilateral relations, Germany's support for democracy abroad has been quite strong.

Germany's vision for a greater international role has been widely supported by the international community. Germany hosted the UN conference for an interim government for Afghanistan in December 2001 at the explicit request of the UN, the Afghan leadership and the governments of the neighboring states. Even among non-democratic regimes, such as China, Germany is less likely to be perceived as pursuing a

political-cultural quest for geo-strategic advantage than are many other Western powers. These regimes thus look to Germany to mediate democracy-related issues for them in the international arena.

Relations with neighbors are largely friendly, inclusive and cooperative, apart from occasional tensions such as those arising from democratic failings in Slovakia under the Meciar government and in Belarus under President Lukashenko. Germany also faced a tricky challenge with regard to troubling political trends in Austria, ultimately supporting the EU-sponsored diplomatic isolation of the country's right wing government.

Russia is the single most important case where German foreign policy has been guided by traditional conceptions of national interest, rather than by a desire to promote democratic practices and values. Despite indiscriminate use of force against civilians in Russia's would-be breakaway republic of Chechnya, and increasing levels of state repression across Russia, Germany has consistently opted for cooperation while downplaying or ignoring democratic shortcomings with governments in Moscow. Official relations have never been as good as during the Schroeder-Putin era, yet within Germany, criticism towards what some view as the political leadership's excessively accommodationist policy has been mounting.[5]

RESPONSE TO OVERTHROW OF DEMOCRATICALLY-ELECTED GOVERNMENTS

Germany rarely remains passive in the face of an overthrow of a democratically elected government. German responses have included rhetorical condemnation, the freezing of diplomatic relations, reductions in cultural exchanges and carefully calibrated suspensions of either trade or development aid. Germany has voted consistently on the pro-democracy side in the UN Security Council and General Assembly following coups or other disruptions in the democratic order.[6]

Germany joined the UN oil and trade embargo against Yugoslavia in 1992, and supported subsequent efforts by the UN and EU to expand and toughen sanctions. German governments publicly and financially supported the democratic opposition in Serbia and deployed election monitors in 2000.

In the case of the Pakistani coup in 1999, the German government summoned Pakistan's ambassador on the very evening of the coup to express public concern over the military's ousting of the Sharif Administration and to urge a non-violent resolution. Swift, but less commendable, action followed the unsuccessful April 2002 coup in Venezuela, when President Hugo Chavez was forced to resign before the coup plot disintegrated. The German government called for the crisis to be resolved without more violence, but did not explicitly invoke democratic principles or concerns.[7] With regard to Haiti, Germany fully endorsed the EU common policy of 1994 to restore democratic rule. The EU Commission viewed democratic restoration as a prerequisite for normalization of relations between the EU countries and Haiti. In a statement in 1999, the EU urged the Haitian leadership to hold democratic elections and offered its support for preparing and conducting them.

The creation of a coalition government in Austria that included Haider's right-wing party set off alarm bells around Europe. In several capitals, officials feared that Haider's disturbing anti-immigrant rhetoric would be translated into policy and thereby erode Austrian democracy. Germany supported the EU-led diplomatic isolation of the incoming government, touching off some controversy at home in the process.[8] The conservative German opposition criticized the government, stating, "Germany has a responsibility to act as a mediator rather than stir up differences."[9] When the sanctions were lifted in September 2000, Schroeder said he would neither travel to Austria that year nor receive any official visits from Vienna. The Austrian precedent led to a German-backed initiative in the EU's Treaty of Nice, which introduced a process for monitoring states viewed as at risk of violating EU principles of freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law.

RESPONSE TO MANIPULATION OF ELECTORAL PROCESSES

Over the past decade, Germany has demonstrated a strong commitment to democratic electoral processes abroad. Throughout the 1990s, Germany deployed election monitors worldwide under the auspices of a number of multilateral organizations, publicly condemned electoral malfeasance, and supported imposition of sanctions in some cases.[10]

In response to flawed elections in Africa, the former Soviet Union and elsewhere, Germany supported EU recommended actions, which included strong public criticism, collective sanctions, and the monitoring of elections. Germany has contributed observers to all relevant election

monitoring missions over the past decade, from Namibia and Kenya to Belarus and countries of the former Soviet Union where OSCE missions frequently found sitting governments guilty of electoral manipulation. Most recently, in February 2002, the German government condemned the flawed electoral process in Zimbabwe, charging that an irresponsible regime was driving Zimbabwe into the ecological, social and political abyss. Germany joined the EU in imposing sanctions against Zimbabwean government, including denying President Mugabe and some twenty of his cronies entry into all member countries of the EU and freezing their assets were frozen. Development Minister Heidi Wieczorek-Zeul reiterated, "there will be no cooperation with the Mugabe regime." [11] Aid was halted, except for HIV/AIDS and anti-poverty projects. In Namibia, Germany remained silent with regard to President Nujoma's 1999 bid to change the constitution in order to stay in power for a third term.

PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRACY

Germany's active promotion of democracy through foreign policy reached a turning point in 1998 with the change of government from Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister Kinkel to the Schroeder-Fischer team. Development cooperation was elevated both in institutional and financial terms. A range of policy areas with democracy agendas, such as the Central and Eastern Europe program *Transform* and the *Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe,* were transferred to the Federal Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development (*Bundesministerium fuer Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit, BMZ*), which acquired a seat on Germany's national security council. In 2001, the agency's budget was 7.2 billion DEM, of which a relatively modest percentage went to the UN and international NGOs. Sponsored projects and programs concern mostly conflict prevention, building democratic structures, and strengthening civil society.

In multilateral bodies such as the UN, EU, NATO, OSCE and the CoE, Germany has been a steadfast supporter and perennial initiator of international democracy efforts.[12] The Schroeder/Fischer government increased the German staff in the civilian missions of the UN and the OSCE. Germany lobbied for a stronger mandate for the OSCE and its related Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). Currently, Germans account for some 10 percent of all the OSCE field mission international staff, and Berlin finances about the same share of the cost of the largest OSCE missions (Kosovo, Bosnia, Croatia). In 1999, the Foreign Ministry introduced a training program for UN and OSCE field missions (*Aktion Ziviles Friedenspersonal*), which trains about 250 people annually.[13]

Within Europe, Germany is the key advocate for incorporating the European Charter of Basic Rights into EU treaties so as to "strengthen the democratic principle within the EU."[14] With regard to the EU accession states, Germany has been a strong voice insisting that would-be members meet the 1993 Copenhagen criteria.[15] Under these criteria, countries are eligible for EU accession only if they meet specific standards governing democratic governance, the rule of law, and the protection of human and minority rights. For example, German officials made clear that under the Meciar government, Slovakia fell well short of meeting the requisite democracy-related standards for EU as well as NATO membership.

In 1999, Germany proposed the *European Stability Pact* for the political and economic consolidation of Southeastern Europe,[16] which epitomizes German democratization efforts over the past decade. Within the Pact, the bulk of German aid is devoted to democracy-promotion programs such as strengthening independent media and civil society, institution building, and education.[17] Germany has also participated militarily in all UN missions in the Balkan region, assisted with civil policing, provided electoral-related assistance, and supported mediation stabilization efforts in Montenegro and Macedonia.

German development policy overseas rests on the principles of "human rights, democratic structures, rule of law and good governance."[18] Beginning under Chancellor Kohl, Development Minister Carl-Dieter Spranger pioneered efforts to ensure that German development assistance was conditioned on a country's ability to meet these principles.[19] On the basis of these criteria, Germany suspended aid to Togo and Zaire in the 1990s, and supported Nicaragua only after the defeat of the Sandinistas. In 1999, the Schroeder government urged its colleagues in the G-8 to condition debt relief on "responsible governance and poverty relief."[20]

Germany's policy towards Africa has undergone three phases over the past decade. During the Kohl years, some 40 percent of Official

Development Assistance (ODA) was directed towards Africa. Under the 1993 *Ten Guidelines of Accra*, a document designed to stimulate political reform, aid was conditioned on political stability and the protection of human rights. In the late 1990s, Germany's involvement in Africa was much diminished politically and financially. Embassies and cultural institutes were closed, and few politicians continued to lobby for assistance for Africa. Over the last two years, there has been renewed involvement in Africa. Berlin has stated its commitment to the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the New Economic Plan for African Development (NEPAD), which hopes to attract external investment in exchange for political and economic reforms.[21]

German assistance to developing countries fell to a historic low of 0.26 percent of GNP in 1998, a constant level of about 5.5 billion Euros. A little less than one-half was devoted to social infrastructure and services, which includes support for state and civil society, basic education, and demographic and health programs. Support for democracy programs is still a relatively small proportion of total development aid. Consistent with an EU resolution, however, ODA, including the share dedicated to democracy programs, is scheduled to rise in the coming years.

German party foundations (such as the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, and the Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung) also play a key role in good governance capacity building abroad. They receive most of their funding from the BMZ and run a large number of overseas offices and political development and training projects, including in the Middle East. These entities cooperate with civil society actors in the target countries to strengthen oversight of government activities and defend political rights as well as civil liberties. They "have proved successful instruments in generating networks of contacts between domestic and foreign legislators, party leaders and activists, trade unionists, journalists and politically-active academics, and in particular in providing easier contact with political oppositions. (...) This has given [Germany] major influence abroad at the sub-governmental level."[22] Civil society projects and academic and cultural exchange are also undertaken by the *Goethe Institute Inter Nationes* (128 institutes in 76 countries) and the *Robert Bosch Foundation*. While the German media remains a key forum for the discussion of foreign policy issues, new loci for debate have emerged from intensified links between government, NGOs, churches and business.[23] New think tanks have been created, and traditional ones have freed themselves from domestic political forces.[24]

POLICY TOWARDS ENTRENCHED DICTATORSHIPS

German policy towards entrenched dictatorships frequently entails open support of democratic opposition forces and the imposition of sanctions, if under the auspices of multilateral bodies. Germany supported the EU suspension of aid to Sudan, Togo, Zaire, Sierra Leone, Haiti and Malawi in the 1990s. In the case of Togo, Germany shunned the regime and publicly sided with the opposition in the run-up to the 1998 elections. In Nigeria, German companies, with the support of the German government, withdrew from the country on grounds of human rights violations under the Abacha military regime.

Although many democracy and human rights activists have complained that Germany and the EU have not taken a sufficiently strong stance against the autocratic rule of Aleksandr Lukashenko in Belarus, Germany has publicly criticized the regime and pursued a policy that combines pressure and dialogue. In 1998, the German government participated in the EU-wide action of a temporary closure of all embassies in Minsk. In the same year, following the initiative of the German delegates to the European Parliament (EP), a dialogue was established between legislators, representatives of the "Charter 97" democracy movement and the independent media in Belarus. On that occasion, a German parliamentarian reiterated that the EP continued to support the legitimate parliament that Lukashenko had dissolved in 1997. An unsuccessful effort to press for political liberalization was undertaken by the German Hans-Georg Wieck, head of the OSCE mission to Belarus from 1997 to 2001. While Wieck succeeded in persuading Lukashenko to allow for the presence of OSCE election monitors in 2001, the elections were, nonetheless, deeply flawed. In light of mounting personal threats Wieck stepped down, yet he remained adamant about retaining contacts with Belarus. "Democracy can only come through participation. Boycott does not help."[25] He also reiterated that the democratic opposition had to be supported despite its weakness and fragmentation. German NGOs and party foundations helped collect money to shelter the prominent, pro-democratic Belarusian writer, Wassil Bykau.[26]

Germany has also tried to varying degrees to promote democratic political reform in North Korea and China. Germany has supported EU efforts to encourage the North Korean government to pursue reconciliation with the South and to undertake desperately needed economic and political reforms. With respect to China, German policy is driven by the view that "democratization will never work as a transfer of ideology, but solely as a functional part of a successful economic policy."[27] While this could be dismissed as nothing more than an excuse to carry on business as usual by deflecting criticism from democracy and human rights proponents, the Schroeder/Fischer government has sought to address human rights issues under the heading of a "judicial dialogue," a mostly sub-governmental approach.

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[1]Since 1998 for example, the German government devoted 300.000 Euro for the initiative "Writers in Exile," and four cities (Berlin, Frankfurt/Main, Weimar, Hanover) are committed to become "Cities of Asylum" for persecuted artists. Koch, Walter. "Das Elend neuer Grauzonen. Zum Zustand "Europaeischer Fluchtoeffentlichkei." Frankfurter Rundschau, 11 April 2002, <http://www.business.reuters.com>.

[2] According to the 2001annual report of the platform "Gemeinsame Konferenz Kirche und Entwicklung" (GKKE), the German weapon export industry has become more transparent after 1998. Yet its amount has –despite initial promises of the new government - not decreased throughout the survey period. Germany is the world's 5th most important weapon exporter, selling military equipment of around 2.5 billion Euro abroad. While the majority goes to NATO countries (number one recipient is Turkey), still nearly 50 % of all exports are sold to developing countries as varied as Israel, Uzbekistan, South Africa and South Korea. Jung, Rainer. Das Lob fuer die rot-gruene Ruestungsexport-Politik haelt sich in Grenzen." Frankfurter Rundschau, 18 Dec. 2001. <http://www.business.reuters.com>.

[3] "Germany resolves to pursue its interests." The Economist, 13 July 1996, < http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe>. In the same article, Angelika Volle of Bonn's Foreign Policy Institute is quoted saying that "Germany's international agenda is driven by business, and by what business can do for employment."

[4] Otte, Max. A Rising Middle Power? German Foreign Policy in Transformation, 1989 – 1999. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000. p. 200.

[5] A highly qualified voice of criticism towards the accommodating rhetoric of the *Petersburg Dialogue*, as the German-Russian bilateral cultural relationship has been labeled, was raised by Margolina, Sonja. "Toedlicher Rettungsring. Die russische Nomenklatura simuliert die Zivilgesellschaft." Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. 7 Aug. 2001, p. 39. Chancellor Schroeder's rhetoric defense of Putin's moves against freedom of the media and freedom of speech in an interview with the radiostation Echo Moskwy in April 2001 are documented in Siegl, Elfi. "Wissen Sie, dass Sie im Antiregierungssender sprechen?" Bundeskanzler Schroeder stellt sich im Rundfunk der russischen Oeffentlichkeit. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 11 April 2001, p. 5.

[6] See voting patterns in the UN SC and UN General Assembly at <http://unbisnet.un.org/webpac-1.2/index.htm>.

[7] "Nations deplore violence in Venezuela, urge return to democracy." EFE News Services 12 April 2002 <http://www.efenews.com >.

[8] Dempsey, Judy and Wolfgang Proissl. "Schroeder erinnert Berlusconi and 'gemeinsame Werte' Europas." Financial Times Deutschland 15 May 2001.

[9] "Stoiber: Ich habe mit Haider politisch nichts gemein." Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 12 Feb. 2000.

[10] Between 1996 and 1998, 400 German election observers were deployed to 48 missions, mostly in CEE, CIS, SEE and Russia. In 1999, 13 of the 100 EU-election monitors for Nigerian elections were German. In the same year, 14 Germans participated in the monitoring mission to Indonesia. In 2000, Germany deployed 172 monitors to 22 monitoring missions, among them the presidential elections in Russia (25 German monitors). In 2001, Germany sent 83 election monitors to 15 monitoring missions, among them the presidential elections in Belarus (14 German monitors). German observers were also deployed to the EU monitoring mission in East Timor. All numbers available from "5. Bericht der Bundesregierung über ihre Menschenrechtspolitik in den auswärtigen Beziehungen" < http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/de/aussenpolitik/menschenrechte/mr_inhalte_ziele/mrb/kapitel_6_html>.

[11] "Deutschland ueberdenkt Entwicklungshilfe fuer Simbabwe." Reuters German Language News 14 March 2002, <http://www.business.reuters.com>.

[12] In the UN, Germany shares the principle that "human rights, democracy and good governance need to filtrate into all political realms, most of all our peace- and development policy." (see "5. Bericht der Bundesregierung über ihre Menschenrechtspolitik in den auswärtigen Beziehungen." <http://www.auswaertiges-

amt.de/www/de/aussenpolitik/menschenrechte/mr_inhalte_ziele/mrb/kapitel_6_html>. The German government has supported the counseling services and the human rights field missions of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. During its EU Presidency, Germany lobbied intensely on behalf of the *UN Additional Protocol Against Any Discrimination of Women*, underscoring its strong support for womens' rights and the role of the UN in promoting them. In 2001, Germany lobbied in the UN commission on human rights for a Cuban text contending that economic development and fulfillment of basic human needs are the "sine qua non condition for an effective democracy," and launched a successful initiative in the Commission to adopt its proposed text on "adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living." See Dennis, Michael J. The American Journal of International Law, 01/2002. < http://www.business.reuters.com>.

[13] As of spring 2002, this "Aktion Ziviles Friedenspersonal" provided over a pool of 700 trained stand-by personnel. <www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/de/infoservice/presse/index_html?bereich_id=17&type_id=0&archiv_id=2314detail=1>.

[14] <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de>.

[15] "5. Bericht der Bundesregierung über ihre Menschenrechtspolitik in den auswärtigen Beziehungen" <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/de/aussenpolitik/menschenrechte/mr_inhalte_ziele/mrb/kapitel_6_html>.

[16] "The initiative for this regional and multi-dimensional stabilization concept came from the German Foreign Ministry." (Nachtwei, Winfried. Gewaltvorbeugung konkret: Unterstuetzung internationaler Massnahmen der Krisenpraevention und Friedenserhaltung durch die Bundesregierung. <http://www.nachtwei.de/zkb/gewaltvorbeugen_konkret.htm>.

The *European Stability Pact* was launched against the background of Slobodan Milosevic's continuing hold on power in Belgrad. Serbia was not included as a recipient of the Pact aid flows until 2002. An important political motivation behind the Pact and its early activities was thus the need to signal to the people of Serbia that Europe was willing to help them only once the Milosevic regime was removed from power. The Pact also played a role in wider international efforts to support the democratic opposition in Serbia, which succeeded in toppling Milosevic following elections in September 2000. See Cox, Marcus, et al. "Democracy, Security and The Future of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe." 4 April 2001. <http://www.esiweb.org/pages/rep/rep_stab3.html>.

[17] See exact financing in Nachtwei, Winfried. "*Gewaltvorbeugung konkret: Unterstuetzung internationaler Massnahmen der Krisenpraevention und Friedenserhaltung durch die Bundesregierung.*" <http://www.nachtwei.de/zkb/gewaltvorbeugen_konkret.htm>.

[18] Government of Germany. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Entwicklungspolitik in der 15. Legislaturperiode. <http://www.bmz.de/infothek/aktuell/ausgangslage/index.html>.

[19] Schweiz, C.W., "Entwicklungshilfe Ohne Ideologischen Ballast – Gespraech mit dem deutschen Minister Spranger." Neue Zuercher Zeitung, 17 March 1994 < http://www.business.reuters.com>.

[20] <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de>.

[21] Government of Germany. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Entwicklungspolitik in der 15. Legislaturperiode. <http://www.bmz.de/infothek/aktuell/ausgangslage/index.html>.

[22] Pinto-Duschinsky, Michael. "Foreign political aid: the German political foundations and their US counterparts." International Affairs 67(1)/1991, p. 33 – 63.

[23] An example is the "*Forum fuer globale Fragen*" in Berlin, which brings public and private sector actors together. See <www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/de/infoservice/presse/index_html?bereich_id=17&type_id=0&archiv_id=742&detail=1>.

[24] Examples are the Berlin-based "European Stability Initiative" monitoring progress in South-eastern Europe, or the German Institute for Human Rights, informing the government on the human rights situation in Germany and abroad.[24] Other key players are the EastWest Institute and the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, which also hosts a European research cell (Conflict Prevention Network).

[25] "Im Bann des bizarren Praesidenten." Der Standard. 3 Feb. 2001 < http://www.business.reuters.com>.

[26] "Weissrusslands Praesident Alexander Lukaschenko." Berliner Zeitung 24 Jan. 2000. <http://www.business.reuters.com>.

[27] Krautscheid, Andreas. "Zehn Jahre Tienanmen. Ritualisierte Empoerug – oekonomische Kurzsichtigkeit?" Internationale Politik June 1999, p. 49-50.



Ghana

Assessment: Good
Trend: ⇑
Capital: Accra
Type of Government: Constitutional Democracy
Head of Government: President John Agyekum Kufuor (since 7 January 2001)
Foreign Minister: Hackman Owusu-Agyeman
Population: 19,894,014
Human Development Index Ranking 2002: 129

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Ghana's record of support for democracy abroad in the last ten years has shifted from fair to **good** as the country itself has undergone a transition to democratic rule within this same period.

A key factor influencing Ghana's record is the fact that former President Jerry Rawlings began his 19-year period of leadership (1981-2000) as a military ruler who led a coup d'etat against an elected government. Therefore, he was less inclined to condemn other military dictatorships or military coups outright. His comments and speeches often contained mixed messages about the value of democracy,[1] and he regularly showed sympathy for regimes perceived to be under siege from Western pressure. However, his personal experience made him a good candidate to negotiate with other coup-makers and rebels, which helped bring about agreements for democratic reforms in neighboring countries like Liberia and Sierra Leone.

More recently, President Kufour has had a stronger platform from which to support democracy around the world. He belongs to a political party that has a long tradition of espousing the ideals of constitutionality, and he won power in 2000 through elections that were universally acclaimed as being free and fair. Ghana is now viewed as a model democratic transition, and President Kufour is seen as a keen advocate of democracy on the continent. President Kufour was one of the few African leaders to openly condemn the manipulation of the recent elections in Zimbabwe. However, he has, in several instances, chosen domestic strategic interests over the promotion of democracy abroad. In his short time as president, he has fostered close cooperation with authoritarian leaders in the sub-region including Burkina Faso's Blaise Campoare and Togo's Nyasinbge Eyadema. Nevertheless the trend shows that Ghana has steadily improved its support for democracy abroad since Kufour took over from Jerry Rawlings two years ago.

FOREIGN RELATIONS BACKGROUND

Ghana's foreign relations is structured around three major goals: attracting development assistance and investment capital, maintaining friendly ties with neighbors, and playing an active and constructive role in international and regional fora by engaging in peacekeeping and election monitoring missions. These goals reflect pragmatism dictated by poor economic conditions and the need to compete globally for development assistance.

In the early 1980s, for instance, Ghana agreed to embark on IMF / World Bank sponsored program of economic and political liberalization in order to attract development aid and foreign investment. It has also maintained good relations with Nigeria (from whom Ghana receives crude oil at concessionary prices) and Cote d'Ivoire (which provides electrical energy supplements when needed) irrespective of the type of leadership governing those states. Ghana is cognizant of its weak capacity for unilateral action in the international arena and hence augments its power by developing close ties (usually at the presidential level) with more powerful states. Towards this goal, President Rawlings traveled extensively to several Western capitals and hosted visits by President Clinton, Queen Elizabeth II and many other dignitaries. Since President Kufour came to power in 2001 he has also enjoyed a special relationship with the West.

Ghana's limited capacity for unilateral action also has led it to pursue many foreign policy activities through multilateral channels such as the United Nations, the African Union (AU), and the Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS). Membership in these organizations provide Ghana with a platform for protecting some of its interests as well as to establish itself as a leader on several issues of concern to the African continent. For example, through the UN and ECOWAS, Ghana has been able to engage in numerous peacekeeping missions, which earns it international respect as a partner for global stability and a moral leader in African affairs. But Ghana's involvement in international peacekeeping functions is sometimes also driven more by a desire to raise funds for its military than peace and security concerns. Such pragmatism allows Ghana to influence events in neighboring African countries sometimes to an extent that belies her small size and resources.

Ghana's other foreign relations "assets" include its status as a "role model" and the prominent role several Ghanaian nationals play in the international system. Ghana's "role model" status arises out of the country's position as the first African state south of the Sahara to gain independence from colonial rule and the dynamic leadership of its first president, Kwame Nkrumah, in the Pan-Africanist movement. The decision to implement World Bank sponsored economic reform programs two decades ago and recent democratic reforms have also reinforced the "role model" image and somewhat established Ghana as a leader of the movement for political change and rejuvenation of the African continent. The recent electoral victory of the opposition National Patriotic Party (NPP) and former President Jerry Rawlings' decision to peacefully leave office after his constitutionally prescribed term limit, for instance, were seen as symbolic lessons for other African leaders.

The leadership positions occupied by Ghanaian nationals in various multilateral institutions also enhance the country's profile in the international system. The current heads of the UN (Kofi Annan), ECOWAS (Ibn Chambas) and the Economic Commission for Africa (K.Y. Amoako) are Ghanaians. The country takes credit for the works of these and others nationals in the field of international diplomacy and often supports their work by launching mediation sessions to bring peace to war-torn countries such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the Cote d'Ivoire and also by hosting conferences that enhance the prospects for democracy and development in Africa.

RESPONSE TO OVERTHROW OF DEMOCRATICALLY-ELECTED GOVERNMENTS

Ghana's record of response to the overthrow of democratically-elected governments has been mixed. For most of the Rawlings years, Ghana was less willing to unilaterally condemn military takeovers but nevertheless worked through regional institutions to promote reconciliation and a return to constitutional rule.

In the case of the April 1999 coup in Niger, for instance, the Ghanaian government did not strongly condemn the overthrow of the democratically-elected government of Ibrahim Bare Mainassara. This was partly because Jerry Rawlings (himself a three-time coup maker whose recent stint in office began with the overthrow of democratically-elected government of President Hilla Limann)[2], was not in a strong moral position to condemn the overthrow of democratically-elected regimes elsewhere. Another reason for the poor response to the Niger coup is the fact that Ghana has neither strategic interests in nor special ties to the country. Hence Jerry Rawlings did not invest any significant resources into cultivating a friendship with its leadership as he did with Presidents Konan Bedie of neighboring Cote d'Ivoire and Sani Abacha of Nigeria (Ghana's principal ally in West Africa).

Personal friendships were an important aspect of foreign relations under Rawlings. In the case of the Cote d'Ivoire coup (1999) for instance, ousted President Bedie, a personal friend of Mr. Rawlings, paid a visit to Ghana to enlist the support for his return to power. The Rawlings government condemned the coup and declared that the Ivorian junta would not enjoy any support from Ghana. The government, however, refrained from applying any unilateral measures to force the coup leader, General Robert Guei, out of office and instead limited its involvement to an ECOWAS mediation plan that eventually persuaded General Guei to hold elections in October 2000. Rawlings supported the return of Bedie (who was the guest of honor at Ghana's 40th independence anniversary in 1997) in spite of the fact that he was widely believed to have

rigged the October 1995 elections that confirmed him in power.

Since becoming President, Kufour has also fostered a close relationship with neighboring leaders such as Bedie's successor, Laurent Gbagbo. The Kufour regime therefore responded to the recent coup attempt against Mr. Gbagbo (September 2002) with an immediate and strong condemnation of the coup plotters. Ghana has since hosted an ECOWAS summit on the reconciliation process in Cote d'Ivoire and has promised to send troops as part of any ECOWAS peacekeeping presence.

RESPONSE TO MANIPULATION OF ELECTORAL PROCESSES

Ghana has a mixed record on response to the manipulation of electoral processes abroad. Under Rawlings, Ghana failed to openly condemn the manipulation of electoral processes abroad. Rawlings' government had itself been accused of rigging elections in 1992, and was therefore not inclined to point a finger at anyone else. Accordingly, the Rawlings regime failed to condemn the annulment of the 1993 elections in Nigeria. Rawlings may also have shied away from condemning Nigeria (an important trading partner and regional ally), because of fear of reprisals from Abuja. Nigeria supplies Ghana with oil on favorable terms and there is a large Ghanaian immigrant population living in Nigeria. The deportation of approximately one million Ghanaian immigrants from Nigeria in the mid-eighties was the cause of severe instability in the Ghanaian economy. Therefore the Ghanaian government has tried to maintain a policy of friendly relations with whichever government is in power in Nigeria regardless of their democratic or human rights record.

In the Cote d'Ivoire case, President Bedie was perceived by several observers to have manipulated the elections that confirmed him as President in 1995. The Ghana government's silence may have been due to the personal friendship between Mr. Bedie and Mr. Rawlings as well as Ghana's strategic and economic relationship with Cote d'Ivoire.

In a clear departure from Rawlings, John Kufour's administration has openly condemned attempts by foreign governments to manipulate electoral processes since it came to power in 2001. The government has also dispatched observers to join election-monitoring missions in several countries. In Zimbabwe's March 2002 elections, for instance, Ghana strongly defended the principle of free and fair elections and dispatched official election monitors to the country. The monitors found the elections not to be transparent and noted the absence of an independent Electoral Commission in Zimbabwe. President Kufour made clear his disapproval of Mr. Mugabe's attempts to hold on to power through the manipulation of the vote. He fully backed Zimbabwe's suspension from the Commonwealth, and decried treason charges leveled against the main opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai.

PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRACY

Ghana's record of support for democracy internationally in the past decade has been good especially under the Kufour administration. Despite its limited resources, Ghana has been an active participant in democracy promotion abroad. It has mediated disputes in other countries, provided technical assistance and participated in election-monitoring and peacekeeping. Ghanaian leaders have participated in international fora and been vocal in publicly condemning actions that subvert the democratic process. President Kufour in particular, has been a strong advocate for democracy, frequently stressing the importance of the rule of law and respect for human rights. In a keynote address at the AU summit in Zambia this year he stated that, 'The African Union must reflect the commitment of its member states to democracy, the rule of law and the protection and promotion of human rights...We also believe that unconstitutional means of changing governments on the continent is an anachronism, and should not be tolerated in an era of mutual respect amongst us as states, governments and peoples.'[3]

Ghana under Kufour has also been at the forefront of the New Partnership for African Development (Nepad) and a strong advocate for the peer review mechanism that emphasizes good governance as criteria for membership.

POLICY TOWARDS ENTRENCHED DICTATORSHIPS

African leaders have traditionally shown solidarity with each other, and with other third world leaders regardless of differences in their styles of government or their human rights records. Ghana has been no exception. As stated earlier, Ghana believes that maintaining good relations with key states in the West Africa region is in its

strategic interest. The more strategically relevant a country is, the less likely the government will be to condemn the undemocratic tendencies of its leaders.

Jerry Rawlings' populism drew him to support most left-wing regimes when he ruled Ghana as a dictator from 1981 to 1992. His ties with entrenched dictators like Muammar Quadafi and Fidel Castro became weaker after he transformed himself into a civilian President. However, strong ties with "local" dictators such as Sanni Abacha of Nigeria persisted and shaped Ghana's policies. Rawlings became a personal apologist for the Abacha regime and tried to persuade the Commonwealth against suspending Nigeria following Mr. Abacha's execution of the six Ogoni nationalists in 1995.

In 1996, Mr. Abacha was invited as the guest of honor at Mr. Rawlings' second inauguration. It was later alleged in *The Post Express*, a Nigerian newspaper, that Rawlings had accepted a fee of $5 millions from Abacha in 1996 to help rehabilitate his international reputation. When Rawlings met with the US Special Representative on Liberia, he called for the recognition of Nigeria's leading role in resolving the Liberian conflict. "It is therefore fair that we give Nigeria due credit," he said.[4]

Since becoming president, Kufour has also encouraged links with entrenched dictators like Eyadema of Togo. To the surprise of many observers, one of his first trips abroad after coming to power was to Togo. This may have been due to the financial help and others forms of assistance that Eyadema, a long-time Rawlings adversary, is rumored to have given to Kufour's party in the run up to the December 2000 elections.

President Kufour appears committed also to maintaining some level of cooperation with Cuba's Fidel Castro, a staunch friend and role model for Rawlings. Once again, socio-economic interests may be the underlying factor. Cuban doctors have been an important presence in Ghana's health services since the early 1980s. In July 2002, Ghana's Foreign Minister Hackman Owusu-Agyemang visited Cuba to successfully negotiate an increase in the number of Cuban doctors working in Ghana. Cuba also agreed to send medical professors to Ghana's University of Development Studies at Tamale.

Clearly, when strategic interests are at stake, Ghana's leaders have chosen cooperation and friendship with entrenched dictators over criticism.

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[1] For example in an interview to the German Spiegel magazine in 1997, President Rawlings rejected a suggestion that military dictatorships are the real problem in Africa, saying that they rather help to transform political ideas into reality.

[2] Rawlings first attempted to seize power through a coup (unsuccessfully) on 15 May, 1979. Subsequent coups brought him to power on 4 June 1979 and again on 31 December 1981.

[3] The Republic of Ghana. <www.ghana.gov.gh>

[4] Ghana Review International 20 May 1997.

Hungary

Assessment: Good

Trend: ⇔

Capital: Budapest
Type of Government: Parliamentary Democracy
Head of Government: Prime Minister Viktor Orban (since 6 July 1998)
Minister of Foreign Affairs: Laszlo Kovacs
Population: 10,106,017
Human Development Index Ranking 2002: 35

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Despite only modest international influence and economic resources, Hungary has a **good** record of support for democracy in the region of Central and Eastern Europe, including the Balkans. The presence of over three million ethnic Hungarians living in neighboring countries, principally in Slovakia and the former Yugoslavia, is a major factor in Hungary's generally cautious foreign policy approach. The country exhibits a strong tendency to join with regional or global organizations when condemning threats to democracy in other countries. The Hungarian government has frequently cited the importance of democracy and strong democratic structures in the former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, as well as in other regions, to ensure security and stability. Within the international organizations to which it belongs, Hungary has actively worked on behalf of democracy promotion initiatives, condemned abusers of democratic principles, and supported efforts to bolster weak institutions in countries undergoing a democratic transition. Strengthening democracy abroad is cited as a priority in Hungary's 2002 foreign policy documents, and the 2003 budget will for the first time allocate funds in support of this goal -- clear evidence of the country's own successful transition to democracy, and its serious commitment to promoting democracy abroad.

FOREIGN RELATIONS BACKGROUND

Since the collapse of communism in 1990, Hungary's foreign policy has focused on integration into Western political and security structures. Joining the European Union (EU) and NATO were paramount objectives and were captured by the oft-heard slogan in Budapest, "Return to Europe." Hungary joined NATO in March 1999, and is currently a strong candidate for EU accession in January 2004. Overall, Hungarian foreign policy over the past decade has focused on European issues, and for the most part the country has had little ambition or means to engage in issues that extended beyond the region. It has, however, recognized the importance of its membership and activities in international fora, spanning the full spectrum: United Nations, Council of Europe, Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Visegrad Group, and the Central European Initiative. It also participates in the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, a program financed and managed by the EU.

In addition to the EU, Hungary has taken a strong interest in developments in neighboring countries. As a result of the collapse of communism in Eastern and Central Europe, Hungary found itself in a dramatically different regional environment. In the first half of the 1990s, three countries that had bordered Hungary since 1945 --Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia-- ceased to exist or dramatically changed their territorial shape. Apart from Austria and Romania, five of Hungary's seven neighbors, Slovakia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Slovenia, Croatia, and Ukraine, were new states. Throughout the 1990s, the country had to dedicate considerable resources and attention to establishing good relations with these countries.

A key factor in Budapest's diplomatic relations with its immediate neighbors is the large number of ethnic Hungarians living there, a legacy of Hungary's territorial losses following World Wars I and II.[1] Over

three million of its citizens now live in the surrounding countries.[2] Attending to the needs of Hungarian minorities abroad and monitoring the conduct of the respective governments on this issue has been one of the most important aims of the country's diplomatic efforts.

Security concerns have also occupied a prominent place in Hungarian foreign policy over the past ten years. The Yugoslav wars in the first half of the 1990s, the Kosovo crisis in the late 1990s, and recent turmoil in Macedonia have forced consecutive Hungarian governments to engage in considerable unilateral and multilateral efforts to try to restore peace and stability in the countries of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia.

RESPONSE TO THE OVERTHROW OF DEMOCRATICALLY-ELECTED GOVERNMENTS

Between 1992 and 2002, there were no instances of the overthrow of a democratically elected government in Europe. Because the purview of Hungarian foreign policy typically does not extend beyond the region, the government has not taken any unilateral steps in response to coups in other regions of the world. But as an active member of many international organizations, Hungary has voiced its opposition to overthrows of democratic governments beyond Europe. In The Americas, for example, Hungary supported intervention by U.S. troops in Haiti to restore the ousted democratic regime (in compliance with the UN Security Council resolution), although Budapest did not have diplomatic relations with Haiti at the time of the coup and therefore did not issue any statements condemning it.[3] When Jörg Haider's Freedom Party was incorporated into the Austrian government, Hungary had a tempered reaction. While sharing the concerns and unease expressed by the EU, Hungary wished to maintain bilateral relations with its neighbor and chose to see "what kind of political action the new Austrian Government will follow after entering into office" before taking any official action.[4] After the coup in Pakistan, the Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that his government was following the events in Pakistan closely and hoped for the immediate renewal of democratic institutions.[5]

RESPONSE TO MANIPULATION OF ELECTORAL PROCESSES

The Hungarian government's response to electoral manipulation has almost always come in cooperation with international organizations rather than in the form of unilateral actions. Hungary has joined the OSCE and Council of Europe in numerous missions to monitor elections, particularly within neighboring countries. A number of cases over the past decade tested Hungary's commitment to upholding democratic rule in the region. In keeping with its belief that democracy is the foundation for stability and security, the Hungarian government condemned the manipulation of elections in Serbia in 1996[6] and 2000, and similarly sharply criticized electoral malpractice in Belarus in 1997.[7] Hungary also publicly disapproved of widespread election irregularities under the Meciar government in Slovakia, though it declined to disrupt diplomatic relations because of ongoing concern about ethnic Hungarians in the country. Finally, Hungary joined statements issued by the Council of Europe and OSCE citing serious shortcomings in the 1998 Ukrainian elections.[8]

PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRACY

Hungary has supported efforts to promote democracy undertaken by international organizations such as the Council of Europe, OSCE, and the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, and to a lesser extent, the forum of the Visegrad Group. Among the most important Hungarian initiatives has been the Szeged Process, named after a Hungarian city, where in October 1999 the Government of Hungary and the Stability Pact Special Coordinator pledged to work together to strengthen civil society in the FRY and to include Serbian democracy activists in the initiative. The program identified representatives of opposition-governed municipalities and independent media and linked them with European partners in an effort to reduce their isolation. The Szeged Process was carried out through a series of conferences geared to practical assistance measures, such as the provision of humanitarian and technical assistance, and creation of sister-city relationships.[9]

Since the end of communist rule, Hungary has received a comparatively generous amount of foreign aid to assist in fortifying domestic democratic institutions and reviving civil society. Twelve years later, having consolidated democratic rule, Hungary is drafting its own international development assistance strategy. Democracy promotion and institution building, focusing on Eastern Europe and the Balkans, are major elements of this strategy, which is slated to be announced

officially late in 2002. The 2003 federal budget will, for the first time, allocate funds for this new development policy, completing the country's evolution from recipient to donor.

POLICY TOWARDS ENTRENCHED DICTATORSHIPS

Over the past decade, Hungary has consistently criticized dictatorships and anti-democratic behavior across the Central and Eastern Europe region, the regimes of Lukashenko in Belarus and Milosevic in Yugoslavia coming in for the harshest treatment. Hungary has joined international efforts aimed at isolating these regimes, and took part in the NATO operations against Milosevic. Hungary also supported EU sanctions against Belarus in 1998, as well as UN and EU sanctions against Yugoslavia during the 1990s.[10]

Concern over the ethnic Hungarian community in the FRY (as well as in Slovakia) compelled Budapest to adopt at least initially a somewhat less strident stance than it ordinarily might. Hungarian governments of varying political persuasions have felt they have to maintain a degree of engagement with these regimes to help ensure proper treatment for the ethnic Hungarian communities there.

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[1] Political Developments Since 1989; Hungary; Foreign Policy. <www.europeanforum.bot-consult.se/cup/hungary/develop.htm>.

[2] Fowler, Brigid. Hungary's Neighbourhood Policies and Western Integration: Complementary or at Odds? Birmingham, England: University of Birmingham, 2001. Although numbers vary greatly, it is safely assumed that there are currently around 500,000 Hungarian in Slovakia, 160,000 in Ukraine, 1,600,000 in Romania, 300,000 in Yugoslavia, 22,000 in Croatia, 8,500 in Slovenia, and 33,000 in Austria.

[3] "BBC Summary of World Broadcasts." British Broadcasting Corporation. 23 September 1994.

[4] Government of Hungary. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "Statement by Hungarian Foreign Minister János Martonyi on the Austrian Situation." Budapest, 2 February 2000. http://www.mfa.gov.hu.

[5] Government of Hungary. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "Summary in English of the Press Conference Delivered by the Spokesman on 13 Oct. 1999." Budapest, 13 October 1999. http://www.mfa.gov.hu.

[6] Hungarian government statement on Serbian situation, Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Budapest, 12 January 1997.

[7] Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. <www.infoukes.com/rfe-ukraine/1997/0908.html>.

[8] European Forum. Newsletter/Calendar. No. 19. June 1998.

[9] For more, see: www.stablitypact.org.

[10] For more, see the following information and analytical bulletin: www.openby/belarus-now.

India

Assessment: Fair
Trend: ⇑
Capital: New Delhi
Type of Government: Federal Republic
Head of Government: Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee (since 19 March 1998)
Minister of External Affairs: Yashwant Sinha
Population: 1,029,991,145
Human Development Index Ranking 2002: 124

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

India, the world's most populous democracy, has compiled only a **fair** record of support for democracy abroad between 1992 and 2002, but has shown improvement in the past few years. New Delhi has not made democracy promotion beyond its own national borders a priority of Indian foreign policy. Its leadership in the non-aligned movement has given India a highly visible platform from which to champion an agenda for the developing world but one that for a long time was conspicuously silent on matters of democracy and human rights. For the most part, successive Indian governments have demonstrated little interest in criticizing transgressions of democracy and human rights norms and practices in other countries, perhaps because of residual sensitivities stemming from its own shortcomings in this sphere. India has begun to adopt a more active stance on democracy issues in international fora and its swift and firm response to the military coup in neighboring, nuclear-armed Pakistan was at least in part motivated by a belief that democracy will advance the cause of regional stability in the sub-continent.

The Indian government does not have an agency dedicated to developing expertise to monitor or support democratic trends across the world. Its primary focus has been in the South Asia region. While it is acutely aware of the threat to regional stability and its own security posed by weak democratic institutions in the surrounding countries, India has not made a strong push to promote democratic practices and values in the neighborhood. A small amount of bilateral economic aid, (e.g. to Nepal) and military intervention in Sri Lanka cannot credibly be claimed as attempts to advance democratic goals as New Delhi has tried to do in the past. Indeed, the Indian government appears to be placing greater emphasis on fostering economic ties with neighboring countries, regardless of the nature of their systems of government. This is particularly true with respect to India's evolving relations with members of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), some of which remain highly repressive societies. On the other hand, India has become a more active player in regional organizations that respond to threats to democracy, such as the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group.

FOREIGN RELATIONS BACKGROUND

Any discussion of Indian foreign policy must begin with its relations with Pakistan, a nuclear-armed neighbor with whom India has fought three wars and engaged in countless other border skirmishes since both countries achieved independence. Most knowledgeable observers believe that the failure to come to a mutually-acceptable agreement on the future of Kashmir, the object of almost all of the cross-border violence for five decades, dooms the two countries to perpetual rivalry, possibly escalating to armed conflict, a nightmare scenario given both sides possession of nuclear weapons.

The 1999 coup in Pakistan, a development examined throughout this essay, has further exacerbated

tensions on the Asian subcontinent. The Indian government has bluntly stated its preference to deal with a democratic counterpart and has little confidence that the Musharraf government, despite intense pressure from the United States, has the political will to stop incursions by Islamic militants and Kashmiri separatists.

While India historically has sought to influence the evolution of the international political system through its vigorous diplomacy on behalf of the developing world, its limited economic and military capacity has continued to steer Indian foreign policy toward South Asia, a region with its share of formidable challenges. Throughout the 1990s, India has sought greater regional economic and geo-strategic prominence.[1] New Delhi tempered its arguably hegemonic ambitions with lofty democratic and development discourse, but its goal of establishing a sphere of influence to check Pakistani and Chinese influence is unmistakable.

Sharing borders with six countries with ethnic, communal and linguistic overlaps, India has grown wary of the "contagion effect" of nearby repressive regimes.[2] New Delhi has taken some steps to assist in the political transformation of surrounding countries. Its relatively small bilateral assistance program contributed to Nepal's democratic transition, however fragile. This, in turn, created an important strategic buffer zone of democratic stability between India and China. The ongoing civil war in Sri Lanka, which now shows signs of coming to an end, has also been a concern to Indian policymakers. The Indian government has opted to maintain a low profile in working for a truce between the Singhalese majority and Tamil separatists after its disastrous military mission to bring peace to the island in the mid-1980s. India also intervened militarily in the Maldives in 1988 after an attempted overthrow of the democratically-elected government by armed militias.

Border tensions with China remain, although the overall rivalry between the Asian giants is today more economic and political than military in nature. India has chosen to foster closer links with China even as New Delhi attempts to blunt the expansion of Chinese influence in the region. Beijing's establishment of naval bases in Burma[3] prompted India to pursue a strategy of constructive engagement with repressive neighbors, including Burma.

In Afghanistan, India provided covert logistical aid to the Northern Alliance while it fought the ruling Taliban throughout the 1990s. A large number of Afghani refugees and political expatriates were given shelter in India, and the Indian government responded generously to the fall of the Taliban, pledging $10 million for immediate economic, humanitarian and technical assistance to the country for its post-conflict reconstruction.[4] India's "look East" policy[5] is also geared towards integration into the ASEAN community, a region where democratic norms, practices and mechanisms are underdeveloped.

The focus on the Asian theater is not to say that India has lacked for larger ambitions on the international stage. Since independence, India's leaders have sought and often attracted an international audience, abetted by the country's singular role in the non-aligned movement and the so-called Group of 77. More recently, India has waged a campaign to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council. One of the original signatories of the UN Charter in 1945 and still an ardent backer of the body, India today is the second largest source of troops for various UN peacekeeping missions in Africa and Asia[6] and an extremely engaged actor in all manner of UN activities and programs.

RESPONSE TO OVERTHROW OF DEMOCRATICALLY-ELECTED GOVERNMENTS

India's reaction to the overthrow of democratically-elected governments has been immediate and strident in some cases and more muted in others. Specifically, India played an active role in rallying both the Commonwealth and the United Nations to condemn coups and impose sanctions on military regimes in both Fiji and Pakistan. India also supported the unprecedented suspension of Nigeria from the Commonwealth following the execution of opposition leader Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight others in 1995. New Delhi clearly had an overriding interest in focusing international attention on the overthrow of civilian government in Pakistan and securing broad support for efforts to restore democratic rule.

India's response to the coup in Fiji in 2000 was a test of the values and principles to which New Delhi claimed allegiance. The outcome of the unconstitutional seizure of power in tiny Fiji was not itself of strategic significance to India but it felt obliged to act in the case given the sizable ethnic Indian population on the island and the fact that the ousted democratically-elected president, Mahendra Chaudhry, was of Indian descent. Pressure built on the Ministry of External Affairs to respond with

some sort of limited military intervention, as coup leader George Speight appealed to the native Fijians to back him against the allegedly exploitative Indian minority community. But unlike the Maldives a decade earlier, Fiji was not in the immediate region. Eschewing the military option, India worked closely with Australia to put pressure on the new regime to restore the constitution as soon as possible and pressed the Commonwealth's Ministerial Action Group and ASEAN to suspend bilateral ventures with Fiji as long as the coup plotters remained in power.

Predictably, India's response to General Musharraf's bloodless coup in Pakistan in 1999 was swift and hard-hitting. The overthrow of the Sharif government, which had lost much of its popular support because of endemic corruption and mismanagement, was especially disappointing because the two sides had made headway in direct negotiations on a number of important bilateral issues, including the long-standing dispute over Kashmir. The Indian government understood that the ineffective and corrupt Sharif government no longer had broad-based support but this did not dissuade New Delhi from spearheading a campaign to enlist the support of the international community to isolate the military regime (for example, through suspension from the Commonwealth) and push for democratic restoration. India's efforts to mobilize world opinion to isolate the Musharraf regime suffered a major setback in the aftermath of September 11th when the U.S., already wary of holding security and economic interests in South Asia hostage to democratic restoration in Pakistan, stifled any criticism of the government that had become pivotal in the global war on terrorism.

Irregular democratic transitions in the Philippines and Indonesia were not central to the Indian foreign policy establishment.

RESPONSE TO MANIPULATION OF ELECTORAL PROCESSES

India has not reacted strongly to the manipulation of democratic elections abroad. Although it has sent electoral monitors to transitional African and Asian states at the request of the UN, India has not openly condemned electoral irregularities in other countries. India has instead asserted the need to respect every country's "territorial integrity and sovereignty." This position may be partially explained by India's own apprehension over how other democracies view its claim in Kashmir and its need to defend against international criticisms of human rights violations in that territory.

The controversial 1998 elections in Cambodia coincided with an escalation in tensions between India and Pakistan as a result of both countries' testing of nuclear weapons. As such, India's diplomatic efforts were at the time focused on responding to widespread international criticism for going through with the testing, despite calls not to. However, India did join the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) statement supporting reports that the voting process was generally peaceful and recognizing the elections as an important step towards enhancing peace and stability in Cambodia.[7]

India responded to Zimbabwe's 2002 election crisis as a member of the Commonwealth, within which it had just been appointed to the Ministerial Action Group (CMAG). While it did not use this new leadership position to directly respond to the election violence, it did join the CMAG decision to suspend Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth for one year.

PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRACY

India has been a relatively strong supporter of democracy promotion in international fora, particularly in the UN, a body in which India has historically exercised considerable influence in large part because of its leadership of the non-aligned movement. Long a powerful voice on development as well as nuclear and alternative security issues, India has shown increasing willingness to become involved in democracy-related efforts in regional and global institutions.

Moreover, successive Indian governments have also consciously held up the country as a model for the Third World to show that development and democracy can proceed together, an achievement celebrated by the UN in its annual Human Development Report for the year 2000.[8] Any visitor to India will note that elites and ordinary citizens alike take pride in the country being the world's most populous democracy and maintaining that course despite enormous challenges that have overwhelmed many nascent democracies.[9] And while India remains a comparatively poor if rapidly modernizing country that cannot devote substantial resources to democracy promotion programming internationally, it has tried to support with modest amounts of funding some activities in Nepal and other countries designed to strengthen democratic institutions. According to the Indian Ministry of External Affairs

annual reports 1998-2002, this support has been focused on economic development projects, e.g., infrastructure projects and technical cooperation, as well as maintaining peace and stability.

Recent Indian governments also have been more inclined to support democracy and human rights resolutions at the UN, suggesting that New Delhi does not regard its shared interests with developing countries as precluding more vigorous support for internationally recognized norms in this area. However, India does remain sensitive about its human rights record, which has come under scrutiny from Western governments and civil society activists at home and abroad, particularly with regard to Kashmir and to safeguarding rights of Muslims and other minority communities.

In another example of India's more visible involvement in international democracy efforts, the government has been a member of the steering committee of the Community of Democracies initiative and in that capacity has helped to organize the Warsaw and upcoming Seoul ministerial conferences. India also played host to an important non-governmental conference of the World Movement for Democracy, an initiative of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED).[10] The 1999 conference in New Delhi, which was organized by NED and the influential Confederation of Indian Industry, brought together participants from across the world to discuss ways to reinvigorate national and transnational civil society networks.

The Commonwealth of former British colonies has been notably more active in defending and promoting democracy around the world and India has been central to many of the major policy initiatives related to coups in Pakistan, Fiji and elsewhere. New Delhi has supported sanctions imposed by the organization and by the UN, but is generally very reluctant to take such steps unilaterally. On the other hand, it has made no apparent effort to incorporate democracy-related concerns in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, a grouping in which India dominates.

In some of its newer bilateral relations, India has been actively aiding Cambodia's uneasy transition to democracy. The Indian government provided Cambodia with a sizable loan and aid package of $15 million and various training programs surrounding its admission to ASEAN and offered the services of the Indian judicial system, in the event that the UN decided to withdraw from the Khmer Rouge human rights trial.

In the context of establishing closer relations with the Indonesian government, India has strongly encouraged further democratic reform, a message carried by Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee during high-profile visits to the new democracy and largest Muslim majority country in the world.

It is also important to point out that for decades India has been the home-in-exile of Tibet's spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama. The issue of Tibet and specifically, India's granting asylum to many, who have fled Chinese repression in the kingdom, has been a source of friction in bilateral relations with Beijing.

POLICY TOWARDS ENTRENCHED DICTATORSHIPS

Throughout the 1990s, India's policy toward entrenched dictatorships was governed by geo-strategic interests that left little room for democracy-related considerations. In a move that was designed to counter growing Chinese influence in South Asia and adjoining areas, India moved its policy away from isolating or simply ignoring unfriendly authoritarian regimes in the direction of greater engagement. In doing so, already weak democracy promotion motives were further marginalized or discarded altogether in the deliberations of Indian policymakers. In the case of Burma, for example, India initially harshly condemned the military junta that prevented the winner of democratic elections, Aung San Suu Kyi, from taking office. When the staying power of the military dictatorship became more evident, as did the suffering of the Burmese people, New Delhi toned down its criticism and sought an accommodation with the repressive military rulers. The Indian government was also apprehensive about growing Chinese influence in Burma and the Indo-China corridor. Today, it is the largest market for Burma's exports[11] and also runs technical training programs in the country.

India has similarly decided that in the case of China, New Delhi's regional interests are best served by a policy of rapprochement with Beijing. For decades, China attempted to counter-balance Indian military power through a close relationship with Pakistan. Cordial relations with China are seen in New Delhi as essential to extend India's regional influence. As a result, India has refrained from citing China's poor record on human rights and democracy and even the issue of Tibet seems to have fallen off India's bilateral and multilateral agenda.

With regard to Pakistan, there is no question that the Indian government very much wants

democracy to be restored and believes that the prospects for long-term stability in bilateral relations depend on it. At the same time, policymakers in New Delhi feel India has no real choice but to deal with the Musharraf regime given the possibility of armed conflict and a host of other critical issues. They also concluded that no moderate alternative is likely to come to power any time soon. Former prime ministers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif have both been banished from the country and/or largely discredited for their own inept and corrupt rule. India does try to apply low level pressure on the Pakistani regime to restore democracy. Accordingly, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs continues to monitor Musharraf's progress on his promise to return democracy to Pakistan, and India can be expected to criticize measures by Musharraf to weaken the Pakistani constitution and solidify his power.

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[1] For more, see: Cohen, Stephen. India: Emerging Power. Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2001.

[2] As witnessed in the democratic movement in East Pakistan in 1970-71 where a military regime cracked down on ethnic Bengalis and India had to intervene militarily as hundreds of thousands of crossed over to India and threatened to destabilize the entire region. This resulted in the independence of Bangladesh from Pakistan. Similarly, the civil war in Sri Lanka has caused a substantial number of Tamils to flee towards South India exacerbating ethnic tensions and natural resource pressures.

[3] Pant, N.K. Regional Center for Strategic Studies. "Need to Mend Fences With Neighbors." Article No. 558. Colombo, Sri Lanka: 1 Sep. 2001.

[4] Press statement released by the Indian Embassy in Washington, DC on 27 Feb. 2002. Statement on Areas of Cooperation between India and Afghanistan on Reconstruction and Rehabilitation in post-conflict Afghanistan. www.indianembassy.org/South_Asia/afghanistan/afghan_feb_27_02.html.

[5] Former Prime Minister I.K. Gujral in a previous stint as the external affairs minister in the mid-1990s had urged the 'need to revitalize Indian foreign policy's economic dimension' (from speech at the Council of Foreign Relations, New York, on 3 Oct. 1996. This initiative has since energized the urge to reassess and explore new bilateral economic potentials with the Middle East, Southeast Asian 'tiger' economies and the vast energy and mineral resources of Central Asia.

[6] "A History of Indian Participation in UN Peacekeeping Missions." http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/Peace_Keeping/history_india_UN_peace_keeping.htm.

[7] "ARF Welcomes 'Generally Peaceful' Elections in 'Cambodia." Xinhua News Agency 27 July 1998.

[8] United Nations. Human Development Report. New York: 2000. <hrdc.undp.org.in/hdrepost2000>; Deccan Herald (New Delhi) 30 June 2000.

[9] Apart from a brief period of absolute power exercised by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in-between 1975 to 1977; she declared a state of emergency and banned all opposition parties. Subsequently deciding to hold democratic elections, she lost by a heavy margin.

[10] More information including the charter, aims and operational framework can be found at: www.wmd.org.

[11] Allison, Tony. "Burma Shows India the Road to Southeast." Asia Times Online 21 Feb. 2001. www.atimes.com/reports/CB21Ai01.html.

Indonesia

Assessment: Poor

Trend: ⇔

Capital: Jakarta

Type of Government: Republic

Head of Government: President Megawati Sukarnoputri (since 23 July 2001)

Minister of Foreign Affairs: Noer Hasan Wirajuda

Population: 228,437,870

Human Development Index Ranking 2002: 110

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Republic of Indonesia has a **poor** record of support for democracy abroad during the period 1992 to 2002, as evidenced by the country's unwillingness to criticize electoral manipulation, entrenched dictatorships, or the overthrow of democratically-elected governments. From 1992-1998, while President Soeharto was in office, Indonesia actively opposed international support for democracy, rejecting the idea of democracy as a universal value. Soeharto's resignation in 1998 created the opening for political liberalization within the country, and brought about a partial change in the country's position toward democracy internationally. Indonesia has ceased its vocal opposition to international support for democracy, and the country has taken some small steps toward participation in the community of democracies. These steps include signing the Warsaw Declaration and accepting democratization-related foreign assistance. In addition, there have been three isolated and minor instances since 1998 where Indonesia played a role that can be construed as supporting democracy within a neighboring country. More generally, however, Indonesia remains committed to the principle of non-interference in the affairs of sovereign states, and focused on the challenges of its own political transition. For these reasons, the country is not likely to emerge as an active supporter of democracy on the international scene.

FOREIGN RELATIONS BACKGROUND

Indonesia's foreign policy objectives derive from the country's three critical national priorities: maintaining territorial integrity, preserving social calm, and stimulating economic development. With colonially-defined borders extending over some 13,000 islands and a diverse though largely Muslim population of more than 250 ethnic groups, Indonesia faces significant challenges to its basic stability from secessionist movements and religious and ethnic violence. These stress points are perceived to be highly vulnerable to outside meddling and there is some justification for this view; the cataclysmic internecine violence that claimed at least 100,000 lives in 1965 was triggered by an aborted Communist coup supported by China.

The first priority of Indonesian foreign policy has therefore been to prevent outsiders from exacerbating the country's flashpoints. This goal has led Indonesia to support the creation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), an organization designed to maintain the territorial status quo of all member nations and build regional stability. More generally, the view that foreigners can exacerbate internal tensions has increased vocal support for the policy of non-interference in the affairs of sovereign states. For much of the 1990s, Indonesia was a leading opponent of universalism in human rights, arguing that Western governments and human rights organizations should not make prescriptions for Asia, where, it was argued, a fundamentally different set of values prevail.

This fear of outside criticism intensified as a result of Indonesia's disastrous occupation of East Timor. Indonesia invaded the former Portuguese colony in 1975, claiming that the newly-liberated East Timorese preferred Indonesian citizenship to independence. International condemnation of the invasion intensified after the December 1991 massacre of independence protestors in the capital city of Dili. Through

the 1990s, Indonesia found itself increasingly on the defensive over its repressive occupation of East Timor and its refusal to allow a referendum on self-determination. This criticism reinforced the belief within the Soeharto administration that outsiders were out to discredit and undermine the Indonesian state.

Offsetting this isolationist tendency has been Indonesia's intense focus on economic development, which has led the country to engage with the world in order to gain access to technology, investment capital and export markets. These goals have turned Indonesia's attention to the financial centers of Europe and the U.S. Indonesia has also sought to anchor its economic growth within Asia. Japan has been a major investor in Indonesia, and the country has close economic ties with Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong, and increasingly with China.

These two impulses of Indonesia foreign policy --self-protective isolationism, on the one hand, and economic engagement, on the other-- reflect the "independent and active" (*bebas dan aktif)* policy that has guided the country's foreign relations since independence in 1945. On balance, Indonesia has tended to favor the "independent," or isolationist, side of this equation, which helps explain why Indonesia's influence externally has been inconsistent with the country's size and strategic significance. It bears reminding that Indonesia has the world's fourth largest population, significant military capability, oil reserves, and a strategic position astride major international shipping lanes. Yet from 1992 to 2002, the country made little use of its potential to influence others, aside from its effort to build ASEAN as a kind of solidarity group in support of "Asian values" and the doctrine of non-interference.

The domestic political context for this foreign policy framework has shifted with Indonesia's own democratic transition, which in a few short years has transformed the nation's constitutional structure and political dynamic. Until 1997, Indonesia was essentially a one-party dictatorship. Regular elections for parliament did take place, but government officials vetted all candidates and controlled the three approved political parties, and a significant percentage of seats were reserved for the military. This carefully structured political edifice began to crumble with the 1997 Asian financial crisis, which devastated Indonesia's economy. Soeharto's resignation in May 1998, in the face of social upheaval and widespread political protests, set in place a transition to multiparty democracy that has surprised most observers by its speed and intensity. By August 2002, Indonesia had relaxed controls on political parties, conducted democratic elections, and amended the constitution to institute direct presidential elections and curtail the military-allocated seats in parliament. Indonesia also survived three leadership transitions: Soeharto was replaced by his Vice President, B.J. Habibe, who administered transitional elections. These were won by moderate Islamic leader Abdurrahman Wahid, who was then impeached two years into his term and replaced by Vice President Megawati Sukarnoputri.

The democratic transition has affected Indonesia's foreign policy in complicated ways. First, and most positively, democracy in Indonesia has brought an end to the country's rejection of universal norms in human rights. Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda noted this in a briefing to foreign journalists in October 2001: "For a long time, the Indonesian public did not quite see human rights in the same way that the international public did. This discrepancy in perception became a constraint in the development of our foreign relations. We will do our best to remove that perception gap."[1]

At the same time, democratization in Indonesia has coincided with, and to some extent contributed to, an intensification of the country's key stress points. Challenges from secessionist movements, particularly in Aceh, and from religious and ethnic rioting have intensified since 1997. These problems affect foreign policy in two ways. First, they deepen the fear that the unity and social stability of the country are at risk, which intensifies the country's self-protective isolationism. Second, they focus all attention inward, keeping on hold the question of how a newly democratic Indonesia will conduct its foreign policy. President Megawati, in her August 2002 State of the Union Address to Parliament, had almost nothing to say about foreign policy except to restate a commitment to ASEAN and to an "independent and active foreign policy."

Part of Indonesia's challenge in formulating a post-transition foreign policy vision stems from a new factor that has entered the scene: Islamic politics. The Soeharto years were marked by a strict separation between mosque and state, which imparted a degree of religious neutrality to the country with the world's largest Muslim

population. In the new electoral dynamic, Islamic groups in Indonesia are beginning to recognize and exercise the strength of their numbers. At the same time, the emergence, since the attacks on the World Trade Center, of a global Islamic terrorist threat has suddenly rendered Indonesia a critical player in global anti-terrorist efforts. Indeed, the United States now appears to be much more interested in Indonesia's ability and willingness to combat terrorism, than in the country's democratization process. Megawati's vague generalities on foreign policy may reflect her unwillingness to choose between alienating domestic Islamic groups and losing the support of the United States.

Another new political force that has recently become a factor in the country's policy debate is the NGO community, which has been a key catalyst of the country's political reform. In general, this community tends to be less isolationist than other actors in the country, in part because of their connections with peer groups such as NAMFREL in the Philippines. NGOs, therefore, have the potential to nudge the government toward a more active and involved foreign policy -- one more in keeping with growing international norms. This potential has yet to be realized, however, because at present, NGO leaders, like everyone else in the country, are single-mindedly focused on how Indonesia will navigate its difficult transition to an open but harmonious democracy.

Given the intense preoccupation with domestic crises and internal stability, and the difficult balancing act around Islamic issues, it is likely that in foreign policy Indonesia will default to the familiar position of emphasizing non-interference in the affairs of sovereign states.

RESPONSE TO OVERTHROWS OF DEMOCRATICALLY-ELECTED GOVERNMENTS

The Indonesian government took no actions to condemn or otherwise respond to the overthrow of any democratically-elected governments during the period 1992 to 2002. In two of three seminal cases involving countries in the region, Indonesia actively demonstrated support for the new governments. Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid visited Pakistani General Pervez Musharraf seven months after he overthrew Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in 1999. And President Wahid called the new President of the Philippines, Gloria Macapagal, to congratulate her after the January 2001 extra-constitutional impeachment of President Joseph Estrada. Finally, there is no record of any response from Indonesia to the May 2000 military coup in the Fiji.

RESPONSE TO MANIPULATION OF ELECTORAL PROCESSES

There is no record of the Indonesian government taking any action to condemn or respond to manipulation of electoral processes in other countries during the period 1992 to 2002. The two seminal cases of the Malaysian election of 1999 and the Cambodian election of 1998 were reviewed, and in neither case is there a record of any public reaction on the part of the Indonesian government. The Cambodian election drew extensive criticism from international and local observers and from the United States Government, but ASEAN declared the elections free and fair and a reflection of the will of the Cambodian people. Whether Indonesia was the instrumental force shaping ASEAN's response is difficult to discern, but there can be little doubt that Indonesia supported this view. A few months later Indonesia sided with Vietnam against Thailand in an ASEAN vote on Cambodian membership.

Regarding the Malaysian elections, President B.J. Habibe did express concern about the conditions of Malaysia's well-known prisoner Anwar Ibrahim, the former Deputy Prime Minister, and Habibe cancelled a planned visit to Kuala Lumpur. The Economist described these gestures as "a breach of South-East Asia's hallowed principle of "non-interference."[2] Ibrahim's arrest occurred several months before the election and may have been intended to dampen enthusiasm for political rivals as the polls approached. Habibe's comments could be taken as an indirect criticism of the pre-election environment in the country, but there was no direct reaction to the election itself.

PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRACY

Indonesia did little to promote democracy internationally in general terms between 1992 to 2002, but there has been some improvement in this area following the country's own political transition. During the Soeharto administration, Indonesia essentially opposed international support for democracy. In a 1992 address to the United Nations, for example, President Soeharto issued a strong rejection of Western pressure for democracy and human rights in developing countries, calling

instead for greater support for economic development. In 1994, B.J. Habibie, then minister of Research and Technology, stated that voting created a "conflict prone democracy" suitable only for cultures accustomed to conflict.[3] President Soeharto warned on several occasions of the threat of "outside values." Indonesia also blocked the efforts of Thailand and the Philippines to modify ASEAN policy on democracy and human rights from one of strict non-interference to a more nuanced "flexible engagement."

Things did change somewhat after Soeharto's resignation. Starting in 1998, Indonesia began to accept some foreign assistance to support democratization programs. Over the next four years the percentage of development aid to support democratization became significant. The United States Agency for International Development, for example, devoted roughly 20 percent of its Indonesia budget to democratization programs in 2000 through 2002. Indonesia has also ratified some international agreements relating to democracy and human rights, and endorsed the Warsaw Declaration in 2000. Indonesia also voted in support of several United Nations General Assembly resolutions that pledged to strengthen the role of the UN in the promotion of democratization. Finally, in 1999, President Habibe agreed to allow a referendum on self-determination for East Timor, an important step towards Indonesia's learning to respect elections as an expression of the will of the people.

POLICY TOWARD ENTRENCHED DICTATORSHIPS

Between 1992 and 2002, Indonesia did nothing to support democracy in entrenched dictatorships. For example, Indonesia had been at odds with China, not because of its dictatorship, but rather because China had supported the communist uprising in Indonesia in 1965. Beginning in 1988, Indonesia began to reestablish relations with China, and since then close ties with Beijing have been an important priority. There is no record of any criticism of China's government from any Indonesian officials.

Indonesia also was supportive of Burma and Laos, two other dictatorships in the region. In 1997, Indonesia helped the two countries gain admission into ASEAN. Some saw the move to include these countries as an attempt to "strengthen the authoritarian pole...within ASEAN, neutralize the formal democratic regimes --the Philippines and Thailand-- and prevent them from following foreign policies that would be more sympathetic to democratic movements on the ground."[4]

After Soeharto, there were isolated instances during which Indonesia appeared to be changing its approach toward entrenched dictatorships. In 1999 President Wahid met with Burmese democracy leader and political prisoner Aung San Suu Kyi during his visit to Rangoon, although there is no record that Wahid made any statement in support of a more democratic process in that country.

It is unclear, however, whether President Megawati Sukarnoputri will continue this general trend. Since her inauguration in July 2001, Megawati has visited both China and North Korea. During her visit to China, the President secured a $400 million loan guarantee from the Chinese government.

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[1] Statement by H.E. Dr. N. Hassan Wirajuda before the Jakarta Foreign Correspondents' Club, Jakarta, 12 October 2001.

[2] "South-East Asia's leaders: Out with the old, in with something much less familiar", The Economist, London: 10 October 1998.

[3] Sukma, Rizal. "Values, Governance and Indonesian Foreign Policy" in Changing Values in Asia: Their Impact on Governance and Development. Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 1999, p. 139.

[4] Bello, Walden. "View and Comment: Democratic Expansion in South East Asia." Business World 1 August 1997.

Japan

Assessment: Fair
Trend: ⇑
Capital: Tokyo
Type of Government: Constitutional Monarchy with a Parliamentary Government
Head of Government: Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi (since 24 April 2001)
Foreign Minister: Yoriko Kawaguchi
Population: 126,771,662
Human Development Index Ranking 2002: 9

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Overall, Japan has a **fair** record of support for democracy abroad. Japan has at times quietly tried to persuade leaders of non-democratic regimes to return to democracy, and has provided financial and humanitarian assistance to help build functional legal, administrative and law enforcement systems abroad. However, it has consistently chosen to let concerns for democratic development abroad take a back seat to what it considers more important interests – commercial, political and security.

The willingness and ability of the Japanese government to speak and act in support of democracy is shaped and constrained by several of its deeply held beliefs, as well as concerns for its other national interests. The Japanese government believes, for example, that democracy cannot be secured without economic development and social stability and, therefore, it has pursued policies and programs designed to help strengthen national economies over support for democracy. In addition, Japan believes that "quiet diplomacy" is often more effective than open condemnation. Finally, consideration of other national interests has, at times, constrained Japan's support for democracy abroad. This has been especially true in the Middle East, the source of most of Japan's oil, and Southeast Asia, where increasing Chinese influence has been Japan's primary concern.

FOREIGN RELATIONS BACKGROUND

Official Japanese statements hold that the spread of democratic institutions and regimes will contribute to stability across the world.[1] Japanese officials recognize that promoting democracy and respect for fundamental human rights have become important issues for the global community. Thus Japan has participated in international efforts to promote democracy both multilaterally and bilaterally. However, Japan has also frequently adopted policies of bilateral engagement toward non-democratic regimes, especially when responding to democratic crises. This approach of engagement has frequently raised doubts about Japan's intentions or seriousness in this endeavor.

Japan's limited approach to democracy promotion is due in part to its contention, informed by its own national experience, that economic development is an indispensable precondition for democratization. According to this logic, sustained economic growth will facilitate changes and reforms in social and political systems, like an expanded middle class, and help the public develop democratic norms. Since these types of changes generally take a relatively long time, Japan tends to seek and tolerate long-term solutions. In Japan's thinking, "democracy and political freedom cannot be achieved overnight."[2] This position is based on a firm belief that, without economic development, the social foundation for democracy would remain fragile. Japan learned this lesson through its own bitter experience before World War II, when in the face of the global economic depression of the late 1920's, emerging democracy in Japan gave way to the rise of militarism.[3]

A second explanation for Japan's unwillingness to condition its relations with non-democratic regimes on improved respect for human rights grows out of Japan's role as a model for economic development in the Asia-Pacific region. Countries such as South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and Malaysia have long sought

to emulate the Japanese economic system -- at least until the early 1990's when the Japanese economic bubble burst. Having observed Japan's "economic miracle" under strong, centralized leadership, these countries came to believe that centralized governance would best support their own economic development.[4] Thus, many leaders in the Asia-Pacific region chose more authoritarian structures as a way to free themselves from the demands of various interests groups and the general public. Japan has been sympathetic to these leaders because their countries had relatively short periods of self-governance after they were liberated from colonial rule and faced numerous challenges in their transitions to modern statehood. Few had functional administrative systems and most faced threats of communism and domestic unrest throughout the period of the Cold War. Thus, Japan tolerated and even supported these authoritarian regimes as they sought to achieve economic and social stability.

A third reason for Japan's policy of engagement is that, in Japan's view, social or political instability in the Middle East or Southeast Asia could run counter to Japan's national security interests. As a result, Japan's support for democratization in these regions has been cautious or non-existent.

Japan typically has engaged in "quiet diplomacy" rather than open condemnation of the leaders of target countries.[5] Japan believes that economic sanctions are more effective if they are imposed without humiliation, particularly with regard to the countries of Southeast Asia, and that in some cases sanctions can induce confrontations and cause leaders to become more defensive and less inclined to open up their countries. These cases are, in their view, most likely to occur when leaders are proud and xenophobic nationalists, as is the cases of Burma and Indonesia.[6] In sum, from Japan's perspective, accommodation can be more effective than pressure.[7]

Japan's foreign policy has traditionally been the exclusive domain of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). In the future, however, changes in Japan's domestic politics might decrease its influence and affect the key assumptions in Japan's policy to support democracy abroad. For example, the number of NGOs engaged in supporting democracy and economic development abroad has been increasing rapidly and they have become more willing to criticize Japan's external policy, particularly its policy of official development assistance to repressive regimes.

RESPONSE TO OVERTHROW OF DEMOCRATICALLY-ELECTED GOVERNMENTS

Overall, Japan's record with regard to the overthrow of democratically-elected governments has been modest but good. Over the past decade, Japan has responded to coups in Haiti, Nigeria, Fiji and Pakistan. Its responses have included open expressions of regret, suspension of economic aid, and the initiation of diplomatic efforts aimed at persuading coup leaders to return to democracy.

In response to the 1991 coup in Haiti, for example, Japan froze its official development assistance (ODA) until President Jean-Bertrand Aristide was restored in 1994. After 1995, Japan resumed its ODA to support the new democratic regime, held a series of training seminars for Haitian officials, and dispatched foreign ministry officials to oversee elections in Haiti.[8] Similarly, in response to the military government in Nigeria, Japan suspended all new economic cooperation, except for urgent humanitarian aid.

Japan denounced the coup in Fiji in 2000 as regrettable, announced its support for ousted President Mara, and expressed its continued hope for democratization.[9] Japan extended emergency assistance to the United Nations Development Program to assist with the fair and smooth implementation of the general elections in August-September 2001, and dispatched staff members to support the elections.[10]

In response to the 1999 military coup in Pakistan, Japan launched a diplomatic initiative aimed at persuading General Musharraf to keep his pledge to hold the planned general election in October 2002. Japan did not impose economic sanctions -- it had already suspended most of its official development assistance in response to Pakistan's nuclear weapons testing in 1998 -- but its position as one of the largest donors of economic assistance to Pakistan, and one of its largest trading partners, gave it some leverage in this effort.[11] More specifically, the Japanese government used the visits of high-ranking Japanese officials and politicians to Pakistan to continue to put pressure on Musharraf to hold democratic elections.[12]

RESPONSE TO MANIPULATION OF ELECTORAL PROCESSES

Overall, Japan has a mixed record when confronted with obvious cases of flawed electoral processes abroad. For example, Japan actively worked to push the government of Cambodia to hold democratic elections, and has provided

electoral monitoring assistance to facilitate democratic elections in a number of countries around the world. In addition, Japan enforced economic sanctions on Yugoslavia and froze the funds of the Yugoslavian and Serbian governments in Japan in 2000 when the new Kostunica government replaced Milosevic's regime.[13] On the other hand, it stood by former Peruvian President Fujimori after he resigned in disgrace in 2000, and failed to respond to the 1997 manipulation of the election process in Malaysia.

Japan exercised some leadership in efforts to broker democratic peace in Cambodia in 1993, and has been the largest donor of economic assistance to Cambodia ever since.[14] In 1997, when the Second Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen expelled and took over the position of the First Prime Minister Prince Ranariddh Sihanouk by force, Tokyo avoided calling the expulsion a "coup," accepted Hun Sen's new position and played a significant role in arranging the planned 1998 election.[15] Japan regarded Hun Sen's action as a "necessary evil" that would help preserve the fragile peace in Cambodia.[16] While Ranariddh was certainly forcibly removed, Hun Sen did not make any substantial change to Cambodia's principal governance system, including the constitution, the constitutional monarchy, and the framework of coalition government. Thus Japan, in coordination with the French government, focused its high-level diplomatic initiatives on persuading Hun Sen to hold the 1998 national elections and on allowing Ranariddh to return to Cambodia to participate in them.[17] Eventually, Hun Sen accepted this position, and, despite some independent observers questioning the violent pre- and post-election atmosphere, on 26 July 1998 what are generally considered to be free and fair elections were held throughout Cambodia.[18]

With regard to Burma, the official Japanese approach has been one of "engagement and dialogue" requiring "patience and persistence."[19] Initially, when the military junta refused to hand over power to Aung San Suu Kyi in 1988, Japan joined the West in criticizing the military regime and froze its economic assistance to Burma. Privately, however, Japan's policy toward Burma was torn between conflicting interests.[20] As one analyst noted, Japan looked for "ways to continue economic support for Rangoon without breaking openly with the United States and European Union."[21] As time went by, Japan took the view that international sanctions were failing to promote democratization in Burma because they pushed the military junta toward a more defensive posture, which resulted in the cessation of economic and democratic reforms.[22] Perhaps more importantly, the Japanese government was at this time concerned with the increasing Chinese economic and military influence in Burma.[23] The government felt that, in order to promote political reconciliation between the military government and Aung San Suu Kyi and her supporters, economic stability had to be established as a precondition for political stability.[24] Thus, Japan resumed limited economic aid to Burma.[25] Additionally, under close diplomatic coordination with ASEAN, Japanese leaders have continued their diplomatic offensive to persuade the leaders of Burma's State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) to return to democracy.[26] In 2002, while Aung San Suu Kyi has been released from house arrest, Burma's top generals maintained their position that the SPDC would restore democracy at its own pace and in its own way.

In Peru, Japan initially played a constructive role in responding to the 1992 *autogolpe* by Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori. However, it failed to support democratization in other ways, particularly since 2001. Japan is the largest donor of economic assistance to Peru and actively assisted the Fujimori administration.[27] Since Fujimori was a Japanese immigrant to Peru, Japan enjoyed special access to him, and Fujimori himself paid a visit to Japan every year, officially or unofficially. After the 1992 *autogolpe*, a senior Japanese foreign ministry official handed Fujimori a letter from the Japanese Prime Minister, urging him to create a plan for democratization before the Organization of American States (OAS) conference was convened.[28] Patiently, through quiet diplomacy, Japanese officials and politicians attempted to persuade Fujimori to restore democracy. Subsequently, Japan also dispatched electoral observation missions and provided financial support for the OAS's monitoring of national elections.[29] When President Fujimori fled to Japan in November 2000 to escape a dramatic corruption and governance scandal, he claimed that he had Japanese citizenship and announced that he would remain in Japan. Despite the new Peruvian government's repeated pleas to Tokyo to extradite Fujimori so he can stand trial for a series of crimes, the Japanese government has taken the position that it is now obliged to protect his rights as a Japanese citizen, a move viewed by others as providing a safe haven for an alleged criminal.

PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRACY

Japan's primary tool for supporting democracy abroad is its official development assistance (ODA). The 1992 ODA Charter states that in providing economic assistance, "full attention should be paid to efforts for promoting democratization and the introduction of a market-oriented economy and the situation regarding the securing of basic human rights and freedoms in the recipient country."[30] Japan risked a contradiction in the Charter, however, when it provided economic aid to non-democratic countries such as China and Burma. Moreover, Japan's ODA policy has been criticized as allocating too much toward building hard infrastructure as compared to initiatives for developing democratic institutions and systems.[31] This policy is currently under thorough review, and Japan is expected to shift the target areas of its ODA from hard infrastructure to education, poverty reduction, and the environment.

At the 1996 Lyons Summit, Japan introduced a new policy framework of "Partnership for Democratic Development (PDD)" to assist developing countries in building functional legal, administrative and law enforcement institutions, and in expanding human resources for democratization and better promotion and protection of human rights.[32] Japan has also established another new policy framework of "Human Security" in order to better jointly promote economic development, social stability, and democracy. The definition of Human Security remains somewhat broad, but in general it aims to protect individuals from the problems that threaten human lives, livelihood, and dignity. For this purpose, Japan has created a Human Security Fund at the United Nations Secretariat.

POLICY TOWARD ENTRENCHED DICTATORSHIPS

Japan has openly expressed regrets about human rights violations by entrenched dictatorships. At the same time, however, Japan has pursued an engagement policy toward these dictators by providing them with development assistance and by pursuing quiet diplomatic interactions with them. This approach has been especially evident in Japan's policy toward China (the People's Republic of China), North Korea, Iraq, and Cuba.

Japan normalized relations with China in 1972, and has become the largest donor of economic aid to that country.[33] Japan believed that this development assistance would support China's economic development, and that this would in turn facilitate political reform. Japan has almost always emphasized the importance of supporting Chinese economic development on the grounds that economic growth would eventually soften the regime's posture on political liberalization.[34] Japan has also tolerated human rights violations in China and declined to isolate the Chinese regime. As the Chinese economy and defense budget have been growing, however, there has been a mounting sense of insecurity in Japan regarding the future of China.[35] It remains to be seen whether, as Japan shifts its target areas of economic aid from public works to environmental protection, support for good governance, and poverty reduction, it will begin to place more emphasis on democratization in its policy toward China.

Japan regards North Korea as a source of grave security threats.[36] Japan's policy toward North Korea has been framed in terms of "carrots and sticks," a combination of engagement and deterrence. The most important "carrot" is the possible normalization of bilateral relations that would ensure a massive flow of economic assistance to North Korea.[37] In close coordination with the United States, South Korea and the European Union, and with support from the broader international community, Japan signed its first joint declaration with North Korea at its first bilateral summit meeting in September 2002. This was widely viewed as a constructive step in inducing Pyongyang to soften its external policy and reform its economy.[38]

More than 90 percent of Japan's oil imports come from the Middle East. As a result, Japan places a higher priority on stability than on democracy in this region – indeed, Japan has avoided support for democratization out of fear it could produce uncertain outcomes that might disrupt Japan's oil imports. Japan maintained a close relationship with Iraq for several decades until the early 1990's, but has supported international sanctions against that country since the 1992 Gulf War.[39] While Japan clearly condemns Iraq's violations of the UN Security Council resolutions, it views the U.S. Government's policy of regime change in Iraq as too ambitious.

Japan has adopted an active engagement policy toward Cuba to expose it to "outside air," and has built close relations with high-ranking Cuban political figures. However, Japan has also openly expressed regrets with regard to its human rights record.[40] Japan has held a series of bilateral political dialogues with Cuba, and frankly discussed

their concerns about Cuban human rights violations. Japan has taken a "carrot" approach to its dealings with Havana by emphasizing that improvements in human rights conditions would enhance Japan's interest in Cuba, and urged Havana to take measures to promote democratization.[11] Cuba expressed its intent to continue bilateral dialogues with Japan on these issues.

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[1] Japan's primary foreign policy objectives include: protecting the homeland; maintaining peace and stability in Northeast Asia; protecting the sea-lane of transportation; sustaining economic growth by promoting open-market economic systems globally; combating global problems including poverty reduction, environmental degradation and transnational crimes; promoting arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation of weapons and related-materials and technologies; and promoting good governance and democracy as well as protecting human rights and freedom throughout the world. Given its geographical proximity, Japan has especially focused on developing and sustaining peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

[2] Nishihara, Masashi. Crisis in "Myanmar and East Timor: The Case for Japanese-American Cooperation." a lecture note from an Asian Voices Seminar of the Sasakawa Peace Foundation. 6 Oct. 1999. p. 5.

[3] In 1920's, Japan's democracy remained "immature" because it suffered significantly from a series of corruption scandals, while politicians and government officials were almost incapable of dealing with the rapid expansion of poverty in rural areas throughout the country. When the public's trust in democratic government eroded, military seized the opportunity. See, Kitaoka, Shinichi. Seitou kara Gunbu he (Transition of Power from Political Parties to Military before WWII). Japan: Chuou Koron Shinsha, 1999.

[4] Iwasaki, Ikuo. Ajia Seiji wo Miru Me (Perspectives on Politics in Asian Countries) Japan: Chuko-Shinsho, 2001. pp. 155-178.

[5] Nishihara, *op. cit.*, n. 3, p. 5.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 4. In this article, Nishihara lays three cases where sanctions usually work effectively: 1) when sanctions hurt the elite, not the people; 2) when sanctions are targeted at certain specific areas, such as arms sales, military training, or certain economic practices; and 3) when sanctions are enforced in concert with the entire international community without any room for competitors to take advantage of sanctions.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 6. Another factor influencing foreign policy formulation in Japan is globalization, which has encouraged a new generation of "liberals" in Japan. The new liberals mainly consist of young professionals in their twenties and thirties, who admire Western values of freedom and democracy. They support Taiwan's democracy and strongly condemn human rights violations in mainland China. They do not hesitate to seek open condemnation of repressive regimes rather than quiet diplomacy. Additionally, the Japanese public craves enhanced transparency and accountability in the working of Japanese government. And Japan's external policy has been going through ever more intense scrutiny in recent years.

[8] Between 1995 and 1999, Japan provided $124.73 million in official development assistance to support the Haitian government in the health and medical areas, transportation infrastructure, training of officials, and agriculture. See, Government of Japan. Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/00_hakusho/csa/csa_26.html>

[9] Government of Japan. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A Message from Foreign Minister Yohei Kono to Fijian President Mara. 26 May 2000. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2000/5/526.html>; and Government of Japan. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Statement by the Press Secretary/Director-General for Press and Public Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the Situation in the Republic of Fiji. *2* Mar. 2001.
<http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2001/7/0710.html>

[10] Government of Japan. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Emergency Aid to Fiji for its General Elections. 10 July 2001.
<http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2001/7/0710.html>

[11] In response to Pakistan's nuclear testing in 1998, Japan froze provision of all new ODA to Pakistan, except for humanitarian aid and grassroot grants. Thus, when the Chief of Army Staff, Pervez Musharraf, carried out the coup in 1999, Japan did not have any additional ODA to suspend as a measure for economic sanctions.

[12] The diplomatic offensive included Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori's visit to Pakistan in August 2000 and the summit meeting between Prime Minister Koizumi and President Musharraf on the occasion of the UN General Assembly in New York in September 2002.

[13] Government of Japan. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Japan's Policy to Lift Sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 22 Dec. 2000. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2000/12/1222.html>

[14] See, for example, Kohno, Masaharu. Wahei Kousaku (Constructing Peace) . Japan: Iwanami Shoten, 1999.

[15] In defense of his action, Hun Sen claimed that Ranariddh was preparing for a military attack against Hun Sen's

forces by mobilizing the remnants of forces of the Pol Pot faction and by illegally smuggling a number of weapons from former Eastern European countries. See, Imagawa, Yukio. Canbojia to Nihon (Cambodia and Japan) Japan: Rengo Shuppan, 2000. pp. 223-226.

[16] Japan was concerned that Pol Pot faction might have been revitalized with the cooperation of Ranariddh. In fact, Ranariddh admitted having contact with the Pol Pot faction. King Sihanouk also stated that this was not a coup. See, Imagawa, *Ibid.*, pp. 223-226.

[17] Japan's diplomatic offensive included unofficial meetings between Hun Sen and Japanese officials and politicians on the occasion of Hun Sen's visits to Japan and vice versa. Several Japanese parliamentary members, including the former Vice Foreign Minister and the son of a former Japanese foreign minister whom Hun Sen was quite close, also advised him to pursue democracy. Author's interview with a senior MOFA official, August 1997, Hawaii.

[18] Specifically, Japan requested that: 1) Ranariddh stop military cooperation with the Khmer Rouge; 2) the two parties agree on an immediate ceasefire; 3) a trial of Ranariddh should be concluded promptly, to be followed by a pardon; and 4) Ranariddh be allowed to return to Cambodia safely and to participate in a free and fair election as long as he observe the law. See, Imagawa, *op. cit.*, n. 17, p. 227.

[19] Speech of Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., 16 September 2002.

[20] On the one hand, some senior MOFA officials were concerned that Aung San Suu Kyi might lack the capability to govern Burma. Also, natural resources in Burma attracted the interest of Japanese trading companies. On the other hand, there was considerable political support in Japan for Aung San Suu Kyi, a 1991 Nobel Peace Prize laureate. In fact, Japanese Diet members formed a Parliamentary League to Support Aung San Suu Kyi. See, for example, Green, Michael J. Japan's Reluctant Realism Palgrave, New York: 2000. pp. 182-183.

[21] *Ibid.*, pp. 179-180.

[22] Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS), Myanmar and Cambodia in a New ASEAN: Dilemmas and Opportunities (Japan: RIPS. 2000), p. 1. Also, Japan feared that the continued economic sanctions worsened living conditions for the poor an as such could become a potential source of political instability. See, Nishihara, *op. cit.*, n. 3, p. 4.

[23] Burma has geostrategic importance as "an area for Sino-Indian rivalry," in Japan's perspective. See, Nishihara, *op. cit.*, n. 3, p. 9. Japan viewed China's "aid offensive" in Burma as aimed at gaining naval access to the Indian Ocean. See, "*Myanmar ni Mushou Enjo, Chugoku, Keizai Kyouryoku no Oboegaki Chouin* (China Signs Aid MOU with Myanmar, Giving United Aid)," *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, 26 March 1999.

[24] RIPS, *op. cit.*, n. 25, p. 29.

[25] Japan attempted to resume limited economic aid in 1989 and 1995, respectively, and extended loans for Yangon International Airport facilities in February 1998. Although Aung San Suu Kyi used to oppose any foreign economic assistance to Burma on the grounds that it would benefit the military junta, she finally acknowledged that Burma needs Japan's ODA and requested enhanced transparency in the provision of the assistance. See, "*Gaishou to Kaidan no Suchi-san, Nihon no Enjo Houshin ni Rikai* (Ms. Suu Kyi Recognized Japan's Aid Policy in Her Meeting with Japanese Foreign Minister)," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 6 Aug. 2002.

[26] Many Japanese leaders have expressed Japan's intention to provide support for democratization and nation-building efforts in Burma. For example, in October 1998, Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi and Burma Chairman Than Shwe held the first summit meeting since 1984, at the ASEAN Plus Three summit meeting in Manila, in which the Japanese Prime Minister took the opportunity to urge Than Shwe to adopt democratization in Burma. Also in December 1998, former Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto visited Burma to discuss issues of medicine, education and energy development with the SPDC leaders. See, RIPS, *op. cit.*, n. 25, p. 29. Additionally, in August 2002, Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi visited Burma and met with the SPDC leaders and Aung San Suu Kyi. Kawaguchi urged the two sides to initiate policy-oriented dialogue to discuss humanitarian issues so that eventually the two sides might be able to advance such dialogue into political dialogue to discuss the next phase of governance. See Government of Japan. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 5 Aug. 2002. <http://www.MOFA.go.jp/mofaj/kaidan/g_kawaguchi/ASEAN+3_02/nm_gh.html>

[27] Overall, Japan had a positive assessment of Fujimori's achievements during his tenure, especially his efforts to fight terrorism, illegal drugs, and poverty. Japan was sympathetic to Fujimori because of his Japanese heritage and because of Peru's terrible conditions: annual inflation rate of some 10,000%; huge government deficits that almost destroyed the national financial system; and frequent incidents of terrorism. Japan provided $66.14 million in 1995 and $80.14 million in 1998 as ODA and helped Peru build social infrastructure including schools and hospitals.

[28] Author's interview with a senior MOFA official, 13 September 2002, Washington, D.C. Fujimori's "return to democracy" was subsequently criticized by the OAS and the United States because the Peruvian National

Intelligence Service still engaged in repressive authoritarian practices.

[29] For the elections in 2000 and 2001, Japan dispatched electoral observation missions and provided $200,000 to the OAS to support its electoral monitoring effort. See, Government of Japan. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Dispatch of Electoral Observation Mission for the Presidential and Other Elections in the Republic of Peru. 23 March 2000 and 28 March 2001. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2000/3/323.html>; and <http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2001/3/0328-3.html>

[30] Government of Japan. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Official Development Assistance. (http://www.MOFA.go.jp/policy/oda/category/democratiz/1999/partner.html)

[31] Especially in recent years, criticism of Japan's ODA policy toward China has intensified primarily because of Japan's increasing concern that its economic assistance might abet China's military modernization while virtually almost no one in China appreciated Japanese economic aid. See, for example, Komori, Yoshihisa Pekin Houdou 700 Nichi (700 Days in Beijing as a Correspondent) Japan: PHP Shuppan, 2000.

[32] Examples of Japan's support under the PDD initiative include: support for Vietnam's establishment of a legal system; arranging Democratization Study Seminars for senior government officials from developing countries since 1992; providing training assistance at the UN Asia and Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders for officials engaged in crime prevention and criminal justice mainly in Asia-Pacific region; support for the UN Voluntary Fund for Advisory Services and Technical Assistance in the field of human rights; support for training election observers and for community leaders in Zambia in preparation for the 1998 local elections; sponsoring a symposium on human rights in the Asia-Pacific region; providing support for governance improvements in African countries; and contributions to UN programs to benefit women. Additionally, Japan has supported democratic elections in about 40 countries around the world by dispatching personnel, providing financial assistance and electoral training, as well as supplying equipment and materials. See, Government of Japan. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Partnership for Democratic Development <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/pdd/index.html>

[33] In 2002, the cumulative amount of Japan's ODA for China reached approximately $24 billion, a more than 50% share of the entire bilateral economic aid that China has received from all countries. Other objectives of Japan's ODA to China include: 1) providing Japan's wartime compensation to China; and 2) deepening economic interdependence.

[34] Even in the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen incident, when the West enforced economic sanctions against China, Japan emphasized the importance of promoting China's stable economic growth, instead of isolating Beijing. After suspending economic aid for a brief period of time, Japan was the first country to resume economic aid to China, and urged the West to lift economic sanctions as well.

[35] Especially given China's ongoing efforts to modernize its military, an increasing number of Japanese came to believe economic aid may have assisted Chinese military modernization and that Japan might have been too conciliatory in dealing with Beijing.

[36] With regard to humanitarian issues, Japan has been primarily concerned with the abducted Japanese citizens as well as the return of Japanese wives who has been living in North Korea. Also, the issue of international cooperation in response to an increasing number of North Korean refugees seeking political asylum abroad, especially in China, has become an important agenda item for the MOFA.

[37] Reportedly, in the event of diplomatic normalization between the two countries, Japan's provision of economic aid to North Korea is expected to become somewhere around $10 billion. See "Japan Expected to Aid N. Korea: Communists Seek $10 Billion in World War II Reparations," *Washington Post*, 14 September 2002.

[38] Government of Japan. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration. 17 Sep. 2002. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/n_korea/pmv0209/pyongyang.html>

[39] Privately, the Japanese oil industry and the Ministry of Economic, Trade and Industry sought in vain to ease economic sanctions.

[40] For example, see, Government of Japan. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "Guilty Sentences for Four Dissident Human-Rights Activists in Cuba. 17 March 1999 <http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/1999/3/317.html>; and Government of Japan. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Statement by the Press Secretary/Director-General for Press and Public Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the Parole of Anti-Government Human Rights Activists in Cuba. 19 May 2000 <http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2000/5/519.html>.

[41] Government of Japan. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Visit to Japan of Mr. Felipe Ramon Perez Roque Minister of Foreign Relations of the Republic of Cuba. 7 March 2001. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/latin/cuba/fmv0103/outline.html>.



Jordan

Assessment: Poor

Trend: ⇔

Capital: Amman

Type of Government: Constitutional Monarchy

Chief of State: King Abdullah (since 7 February 1999)

Minister of Foreign Affairs: Marhuan Muasher

Population: 5,153,378

Human Development Index Ranking: 99

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Jordan has a **poor** record of support for democracy abroad. While Jordan has consistently voted in favor of resolutions supporting democracy, participated in international fora on democracy promotion, and spoken in favor of freedom and human rights, it has failed to apply these principles at home or when democracy was challenged in a neighboring country. The Hashemite monarchy remained silent when democratically elected governments were overthrown or electoral processes manipulated, and followed a policy of appeasement towards entrenched dictatorships.

Amman has pursued a non-interference approach when responding to challenges to democracy abroad, seeking to maintain cordial relations with all countries in the region. The threat from Islamic extremists often has been cited by the regime as justification for suppressing domestic freedoms and for not supporting democracy in the Middle East. In fact, Jordan has refrained from condemning undemocratic practices abroad regardless of whether Islamists were poised to gain power. This approach has been inconsistent with Jordan's rhetorical commitment to democracy in international fora.

FOREIGN RELATIONS BACKGROUND

Jordan identifies its short-term foreign policy objective as protecting the country's interests by "maintaining good relations with neighboring countries as well as global powers." The monarchy says its long-term objectives include promotion of democracy and human rights in the region, adding that these objectives have "sometimes conflicted with Jordan's immediate interests."[1] In fact, democracy promotion is not an issue in the policy debate regarding relations with other countries. The Arab-Israeli peace process and Jordan's economic well-being have been the prime concerns of Amman's foreign policy, taking precedence over all other issues.

Geopolitical, economic and internal vulnerabilities have limited Amman's capacity to directly influence events in other countries. Jordan is a small country surrounded by more powerful neighbors, and heavily dependent on foreign aid from oil-rich countries. It has tried to maintain good relations with these neighbors, and has avoided criticizing their undemocratic practices. It remains to be seen whether Jordan, as it shifts its economy away from dependence on Arab countries and more towards the West, will work more effectively towards promoting democracy in the region in the future.

Another factor that heavily influences the monarchy's foreign policy is the fact that Palestinians make up an estimated 60 percent of the population. For example, Jordan sided with Iraq in the Gulf War, in part to meet demands of the Palestinian population, but paid a high price in terms of its relations with the United States and the Gulf countries. However, Jordan's 1994 peace treaty with Israel allowed it to strengthen its relations with the U.S., but put the monarchy under heavy domestic pressure from both Islamists and Palestinians, who continue to demand that Amman break relations with Israel.

Faced with widespread opposition to Jordan's peace treaty with Israel, and to Israel's intensifying campaign against the Palestinian uprising in the occupied territories, the monarchy has been trying to control the internal democratic debate and to limit political freedoms, halting the process of democratization begun in 1989. Direct public criticism of the regime's foreign policy is not allowed in Jordan. Editorialists often criticize undemocratic trends in Arab countries, but there is a striking degree of self-censorship.

The regime believes that democracy can only be introduced in the region when peace is reached between Israel and all Arab countries. King Abdallah, who assumed the throne following his father's death in February 1999, has followed the late King Hussein's strategy of cautious diplomacy, building up and maintaining good relations with regimes in the region, regardless of how they acceded to power.

RESPONSE TO OVERTHROW OF DEMOCRATICALLY-ELECTED GOVERNMENTS

Although Jordan's immediate neighborhood is hardly democratic, it has avoided condemning military coups or other forms of overthrow of democratically-elected governments wherever the opportunity has arisen. When condemnations have been made by a few Western countries or by regional organizations like the Commonwealth or the European Union, Jordan has remained silent.

The 1999 coup in the Comoros Islands is the exception that proves the rule. The Arab League, of which Jordan is a member, severed ties with the Comoros Islands when a military chief, Colonel Azali Assoumani, overthrew the government of Tajiddine Ben Saoud Massounde in a bloodless coup on 30 April 1999. The Arab League condemned the coup and refused to recognize the new regime. The 22-member organization sent a fact-finding commission to the small island state, which is one of its members. The commission called on the Arab League to authorize the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to supervise the Antananarivo Accord of April 1999 and to oversee the transfer of authority from the military regime to civilians.

In most other cases, Jordan did not take a public stance. For example, it did not join the Commonwealth and European Union condemnations of the crackdown by the Abacha regime in Nigeria in 1995. Nor did it condemn the 1996 coup in Niger led by Col. Bare Ibrahim Mainassara, which resulted in the overthrow of the country's first democratically-elected President. Jordan did not support efforts to impose sanctions on the new regimes, nor efforts to facilitate transitions back to democracy.

When Pakistani army chief Gen. Pervez Musharraf toppled Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in a bloodless coup on 12 October 1999, there was a great deal of criticism from much of the international community. However, Arab countries, including Jordan, refrained from denouncing the action, despite the concern in many Gulf countries that the coup would thwart Sharif's planned crackdown on Afghanistan's Taliban rulers.

RESPONSE TO MANIPULATION OF ELECTORAL PROCESSES

Jordan has abstained from condemning attempts by foreign governments to manipulate electoral processes and has always recognized the winners of elections in the region, even when the elections were widely viewed as flawed. Amman has not responded to pre-electoral malpractice abroad, but it has been willing to monitor elections in other countries. It participated in monitoring the 1996 legislative elections in Gaza in the Palestinian territories, as well as the 1993 elections in Cambodia.

Jordan's unwillingness to condemn manipulation of electoral processes is partly due to the fear that fair elections in an Arab country would lead to a sweeping victory by Islamic groups and thereby empower Jordanian Islamists. At a time when many countries were condemning Algeria's military-backed government for canceling the country's first free parliamentary elections (1992) to prevent a victory by the Islamic Salvation Front, Jordan accepted the situation, although not without comment from the King. A few days after the elections, Hussein told Le Figaro that he hoped the Arab world "will understand that it has to move toward democracy and the end of oppression," but added that religion should not be used as a political tool. "No one can pretend to monopolize the truth and Islam does not belong to a small group."[2]

King Hussein remained silent when Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak manipulated parliamentary elections in November and December 1995 to maintain a rubber-stamp assembly that could be trusted to re-elect him in 1999 for another six-year term. Throughout Egypt, police officers stuffed ballot boxes and harassed opposition candidates, human rights activists and election observers. Leaders of opposition parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood were arrested and prosecuted before military courts for peaceful political activities while hundreds of their supporters were detained in the run-up to the election. The election was described as "the worst we have ever had in Egypt" by lawyer Negad el-Borai, secretary-general of the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights.[3]

Shortly after the elections, Hussein called Mubarak, not to discuss elections in Egypt, but to exchange views on the Middle East peace process. Two days later, Hussein met with Mubarak to discuss the peace process and praised his role in "making peace and solving Arab problems."

During that time, Hussein was undertaking his own campaign against opposition figures, arresting dozens of suspected members of

Islamic and leftist groups opposed to the peace treaty with Israel. Scores of people were held in detention and frequently not told the charges against them. For example, Leith Shubeilat, president of the association of Jordanian engineers, was arrested on 9 December 1995 on charges that included lese-majesty after a speech the previous month in which he criticized King Hussein.

PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRACY

The policy of the Jordanian government has been to participate actively in international fora on democracy, though it has not undertaken any initiatives on its own. In addition, Jordan's commitment to the principles and agreements developed in these fora is often rhetorical, at best.

Jordan endorsed the Warsaw Declaration at the Community of Democracies ministerial conference in June 2000, and voted in favor of the 4 December 2000 UN resolution (A/RES/55/96) calling on states to promote and consolidate democracy. It has also ratified a number of important human rights treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its First Protocol, the International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights, and the Convention against Torture. In addition, Jordan has ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, although with reservations that reflect Islamists' interpretation of the Koran. Jordan is the only Arab country that has ratified the International Criminal Court (ICC) treaty, which is intended to hold accountable and bring to justice individuals responsible for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.

While Jordan has a good record of ratifying international human rights treaties, it also has a good record of breaching them. In the last few years, the regime dissolved Parliament, postponed elections several times, and issued new laws expanding the scope and definition of "terrorism," further restricting freedoms of expression. The "laws were promulgated by royal decree after [the attacks of] 11 September without passing through the Jordanian parliament...and came on the heels of additional new laws introduced in August 2001, limiting the rights of assembly and the right of political opponents to legal counsel."[4]

While democracy has been practiced in the breach, it has been a rhetorical cornerstone of Jordan's foreign policy. The speeches of the Jordanian monarchy are replete with references to democracy, freedom and human rights. In his address to the United Nations General Assembly on 22 October 1995, the late King Hussein referred to the plight of people "living under dictatorship and tyranny, deprived of freedom, democracy and human rights," adding that it was "high time that the international community and the human conscience moved to lift their suffering."[5] King Abdullah has continued along this rhetorical line; references to democracy are frequent in his speeches. Mostly, they revolve around claims about an internal democratization process in Jordan. There is an explicit allusion to democracy and human rights related to foreign policy that states that while Jordan cannot yet be considered a democracy, its "success on [the] democratic path" presents it "as a model for others to emulate."[6] However it clearly affirms that Jordan believes non-democratic countries should democratize from within and that it does not intend to impose their experience on other nations.

Solicitation of donor assistance for democratization programs in Jordan is mainly carried out by nongovernmental organizations, many of which are affiliated with the royal family. Jordanian laws, however, prohibit research centers from soliciting funds from abroad except for specific activities approved by the government. This is further complicated by the fact that many Islamists in Jordan consider the donations as western attempts to control the country. The controversy reached a climax in September 2000 when Jordan's journalists union expelled Nidal Mansur, the editor of the independent weekly Al-Hadath, for allegedly accepting foreign donations for his Center for the Defense of the Freedom of Journalists.

POLICY TOWARDS ENTRENCHED DICTATORSHIPS

Jordan has pursued a policy of appeasement toward undemocratic regimes, trying to maintain cordial relations.

The strategic position of Jordan as a small state surrounded by bigger and stronger countries weighs heavily on the Jordanian government, which has been building good relations with dictatorships in the Middle East. "Our relations with each Arab brethren state are based upon compassion, brotherhood, respect, trust, cooperation and non-interference with others' internal affairs,' said King Abdallah at the opening of the 3rd Ordinary Session of Jordan's 13th Parliament in 1999.[7]

In addition to its geo-strategic position, Jordan's economic dependence on the countries of the region has made it unwilling to isolate dictatorships. Iraq, for example, is Jordan's primary source for fuel oil, and a special exception to UN sanctions permits it to continue buying oil from its neighbor. In return, Jordan exports

humanitarian goods, which Iraq is allowed to buy. Another key factor underlying Jordan's relationship with Iraq is the risk that Palestinian anger toward Israel, and toward the West's treatment of Iraq, could turn quickly into hostility toward the regime.

Nonetheless, the late King Hussein at times criticized the Iraqi regime and supported efforts to change it. He permitted anti-Saddam media activities in Amman and welcomed Iraqi defectors in 1995. He hosted a prominent Iraqi defector, Lt. Gen. Hussein Kamel Hassan Majeed, Saddam Hussein's son-in-law, who later returned to Iraq only to be executed. There were, however, reports of forcible return of asylum seekers to Iraq where they were at risk of serious human rights violations.

Jordan and Libya have experienced decades of tense relations after Amman accused Tripoli of supporting Palestinians opposed to King Hussein. In March 2000, Jordan deported seven Libyan Islamists to Libya despite warnings by Amnesty International and other NGOs that their lives would be threatened. Relations have improved recently, and the two countries have exchanged high-level official visits and signed a cooperation agreement in 2000, which provides for Libyan financial assistance in bringing water from Southern Jordan to Amman.

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[3] Marlowe, Lara. "Dying For Change; A Badly Flawed Election Will Not Ease the Spreading Conflict Between Mubarak And Rebel Muslims." Time 11 December 1995, p. 41.
[4] "Jordan: New security measures violate human rights." Amnesty International. 2 October 2002. <http://web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/Index/MDE160032002?OpenDocument&of=COUNTRIES>.
[5] King Hussein of Jordan "Address to the United Nations General Assembly on the Occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the United Nations," speech to the United Nations, 22 October 1995. <http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/speeches_letters.html>.
[6] Government of Jordan. About Jordan-Foreign Affairs - The Future is in the Balance- Democratization and Human Rights. 2 October 2002. < http://www.kingabdullah.jo/about%5Fjordan/decoration%5Fhum.html>.
[7] King Abdullah III of Jordan. "Opening of the 3rd Ordinary Session of the Jordanian 13th Parliament," speech to the Jordanian Parliament, 1 November 1999. <http://www.jordanembassyus.org/HMKASpeech110199.htm>.
Address to the United Nations General Assembly on the Occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the United Nations.



Kenya

Assessment: Poor
Trend: ⇔
Capital: Nairobi
Type of Government: Republic
Head of Government: President Daniel Toroitich arap Moi (since 14 October 1978)
Foreign Minister: Marden Madoka
Population: 30,765,916
Human Development Index Ranking 2002: 134

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Kenya has a **poor** record of support for democracy abroad and has often condemned democracy-promoting activities of other countries as external interference in Africa's internal affairs. It has done little to respond to coups and has defended regimes engaged in human rights abuses. Kenya has not only failed to condemn controversial elections in Uganda, Tanzania (Zanzibar), Zambia and Zimbabwe, it has often supported the outcomes as reflecting the "will of the people." Daniel arap Moi, Kenya's president for 24 years, has been a staunch opponent of multi-party politics. He has consistently disagreed with supporters of political pluralism over what constitutes a fair election, and argued that Western standards should not apply to the African continent.

FOREIGN RELATIONS BACKGROUND

From the day it gained independence in 1963, Kenya adopted a cautious foreign policy toward its neighbors in East Africa and the rest of the world. At the sub-regional level, Kenya took the position that a policy of mutual understanding between neighbors was the best method for ensuring the security of both its people and its territory. Furthermore, Kenya was convinced that African states lacked the means to carry out adventurist foreign policies.[1] Thus, from the start, respect for territorial integrity, peaceful cooperation and co-existence in Africa, and non-alignment in East-West power conflicts have been the cornerstones of Kenya's foreign policy.

Even after the end of the cold war, Kenya has maintained a low profile on many of the burning issues in Africa and beyond. It has defended the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other African states, a principle enshrined in the original 1963 Charter of the Organization of African States (OAU). When Kenya has chosen to take a stand with respect to important regional issues, it has preferred to work through the OAU, the Commonwealth and the United Nations.

Kenya's traditionalist foreign policy reflects Moi's self-interest in defending himself against international criticism directed at his government. Moi rejected multi-party politics when calls for political liberalization in Kenya first arose in 1989. Moi claimed that a multi-party system was not suitable for a country such as Kenya, because political differences were based not on issues, but instead on tribal and ethnic lines. It was not until December 1991, in the face of domestic unrest and pressure created by the suspension of $350 million in "quick-disbursing" aid by the country's bilateral donors, that Moi allowed opposition parties to compete in the 1992 presidential and parliamentary elections. However, both the 1992 and 1997 elections were marred by political repression, state control of the media, and dubious electoral procedures.[2] The upcoming election, scheduled for December 2002, is considered to be one of the most important and likely hotly contested elections in post-independence Kenya. Moi, who is barred by the 1991 constitution from running for office, has handpicked a successor in a possible attempt to continue to control the government after his term is up. However, Moi's party, Kanu, faces tough competition from several other candidates pushing for greater democratic reform.

RESPONSE TO OVERTHROW OF DEMOCRATICALLY-ELECTED GOVERNMENTS

Kenya has a mixed record with respect to its policy towards the overthrow of democratically-elected governments. When coups swept across West Africa in the mid 1990s, leading to the downfall of democratically-elected governments in The Gambia (1994), Niger (1996), Sierra Leone (1997) and Cote d'Ivoire (1999), Kenya did not take an independent stand. For example, in the case of The Gambia, Kenya left it to the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group, led by then Ghanaian Foreign Minister Obed Asamoah, and deputy ministers from Canada and New Zealand, to pressure Gambian coup leader Lieutenant Colonel Yahya Jammeh to restore constitutional rule.

Nor did Kenya make its voice heard with respect to human rights violations perpetrated by General Sanni Abacha's military government in Nigeria. In 1995, Abacha executed Ken Saro-Wiwa, a human rights activist, despite international appeals. He also imprisoned former president Olesegun Obasanjo and Mashood Abiola, the legitimate winner of the democratic elections of 1993. At the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in Auckland, New Zealand on 10-13 November 1995, Nigeria was suspended after strong action from Nelson Mandela and Robert Mugabe. But President Moi, who was present, "was not a force at the meeting."[3]

One exception to Kenya's passive stance was its response to the overthrow of the constitutionally-elected government in Burundi. On 25 July 1996, Major Pierre Buyoya, the coup leader and a Tutsi former President himself, joined up with radical Tutsi military generals to grab power from the elected government of Hutu President Sylvester Ntibantunganya. Buyoya proceeded to outlaw all political parties, disbanded parliament and suspended the constitution. The coup drew immediate reactions from Kenya and Tanzania. In Nairobi, the government issued a strongly worded statement "joining the international community in condemning the coup in Burundi and calling on all the parties...to undertake unconditional negotiations".[4] A week after the coup, Kenya, along with Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda and Ethiopia, imposed immediate economic and trade sanctions on the tiny, landlocked country. The sanctions were considered a success; six weeks after their imposition political parties and the national assembly were restored. The regional reaction came in part from the recent emergence of democracy in the region and the desire for self-preservation. Another possible factor contributing to Kenya's reaction are Moi's close relationship with the Hutu leadership in both Burundi and Rwanda.[5]

RESPONSE TO MANIPULATION OF ELECTORAL PROCESSES

The Moi regime has refrained from criticizing incumbent governments in Eastern Africa despite obvious evidence of electoral malpractice. Instead, such subversions were often described by Kenya as "reflecting the will of the people" of the countries concerned.

When Tanzania held its first multi-party elections in 1995, the ruling party *Chama Cha Mapinduzi* (CCM-the Revolutionary Party) was declared the winner in Zanzibar with a narrow win of 50.2 per cent to 49.8 per cent for the Civic United Front (CUF), the main opposition party. But this victory was widely discredited because of poll chaos and allegations of vote fixing. This happened again when the island's elections were held in November 2000. The CCM was declared the winner once again and, as in 1995, the elections were marked by allegations of vote rigging. Violence and widespread human rights violations followed, and more than a dozen of Zanzibar's 50–member parliament flew to Kenya to escape state-sponsored repression. Yet Kenya did not condemn the fraudulent results of either the 1995 or 2000 elections. Instead, Kenya supported the CCM, and President Moi even attended President Benjamin Mkapa's swearing-in on 9 November 2000.

Kenya has strictly adhered to the principle of non-interference in other elections in the region as well. It did not raise its voice concerning Yoweri Museveni's "no-party" democracy in Uganda, or regarding the Ugandan President's now famous remark that "losing is completely hypothetical. It will not happen," which he made when he was campaigning for re-election in February 2001.[6] And Kenya continued to remain quiet in the face of government harassment of the leading opposition candidate Kizza Besigye. When the elections were held on 13 March, Museveni emerged the winner with 69 per cent of the vote. Moi personally attended the inauguration party in Kampala. In Zambia Kenya again refrained from condemning the results of the much disputed December 2001 presidential elections, in which Levy Mwanasawa of the ruling party's Movement for Multi-party Democracy

(MMD) won with less than 30 percent of the vote. Similarly, Kenya was not engaged during the 2002 constitutional crisis that engulfed its Indian Ocean neighbor, Madagascar. Instead, it allowed distant Senegal and the OAU to take the lead in resolving the stalemate.

The March 2002 elections in Zimbabwe provide further evidence of Moi's lack of concern for democracy and human rights abroad. In spite of widespread international condemnation of state terror, intimidation, arrests and prosecution of journalists and manipulation of the electoral process in the weeks preceding the vote, the Secretary General of Kenya's ruling party, KANU, accused the West of once again failing to understand Africa. When the Commonwealth debated possible responses to the Zimbabwean electoral crisis at its meeting in Australia in March this year, Moi opted for solidarity with other African leaders in support of Mugabe. And when President Mugabe was declared the winner with 56 per cent of the vote, Moi promptly congratulated him, calling his victory "a testimony of the confidence and high esteem the people of Zimbabwe hold in you."[7] Moreover, Kenya, unlike Tanzania, Uganda, Namibia and South Africa, did not send election monitors to observe the Zimbabwean elections.

PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRACY

Kenya has done little to promote democracy abroad, and instead has strictly adhered to the principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries. This position is reflected in its voting record at the UN General Assembly on human rights issues and on issues concerning electoral malpractice. During the period 1994-2001, Kenya regularly abstained from votes with respect to human rights abuses in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cuba, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kosovo, Iran, Iraq, Nigeria and Sudan.[8] On the question of whether support for electoral processes abroad constitutes an infringement of the principle of national sovereignty and interference in the internal affairs of other states, Kenya voted "yea" all five times in the period between 1989 and 2001 that the issue was raised in the UN General Assembly.[9]

POLICY TOWARDS ENTRENCHED DICTATORSHIPS

President Moi, who, like many dictators, takes direct charge of the nation's foreign relations, has defended his authoritarian regime against international criticism and lobbied other African heads of state to ignore international criticism of his and other dictatorial regimes, as well. His own policy towards other entrenched dictatorships, therefore, has been one of solidarity. While addressing the Ugandan Manufactures' Association (UMA) in Kampala on 19 May 1998, Moi answered his critics, stating, "I am not a dictator. I just say what is good. I say things direct."[10] Moreover, while addressing the launching of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) Free Trade Area in Lusaka in 2000, Moi advised member countries to recommend measures to curb "loss of sovereignty" caused by foreign influences that were bent on causing discord in the region.[11] As already noted, Kenya also took a back seat when the Commonwealth debated sanctioning Nigeria for human rights violations at its meeting in Auckland in 1995.

In addition, Kenya has maintained excellent relations with a number of entrenched dictatorships in the East African region, most notably with the late Mobutu Sese Seko of the former Zaire. When Mobutu was overthrown by Laurent Kabila's rebels supported by Uganda and Rwanda in 1998, Moi became furious over what he termed Ugandan and Rwandan interference in Zaire's "internal affairs." Further evidence of Kenya's relationship with dictators and human rights violators is seen in the country's ambivalence towards the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. After the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) took over in Kigali, Moi granted asylum to the perpetrators of the genocide. Most of them found comfortable homes in Nairobi. Furthermore, Kenya initially protected the leading criminals of the Rwandan genocide, with Kenya's Foreign Minister, Kalonzo Musyoka arguing that nobody could pinpoint the perpetrators of the Rwandan massacre.[12]

In its own neighborhood, Kenya has failed to condemn human rights violations in Uganda, where Museveni's 16-year war against the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) in the northern part of the country has caused repeated civilian casualties and led to the displacement of large rural populations. Kenya has also maintained relations with the Sudan, notwithstanding Khartoum's callous disregard for human rights and continued indifference to international opinion. Indeed, on 12 April 2002, at the annual meeting of the United Nations Human Rights Commission, Kenya, along with Algeria, Burundi, Libya and Sierra Leone, voted unsuccessfully to stop the renewal of the mandate of the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Sudan, despite reports from Gerhart Baum, former German Interior Minister, of government atrocities on the Sudanese civilian population in the south.

[1] John Okumu. "Kenya's Foreign Policy", in Aluko, Olajide, ed. The Foreign Policies of African States. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1977.
[2] Freedom in the World 2001-2002, p. 335.
[3] Africa Confidential, 36.23 (1995): Moi may have been worried that he would be liable for similar sanctions because of his proxy war in the Rift Valley of Kenya.
[4] Kenya Times 2 August 1996.
[5] McKinley Jr., James C. "As the West Hesitates on Burundi, Leaders in Africa Make a Stand." The New York Times 24 August 1996: A1.
[6] Africa Confidential 42.16 (2001)
[7] Daily Nation, Kenya 14 March 2002; Daily News, Dar es Salaam 14 March 2002.
[8] Out of the 43 times when human rights situations in eight authoritarian states were tabled before the UN General Assembly over this period, Kenya abstained from voting 41 times, earning an abstention record of more than 95 per cent.
[9] Although this study confines itself to the period after 1992, the inclusion of the votes taken in 1989 and 1990 were included to show the consistency with which Kenya has applied the principle of non-intervention.
[10] Africa Confidential 39.11 (1998)
[11] Kenya Times 1 November 2000.
[12] Africa Confidential 36.11, 26 (1995)

Republic of Korea

Assessment: Good
Trend: ⇔
Capital: Seoul
Type of Government: Republic
Head of Government: President Kim Dae-jung (since 25 February 1998)
Minister of Foreign Affairs: Song-hong Ch'oe
Population: 47,904,370
Human Development Index Ranking: 27

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Republic of Korea (R.O.K) has a good record of support for democracy abroad, as evidenced by its willingness to monitor elections, support international resolutions condemning undemocratic regimes, and host international democracy fora. Its foreign policy remains focused mostly on the United States, its main security ally, and North Korea (Democratic People's Republic of Korea or DPRK), its principal security threat, but the R.O.K has become more active in the global community of states, sometimes playing a leadership role in international organizations. Economic and security considerations sometimes take precedence over democratic ideals, however, particularly when responding to oil-producing states.

As a newly democratizing country itself, the R.O.K has only recently begun to actively support democracy worldwide. In the early 1990s, the R.O.K was just emerging from three decades of military rule. The 1992 election of Kim Young Sam brought to power the first civilian leader in the R.O.K since 1961. Pro-democracy activities have notably increased since the 1997 election of former dissident and long-time democracy activist Kim Dae Jung, including the participation in, and hosting of, international democracy fora. Critics have charged, however, that Kim's obsession with his "sunshine policy" of constructive engagement toward North Korea has undermined R.O.K support for human rights and democratic principles.

FOREIGN POLICY BACKGROUND

Since the Korean War, R.O.K foreign policy has been dominated by two key concerns: how to deal with North Korea and, closely related to this, Seoul's strong military and political alliance with the United States. With a single, overarching security concern and heavy dependence on a superpower ally, the R.O.K has been slow to develop an independent, globally-focused foreign policy. This began to change gradually with the end of the Cold War. Then-President Roh Tae Woo launched a series of initiatives jointly known as "Nordpolitik." Key among these was a decision to open relations with North Korea's two main allies, China and Russia. There has been little progress in the relationship with the latter, due mainly to Russia's economic malaise and declining influence in North Korea. However, China has emerged as arguably the Republic of Korea's most important diplomatic partner outside of the United States. The two countries are now major trading partners, and Seoul often looks to Beijing to play a mediating role with Pyongyang. Another notable success of Roh's policy was the joint admission of both Koreas to the United Nations in 1991, which put an end to the decades-old contest for legitimacy between the two and paved the way for an increased international role for the R.O.K.

President Kim Young Sam tried to expand the R.O.K's foreign policy focus through the implementation of a globalization (*saegaehwa*) policy. Following its rise from one of the poorest nations of the world to one qualified for admission to the wealthier club of states at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), South Korea was held up as an example of economic and democratic development for Third World nations to emulate. Although primarily focused on economics, under the

globalization policy, Seoul's diplomatic activities were expanded to geographic areas that it had traditionally ignored, such as Africa and Latin America. In practice, this frequently amounted to little more than enticing North Korea's third world allies to switch allegiances with offers of aid or investment. The Asian financial crisis of 1997 spelled the end of the globalization policy, as revelations of widespread corruption greatly undermined the R.O.K's claims to serve as a role model.

The 1997 election of former dissident Kim Dae Jung brought to power a leader with an international reputation as a pro-democracy activist. Kim, who survived imprisonment and assassination attempts under the military dictatorships of Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan, had spent the years before his election cultivating relationships with other regional democratic leaders through the Kim Dae Jung Peace Foundation for Asia Pacific and the Forum of Democratic Leaders in Asia Pacific (FDL-AP), which he had helped to found in 1994. Kim's "sunshine policy" of engagement with North Korea, along with his lifelong pro-democracy activities, resulted in his receiving the 2000 Nobel Peace Prize.

As part of the sunshine policy, the R.O.K has encouraged other states, especially in the European Union, to take a more active role in engaging North Korea. In addition, the R.O.K. has cultivated relations with states that may be able to influence Pyongyang, especially China and, more recently, Cuba. Proponents of the sunshine policy argue that bringing North Korea more into the international community will help open the country to gradual economic and political reform, lessening the negative impacts of eventual reunification. North Korea's recent price and wage reforms have been cited as an indication that it is slowly creeping toward reform. Critics, however, charge that the policy makes too many concessions to Pyongyang, ignores the principle of reciprocity, and fails to address the numerous human rights violations by the communist regime. In this view, North Korea is an irredeemable dictatorship that must be contained to prevent it from embarking on its ultimate goal of communizing the whole peninsula by force. Instead of paving the way for long-run democratization in North Korea, they argue that the sunshine policy is only helping to prolong the Kim Jong Il regime and allowing it to continue its egregious human rights violations. Moreover, Kim has also been accused of resorting to undemocratic measures to silence his domestic opponents. International democracy activists, meanwhile, have also criticized Kim's failure to repeal the National Security Law, which allows the government to jail citizens whose activities are seen as supportive of North Korea's position on reunification.

While the sunshine policy represents a more aggressive approach toward engagement of North Korea, R.O.K governments have always used a mixture of carrots and sticks in dealing with North Korea. As part of his "Nordpolitik," Roh Tae-Woo signed the North-South Basic Agreement, which called for peaceful co-existence, denuclearization, and confidence-building measures, but the specifics of the agreement were never implemented. The Kim Young-Sam government generally took a skeptical line toward engagement with the DPRK, but did join the light-water reactor project negotiated by the United States, provided food aid to the North, and launched the four-party talks, which while ultimately unsuccessful, did bring the DPRK to the negotiating table with both the R.O.K and the U.S. for the first time.

RESPONSE TO OVERTHROW OF DEMOCRATICALLY-ELECTED GOVERNMENTS

Overall, the recent response of the R.O.K to the overthrow of democratically-elected governments abroad has been good. Although it does not as a rule resort to unilateral sanctions against coup leaders, it has generally been supportive of international efforts to condemn coups, occasionally taking the lead in getting resolutions passed in the UN and other international bodies. When democratic governments have been restored after a coup, the R.O.K has been quick to recognize them, often being the first nation to invite a newly-elected leader to visit. However, there have also been occasions when economic interests have caused the R.O.K. to adopt a more muted response to the overthrow of an elected government.

In Africa, where the R.O.K has minimal interests, it has been quick to condemn overthrows of democratic governments. The R.O.K froze relations with Cote d'Ivoire following the 1999 coup d'etat. In 1997, while serving as President of the United Nations Security Council during the Kim Young Sam administration, the R.O.K strongly condemned the overthrow of the government of President Kabbah in Sierra Leone. It supported sanctions by the UN and the Economic Committee of West African States (ECOWAS) against the military junta, and called for maintaining relations with the legitimate government in exile.[1] The R.O.K supported the 1995 UN Human Rights Declaration on Nigeria, to

the detriment of its relations with that oil-exporting country, and was quick to praise the restoration of democracy with the election of President Olusegun Obasanjo, inviting Obasanjo to Seoul shortly after he took power.[2]

In the Americas, the R.O.K's record has been somewhat more mixed. With regards to Haiti, the R.O.K strongly supported the establishment of a United Nations Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH) to help train the Haitian National Police as part of the effort to restore democracy in that country, and contributed $500,000 to the effort. In Ecuador, the R.O.K did not condemn the coup d'etat itself. However, it did issue a statement praising the return to civilian rule under President (former Vice President) Gustavo Noboa as in line with the constitutional process, and inviting Noboa to Seoul in March 2002.[3] The R.O.K remained silent on the 2002 coup in Venezuela, most likely because of its relationship with the United States (which opposed the democratically-elected Chavez government), and because Venezuela is an oil-exporting state. South Korea remains heavily dependant on foreign oil for the majority of its energy needs.

In the former Yugoslavia, the R.O.K has been supportive of international efforts to restore peace and democracy to the region, consistently voting for resolutions critical of the Milosevic regime, and sending election monitors to Bosnia on two occasions. The R.O.K did not actively oppose the coup in Fiji, however. In fact, the R.O.K was the one of the first countries to restore air travel to Fiji in August 2000, and continued naval visits despite the lack of a restoration of democracy there.[4] The R.O.K. response to this particular case can not be explained by an overriding economic interest, and is thus quite inconsistent with its strong support of democracy evidenced in other similar cases.

In Asia, President Kim Dae Jung has long-standing relationships with many democratic leaders, especially through FDL-AP. While not actively condemning the coup in Pakistan, Kim did continue contacts with civilian leaders there, inviting exiled former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto to Seoul in May 2001.[5] Seoul was slow to respond to the deterioration of Philippine President Estrada's administration, inviting him to Seoul shortly before his removal from office. The R.O.K, however, accepted Estrada's removal as within the bounds of a constitutional process. In Indonesia, the R.O.K was strongly supportive of the return to civilian rule under Abdurahim Wahid, another leader with whom Kim Dae Jung had a prior existing relationship, and was one of the first nations to recognize the new government there. At the same time, the R.O.K was extremely active in supporting the establishment of a democratic and independent East Timor, providing peacekeeping forces, election monitors, and financial aid, and becoming the first government to open a diplomatic mission in the newly independent state.

RESPONSE TO MANIPULATION OF ELECTORAL PROCESSES

The R.O.K has had a fair response to the manipulation of elections abroad, providing strong support for international election monitoring efforts, but failing to take active measures against countries that engage in electoral fraud.

The R.O.K has strongly supported election monitoring efforts abroad, and has endorsed the findings of international election monitors. It has provided electoral assistance and monitoring to Cambodia (1993, 1997), South Africa (1994), Mozambique (1994), Bosnia & Herzegovina (1996), and East Timor (1999).

Other than joining international condemnation of Nigeria, which led to a freezing of relations with that country, the R.O.K has been rather silent on electoral manipulations. It has continued to maintain relations with Algeria, first established in 1990, despite electoral irregularities there. It has cultivated good relations with Cambodia, despite the 1998 flawed elections, providing Phnom Penh with development aid in the belief that Cambodia, which traditionally has had a very close relationship with North Korea, can be an ally in support of the sunshine policy.[6]

The R.O.K's reluctance to take a stronger stand against electoral manipulation may stem from its own history of such malpractice. Although electoral irregularities have greatly decreased since Chun Doo Hwan stepped down in 1987, they do occur. In the last presidential election, elements of the R.O.K intelligence agency conspired in an attempt to portray Kim Dae Jung as a North Korean agent in the so-called "Northern Wind" scandal. All three of the most recent presidents have been tied to varying degrees to a slush fund created by former dictator Chun Doo Hwan. These electoral irregularities greatly undermine the R.O.K's moral authority to criticize manipulation of elections in other states.

PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRACY

The Republic of Korea has a very good record of supporting democracy internationally, especially during the administration of Kim Dae Jung, when it has often assumed a leading role in pushing pro-democracy resolutions at the United Nations and other international fora. The R.O.K

has voted for all UN resolutions calling for strengthening the UN role in the democratic process. At the same time, it has voted against resolutions calling for non-interference in other countries' electoral processes, viewing the resolution as a justification for electoral manipulation. The R.O.K has also spoken at the United Nations in support of democratic transitions in South Africa and Nigeria.[7]

The R.O.K participated in all of the UN-sponsored Conferences of New or Restored Democracies. It hosted the International Conference on Democracy, Market Economy and Development in February 1999. It also hosted the Inaugural Conference of the Democracy Forum in July of that year, at which President Kim strongly disputed the notion that democracy is incompatible with Asian values.[8] Seoul was instrumental in establishing the International Conference of the Community of Democracies in Warsaw, Poland in June 2000, and will host the Second Ministerial Conference in November 2002.

The R.O.K's capacity to support the democracy agenda is derived from its status as a new donor nation, its strong participation in international fora, and its own experience of having undergone the transition from dictatorship to democracy. The R.O.K has been particularly active in promoting the establishment of a democratic government in East Timor. Since 1999, it has sent four separate units of peacekeepers to join UN efforts in East Timor. It was the eleventh country to establish a diplomatic mission in the newly independent country, and became the first country to initiate full diplomatic relations when East Timor officially gained independence on 20 May 2002. It supported the establishment of a United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) to replace the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). It also argued against a premature reduction of the UN peacekeeping presence in the country "until East Timor achieves an integrated democratic system, with a strong enough set of institutions that are necessary to that end,"[9] while at the same time pushing for an early transition to East Timorese independence. In addition to supplying over 400 peacekeeping troops, the R.O.K contributed US$1,250,000 for humanitarian assistance and other programs. In Afghanistan, the R.O.K contributed US$12 million in humanitarian assistance, and strongly supported the establishment of the interim government under Hamid Karzai.

Since the mid-1980s, the R.O.K has been an international donor nation, providing a total of $1.7 billion in overseas development aid (ODA) over the past decade. However, it does not have a policy of targeting any portion of that aid specifically for the promotion of democracy, as the government believes that supporting economic and social development will eventually lead to democratic development as well.

POLICY TOWARD ENTRENCHED DICTATORSHIPS

The R.O.K has only a fair record of supporting democratic change in entrenched dictatorships. Its policy toward entrenched dictatorships largely derives from its unusual status as one half of a divided country. The main driving factor in many of these cases is the overwhelming concern of the Kim Dae Jung administration with the sunshine policy toward North Korea, which has led to closer relations with non-democratic regimes, like China and Cuba, that have ties to Pyongyang. Elsewhere, it has generally been willing to take actions against dictatorships except where economic or security concerns predominated.

Political and economic interests are paramount in South Korea's relations with China. Since normalizing relations in 1993, the two countries have emerged as major trading partners. China also plays a crucial role in R.O.K attempts to engage the North Koreans. Many political and economic contacts between South and North Koreans take place in China. Recently, the growing problem of DPRK refugees has created a diplomatic problem for China-R.O.K relations. The R.O.K has attempted to push China to take a humanitarian approach to the crisis, while respecting China's concerns about sovereignty. Critics have called on the R.O.K to take a more aggressive approach to force China to provide aid to the refugees, and have proposed that the UN High Commissioner for Refugees be allowed to take over the problem Others, however, including many NGOs, argue that a quieter approach—one that avoids antagonizing China—may be more effective for aiding the refugees and preventing a crackdown by the Beijing government. The importance of economic and security ties with Beijing also led the R.O.K government to refuse a request by Korean Buddhist groups to invite the Dalai Lama to Seoul, even though the Tibetan leader was, like President Kim Dae Jung, a former recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize.

Elsewhere in the world, the R.O.K. under President Kim Dae Jung has supported a range of UN resolutions criticizing authoritarian regimes. In the case of Nigeria, relations between the two countries worsened when the R.O.K agreed to the adoption of the Nigeria Human Rights Resolution

at the December 1995 session of the UN General Assembly. Relations were restored after Obasanjo became President. The Kim Dae Jung government has also taken a critical stance toward Sudan, consistently voting to condemn Sudan's human rights record in the UN. Previously, the Kim Young Sam government had abstained from such votes. In the case of Iraq, the R.O.K has supported all Security Council resolutions and General Assembly criticisms of the Saddam Hussein regime. Similarly, although the Kim Young Sam government had been rather slow to respond to the situation in Bosnia, the R.O.K has consistently supported all UN resolutions regarding former Yugoslavia since the inauguration of Kim Dae Jung. However, with Libya, which is a major exporter of oil to the R.O.K and where South Korean construction firms are quite active, the R.O.K has maintained a close relationship.

Cuba, a long-time ally of North Korea, is one of the few countries with which the R.O.K has no formal diplomatic relations. Recently, however, the R.O.K has attempted to improve ties with Cuba as part of its overall strategy of engaging North Korea. Since 1999, the R.O.K has voted for the first time for the annual UN resolution calling for the lifting of the U.S. embargo against Cuba. It has continued to support criticisms of Cuba's human rights record in the General Assembly, however. Recently, the two countries have begun to discuss opening trade offices in each other's capitals, and R.O.K National Assembly Speaker Lee Man-Sup proposed in 2001 that Fidel Castro make a visit to both Seoul and Pyongyang, although the Cuban government failed to respond to the proposal.[10]

The case of Burma provides an interesting comparison of the R.O.K's policy toward other entrenched dictatorships. On the one hand, President Kim Dae Jung has a very close personal relationship with Burmese democracy activist Aung San Suu Kyi, who is on the board of directors of FDL-AP. Kim hosted a conference in Seoul to discuss NGO strategies for promoting democratization in Burma. On the other hand, the government has not put pressure on R.O.K companies to divest from Burma, and South Korea remains one of the leading foreign investors operating in the country. This case shows how vested interests can undermine the government's policy toward entrenched dictatorships even when the president has a personal connection to the issue.

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[1] H.E. Ambassador Park Soo Gil, Permanent Representative of the R.O.K to the UN. "The Situation in Sierra Leone," speech to the UN, at the 3822nd Meeting of the Security Council, 8 Oct. 97.

[2] Kim Dae-Jung, President R.O.K. "Remarks By President Kim At A State Dinner For President Olusegun Obasanjo," 21 July 2000.

[3] Ilbo, Hankook. "Seoul Recognizes New Ecuador Government." 28 Jan. 2000.

[4] Information on the R.O.K's relations with Fiji is available at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website: http://www.mofat.go.kr/mission/emb/ww_data_view_en.mof?b_code=ww13&seq_no=3788&si_dcode=FJ-FJ.

[5] Chung, Hye-jean. "Bhutto Calls for Equal Rights for Women. Korea Times 5 March 2001.

[6] As is often the case in Korean politics, North Korean-Cambodian relations have a strong personal basis, as the late North Korean President Kim Il Sung provided asylum to ousted Prince Norodom Sihanouk. Kim Dae Jung's cultivation of relations with Hun Sen, who has often been at odds with the Sihanouk family, can be seen as an attempt to counterbalance this relationship.

[7] H.E. Suh Dae-won, Deputy Permanent Representative. "Agenda Item 46: Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa," speech at the UN.
at the 54th Session of the General Assembly, 12/09/99.

[8] Kim Dae-Jung, President R.O.K. "Congratulatory Message By President Kim Dae-Jung," speech at the Inaugural Conference - Challenges for Asian Democracy in the 21st Century: Setting the Agenda for the Democracy Forum.

[9] Kim Young-mok, Charge d'Affaires. "The Situation in East Timor," speech at the Open Debate of the Security Council on East Timor, 26 Jan. 2001.

[10] "Korea, Cuba move to establish trade offices" Korea Herald, 6 April 2001.

Mali

Assessment: Fair
Trend: ⇔
Capital: Bamako
Type of Government: Republic
Head of State: Amadou Toumani Toure (since May 2002)
Minister of Foreign Affairs: Lassana Traore
Population: 11,008,518
Human Development Index Ranking 2002: 134

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Mali has a **fair** record of support for democracy abroad. It has regularly made statements on the importance of democracy as one of its main foreign policy principles. But the rhetoric is often not matched by reality. There are few examples of Mali actively promoting democracy abroad. Moreover, Mali has refrained from criticizing the manipulation of electoral processes, maintained relations with entrenched dictators (such as Nigeria's Sani Abacha) and abstained on votes concerning democracy and human rights in the United Nations.

Mali, one of the poorest countries in the world, views itself as an increasingly important country in West Africa. Its steady progress on democratization makes Mali a potential role model for other emerging democracies struggling simultaneously to undertake political reforms and deliver improved standards of living to the population. Building on the leadership of former President Konare, who peacefully handed power to his successor following free and fair elections in 2002, Mali enjoys a significant degree of respect in the international community that allows it room to speak out on democracy issues and criticize non-democratic behavior.

It is unclear whether Mali's approach to promoting democracy abroad will change under the new administration of President Amadou Toumani Toure, but significant alterations are unlikely. The new president is likely to focus his attention on domestic issues, at least initially, as he does not enjoy the reputation or respect among his peers of his immediate predecessor.

FOREIGN RELATIONS BACKGROUND

After sustaining democracy for more than a decade, and holding recent elections in which power transferred peacefully through the ballot box from one civilian administration to another, Mali is considered one of the leading democracies in Africa. The country remains woefully poor, but politically Mali is well-developed relative to many of its neighbors.

Mali's foreign relations objectives are generally limited to the West African sub-region. Foremost among them is promoting regional cohesion and cooperation. This goal took on greater significance when President Konare assumed the chairmanship of the 16-member Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1999. Another objective is conflict mediation and resolution in the sub-region, particularly in Sierra Leone, where Konare played an active role, and to a lesser extent in Liberia. Economic and monetary integration is a third objective; in addition to his ECOWAS post Konare recently served as president of the francophone regional economic grouping, l'Union Economique et Monetaire Oust-Africaine (UEMOA). Also important to Mali is border security and relations with its immediate neighbors, particularly Mauritania, which in the past has been accused of harboring dissident Tuaregs who launched raids into Mali. Promoting democracy and good governance is certainly among Mali's foreign relations objectives, but it cannot be said to be one of the highest priorities. As the evidence presented below suggests, economic objectives seem more often than not to trump political objectives. Mali's capacity to influence events in other countries remains

modest. Though it has become increasingly influential in recent years, in part due to the democratic progress it has achieved, Mali remains a relatively weak state with a small economy and no major resources to speak of. Mali has few carrots with which to motivate other states and as elaborated below, the country is particularly dependent on Nigeria, the regional hegemon. These factors account to a certain extent, but not entirely, for Mali's mixed record of democracy promotion abroad.

The primary tool employed by Mali in pursuing foreign policy goals is personal diplomacy, conducted most often by the head of state. As a respected statesman, former President Konare was relatively successful in conducting such diplomacy, but it remains to be seen whether his successor will be able to match this success. Foreign policy in Mali, as it is in many African states, is generally formed by a small handful of elites near the top of government, with little input from non-governmental actors.

RESPONSE TO OVERTHROW OF DEMOCRATICALLY-ELECTED GOVERNMENTS

Mali's response to the overthrow of democratically-elected governments has generally been good. Mali has been consistent in its condemnation of coups. President Konare, "has always been quick to denounce military coups in neighboring countries and has played an important role in regional peacekeeping."[1] According to Malian diplomat Mahamane Toure, Mali maintains a policy of condemning coups wherever they occur and of "working to isolate" coup leaders. It is not entirely clear, though, how Mali "isolates" illegitimate governments. Toure asserted that Mali "finds ways to give them the cold shoulder" and attempts to "show that we're not in bed with them." But there is little evidence of concrete actions, the severing of diplomatic relations or offering support to ousted regimes.

Mali was quick to condemn the December 1999 coup in Cote D'Ivoire in which General Robert Guei seized power from President Henri Konan Bedie. But while Malian officials have claimed that official policy is to refuse to recognize governments that come to power through coups, Mali maintained diplomatic relations with Cote D'Ivoire under Guei. Konare pressured Guei through personal diplomacy to hold legitimate elections, but there were no concrete actions taken against Guei's regime. Similarly, Mali condemned the 1996 coup in Niger but did not take any substantive action against the regime.

RESPONSE TO MANIPULATION OF ELECTORAL PROCESSES

Mali has generally remained quiet on the manipulation of electoral processes both in West Africa and beyond. The exception is the Ivorian elections of 2000, as Mali did respond to Guei's attempts to manipulate the process. In the confusing and tense weeks preceding the election, Mali was involved in mediation efforts as the ECOWAS Chairman dispatched a delegation to Abidjan, comprising the Malian Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Chairman of the Mediation and Security Council, and the ECOWAS Executive Secretary. Mali had long been rumored to support Alassane Ouattara, a northern Ivorian politician barred by Guei from running in the elections, ostensibly because of his supposed Burkinabe citizenship. Konare made strong statements against the disqualification of Ouattara and several other popular candidates. One of the few remaining viable candidates, Laurent Ghagbo, defeated Guei in the election, but Mali's relations with Cote d'Ivoire under Ghagbo have remained uneasy.

More recently, Mali passed on the opportunity to condemn Robert Mugabe's obvious rigging of Zimbabwe's 2002 elections and blatantly corrupt behavior. The Malian government remained completely silent. Unlike Cote d'Ivoire, Zimbabwe is of little strategic or economic importance to Mali. In remaining silent, Mali missed an opportunity to enhance its stature on the continent as a leader in promoting and defending democracy. This was the approach adopted by a select few African leaders, such as President Abdoulaye Wade in Senegal, and to a lesser extent President John Kufuor in Ghana, both of whom spoke out against Mugabe's actions. Malian diplomat Mahamane Toure's explanation was that Zimbabwe is an issue for members of the Southern African Development Community (southern Africa's regional organization).

Closer to home, Mali maintained close relations with Nigeria throughout the period of manipulated and annulled elections under Generals Babangida and Abacha. Nor was there much of a response from Mali to Nigeria's 1999 elections, won by Olesegun Obasanjo, in which it is generally agreed that all of the major parties

engaged in fraudulent activities. Like many other West African states, Mali is economically dependent on Nigeria and thus cannot afford to risk damaging relations with Abuja by being seen as meddling in its domestic affairs.

PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRACY

Mali has a mixed record of support for international democracy. Former President Konare was active in promoting democracy on the international stage, and Mali recently held an important international symposium on democracy. But Mali was less consistent in supporting democracy promotion efforts in the UN.

Konare is a respected regional statesman. As a result of his leadership, Mali has been involved in many conflict resolution initiatives in West Africa. He was one of the strongest forces behind the 1999 Organization of African Unity resolution banning leaders who came to power through the use of force from admittance to the OAU or participation in its summit meetings.[2] He made a point to espouse democracy in his public statements. For example, in a speech during his trip to Washington in 2001, Konare said "African leaders perfectly realize that in order to combat hunger they must undertake political and economic reforms that lead to democratization, decentralization, market economies, fights against corruption, respect for human and minority rights, and for diversity, and more important, the implementation of peace-seeking policies."[3] Further, Mali has played a constructive role as a member of the Convening Group of the Community of Democracies. Konare addressed the participants at the inaugural forum in Warsaw. Overall, Konare has made a significant contribution to international democracy promotion efforts.

It is also important to consider the international symposium concerning democracy and related issues held in November 2000 in Bamako, Mali's capital city. Organized by the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie, it focused on the role of human rights in the French-speaking world. The symposium resulted in the *Declaration de Bamako*, a substantial document, much of which deals with democracy and human rights in francophone countries. It states that "democracy, a universal value system, is founded on the recognition of the inalienable character of the dignity and equal value of all humans; each one has the right to have an influence on social, professional and political life and to benefit from the right to development."[4] It is also of note that Mali strongly supported the ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, adopted in late 2001.

Within the United Nations, Mali has been less consistent in its support for democracy promotion efforts. Mali has a history of abstaining on important UN votes concerning democracy and human rights.[5] Such abstentions are often tantamount to "no" votes under such circumstances. In both 2001 (Res 56/173) and 2000 (Res 55/117) Mali abstained on resolutions concerning the human rights situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Mali also abstained on similar resolutions concerning human rights in Nigeria under Abacha in 1997 (Res 52/144) and 1996 (Res 51/109), though it voted in favor of the resolution in 1995 (Res 50/199). In addition, Mali abstained on resolutions on human right in the Sudan in 2001 (Res 56/175), 2000 (Res 55/116), 1999 (Res 54/182) and 1997 (Res 52/140). Further from home, Mali also abstained on a resolution on human rights in Iraq in 1997 (Res 52/141). Diplomat Toure said part of the explanation for this pattern is that Mali attempts to avoid resolutions that involve "name calling," despite the clear evidence of transgressions of international norms in those cases. In Mali's favor, it voted for a 1997 resolution recognizing the necessity of periodic and genuine elections (Res 52/129).

POLICY TOWARDS ENTRENCHED DICTATORSHIPS

Mali's record of relations with entrenched dictatorships in the West African sub-region reflects its reluctance to jeopardize otherwise stable relations with its neighbors. Mali maintained close relations with Nigeria under the brutal dictatorship of Sani Abacha, and Mali's leadership apparently never seriously considered severing diplomatic relations or supporting economic sanctions despite Abacha's numerous human rights abuses and opposition to democratic reforms. In fact, according to Toure, Mali's relations with military-ruled Nigeria under Abacha were better than current relations with a semi-democratic Nigeria under Obasanjo. There was a close personal relationship between Konare and Abacha, and their respective wives were apparently good friends as well. Toure explained this as a

consequence of Nigeria's power in the region. "We said that we can't isolate Nigeria," he said. "We have to find ways to involve Nigeria. We need Nigeria for regional integration and cooperation. There was no other option."

Meanwhile, Mali maintains minimal relations with Sudan, as geography and ethnicity make them physically and ideologically distant from one another. But, as noted above, Mali has abstained on votes in the UN concerning human rights in Sudan.

Before leaving office President Konare indicated his willingness to support imposing sanctions on Liberia's Charles Taylor. A credible report stated that "in a specific reference to Liberian leader Charles Taylor, Konare said he and other West African leaders approve of limited and carefully focused sanctions, 'but also dialogue – dialogue to force him to behave well, to force him to have dialogue with his opponents.'"[6] According to Mahamane Toure there was no relationship between Konare and Taylor, nor was there much of a relationship between Konare and another regional quasi-dictator, Togo's President Gnassingbe Eyadema.

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[1] Smith, Zeric Kay, "Mali's Decade of Democracy," Journal of Democracy 12:3 (2001), p. 78.
[2] Fomunyoh, Christopher, "Democratization in Fits and Starts," Journal of Democracy 12:3 (2001), p. 41.
[3] Konare, Alpha Oumar, "Speech of President Alpha Oumar Konare of Mali to the conference of the partnership to Cut Hunger in Africa, State Dept., Washington, D.C. June 27, 2001" <http://www.africanhunger.org/konare.htm>.
[4] Organization of African Unity. Declaration de Bamako. Bamako: 1 Dec. 2000, p. 1.
[5] UN voting records at <http://www.libraries.psu.edu/crsweb/docs/unvote.pdf & http://unbisnet.un.org/webpac-bin/wgbroker?new+-access+top.vote>.
[6] Cobb Jr., Charles, "Africa Offers Opportunity, Says Mali President," 28 June 2001. AllAfrica.com 3 Oct. 2002. <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/200106280644.html>.

Mexico

Assessment: Fair
Trend: ⇑
Capital: Mexico City
Type of Government: Federal Republic
Head of Government: President Vicente Fox Quesada (since 1 December 2000)
Secretary of Foreign Relations: Jorge Castañeda
Population: 101,879,171
Human Development Index Ranking 2002: 54

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Over the past ten years, Mexico's record of support for democracy abroad has been **fair** but shows significant signs of improving. Although Mexico's foreign policy has increasingly incorporated the democratic norms that became institutionalized throughout Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s, the country's steadfast belief in the basic principles of non-interventionism traditionally has prevented it from taking a leading role in the defense of democracy in the region. Furthermore, it has abstained from participating in, and did not itself receive, international electoral observation missions until 1994. In general, Mexico has tended to be wary of any practices suggested in international fora that have seemed to impose foreign values and practices on other countries.

Vicente Fox's election as President in July 2000, which ended 71 years of one-party rule by the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), and other recent domestic developments indicate that, as the country has begun to democratize internally, it has also begun to promote democracy and human rights internationally. However, while the current political transition in Mexico has led to important reforms, many challenges remain. Fox has lost some political capital because of his perceived inability to demonstrate leadership in a divided political system or to clearly introduce new policy initiatives. Nonetheless, Mexico under Fox is expected to continue the trend toward greater multilateral cooperation in the defense of democracy in the region and possibly further afield.

FOREIGN RELATIONS BACKGROUND

As a result of repeated foreign interventions in the nineteenth century and its struggle to establish revolutionary governments, Mexico's foreign policy came to be based largely on the *Carranza* and *Estrada* doctrines.[1] These doctrines advocated the principles of non-intervention, non-aggression and the self-determination of nations, regardless of the means by which governments came to power. Over time these doctrines were manipulated by authoritarian regimes and used as a shield against international scrutiny of internal undemocratic practices. Although Mexico is still a proponent of non-interventionism, beginning with the Salinas Administration (1988-1994), it has begun to move away from strict adherence to these principles. Mexico has relied on a variety of tools to promote democracy abroad, including participation in electoral observation missions, provision of technical electoral assistance, and adoption of most regional instruments to defend democracy.

Geographic proximity to the United States has always been a dominant factor influencing Mexico's foreign policy decisions. Through most of the twentieth century, the U.S. was more concerned with ensuring stability throughout the region and the world than with promoting democracy.[2] This was particularly true in the case of its relationship with Mexico, whose geo-strategic importance facilitated its position as an intermediary between the United States and the rest of Latin America. According to some analysts, this relative power allowed Mexico to adopt foreign policy positions that were sometimes blatantly defiant of the United States.[3] But at critical junctures Mexico has tended to support, or at least not openly oppose, U.S. policies.[4]

The financial crisis in the 1980s curbed Mexico's nationalistic and even subtly anti-American foreign

policy. Economic recovery dominated internal as well as external policies. Integration with the United States became the new focus of Mexican foreign policy,[5] although Mexico-U.S. relations were strained by incidents such as the assassination of DEA agent Enrique Camarena in 1985 and the retaliatory U.S.-authorized kidnapping of the alleged accomplices on Mexican soil. Mexico's regional activism during this period manifested itself mostly in efforts directed at promoting the peace process in Central America.[6]

During the Salinas administration (1988-1994) integration into the global economy, rather than democratic political reform, continued to dominate domestic and foreign policy.[7] International agreements, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), focused on economic development and did not include political conditionalities such as democracy strengthening. However, Mexico's continued quest for integration into the world economy also exposed it to greater international scrutiny of its domestic politics. During this period Mexico repeatedly resorted to the principles of non-intervention and self-determination to defend itself against potential queries from international organizations.[8] Yet such scrutiny could not be held off for long, and the political instability of 1994, beginning with the Zapatista rebellion in the southern state of Chiapas and followed by the assassination of the PRI's political candidate, Luis Donaldo Colossio, turned the world's attention to Mexico.

Under President Zedillo (1994-2000), Mexican foreign policy continued its gradual shift toward integrating Mexico into global political affairs. On issues of greatest importance, e.g., its relations with the United States, Zedillo himself controlled the agenda, while the bureaucrats at the Foreign Ministry maintained the traditional non-interventionist line on democracy-related matters and other issues. President Fox (2000-2006) has signaled a strategic reorientation of Mexico's foreign policy objectives to include the promotion of democracy and the protection of human rights using international instruments designed for such purposes, and the development of national legislation that fulfills international obligations.

RESPONSE TO OVERTHROW OF DEMOCRATICALLY-ELECTED GOVERNMENTS

For most of the past decade, the Mexican government stuck to its position of non-intervention in response to attempted overthrows of democratically-elected governments. The Mexican government consistently indicated its disapproval of the interruption of constitutional rule, and clearly stated its refusal to support any coup attempts. Yet for many years it repeatedly refused to isolate or interfere with governments that were otherwise criticized as being undemocratic or that came to power through undemocratic means. In fact, Mexico was an outspoken critic of attempts to do so by other governments.

When Peruvian President Fujimori orchestrated an "auto-golpe" or self-coup, Mexico was quick to charge that any strong action taken by the organization under the pretext of the defense of democracy would be yet another example of how the United States uses the OAS to intervene in the internal affairs of countries in the region. Contrary to the measures called for by many Latin American governments, the Mexican Foreign Ministry declared that "it is up to the Peruvian leaders, institutions and people to find ways to overcome the difficulties their country [was] facing."[9] Though the Mexican government did express concern over the incident, and scrutinized events as they unfolded, it was firm in its position that Fujimori's actions were a matter only for Peruvians. Mexico's strong position was instrumental in blocking any type of regional consensus on tough sanctions against Peru. When Fujimori announced that he would hold elections for a Constituent Assembly later in the year, Mexico was supportive, and agreed to send electoral observers, even though Peruvian opposition leaders believed that doing so would legitimize an otherwise undemocratic process.

In May of 1993, when President Jorge Serrano of Guatemala initiated a coup similar in style to Fujimori's, Mexico again abstained from condemning it. Mexico had played a prominent role in advancing the Guatemalan peace process as a convening member of the 'Amigos de la Paz,' along with Germany, Canada, Norway, and the United States. Furthermore, Mexico gave refuge to the guerrilla leaders of the UNRG[10] and accepted over 50,000 Guatemalan refugees, mostly indigenous people escaping the armed conflict. However, Mexico did not join its fellow "Amigos," Germany and the U.S., in condemning the coup and threatening trade sanctions. The Mexican government did urge Serrano to return to constitutional rule, though it did not take a strong position on the incident.

In July 1994, in response to a collapse of

negotiations with the de facto military government in Haiti, as well as mounting unrest and distress throughout the country, the United Nations Security Council approved Resolution 940 authorizing the use of force to restore democracy. The Mexican Foreign Ministry strongly criticized the resolution, arguing that the economic and travel sanctions that had been imposed on the country had not been given enough time to have an effect. Mexico's Ambassador to the United Nations, Victor Flores Olea, proclaimed that the situation in Haiti did not justify the use of force to violate the sovereignty of another country, and that all diplomatic efforts must first be exhausted. The Ministry added that Mexico "rejects the use of force except in cases of a threat to peace, its violation, or acts of aggression," noting that the crisis in Haiti did not fall into any of those categories.[11] The Mexican government denounced the oppressive military regime in Haiti and publicly professed its commitment to the promotion of democracy in the region, maintaining diplomatic relations with Aristide's government in exile. Nonetheless, it viewed the UN resolution as having been pushed through largely by the United States. Mexico also joined Venezuela, Chile and Uruguay in seeking to meet with the military leaders of the de facto government in an effort to convince them to step down to avoid the bloodshed that an invasion would inevitably bring. Ultimately, Mexico approved a modified version of actions that the U.S. agreed to take after its negotiations with the Haitian military leaders and even pledged humanitarian relief and an economic development package in conjunction with nine other nations.

While regional leaders may have disagreed about what actions were appropriate for Haiti in 1994, the cases of Paraguay in 1996 and Ecuador in 2000 demonstrated an increasing resolve to oppose the overthrow of democratically elected governments. When Paraguay's Army General Lino Oviedo refused to give up his command after being asked to resign by President Wasmosy in what would have been South America's first successful military take-over in two decades, Mexico joined the OAS in expressing support for the democratically-elected government. In January 2000, when a military-backed rebellion forced the ouster of Ecuador's President Jamil Mahuad, the OAS unanimously condemned the military's actions and warned there would be "grave consequences in any attempt to destabilize the democratic system."[12] Mexico went even further and stated that stronger actions than mere condemnation of the rebellion may be necessary.

Mexico's non-interventionist policies have gradually softened as its internal democratization process has advanced. This was demonstrated during Venezuela's April 2002 coup against President Hugo Chavez. President Fox promptly condemned the attempted rebellion and the interruption of constitutional order, despite his earlier expression of concern about Chavez's increasingly authoritarian policies. While Mexico continued to maintain limited diplomatic relations with Venezuela, Fox stated that Mexico would refuse to recognize Venezuela's new government until new elections were held. He later welcomed Chavez's return to power as a victory for democracy in the region. Unlike the response of previous Mexican governments, Fox has made it clear that any such interruptions of constitutional rule are unacceptable to Mexico and all of Latin America.

RESPONSE TO MANIPULATION OF ELECTORAL PROCESSES

Mexico's steadfast commitment to the principle of a country's right to self-determination has on various occasions prevented it from criticizing other governments that came to power through flawed elections, even when it sent its own electoral observers. In effect, Mexico has lent legitimacy to shoddy elections by sponsoring observers who remained silent in the face of electoral malpractices, as was the case in Peru.

In May 2000, eight years after his *autogolpe*, Fujimori again threatened democracy in Peru by manipulating the electoral process to win an unprecedented third term in office. Though a member of the OAS, and traditionally supportive of election monitoring endeavors, Mexico questioned the subsequent attempt by some member governments to take action by invoking OAS Resolution 1080.[13] Mexico further urged the Rio Group to abstain from issuing a statement about the election one way or another. Foreign Minister Rosario Green stated that "my government's stance is that the topic of elections falls solely and exclusively within the view of the citizens of Peru," thereby supporting Peru's requests to the OAS to refrain from responding in any way that it considered an unwarranted violation of its sovereignty.[14] The PRI government in Mexico likely was influenced by the fact that its own presidential elections were scheduled just two months later, and did not want a precedent to be set whereby the OAS could actively intervene in the outcome of a country's elections. Mexico had had

its own democratic credentials scrutinized in the past, owing to perceived political manipulation by the PRI for many years, and the events in Peru set off alarms about the potential consequences of any post-election crisis in Mexico. Thus, Mexico advocated for a regional non-response to the 2000 presidential elections in Peru, citing concerns of the OAS becoming an "election police" that had the authority to "decertify" results. In contrast to its strong position in Peru, Mexico largely abstained from the OAS response to flawed elections the same year in Haiti, which were widely criticized both within Haiti and by the international community.

Perhaps the strongest contribution that Mexico has made towards strengthening democratic electoral outcomes at home and abroad has come in the form of the establishment of the Federal Electoral Institute (Instituto Federal Electoral, IFE). Until 1994, fraud and manipulation characterized the Mexican electoral system. In fact, up until that year, Mexico prohibited international electoral observation missions from monitoring its elections, and did not contribute to monitoring missions abroad.[15] In 1993, however, the IFE was established with the official mandate of creating a "systematic effort to approach, establish links and collaborate with different institutions and organizations in the international community that are interested or that specialize in electoral issues."[16] This Institute is now considered to be a very successful model for the region, and has participated in 34 technical cooperation missions in 17 countries since 1993 and 33 electoral observation missions in 19 countries since 1996.[17] Through its creation Mexico, in a very practical manner, has helped to strengthen democratic processes throughout the region and the world.

PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRACY

Until 2000, Mexico's record in promoting international democracy presented a dichotomy between support for general declarations in favor of human rights and democracy,[18] and consistent opposition to active intervention to restore democracy in a given country.

During the 1980s Mexico, together with Colombia, Panama and Venezuela, actively participated in the Contadora group, which sought the restoration of peace and democracy in Central America. Contadora later merged with the Support Group, which included Argentina, Brazil, Peru and Uruguay, to form what is now known as the Rio Group. Since its creation the Rio Group has issued numerous statements expressing its commitment to democracy, including the *Acapulco Commitment for Peace, Development and Democracy,* the *Statement for the Defense of Democracy,* issued in 1997, and the *Cartagena Democratic Commitment* adopted in 2000.

In the context of the OAS, Mexico has formally supported most instruments that endeavor to promote and defend democratic rule, but it has consistently expressed reservations, and at times openly opposed any tendency towards what it considered to be interventionist measures.[19] For example, Mexico expressed reservations regarding Resolution 1080 adopted by the OAS in 1991, which allowed for collective action in the event of a threat to democratic rule in a member country.[20] Mexico was also the only country to oppose the *Washington Protocol,*[21] adopted in 1992, which allows OAS member states to suspend any government that comes to power through force. However, Mexico supported and ultimately did adhere to the Inter-American Democratic Charter signed on 11 September 2001.[22]

Mexico has also supported recent UN resolutions and documents regarding the promotion and protection of human rights, as well as the promotion and consolidation of democracy. Mexico was a cosponsor of the UN Resolution for the Fifth International Conference of New or Restored Democracies to be held in Mongolia in 2003. The resolution welcomes the adoption of regional and subregional organizations initiatives to implement measures for the collective defense of democracy.[23]

In June 2000, Mexico participated in the first meeting of the Community of Democracies and endorsed the Warsaw Declaration. Mexico is also one of ten countries that comprise the Convening Group, which acts as the steering committee for the Community of Democracies. In this position Mexico is integral to preparations for future ministerial meetings, including determining invitations and agendas. The current administration is committed to fulfilling this role, though it has failed to make its participation in this historic initiative widely known either within the government or among relevant civil society actors.

In 2000, Mexico signed a free trade agreement with the European Union that contains a democracy clause, committing all parties to respect democratic principles and human rights and to promote civil society participation through mechanisms of political cooperation based on the principle of shared responsibility.[24] The inclusion of this clause in a trade agreement represented a

significant reversal for Mexico, accepting for the first time conditionality related to democracy criteria.

With regards to changes in institutions as well as in the official political discourse, President Fox has increased Mexico's capacity to support democracy in the international arena by creating a new position of Special Ambassador for Human Rights and Democracy within the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and appointing MariClaire Acosta, a renowned defender of human rights, to the post.[25] The position was later upgraded to the rank of Under-Secretary of State and is charged with designing official policies to promote and protect human rights and democracy both in Mexico and abroad.[26] Since he entered office, Jorge Castañeda, Mexico's current Foreign Affairs Minister, has stated the need for Mexico's foreign policy to shift towards a more active role in the international system, thus placing the country at the "...forefront of the world movement toward the protection of human rights – a place it should have always kept."[27] In a significant departure from previous official positions, he has also declared that respect for national sovereignty does not justify overlooking human rights violations, and that abuses in any nation should be a source of concern for the entire international community.

POLICY TOWARDS ENTRENCHED DICTATORSHIPS

For decades Mexico has supported Cuba's right to self-determination, consistently standing with Havana in its confrontations with the United States. Between 1959 and 1962, Mexico was the only member country to oppose the exclusion of Cuba from the OAS, and it has repeatedly reaffirmed this position ever since. The Mexican government has contended that suspensions and embargoes have had little real effect in fostering democracy in the closed state, and has rejected U.S. attempts to get others in the region to tighten the economic embargo, claiming that U.S. national legislation should not be applied "extra-territorially."

However, relations with Cuba began to change during the presidency of Ernesto Zedillo. At the 1999 Ibero-American Summit, which was held in Havana, Zedillo made a speech promoting the values of democracy, including the right to dissent. A few weeks later he sent then Mexican Foreign Minister Green to join various international leaders in meeting with renowned Cuban dissident Elizardo Sanchez.

Mexico's recent support of a United Nations resolution calling for Cuba to examine its human rights record, a resolution Cuba views as "meddling in its internal affairs," has strained relations between the two countries. In the past, Mexico has abstained from the annual UN resolution censuring Cuba for its poor human rights record. As recently as February 2002, when President Fox made his first official state visit to the island in an effort to strengthen relations with Cuba and negotiate trade issues, Mexico's Foreign Ministry claimed it was likely they would again abstain from the U.N. vote. However, Mexico ultimately reversed this position, agreeing to sign this year's version of the resolution as it condemns the U.S. trade embargo and does not condemn Cuba outright, as it had in the past. During the same February visit, President Fox took the time to meet with Cuban dissidents and shared with Castro a list of political prisoners whose cases he hoped Castro would review. Fox reportedly told Castro that he hoped "Cuba would come closer to the standards of human rights and of democracy that day-by-day help make things more secure not only in Latin America, but in the rest of the world."[28] Fox's approach, however, has not been well-received back home, where the opposition parties aligned with Mexico's traditional policy of support for Cuba reacted adversely to Fox's support for the UN resolution.

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[1] The *Carranza Doctrine,* created in 1918 by then president Venustiano Carranza confirmed the basic elements of Mexican foreign policy: non-intervention and self determination of nations. In 1930, then Foreign Minister Genaro Estrada espoused the *Estrada Doctrine* which states that Mexico will not practice "recognition" of foreign governments arguing that it is a denigrating and interventionist practice since it ultimately means that foreign governments can make judgments about the legal capacity of other governments. Mexico would limit itself to keeping or withdrawing diplomatic representation but without issuing a value judgment.

[2] Dresser, Denise. "Treading Lightly and without a Stick: International Actors and the Promotion of Democracy in Mexico", in Tom Farer ed., Beyond Sovereignty: Collectively Defending Democracy in the Americas. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996. p. 319. Diamond, Hartlyn & Linz, "Introduction", in Diamond, Hartlyn, *et. al.* Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America, Colorado: Lynne Reiner, 1999, p. 59.

[3] For example, contrary to U.S. foreign policy, Mexico has maintained official relations with the Castro government in Cuba since the 1959 revolution. During the early seventies, Mexico adopted an active role in the non-aligned movement with other Third World Countries in an effort to avoid alliances with either the United States or the Soviet Union.

[4] Aguayo Quezada, Sergio. "The 'External Factor'." in Journal of Democracy 11.4 (2000): 34.

[5] Dresser, *op. cit.*, p. 319.

[6]Such efforts were influenced in part by the large numbers of migrants seeking refuge from armed conflict. Although Mexico has always had a tradition of liberally offering political asylum, nothing had prepared it for the massive influx of non-professional, non-intellectual refugees coming from Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Honduras in need of security, food and work. See Ferris, Elizabeth. "The Politics of Asylum: Mexico and the Central American Refugees." Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 26.3 (1984): 363-364.

[7] Dresser, *op. cit.*, p. 320; Chabat, Jorge. "Mexico's Foreign Policy in 1990: Electoral Sovereignty and Integration with the United States." Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 33.4 (1991):3.

[8] Dresser *op. cit, p.* 322.

[9] Notimex News Agency 6 April 1992

[10] Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity.

[11] Nordahl, Peter. "México Criticizes Haiti Resolution." Christian Science Monitor 2 August 1994.

[12] Dow Jones International News: 21 Jan. 2000.

[13]OAS Resolution 1080 mandates member states to meet to collectively elaborate and adopt a decision regarding action in response to the interruption of power of a democratically elected state in the region.

[14] Notimex News Agency 31 May 2000.

[15] Millet, Richard L. "Beyond Sovereignty: International Efforts to Support Latin American Democracy." Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 36.3 (1994):7.

[16] Federal Electoral Institute (Instituto Federal Electoral –IFE) http://www.ife.org.mx.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Mexico has ratified several international instruments dealing with the protection and promotion of human rights and democracy, including the International Agreement on Civil and Political Rights, the Inter-American Democratic Charter, several agreements on political asylum, women's and children's rights, instruments against torture and forced disappearances as well as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural rights. Nevertheless, it has also consistently voted against or abstained from UN and OAS proposals to send missions into countries for the purpose of evaluating the status of human rights or restoring democratic order (Cooper & Legler: 4; Nordahl).

[19] Cooper, Andrew F & Thomas Legler. "The OAS Democratic Solidarity Paradigm: Questions of Collective and National Leadership." Latin American Politics & Society, Spring (2001): 8.

[20] Studer, Isabel. "Toward the Other Distant Neighbor." Voices of Mexico 37.Oct-Dec (1996): 5.

[21] The Washington Protocol establishes that any country whose legitimate and democratically elected government is forcefully ousted can be suspended from participating in OAS meetings and proceedings. See Perina, Ruben M. "El regimen democrático interamericano: el papel de la OEA", < http://www.oas.org.> 2001 p. 2, 43; Studer, *op.cit.* p. 5; Dresser, *op.cit.* p. 323.

[22] Article 17, Article 20. OAS, Democratic Charter, Lima, Peru, 11 Sep. 2001.

[23] United Nations, E/CN.4/2002/L65.

[24] Articles 36 and 39 of the Economic Association, Political Coordination and Cooperation between Mexico and the European Union signed in June 2000. Diario Oficial de la Federacion, 26 June 2000.

[25] She was co-founder of the Mexican Academy for Human Rights (Academia Mexicana de Derechos Humanos) as well as the Citizens Movement for Democracy (Movimiento Ciudadano por la Democracia), among other non-governmental organizations within Mexico.

[26] Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores –SRE http://www.sre.gob.mex.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Snow, Anita. "Mexican president returns, juggles pressure in his first state visit to Cuba." Associated Press Newswires 4 Feb. 2002.



Morocco

Assessment: Poor
Trend: ⇑
Capital: Rabat
Type of Government: Constitutional Monarchy
Head of Government: Prime Minister Abderrahmane Youssoufi (since 14 March 1998)
Minister of Foreign Affairs: Mohamed Benaissa
Population: 30,645,305
Human Development Index Ranking 2002: 123

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Morocco has a **poor** record of support for democracy abroad. Morocco is not itself a democracy, and its policies toward countries in the developing world are driven foremost by security concerns and by a desire for these countries to support its position on the long-standing Western Sahara dispute. Morocco has maintained close relations with authoritarian West African and Middle Eastern governments that attained or maintain power through coups or dubious elections. It has not raised its voice to urge greater democracy in these countries or elsewhere. This has remained constant over the past decade, despite the progress Morocco has made internally in encouraging political pluralism and expanding human rights.

FOREIGN RELATIONS BACKGROUND

In July 1999, Mohamed VI replaced his late father Hassan II on the throne with pledges to promote human rights and democracy. In his first national address, the new king declared, "We strongly adhere to the system of constitutional monarchy, political pluralism...establishment of the state of rights and law, safeguarding human rights and individual and collective liberties..."[1] He later declared, with respect to legislative elections that were to take place in September 2002, "Morocco is a democracy. The next elections will be transparent. They will reflect the will of the Moroccan citizenry."[2] Prime Minister Abderrahmane Youssoufi endorsed this claim: "For the first time in Morocco, the government will be able to organize transparent elections. This is without doubt the most important accomplishment of the democratic transition. We will motivate the Moroccan people and instill confidence in them so that the majority that emerges from the voting will be seen as having a popular mandate..."[3]

There has not been, however, any sign of a heightened role for democracy in foreign policy, either at the level of official discourse or policy. Since Mohamed VI's accession, no unfair election or coup anywhere has occasioned any public expression of disapproval or downgrading of relations, the most recent example being Zimbabwe's flawed vote in March 2002.

The domestic political context hardly favors democracy promotion abroad. Despite recent reforms and promises of clean elections, Morocco is not yet a democracy. The King accedes to the throne by heredity and wields considerable power within the Moroccan political system. Showing disrespect for the King or the monarchy is punishable under Moroccan law and advocating curbs on the King's powers is risky, though less dangerous than in the past. In addition, the King appoints the prime minister. In practice, the ministers of interior, defense, justice, foreign affairs and religious affairs are also picked by, and report to, the palace. Thus, the key international relations portfolios are among those in which elected officials have the least input.

Deputies in the lower house of parliament are elected by direct popular vote and belong to a range of political parties. But the chamber's powers are quite limited and elections to it in the past have been tainted by fraud. The legislature has played no role in orienting foreign policy toward greater promotion of democracy.

Morocco nevertheless enjoys far more political pluralism and freedom of expression and of association than it did a decade ago. Independent newspapers, human rights organizations and other civil society associations expose and criticize rights abuses. They challenge the administration to ensure that domestic elections are free and fair. Some print media and other organizations have taken advantage of the freer atmosphere to question the government's coziness with certain repressive governments. But this pressure from civil society has not led to any reorientation of foreign policy.

Beyond its ties with the United States and the European Union, Morocco's international activity is concentrated in three overlapping arenas: Africa, the Maghreb, and the Middle East.

In the decade after King Hassan ascended to the throne in 1961, Morocco's foreign policies were guided by an evolving series of objectives, none conducive to promoting democracy abroad. First, the King sought to consolidate power at home and stifle a domestic leftist opposition that drew some support from radical regimes in Egypt and in newly independent Algeria. Morocco sought also to mend and nurture relations with France, and served as a Cold War ally of the U.S. in Africa and the Middle East, which in turn provided Morocco with economic and military aid. Morocco maintains close alliances with the United States and France today.

Beginning in the early 1970s, the disputed Western Sahara emerged both as the focal point of Morocco's foreign relations and as a nationalist cause that King Hassan II exploited to consolidate his rule at home. Morocco claimed sovereignty over this phosphate-rich territory more than half as large as Morocco itself, which had been administered by Spain during the colonial period. The United Nations proposed to let the territories' sparse population hold a referendum to choose between independence and Moroccan sovereignty. But when Spain withdrew its forces in 1975, Morocco quickly moved in to occupy much of the disputed territory. The following year, the liberationist Frente Popular para la Liberacion de Saguia el Hamra y Rio de Oro (the Polisario) proclaimed the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). War then broke out between the SADR and Morocco.

Since that time, much of Morocco's diplomatic energy has been focused on cultivating support for its claims to the Western Sahara and isolating the Polisario. This desert territory became the new vortex of Morocco's historically stormy relations with Algeria, which hosted the Polisario's leadership and military bases, and championed its cause in international fora.

The nature of the Western Sahara conflict militates against Morocco's advocacy of democracy elsewhere. While Rabat and the Polisario agreed in 1988 to the UN proposal for a referendum on this issue, their disagreement over voter eligibility has prevented it from being held. Rabat has avoided criticism of other countries' democratic shortcomings as it might invite scrutiny of its own commitment to allowing a free and fair referendum in the Western Sahara, to say nothing of elections in Morocco itself.

RESPONSE TO OVERTHROW OF DEMOCRATICALLY-ELECTED GOVERNMENTS

Morocco did not publicly show or voice any disapproval of the overthrow of elected governments in Cote d'Ivoire, Niger, or Nigeria. However, Morocco is a member of the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF), whose secretary-general "firmly condemned" the coup d'état in Cote d'Ivoire in December 1999. The OIF also adopted a resolution on 26 September 2000, urging a return to constitutionality in the Cote d'Ivoire before and during elections scheduled for the following month. Morocco also joined the Arab League condemnation of the April 1999 coup in the Comoros Islands and refused to recognize the new regime, though it did meet with Mohamed Yamani Souif, the new Foreign Minister of Comoros in Rabat[6]

RESPONSE TO MANIPULATION OF ELECTORAL PROCESSES

Morocco has generally abstained from commenting on obvious manipulations of elections abroad. For example, the Moroccan government was silent when Egypt staged unfair parliamentary elections in 1995.

Tunisian President Ben Ali has been re-elected three times since seizing power in 1987, each time with more than 99 percent of the popular vote, according to the official count. In May 2002, a similar majority endorsed changes to the constitution to enable Ben Ali to run for a fourth term in 2004 and a fifth in 2009. None of these dubious votes, nor the steady closure of space for

genuine opposition political parties of all tendencies, has prompted the slightest public protest from Rabat. Shortly after the flawed referendum of May 2002, Prime Minister Abderrahmane Youssoufi traveled to Tunisia and declared that, following reciprocal visits by President Ben Ali and King Mohamed VI, the two countries enjoyed a relationship of brotherhood, friendship, and openness.

When Niger's General Ibrahim Bara Mainassara won elections in July 1996, six months after he had seized power in a coup, Morocco reportedly was among the African governments that hastily applauded the vote.[7] Election observers, human rights groups, and the United States government had all criticized those elections as neither free nor fair.[8] Morocco is not known to have voiced any criticism of Zimbabwe's March 2002 presidential election, which was denounced as not free or fair by the EU and the United States, and resulted in Zimbabwe's one-year suspension from the fifty-four nation Commonwealth.

The one time Morocco criticized the manipulation of elections by another government was an exception that proves the rule. In 1992, King Hassan II expressed regret in press interviews that military-backed leaders in Algeria had interrupted legislative elections in January of that year in order to prevent a landslide victory by the Islamic Salvation Front. The King told *The Washington Post* that he would have allowed the elections to proceed in order to prove to the electorate that Islamists could not govern effectively. "Religion is not enough to run a country," he said. "You have to have politics, diplomacy, economics, finance, agriculture and social programs," said the king. "Had the Algerian elections been allowed to proceed, we would have seen ... [the fundamentalists] at work: we would have seen how they actually perform."

The king had never before advocated free elections in Algeria or anywhere else. Moreover, Morocco refused to legalize its own leading Islamist party. Hence, King Hassan's comment in 1992 appears to be one more volley in the fractious Moroccan-Algerian relationship, rather than a genuine concern for political pluralism next door.

PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRACY

Morocco maintains a modest program of bilateral aid to some of its African allies and to the Palestinian Authority -- none of it apparently devoted to democracy promotion. Morocco receives far more in foreign assistance than it gives out. It has long been the largest recipient of French bilateral aid and is a (distant) third among U.S. aid recipients in the Middle East. Morocco is a member of the Maghreb Arab Union, the Arab League, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference. Few members of these organizations can be considered democracies. Morocco has not sought to use these fora as a platform for promoting democratic principles in any consistent fashion.

Morocco did, however, take the bold step in 1999 of becoming the first Arab state to allow the region's human rights movement to convene a regional meeting on its soil. Prime Minister Youssoufi gave the inaugural address to the gathering of activists from fifteen countries. The participants adopted a declaration urging that "Arab governments legalize, in the framework of democratic constitutions and laws, the rights of assembly and peaceful association for all intellectual and political groups and forces, including the unarmed Islamic groups."[9]

At international conferences, Moroccan officials have touted Morocco's embrace of democracy, multi-partyism and civil society, sometimes suggesting that other countries might also benefit from progress in these realms. Human Rights Minister Mohamed Aujjar sounded this note in his address before a conference on development and human rights in Cairo in June 1999.

Morocco has advocated the rights of the Palestinian people living under Israeli occupation. Each year, it sends a small amount of financial aid and in-kind assistance to the Palestinian Authority, but has never used its voice to advocate democratic rights *per se* under the Palestinian Authority or anywhere in the Middle East and North Africa.

Morocco took part in drafting the Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism which threatens human rights by, among other things, defining offenses related to "terrorism" in a vague fashion and undermining fair-trial guarantees and press freedom.[10] It was adopted in 1998 and ratified by Morocco on 30 August 2001.

Morocco quit the Organization of African Unity in 1984 and remains outside its successor institution, the African Union. It therefore has not joined the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) or the Charter's democracy clause adopted in 1997. However,

Morocco has publicly embraced NEPAD. King Mohamed VI, addressing the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg on 2 September 2002, saluted "the Africa that has brought NEPAD into being" and said that "democracy needs to become more consolidated to better empower individuals and collectivities."

POLICY TOWARD ENTRENCHED DICTATORSHIPS

Morocco has had a long history of close ties to entrenched dictatorships in the Middle East and Africa. It also consistently supports those nations that take its side in Western Sahara dispute.

The absence of democracy and civil and political rights in Ben Ali's Tunisia has never disturbed Morocco's friendly relations with this Maghreb nation and the frequent high-level visits between the two leaders. Morocco has even, on occasion, prevented its own citizens from exercising their right to criticize the deterioration of human rights in Tunisia. On 21 September 1998, authorities deployed police to enforce a ban on a public meeting about Tunisia, organized by the Moroccan Association for Human Rights and the Moroccan Bar Association.[11] Authorities imposed the ban for unspecified security considerations, but most observers believed that it was to avoid offending the government of Tunisia. On 11 May 2000, police in Rabat forcibly dispersed a small demonstration in front of the Tunisian embassy, organized by Moroccan human rights activists in support of the persecuted Tunisian journalist Taoufik Ben Brik – though a similar demonstration was allowed to occur on 26 July 2002.

Relations with Libya's Muammar Qaddhafi have had their ups and downs over the past decade. But at no point is Morocco known to have made the lack of democracy in Libya an issue in bilateral relations or in regional affairs.

African autocrats can count on Morocco's backing if they side with it in the Western Sahara dispute. Africa's two longest-ruling autocrats, Gabon's Hadj Omar Bongo and Togo's Gnassingbé Eyadéma, have regularly supported Morocco's cause in the OAU.[12] Gabon has long been Morocco's staunchest advocate within the organization. At the OAU summit in 1998, Gabon and summit host Burkina Faso backed the unsuccessful effort to expel the SADR. Gabon has employed Moroccan forces in its domestic security service.[13] Morocco also reportedly provides financial and technical assistance to Gabon in the fields of telecommunications, tourism, and real estate development, and Hassan II helped to fund construction of a mosque in Libreville.[14] Togo has also reportedly used Moroccan forces for domestic security in the past.[15]

Rabat has backed the leader of Equatorial Guinea, Teodoro Obiang Nguema, since his 1979 coup. For over two decades, Obiang's reign over the tiny country has been facilitated by the presence of several hundred Moroccan presidential guards.[16] It is reported that Moroccan troops executed Obiang's predecessor because Guinean troops were intimidated by the magical powers said to surround him.[17] They remained in place while Obiang won a one-candidate presidential election in 1989. Subsequent presidential and legislative elections, held in 1996 and 1999 respectively, were also flawed.[18] Yet Moroccan troops were still protecting Obiang until at least 2000.

Presidents Obiang of Equatorial Guinea and Bongo of Gabon have visited Morocco frequently. In July 2001 Mohamed VI hosted in turn Obiang, Bongo, and Eyadéma. Obiang visited twice in June and July 2002 and held discussions with Mohamed VI. There is no evidence that the King discussed issues of human rights and democracy with these heads of state.

Morocco's friendship with another long-serving autocrat and ally on the Western Sahara issue, President Mobutu Sese Seko of the Congo (then called Zaire), dates to the Cold War. In 1977 and 1978, Moroccan troops flew in missions approved by the U.S. and France to help Mobutu subdue an insurgency in Katanga Province (then called Shaba). Ties to Mobutu remained close throughout his reign. In February 1997, as rebels advanced on the Zairean capital, Mobutu conferred in Rabat with King Hassan II. After his ouster three months later, Mobutu was given refuge in Morocco, where he died.

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[1] BBC Monitoring Service. 2 Aug. 1999.

[2] Le Figaro. 3 Sep. 2001.

[3] Florence, Beauge. "Pour la premiere fois, le Maroc va organiser des elections transparentes." Le Monde 25 Jan. 2002.

[4] Jamali, A. "La visite du président tunisien au maroc : une occasion de parler aussi démocratie." Al-Bayane 19 July 2001 ; Mrabet, Ali. "Notre homme à Malabo." Le Journal Hebdomadaire 1 Mar. 1999.
[5] Rabat assisted France in ventures designed to maintain its influence in post-independence West Africa partly to assuage French ire over the kidnap-"disappearance" on French soil in 1965 of opposition leader Mehdi Ben Barka, engineered by senior Moroccan security officials. See Elie Barth, « En France, 'l'affaire' empoisonna le climat politique pendant plus de dix-huit mois, » *Le Monde*, 30 June 2001.
[6] "Comoran and Moroccan foreign ministers meet in Rabat." 20 May 1999. *Arab News.com. 10 October 2002* < http://www.arabicnews.com/ansub/Daily/Day/990520/1999052051.html>.
[7] "Mainassara--'The Victorious One'? He Dug His Own Grave," *Ghanaian Independent*, 15 April 1999. Morocco failed to respond to a request from the Democracy Coalition Project to clarify its positions on the 1996 elections in Niger.
[8] See "The Statement by the National Democratic Institute on 7 and 8 July 1996 Presidential Election in Niger," at http://www.accessdemocracy.org/NDI/library/1101_ne_preselect.pdf [17 June 2002].
[9] "The Casablanca Declaration of the Arab Human Rights Movement," (Cairo: Cairo Institute of Human Rights Studies), pp. 12-13.
[10] Amnesty International, The Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism: A Serious Threat to Human Rights, AI Index IOR 51/001/2002, 9 January 2002.
[11] "Human Rights Watch Condemns Prohibition of Human Rights March and Meeting in Morocco." Human Rights Watch: Press Release. 22 Sep. 1998. 17 June 2002 <http://www.hrw.org/press98/sept/moroc923.htm>.
[12] US Department of State:The Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2001 states with respect to Gabon, "Although opposition parties have been legal since 1990, a single party, the Gabonese Democratic Party (PDG), has remained in power since 1968 and has circumscribed political choice..." The same report states with respect to Togo, "Although opposition political parties were legalized following widespread protests in 1991, Eyadema and his Rally of the Togolese People (RPT), strongly backed by the armed forces, have continued to dominate political power."
[13] Barnes, James F. Gabon: Beyond the Colonial Legacy. Boulder: Westview Press, 1992, p. 133.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Zartman, I. William. "Moroccan Foreign Policy," in Brown, Carl L., ed. Diplomacy in the Middle East:The International Relations of Regional and Outside Powers. London: I.B. Tauris, 2001, p. 211.
[16] Haygood, Will. "Equatorial Guinea accused of rights abuses; African nation called 'a nasty little dictatorship in the middle of nowhere.'" Boston Globe. 25 July 1993.
[17] Sundiata, Ubrahim K. Equatorial Guinea: Colonialism, State Terror and the Search for Stability. Boulder: Westview Press, 1990, p. 129.
[18] United States. Department of State. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2001. Washington: U.S. Department of State, 2002.

Netherlands

Assessment: Very Good

Trend: ⇔

Capital: Amsterdam
Type of Government: Constitutional Monarchy
Head of Government: Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende (since 22 July 2002)
Minister of Foreign Affairs: Jaap de Hoop Scheffer
Population: 15,981,472
Human Development Index Ranking 2002: 8

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Netherlands has generally been a **very good** supporter of democracy throughout the world. A generous donor, the Dutch government has supported democratization with bilateral and multilateral aid, provided electoral assistance, and criticized regimes that violated democratic norms. Since it is a small country with limited unilateral influence, the Netherlands has generally preferred to support multilateral efforts to promote democracy.

In general, the Netherlands has tried to promote democratization with foreign aid rather than through aggressive diplomatic intervention. However, the Netherlands is a strong supporter of greater roles for the United Nations and the European Union, through its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The Netherlands is also a close ally of the United States and often follows its lead. On bilateral issues, the Dutch government has traditionally preferred to exert international political pressure by suspending non-humanitarian aid, rather than by downgrading diplomatic relations or isolating the offending regime in other ways.

FOREIGN RELATIONS BACKGROUND

The Netherlands, despite its size, has major economic and trade interests around the world, but has increasingly tied its future to European integration. It sees itself as at the forefront of promoting respect for international law. The Netherlands is also one of the most generous foreign aid donors, with Dutch foreign assistance pegged to 0.8 percent of Dutch GNP (currently approximately 4 billion euro).[1] A significant portion of the Netherlands' development assistance is targeted at promoting democratization processes and strengthening democratic institutions.

Dutch foreign policy traditionally has been very "progressive," and has contained an explicit human rights agenda since 1979. Democracy is considered essential to the protection of human rights, and democratization has become increasingly important in Dutch foreign policy since 1992, when the World Bank identified good governance as essential for development.[2]

Official Dutch policy states that development assistance will be suspended "where human rights are violated, where there is stagnation in the democratization process or excessive military expenditure."[3] On 1 December 1996, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs established a new directorate, the "Directorate of Human Rights, Good Governance and Democratization," now the "Directorate of Human Rights and Peace Building." In 1999, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs created the post of Ambassador for Human Rights, to help integrate Dutch foreign policy work on human rights, good governance and peace building.

Because the Netherlands is a small country, the Dutch government prefers to exert political pressure through international institutions like the UN and World Bank, and through regional institutions like the European Union and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The preference for multilateral action is due in part to its view that unilateral sanctions as a tool of forcing change have failed in the past.[4]

The Netherlands, and other members of the EU are increasingly speaking with one voice with regard to foreign policy. Since the enactment of the Maastrich Treaty in 1993, members of the EU have agreed to

adopt "common foreign policy" positions on armed conflict, human rights and "any other subject linked to the fundamental principles and common values" of the EU. The Dutch government is a keen supporter of the development of an EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, but would prefer that the CFSP be controlled by the EU Parliament, rather than the European Commission (EC), which is dominated by the larger European states.

On bilateral issues, the Dutch government has traditionally preferred to exert international political pressure by suspending non-humanitarian aid. It generally avoids measures such as embargoes, downgrading diplomatic relations or ending cultural exchanges. All of the Dutch government's foreign assistance, including economic assistance, technical assistance, and cultural exchanges, is subject to review of the diplomatic posts and is required to be in harmony with Dutch foreign policy goals.

RESPONSE TO OVERTHROW OF DEMOCRATICALLY-ELECTED GOVERNMENTS

The Dutch government has generally been critical of leaders that overthrow democratically-elected governments. Furthermore, the Netherlands has strongly supported multilateral, mostly UN and EU, efforts to restore civilian rule.

Dutch government criticism of the coup in Pakistan in October 1999 was muted, much like that of the rest of the world. The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that it deplored the overthrow of the democratic government, but that it would await General Musharraf's next moves.[5] The EU warned that it would discontinue its foreign assistance if the military government did not quickly indicate when it would return rule to a civilian government. Despite promises to do so, Musharraf instead decided to consolidate his control of the country by unilaterally amending the Pakistani constitution to allow him to remain president for another five years. Nonetheless, the EU threat has never been carried out, largely because Pakistan is an important ally in the U.S.-led war on terrorism.

In the summer of 1999, prior to the coup, the Dutch government ended most of its bilateral development cooperation with Pakistan, citing lack of good governance, poor macro- and socio-economic policies, and bad human rights record. The Dutch did, instead, offer Pakistan special assistance in good governance and human rights, though this assistance was reduced after the coup.[6]

In the Americas, the Netherlands was one of the first countries to contribute forces to the UN-authorized and U.S.-led blockade and invasion to restore democracy in Haiti.[7] Later, the Netherlands also contributed a detachment of 150 Dutch marines to serve in the UN peacekeeping mission for one year during the election cycle that culminated in the election of President Réné Préval on 17 December 1995. Haiti, however, remains a fragile and unstable democracy. Because of the chaotic presidential elections at the end of January 2001, the EU, on the basis of the Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement, discontinued most of its development assistance. The Dutch government had already, in 1999, discontinued its bilateral aid to Haiti due to lack of good governance there, though it indicated that it would resume development cooperation when good governance was established.

RESPONSE TO MANIPULATION OF ELECTORAL PROCESS

The Dutch government has generally been critical of attempts by foreign leaders to manipulate electoral processes or to uphold fraudulent election results. In addition, the Netherlands has contributed to many international electoral assistance and monitoring missions. Every year approximately 12 Dutch missions participate in multinational election monitoring missions, usually organized through the EC.[8]

On 19 February 2002, the EU imposed "smart sanctions" on President Mugabe of Zimbabwe and recalled its election observers after determining that the elections could not be free and fair. Within the EU, the Netherlands had been a strong critic of Robert Mugabe's attempts to manipulate the elections, and in retaliation Zimbabwe refused entry to Dutch election observers.

Dutch government policy in similar cases has not always been so firm. When the Nigerian military annulled the presidential elections in June 1993, the EU imposed relatively weak economic and diplomatic sanctions. Stronger sanctions, including a total freeze on development assistance (except for humanitarian assistance), official visa restrictions, and sports contacts were not imposed until November 1995, in response to the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni environmental activists. More meaningful sanctions, such as an oil embargo or the freezing of military bank accounts, however, were reportedly vetoed by the British and Dutch governments, because of the interests of Shell, the Anglo-Dutch multi-national, and other oil companies.[9] In 1998, sanctions were eased by the

European Union after General Abubakar freed most political prisoners and established an election commission to prepare for elections in February 1999.

The EU sent election monitors, with Dutch participation, to observe the May 2000 presidential and congressional elections in Peru. However, when it became apparent that President Alberto Fujimori was employing media manipulation, fraud and intimidation to win re-election, the EU withdrew the observers before the second, run-off round, because "the elections could not take place in a credible manner and in accordance with international standards."[10]

In June 2000, Alejandro Toledo, the opposition leader, traveled to Spain and Brussels, but obtained very little support for additional European pressure on President Fujimori. Ultimately, Fujimori was forced to call new elections after video evidence surfaced that his administration was bribing opposition politicians. These new elections were monitored by an EU election observation mission, which spent more than three months working both in rural areas and in Lima, and determined that they were in compliance with international standards.

PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRACY

The Netherlands has been a strong supporter of international democracy, and an extremely generous donor to democratization programs.

Over a quarter of the Dutch development budget is channeled through multilateral agencies, such as the UN, EU, and World Bank. About a third of the development budget is allocated to NGOs, the majority to the large Dutch development organizations ICCO, NOVIB, HIVOS, and Bilance. Assistance to democratization programs is provided to Dutch political party foundations (*stichtingen*) involved in strengthening foreign political parties and to Dutch and foreign NGOs involved in a wide range of democratization activities, or donated directly to election monitoring missions and programs.

Since 1998, the Netherlands has decided to focus most of its foreign assistance efforts on fewer countries. Currently, about 50 countries receive Dutch government development assistance; 18 of these countries are categorized as Good Governance, Human Rights and Peace Building countries.[11] The development budget allocation for these countries in 2002 was 55 million euro.[12] Because many different assistance projects have multiple goals and separate budgets are used to fund democratization projects, it is difficult to determine the exact amount of Dutch foreign assistance that is allocated to democratization. The Dutch Foreign Ministry estimates it spent 55 million euro on democratization in 2001.[13]

The Netherlands, as an EU member, also contributes a significant portion of the EU's foreign aid budget (approximately 5.2 percent). The European Development Fund, which assists countries in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific Region, spent 182 million euro in direct support for human rights and democratization projects between 1997 and 2000 and some 115 million euro on election assistance and monitoring between 1996 and 1999. In 2000 alone, almost 100 million euro was allocated to support human rights and democracy work, more than 60 million euro of which was targeted to support democratization, pluralist civil society, and technical assistance.[14]

In 1997, members of the European Union adopted the Treaty of Amsterdam, which strengthened support for democratization efforts both in EC development policy and the evolving CFSP. Since then, most political pressure for democratization is now applied by the EC, rather than through unilateral member initiatives. The EU has also adopted a model democracy clause -- guaranteeing respect for democratic principles and fundamental human rights -- that must be included in all cooperation and partnership agreements concluded by the Union.[15] This clause, incorporated as Article 96 in the Cotonou Agreement (the successor to the Lomé Convention), was invoked by the EC to impose sanctions on Zimbabwe in 2002, and on Haiti in 1999.

The Dutch government is also the third largest donor to the United Nations Development Fund, which implements most of the United Nations' democracy assistance programs. Furthermore, the Netherlands is an active member of the OSCE. The OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) implements a wide range of democracy assistance activities throughout Central and Eastern Europe. In 1999, at the urging of the Netherlands, the OSCE created a register of democratization and human rights experts, who could quickly be called up to staff Rapid Expert Assistance and Cooperation Teams, to help prevent and ease conflicts. The Hague is also the base for the OSCE's High Commissioner for National Minorities.

The Dutch government is also an active

supporter of pan-European NGOs, such as the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA). In 2001, the Minister for Development announced it would assist the creation of the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD), as a branch of IDEA. The NIMD is a coalition of the main Dutch political parties, and will work to support political parties in developing countries.

POLICY TOWARDS ENTRENCHED DICTATORSHIP

The Dutch government has supported a strong EU policy of condemnation of entrenched dictatorships in Central and Eastern Europe, specifically regarding the rule of Slobodan Milosevic, in the Former Yugoslavia, and Aleksander Lukashenko, in Belarus. Dutch policy is, however, not entirely consistent, choosing "constructive engagement" with other dictatorships, such as China and Cuba.

The Netherlands, along with the United Kingdom, played a key role in maintaining EU sanctions on the Milosevic regime. Only when Vojislav Kostunica was elected president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on October 5, 2000, and Zoran Djindjic was elected prime minister of the Serb Republic in December 2000, did the EU lift sanctions. The only sanctions that remained in place were those on Milosevic and those intended to compel his extradition to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), based in The Hague.

The deteriorating political environment in Belarus in 1996 provided another test for European commitment to democratization. During the November 1996 referendum, President Lukashenko manipulated, through fraud and intimidation, the vote to consolidate his authoritarian regime in Belarus. On 14 September 1997, the European Union decided to deny Belarus' request to join the Council of Europe. The EU further decided to suspend the completion of any joint agreements, to deny bilateral ministerial contacts (except through the EU-Troika of the Chairman), and to halt any technical assistance, except for humanitarian, regional and democratization assistance. Since September 1997, the Netherlands has held no bilateral meetings with Belarus (the Netherlands does not have an ambassador in Minsk).

In 1998, the OSCE established an "Advisory and Monitoring Group" to create a dialogue between the Belarus government and the opposition, and to attempt to promote democratization, the rule of law and adherence to human rights principles. To date, there has been little improvement in the political environment. Flawed elections, in September 2001, resulted in Luksahenko's re-election to the presidency.

Despite strong Dutch positions with regard to Yugoslavia and Belarus, Dutch policy, like that of the rest of Europe, is far from uniform. While the Netherlands has strongly condemned dictators in Europe, it does little to promote democratization in states like China and Cuba. The Dutch government has been a strong proponent of "smart sanctions" against dictators and their cronies. For example, the Netherlands has called a number of times for lifting of the broad United Nations sanctions on Iraq, and replacing them with more targeted sanctions on the Iraqi leadership and military.

The Netherlands has been very supportive of political refugees, particularly those escaping repressive regimes. Political asylum seekers are generally treated well and not forcibly repatriated if they are at risk in their home countries. The Dutch government is also a major donor to the UNHCR.[16] Lately, however, Dutch popular opinion has become more anti-immigrant. Fortunately, *prime facie* political refugees are still almost always granted political asylum.

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[1] "Foreign Aid." The Economist. 1 Mar. 2001. Under an agreement of the former governing coalition in 1998, the Dutch development budget is set at 0.8 percent of its GNP. This also means that the actual amount increases and decreases in sync with the economy.

[2] Otto, Jan Michiel. "Development Cooperation and Good Governance." International Spectator 51.4 (April 1997).

[3] Randal J. and German T, eds., The Reality of Aid: an Independent Review of International Aid. London: Actionaid, 1994. p. 91.

[4] Crawford, Gordon. Foreign Aid and Political Reform. New York: Palgrave, 2001, pp. 199 and 205.

[5] Bergsma, Evelein. General Netherlands News Agency 13 Oct. 1999. "...Second Chamber is concerned about developments in Pakistan."

[6] Ibid.

[7] General Netherlands News Agency. 15 Sep. 1994. Albeit they sent only a frigate and an Orion surveillance aircraft, [there was] "Little enthusiasm among allies for U.S. invasion of Haiti."
[8] Email from Marieke van der Sar, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Good Governance and Peace Building Division, 10 June 2002.
[9] Black, Ian and Stephen Bates. "Britain, Netherlands veto EU Embargo against Nigeria." The Guardian 21 Nov. 1995.
[10] Patten, "EU electoral observation & assistance in Peru." <www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/peru/intor/comm_patten.htm>.
[11] Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. <www.minbuiza.nl>. Currently these countries are: Albania, Armenia, Bosnia, Cambodia, China, Colombia, Georgia, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, El Salvador, Kenya, Moldova, Namibia, Nepal, Pakistan, the Palestinian Occupied Territories, and Zimbabwe. 4 Oct. 2002.
[12] Email from Marieke van der Sar. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Good Governance and Peace Building Division. 10 June 2002.
[13] Ibid.
[14] EuropeAid. Report on the Implementation of the European Commission's External Assistance, Situation 01/01/01: Staff Working Document, pp. 17-18. <www.europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/index_en.htm>.
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

Nigeria

Assessment: Fair
Trend: ⇑
Capital: Abuja
Type of Government: Republic
Head of Government: President Olusegun Obasanjo (since 29 May 1999)
Minister of Foreign Affairs: Alhaji Sule Lamido
Population: 126,635,626
Human Development Index Ranking 2002: 148

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Since Nigeria's transition to democracy in 1999, it has established a **fair** record of promoting democracy abroad. Under a series of military-dominated governments that controlled Nigeria through most of the 1990s, particularly the Sani Abacha regime, Nigeria actively opposed international efforts to promote democracy in Nigeria or elsewhere. Though a strong advocate of democracy in West Africa and a leading proponent of an Africa-wide peer review mechanism to monitor democratic governance, Nigeria has a poor history of supporting international protocols on human rights and democratization. The election of Olusegun Obasanjo and the continuing process of democratization have begun to produce greater consistency between domestic and foreign policy, strengthening Nigeria's promotion of democracy in West Africa.

In international institutions such as the OAU-AU, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Commonwealth, Obasanjo has promoted democracy consistently and vigorously. Like most African states, however, Nigeria has maintained good bilateral relations with dictatorial regimes across the globe, largely for economic and political reasons, as reflected by its voting record on key UN provisions.

Although Nigeria has been increasingly active in promoting democratic values in Africa, a fragile democratic base, limited domestic support, and a regional environment rife with civil and interstate conflict have hampered its efforts. Strained relations between the legislative and executive branches have weakened the institutional consensus for Nigeria's democracy promotion goals. Furthermore, Nigeria faces formidable obstacles in moving beyond the early stages of its democratic transition at home to consolidate its own democratic norms and develop a united nation-state.

FOREIGN RELATIONS BACKGROUND

Through its foreign policy, Nigeria has sought to promote peace and security in the West African sub-region and to help Africa engage the wider world in economic and political development. Since his election, Obasanjo has also added democracy promotion to these foreign policy priorities.[1] In both bilateral and multilateral relations, Nigeria has focused primarily on West Africa, where it wields influence in ECOWAS, and its peacekeeping arm, ECOMOG. After almost a decade of regional military activity, Obasanjo has indicated that Nigeria will reduce its regional military commitments, most notably in Sierra Leone. This move reflects domestic pressures to replace expensive military operations with dialogue and diplomacy.

In the wider African arena, the Obasanjo government has reclaimed an activist role in important international organizations. Within the OAU-AU, Nigeria has collaborated with South Africa, Senegal, and Algeria to exert shared leadership on African issues and to assist in the creation of new interstate norms. Working with these governments, Obasanjo has actively promoted the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), a program linking good governance and respect for human rights with economic and development assistance. Similarly, Obasanjo employed the Commonwealth as a forum for diplomatic intervention in the Zimbabwe conflict.

Nigeria's strong support for democracy acknowledges the importance of international contributions to its own democratic transition, which was spurred by various foreign pressures such as economic sanctions imposed by the European Union (EU) and suspension from the Commonwealth. Obasanjo has regularly insisted that, since Nigeria's democracy owes much to supportive international action, it behooves Nigeria to champion democracy in Africa. Regionally, the de-legitimization of military rule, a trend underscored by the Nigerian transition, has also strengthened that country's democracy promotion policies. Moreover, Nigeria has extricated itself from costly military engagements at a time when the values of democracy and peaceful conflict resolution are becoming the anchors of regional stability.

Foreign policy in Nigeria remains a preserve of the presidency and a few elites within the establishment.[2] The parliament has started to wield a voice in some decisions, and has tried to engage civil society in these issues. However, Obasanjo remains at the helm of foreign policymaking, enacting the role he patterned for himself in the 1990s as a vocal advocate of good governance and a symbol of the resurgence of democracy in Africa. Nigerian democracy promotion emphasizes the importance of a successful internal transformation for the consolidation of democratic gains in the region; thus, Nigeria seeks to cast itself as a "democratic role model," reconciling its size and strategic position with governance structures based on universal democratic norms.[3]

RESPONSE TO OVERTHROW OF DEMOCRATICALLY-ELECTED GOVERNMENTS

Nigeria under Obasanjo has condemned the overthrow of democratically elected governments in West Africa and has engaged in diplomatic efforts to reverse such outcomes. This was demonstrated in the case of Cote d'Ivoire in which Nigeria was one of the first countries to condemn the coup. Obasanjo also held consultations with the ousted president in Abuja and convened a meeting of the ECOWAS in Bamako, Mali, where regional states adopted a coordinated policy of non-recognition. Responding to the junta's appeals for international sympathy, Obasanjo warned, "military coups remain an aberration irrespective of their raisons d'être," and urged the military to initiate a rapid transition back to democracy.[4]

In July 2000, Obasanjo joined an OAU committee of ten heads of state dedicated to resolving the crisis. In a meeting with all the Ivoirian parties, the mediation committee proposed concrete guidelines for the upcoming elections. When the junta rejected the OAU proposals, Obasanjo and South African President Mbeki together reiterated that the return of "genuine democracy" to Cote d'Ivoire was important to Africa.[5] That fall, Nigeria also granted political asylum to two Ivoirian military officers who sought refuge in Nigerian Embassy in Abidjan, declining government requests for their release.

Although Nigeria and its OAU partners never threatened economic sanctions or severance of diplomatic relations, they issued outspoken condemnations of the coup and established regional consultative mechanisms to facilitate a transition back to democracy. Their efforts did not dissuade the junta leader from participating in the October 2001 elections, but his defeat partially vindicated the Nigerian position on the illegitimacy of military coups.

Obasanjo's condemnation of the military coup in Pakistan was unique among African leaders. At the Commonwealth Heads of State meeting in November 1999, he candidly stated that all military coups are the same: "There is no question of whether there is good military government or bad military government. It is either you are a democracy or you are not. It is a matter of principle, not a matter of good or evil."[6] With the Commonwealth leaders deeply divided, Obasanjo urged that the military usurpers in Pakistan be treated as sternly as the Abacha government had been in 1995.

RESPONSE TO MANIPULATION OF ELECTORAL PROCESSES

Nigeria's mixed record of responding to the manipulation of electoral processes abroad is characterized by engagement and quiet diplomacy interspersed with veiled condemnation of target states. This is illustrated in how Nigeria dealt with the crisis in Zimbabwe. Obasanjo's attention to Zimbabwe began before the Mugabe government embarked on the seizure of white-owned farms and the intimidation of political opponents. During a visit to Abuja in November 1999, Mugabe asked Obasanjo to intercede with Britain for monetary compensation on the land question. Although he noted that the land question was an extension of the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe, Obasanjo proposed dialogue as the best way to settle this issue and offered to mediate between Zimbabwe and Britain.[7]

In September 2001, Obasanjo made good on this offer, mediating the Abuja agreement under which the Mugabe regime agreed to put an end to the political violence in exchange for financial assistance from London.

In spring 2001, Nigeria sent an envoy to meet with Mugabe to express concern about the breakdown of law. In addition, as a member of the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG), Nigeria joined a communiqué that voiced concern "over the ongoing violence, loss of life . . . failure to uphold the rule of law and political intimidation in the run-up to Zimbabwe's parliamentary elections."[8] Subsequently, the CMAG dispatched a fact-finding mission to Zimbabwe to investigate the Mugabe government's record of misrule and human rights abuses. As part of the CMAG, Nigeria was also decisive in the Commonwealth's suspension of Zimbabwe's membership, and joined South Africa in quiet but to date unsuccessful efforts to negotiate a power-sharing agreement between Mugabe and the opposition.[9]

Nigeria's vigorous efforts to promote democracy in Zimbabwe, however, were compromised as its election monitors endorsed Mugabe's victory, saying that it had "recorded no incidences that were sufficient to threaten the integrity and outcome of the electoral outcome."[10] This inconsistency reflects an enduring tension between advocacy for democratization and a lingering commitment to the principles of African solidarity. Nigeria is torn between international pressures and expectations for democracy promotion and the fear of alienating key African allies who may not subscribe to democratic norms. One way out of this dilemma is through recourse to organizations such as the AU and the Commonwealth that provide cover for policies and positions that countries are unwilling to take unilaterally or bilaterally. It is in this context that the Commonwealth has emerged as one of the key vehicles for Nigeria's articulation of democratic principles.

PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRACY

Nigeria has established a good record of democracy promotion in African institutions, but a poor one in other international institutions. Obasanjo has used his status as a former general to stress the values of democracy, advocate for a military that respects civilian control, and lambaste poor leadership in Africa. For example, at a seminar in Niger in January 2000, he rejected the advocacy of "homegrown African democracy."[11]

At ECOWAS and OAU-AU summits, Obasanjo has consistently urged other African leaders to embrace democracy and shun military rule.[12] For example, at the 1999 OAU meeting in Algiers, Obasanjo urged his colleagues to focus on collective security founded on democracy, good governance, and respect for human rights. Following the OAU's adoption of the CSSDCA at the Lomé summit of July 2000, Obasanjo hosted a meeting of African parliamentarians that deliberated on approaches to integrate the principles of the CSSDCA into national legislation. In addition, as part of the 10-member ECOWAS Security and Mediation Council for West Africa and the ECOWAS Council of Elders, Nigeria has been instrumental in the promotion of democracy in West Africa.

This strong record of activism in Africa is undermined, however, by a poor record of support for democracy and human rights principles within the UN. Although it has ratified most of the human rights provisions and treaties, Nigeria has developed a record of abstention on key votes dealing with democracy.

POLICY TOWARD ENTRENCHED DICTATORSHIPS

Nigeria has a consistent record of supporting entrenched dictatorships in Africa and elsewhere, as evidenced by its relations with Libya, Sudan, Cuba, China and Iraq. In Africa, this policy is a legacy of the principle of non-interference established by the OAU in the 1960s. Even recently, as Africa has enshrined democratic norms in the AU's charter, Nigeria has been hesitant to condemn dictatorships. Instead, the Obasanjo regime has engaged them in regional and sub-regional forums. For example, under the framework of the Libya-Nigeria joint commission, both sides have strengthened political, economic and cultural cooperation. Moreover, Nigeria's decision to join the Libya-dominated Community of the Sahelian and Saharan Association (COMESSA) in February 2001 demonstrated its acceptance of Libya's vision of integration. At the summit meeting of COMESSA in February 2001, Obasanjo joined the other fifteen members in a resolution that called for the lifting of United Nations sanctions against Libya.[13] Obasanjo has also been actively courting the Libyans as they have tried to assert leadership in continental affairs.

Libya has also been central to Nigeria's mediation of the civil war in the Sudan. Since 2001, Obasanjo has tried to intervene in the Sudanese conflict, appointing a special emissary, former dictator Ibrahim Babanginda, to facilitate dialogue among the parties. Standing in Nigeria's way are the Libyan-Egyptian and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) initiatives. Seeking a compromise between these competing plans, Obasanjo proposed a new program to be led by Nigeria, South Africa, Libya, and Egypt.[14] This initiative faltered, however, when the United States took an active role in strengthening IGAD's mediation capacity.

Beyond Africa, Nigeria has maintained strong diplomatic and economic relations with China, Iraq, and Cuba. Nigeria's membership in OPEC partially explains its embrace of dictatorships in the Middle East, while trade issues predominate in relations with China and Cuba.

Given Obasanjo's short tenure in power, he has done more for democracy promotion in Africa than most regimes facing the same circumstances. As a consistent advocate for the withdrawal of the military from power, he has helped to validate civilian governance and has given credibility to the regional movement for stability and rule of law. Nigeria's relations with entrenched dictatorships compromise its activism in the promotion of democracy, but this has been balanced by its leadership in other areas important to democracy promotion in the region.

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[2] Suleiman, Zainab O. "Global Junketing as Foreign Policy." Weekly Trust: Kaduna. 24 May 2002; "The Confusing Signals in Obasanjo's Foreign Policy." Africa Today: London. 18 May 1999.
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[9] "Nigeria Calls for Coalition Government in Zimbabwe." The Financial Gazette 21 Mar. 2002.
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Peru

Assessment: Fair
Trend: ⇑
Capital: Lima
Type of Government: Constitutional Republic
Head of Government: President Alejandro Toledo (since 28 July 2001)
Minister of Foreign Affairs: Allan Wagner Tizon
Population: 27,483,864
Human Development Index Ranking 2002: 82

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

From 1992 to 2000, Peru demonstrated a **poor** record of support for democracy abroad. This was mainly due to the fact that the country was under the authoritarian rule of President Alberto Fujimori whose domestic policies repeatedly violated commonly accepted democratic norms. Peru's record in this area began to change abruptly in November of 2000 with the fall of the Fujimori regime followed by free and fair elections in 2001. Since then, the Andean country's record of support for democracy abroad has improved significantly, and can be considered **good**.

The interim administration of President Valentín Paniagua (2000-2001), and the democratically-elected government of President Alejandro Toledo (2001-present), have made numerous efforts to restore the image of Peru in the international community as an advocate for democracy at home and abroad. For example, Peru played a leading role in the hemisphere's adoption of the Inter-American Democratic Charter in September 2001. Given the myriad economic, political, and social problems at home, it remains to be seen how much political capital the Toledo government will invest in continuing to promote democracy in the region and beyond.

FOREIGN RELATIONS BACKGROUND

Given the history of Peruvian politics from 1992 to 2002, it is not surprising that efforts to promote democracy abroad differ significantly before and after the fall of Peruvian President Fujimori in 2000. In April of 1992, President Fujimori led his infamous *autogolpe* (self-coup), closing Congress, suspending the constitution, and taking control of the courts. From then on, while seeking to stabilize a suffering economy and combating the Shining Path insurgency, Fujimori continued to undermine democratic institutions at home -- violating press freedoms, manipulating the judicial system, and concentrating power in the hands of the executive. Abroad, Peru's foreign policy focused on resolving a long-standing border conflict with Ecuador, cooperating with the United States on support to counternarcotics efforts, and attracting foreign investment.

It was in Fujimori's self-interest to undermine international efforts to promote democracy in other countries as a way to discredit the international community's concern about his own regime. Peru was widely criticized for the government's disregard for democratic governance, human rights and fair electoral processes. In 2000, Fujimori ran for a third term, a decision viewed by the majority of the country's opposition (as well as many in the international community) as unconstitutional. When the Constitutional Court ruled against his re-election bid, Fujimori dismissed the three judges who ruled against him, reflecting his unabashed manipulation of the rule of law, judicial procedures, and the electoral system. The subsequent presidential elections were plagued by allegations of fraud and mishandling from the beginning. International electoral missions led by such institutions as the Organization of American States (OAS) and The Carter Center were unable to give their seal of approval to the elections, pointing to the fact that the Fujimori regime controlled not only the electoral offices, but also much of the printed and broadcast media. His challenger, Alejandro Toledo, withdrew from the second round of the elections in protest, and Fujimori took office in July of 2000 in a climate of political illegitimacy.

In November of 2000, among mounting charges of corruption, and thanks to a vital pro-democracy opposition movement largely backed by the hemispheric community, Fujimori fled to Japan and resigned. An interim government led by the highly respected legislator, Valentín Paniagua, quickly organized new elections and began to restore the trampled democratic institutions that had been undermined during a decade of authoritarian rule. On 28 July 2001, opposition leader Alejandro Toledo was sworn in as president after what were widely seen as free and fair elections. The new government assumed power in an intense and politically charged climate marked by high expectations for democratic renewal. One of the many challenges that Peru now faced was undoing the Fujimori foreign policy legacy and reinserting itself in the international democratic community.

RESPONSE TO OVERTHROWS OF DEMOCRATICALLY-ELECTED GOVERNMENTS

Despite the Fujimori government's strong bias against outside intervention in internal affairs, Peru did endorse a growing number of inter-American mechanisms to protect and defend democracy in the region. These included Resolution 1080 adopted in Santiago in 1991, the Washington Protocol (1992) and the Managua Declaration (1993).[1] A closer look, however, reveals that the Peruvian government, in defiance of OAS principles his government had earlier endorsed, condoned and even supported the interruption of democracy in Guatemala in 1993 and, other than the OAS censure, was silent in the cases of Haiti and Paraguay.

On 25 May 1993, the democratically-elected president of Guatemala, Jorge Elías Serrano, faced with growing criticism of his economic austerity policies, dissolved Congress and the Supreme Court and declared that he would rule the country by decree. His actions came only 13 months after Fujimori's own self-coup. Not surprisingly, the Peruvian government was eager to endorse Serrano's power grab. While the OAS governments immediately expressed concern about the Guatemalan situation at an emergency meeting called pursuant to Resolution 1080, President Fujimori stated that Serrano's actions were "a good thing if the objectives are to eradicate corruption."[2]

Peru did not play an important role during the 1994 political crisis in Haiti. During the intense hemispheric debates that took place on the prospect of military intervention in the name of restoration of democracy, the OAS was deeply divided. Peru, along with Brazil, Mexico, Ecuador, and Uruguay, "rejected the use of force under any circumstances."[3] Peru's position was, as earlier noted, best explained by Fujimori's desire to defend the principle of national sovereignty and to avoid setting any precedent that could compromise his own undemocratic rule.

In the case of Paraguay in 1996, once again Peru was a silent spectator within the OAS. In contrast, Brazil, the rest of the Mercosur countries, and the United States joined with Paraguay's own democratic forces to press the military to restore constitutional rule. OAS member states invoked Resolution 1080 and Peru, as a member country, joined the rest of Latin America in this hemispheric response. However, outside of this action, the Fujimori government issued no specific statements expressing concern about the interruption of the democratic order or condemning the coup.

Peru's reaction to the attempted coup in Ecuador in 2000 was, not surprisingly, similarly passive. It joined the OAS consensus condemning the attempt to overthrow the government and expressing full support for President Jamil Mahuad. South American leaders also lined up in support of Mahuad, issuing statements condemning attempts to oust him.[4] Fujimori, however, was preparing to run for his unconstitutional third term and made no official statements, despite the fact that Peru and Ecuador had resolved their border conflict in 1998, and that Fujimori and Mahuad were good personal friends.

Peru's response to the coup in Venezuela in April of 2002, however, reveals a marked shift in its foreign policy. Most members of the hemispheric community did not share President Chávez's particular views on democracy and they questioned many of his policies. Yet the South American heads of state, meeting as the Rio Group in Costa Rica, quickly condemned the interruption of the constitutional order in Venezuela and called for a meeting of the OAS permanent council. President Toledo's reaction was particularly significant since he had made several public statements criticizing Chavez's lack of democratic principles.[5] Yet he and his counterparts strongly encouraged the hemispheric community to consider whether to invoke the Inter-American Democratic Charter. This was the first time that the Toledo administration had faced the overthrow of a democratically-elected government in the region.

In this case, and for the first time in a decade, Peru led a strong response against the interruption of democracy in Venezuela, setting a positive precedent for future foreign policy decisions.

RESPONSE TO FLAWED ELECTIONS

Peru's biggest contribution to improving electoral standards was in holding free and fair elections at home in 2001. The Peruvian people, supported by the international community and the OAS in particular, joined together to denounce Fujimori's systematic electoral fraud and recovered their long besieged democratic order. The energetic pro-democracy mobilization of diverse sectors of Peruvian society during that time united around a common agenda of holding free and fair elections monitored by international observers. The successful process set the groundwork for, and in a way inspired, the future government's commitment to advance and strengthen constitutional rule.

PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRACY

In 1999, the Fujimori government withdrew Peru from the inter-American human rights system, no longer recognizing the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. As Carlos Ayala, then president of the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, rightfully points out, "a country that removes itself from a system of human rights is a country that decides to isolate itself from the international community."[6] Fujimori's decision in this respect, as in many others, demonstrated his government's complete disregard for democratic rules. It is not surprising, therefore, that, for much of the 1990s, the Peruvian government did little to promote international democracy.

Peru post-Fujimori has made significant progress in this regard. According to many Peruvian government officials, since the end of 2000 democracy promotion has become one of the most important principles of Peruvian foreign policy. The country has actively promoted democratic values in regional and international fora.

Peru's leadership in the drafting and adoption of the Inter-American Democratic Charter of the Organization of American States during the transitional government of Valentín Paniagua was particularly noteworthy. The charter subsumed and codified previous democracy-related resolutions, declarations, and protocols, including Resolution 1080, calling for strong and concrete hemispheric responses to breakdowns of constitutional rule in the region. By all accounts, Peru played a critical role, not only by vigorously calling for and pushing forward the rapid establishment of the charter, but also by hosting the actual signing and passing of the resolution that took place on 11 September 2001 in Lima. Indeed, in the past two years, under the leadership of former Prime Minister Javier Perez de Cuellar and former Foreign Minister Diego Garcia Sayan, Peru has become one of the most active and visible defenders of democracy in the inter-American system.[7]

The Toledo government has pursued a pro-democracy agenda in other ways as well. President Toledo has spoken about the connection between promoting democracy and fighting world poverty. Towards this end, at various hemispheric fora, he has proposed lowering defense spending and increasing social investment. He has expressed particular concern about a possible arms race in Latin America, and has suggested that the region's governments should freeze all arms sales and reduce military spending.[8]

Peru also took a leadership role in proposing the most recent UN Human Rights Commission resolution that establishes new mechanisms for promoting and consolidating democracy in trouble spots throughout the world. The declaration --opposed by such countries as Cuba, China, Algeria, Syria, and Sudan-- seeks to define the fundamental elements that constitute a democracy, including rule of law, free and fair elections, separation of powers, independent judiciaries, transparency and accountability, pluralistic political parties, and a free and independent press. The resolution also welcomes the so-called "democracy clauses" now contained in different regional organizations, such as the OAS.

In the search for democracy funds from abroad, the return to constitutional rule in Peru has resulted, and will likely continue to result, in a steady increase of foreign aid devoted to democratic development.[9] An increase in such assistance from 1997 to 2000 was more directly linked to the country's *crisis* in democracy than to its *commitment* to constitutional rule. In 2002 and 2003, USAID assistance to Peru, for example, is expected to increase substantially, a reflection of the Toledo administration's decision to make democracy a priority at home as well as abroad.

POLICY TOWARDS ENTRENCHED DICTATORSHIPS

Peru's policy towards Cuba also seems to reveal a changing trend toward condemning regimes that do not respect fundamental human rights.

Peru served on the United Nations Human Rights Commission throughout much of the Fujimori era, holding terms from 1985 to 1996 and from 1998 to 2003. During the Fujimori government, Peru was the only Latin American country besides Venezuela and Mexico that voted against declarations condemning Cuba's human rights record and calling for Cuba's opening to the democratic world.[10] Yet a year after Fujimori left office, in April of 2001, Peru abstained –along with Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, and Mexico- when the Commission adopted a resolution that urged the Cuban government to guarantee the rule of law through democratic institutions[11]. This marked the first, if subtle, shift in Peru's actions towards Cuba.

More recently, Peru voted in favor of the 19 April 2002 UN resolution urging the Cuban government to protect "human, civil, and political rights, in accordance with the provision of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the principles and standards of the rule of law." On this occasion, Peruvian representative Jorge Voto-Bernales expressed that "his delegation considered a no-action motion inappropriate" and said that the resolution "was a Latin American initiative reflecting the democratic visions of the continent."[12] The President of the Peruvian Congress, Carlos Ferrero, defended the government's vote against Cuba. He claimed that it was "necessary to break the traditional scenario in which Latin America was always on the sidelines of the issue. That attitude has been going on for 50 years and it is too much. It is time that we speak clearly: Cuba is not a democratic regime."[13] Many analysts, however, view Peru's harsher criticisms of the Cuban government as a sign of its closer relationship to Washington, which regularly pressures its Latin American allies to sponsor and support anti-Cuba resolutions at the United Nations

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[1] Resolution 1080 was adopted at the fifth plenary session of the Organization of American States, 5 June 1991. The Protocol of Washington allowed the General Assembly to suspend, by a two-thirds vote, the membership of any government that came to power by overthrowing a previous regime. The Managua Declaration, approved in June 1993, encouraged member states not only to react when faced with concrete threats to democracy, but also to advance efforts to "prevent and anticipate the very causes of the problems that work against democratic rule." For more, see Burrell, Jennifer and Michael Shifter, "Estados Unidos, la OEA y la Promoción de la Democracia en las Américas." in Tickner, Arlene B., ed. Sistema Interamericano y Democracia: Antecedentes Históricos y Tendencias Futuras. Ediciones Uniandes, 2000.

[2] The Toronto Star 26 May 1993; The Guardian 27 May 1993.

[3] New York Times 13 May 1994.

[4] Newsday Associated Press 22 January 2000.

[5] BBC News 13 April 2002. During the meeting of the Rio Group, President Toledo made the following statements: "we are not defending the democratic characteristics of a particular government, we are defending the principle of the rule of law" and "I was, and continue to be, a strong critic of many of the characteristics of the Chávez government. People have the right to remove their government, but they have to do so through democratic channels."

[6] Interview with Carlos Ayala published in Ideele, August 1999. "País que se sale de un sistema de derechos humanos se aísla de la comunidad internacional."

[7] For statements expressing support for the creation of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, see statements by Peruvian Minister of Foreign Affairs Diego García-Sayan: "El Papel del Multilateralismo en la Defensa y Promoción de la Democracia," speech presented at the Asamblea General Extraordinaria de la OEA para la Aprobación de la Carta Democrática Interamericana, 2001; Speech at the Inaugural Ceremony of the 28th Extraordinary Session of the General Assembly of the Organization of American States, Lima, 10 September 2001; Plenary Intervention by U.S. Secretary of State Colin L. Powell at the Special General Assembly of the Organization of American States, Lima, 11 September 2001, underscoring Peru's leadership role in the establishment of the Democratic Charter.

[8] Inter Press Service 29 November 2001. At the August 2001 summit of the Rio Group in Santiago, President Toledo proposed a 10-year freeze on weapons acquisitions.

[9] For most of the 1990s, the United States was one of the major donors of democracy and development assistance to Peru, through the U.S. Agency for International Development. For a more detailed description of USAID programs and specific aid amounts, see Peru Activity Data Sheet USAID. <www.usaid.gov/country/lac/pe/527-001.html>.

[10] "Commission on Human Rights Adopts Resolutions on Cuba, Afghanistan, Burundi and Occupied Arab Territories." HR/CN/99/54, 23 April 1999; "Commission on Human Rights Adopts Resolutions on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, Sierra Leone, Cuba, the Former Yugoslavia, Sudan and Iran." HR/CN/00/52, 18 April 2000; "Commission on Human Rights Adopts Resolutions on Situations in South-Eastern Europe, Afghanistan, Iraq, Myanmar and Cuba." Commission on Human Rights, 57th Session. 18 April 2001.

[11] Member countries have an option to vote against, abstain from signing, or vote in favor of specific declarations.

[12] "Resolutions on Situations in Iraq, Sudan and Cuba Adopted by the Commission on Human Rights." Commission on Human Rights, 58th Session. 19 April 2002.

[13] "Ferrero pone puntos en las íes sobre Cuba." El Comercio 25 April 2002.

Philippines

Assessment: Fair

Trend: ⇔

Capital: Manila
Type of Government: Republic
Head of Government: President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (since 20 January 2001)
Secretary of Foreign Affairs: Blas F. Ople
Population: 82,841,518
Human Development Index Ranking 2002: 77

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Philippines has a comparatively **fair** record of support for democracy abroad. Its geographic location in Southeast Asia (a region that until the late 1990s was dominated by authoritarian regimes and established norms of non-interference), status as a developing nation with severe economic problems, and the priority it places on domestic concerns have prevented the Philippines from registering more progress in promoting democracy beyond its borders. For the most part, Manila's foreign policy interests have been dominated by regional issues regarding East Asian economic and military security, and concerns about the safety of its nationals living abroad.

Successive Philippine governments have made tentative efforts, working within the constraints of the ASEAN framework, to incorporate democracy concerns in policy deliberations. And since the early-mid 1990s elements in Filipino society have gradually started to show more interest in strengthening and promoting democracy beyond the country's borders, spurred by developments in Burma and more recently in Indonesia and East Timor.

Still, persisting domestic and international constraints suggest that Manila will not make democracy promotion abroad a major priority in the foreseeable future and instead will continue to focus on security and economic concerns.[1]

FOREIGN RELATIONS BACKGROUND

Foreign policy in the Philippines has traditionally been embedded in two different sets of relationships: its bilateral security relationship with the United States, and its multilateral grouping with its Southeast Asian neighbors through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The continued dominant role of elites, and the multiple attempts to force extra-legal political transitions, have at times threatened the lauded "tradition" of Filipino democracy and have concentrated policy attention on internal matters, rather than on regional or international ones. Even as the risk of coups has been much diminished in recent years (though President Arroyo's accession to office was not carried out through established legal mechanisms), the focus of most politicians and policymakers remains domestic affairs.

Precisely why have the machinations of the Philippines' domestic situation given rise to a relative lack of interest in promoting democracy abroad? During World War II, the entrenched political elite, with few

exceptions, acceded to Japanese demands and held onto several elections in the Old Order period from 1946 to 1965, and the institutions imported en masse from the United States after 1898 began to be altered by the vicissitudes of Filipino political culture. The dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos, stretching from 1972 to early 1986, further weakened the country's democratic inheritance and traditions. Perceptions of Marcos and his wife, Imelda, shifted over time, from symbols of hope and progress to symbols of corruption and decay. Democracy only returned in 1986, with the rise of Corazon Aquino and her People Power movement, but in many ways the restored democratic system was weaker than earlier variants in Philippine history. Still, the new democratic political order proved durable enough, fending off challenges from the military and popularly-elected politicians.

As these various political maneuverings took place over the last 50 years, the same powerful families continued to dominate politics, leading many citizens to feel marginalized. Political violence and corruption are commonplace, especially with regard to elections, which has rendered Manila reluctant to condemn other nations for similar shortcomings in their political system.

Political weakness was compounded by economic underdevelopment. Despite strong growth in the initial stages of the Marcos regime, the country's economy was never as strong as that of its Southeast Asian neighbors, leading some observers to refer to the Philippines as the "sick man of Asia." These problems, in turn, have helped give rise to and made the country vulnerable to persistent domestic insurgencies, dominated by Communist groups and Islamic minorities.

Domestic political problems and insurgencies have forced successive Philippine governments to give short shrift to foreign policy in general and democracy promotion more specifically. Lacking independent foreign policy aims, the Philippines was, for many years, content to rely upon its close ties with the U.S. and its ASEAN neighbors The Philippines under Marcos was a founding member of ASEAN, an alliance based on ideals of non-interference and consensus, as well as on the communal desire to stimulate economic growth throughout the region. Even as the number of democratic countries in the association has increased markedly, putting democracy as an element of foreign policy on the organization's agenda has proven exceedingly difficult.

By its very nature and given the diplomatic style that predominates in Asia, ASEAN does not readily lend itself to public criticism of other members.[2] Additionally, the Philippines was not a forceful actor in the organization, only rarely putting forward any initiatives, well aware that its close ties with the U.S. spawned concerns among its neighbors that Manila was merely a "deputy sheriff." Manila instead preferred to follow the lead of Indonesia, ASEAN's largest member. All told, Filipino criticism of another ASEAN member's lack of democracy was unthinkable before 1990. Even today, Manila's strongest allegiance is to ASEAN, a region that continues to lack an inter-governmental mechanism dedicated to fostering democracy and human rights.

RESPONSE TO OVERTHROW OF DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED GOVERNMENTS

Given that the Philippines is primarily interested in sub-regional relations (Malaysia, Indonesia, and to a lesser extent, the other Southeast Asian nations) rather than Asia more broadly, and has not been active in democracy promotion abroad, it is not surprising that the government said little and did less in the aftermath of coups in Pakistan and Fiji. President Estrada's only comment with regards to the overthrow of the democratically elected government in Pakistan was an expression of concern for the safety of Filipino workers there. There was no official comment regarding events in Fiji. The ouster of the elected government in Indonesia was considered by Manila to be an impeachment, rather than a coup, a view widely shared by most observers.

In Cambodia, the Philippine government was more engaged as a power struggle threatened to unravel hopes for stability following internationally-supervised post-conflict elections in which ASEAN had invested resources and prestige. The Philippines and Thailand, ASEAN's two leading democratic members at the time and the countries pushing for a more interventionist and open ASEAN[3] were the most vocal in calling on the parties to resolve their differences peacefully. Mediation by the ASEAN troika --the Thai, Indonesian, and Filipino foreign ministers-- was one of the most positive examples of Manila's democracy promotion efforts abroad.

Still, ASEAN and the Philippines did not join the U.S. and many other countries in imposing economic sanctions to protest what essentially became a coup. Though many international observers

raised concerns about the legitimacy of subsequent elections, ASEAN's bark turned out to be worse than its bite, and the Southeast Asian nations quickly declared the elections free and fair.

RESPONSE TO MANIPULATION OF ELECTORAL PROCESSES

The Philippines has had a mixed record of response to attempts by foreign governments to manipulate electoral processes, at times speaking out strongly, and at other times remaining silent. In the later half of the 1990s, Philippine governments did in certain instances depart from strict adherence to ASEAN norms of non-interference but the motivation appears to have been more a function of personal relationships and traditional security concerns, rather than any genuine commitment to democracy. For example, Manila got involved in electoral misconduct after the ouster of Anwar Ibrahim in Malaysia in 1998. Upon taking office that year, President Estrada, reportedly furious over the imprisonment of his close friend Ibrahim, issued public statements about violations of Anwar's human rights and threatened to boycott the annual APEC meeting in Kuala Lumpur. As a result, Estrada, who had little prior experience with foreign policy, quickly found himself under fire from opposition politicians for violating ASEAN norms and "interfering in neighbor's affairs." When his predecessor, Fidel Ramos, sat Estrada down and explained Malaysia's importance as an economic partner, and the extent to which ASEAN played a major role in the Philippines' economic and political life, Estrada backed away from his statements and no meaningful action ensued.

The Ramos government, widely considered to have been the most successful in the post-Marcos era, responded to the manipulation of electoral processes abroad by ignoring those cases that had little direct bearing on Philippine economic or security interests. President Ramos was silent about the violent ouster of Indonesian opposition leader Megawati Sukarnoputri from her post as party leader in 1996. When the Ramos government did take a strong stand, as in the case of China's heavy-handed attempt to influence Taiwanese elections in 1996 and the Cambodian election-related power struggle described earlier, it was motivated principally by fears of instability and traditional security concerns rather than democracy considerations per se.

PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRACY

The Philippines rarely makes democracy promotion a priority unless other factors, such as stability or cohesion in ASEAN come into play. The Philippines plays a fairly minor role in international fora, and almost always votes with the ASEAN-bloc in the United Nations. As noted above, ASEAN, which prides itself on non-interference, has only occasionally stepped forward to condemn non-democratic domestic political practices anywhere in the world. One important exception, however, occurred when Philippine President Estrada supported Thailand's push for a goal of "open ASEAN societies" as part of ASEAN Vision 2020 -- a document setting out the organization's goals for the next 20 years. The final version of the document/statement (approved by all the ASEAN members) watered down this goal significantly by saying that open societies must be consistent with respective national identities. Nonetheless, this effort marked the push for what is now called "flexible engagement" or "enhanced interaction." This concept, supported by the Estrada government, clearly challenged the norm of non-interference, though new leaders in both the Philippines and Thailand have retreated from this position.

The Estrada government took a fairly proactive stance on the East Timor issue. Before the crisis, he offered to help Indonesia monitor a plebiscite under UN auspices.[4] While the crisis was forming, Estrada urged all concerned parties to "respect the people's will" and to achieve "a peaceful resolution" in line with the "proper implementation of the results of the 30 August direct ballot.[5]" Moreover, Manila donated US$200,000 for rehabilitation efforts and contributed 240 soldiers to the UN peacekeeping mission, including high-level and very public leadership figures. However, the Philippines voted against the call for an international inquiry into atrocities carried out in East Timor "because the ROP continues to work within the ASEAN framework" and has "fundamental foreign policy interests" in its relations with Indonesia.[6]

Given its challenging domestic situation and lack of economic or diplomatic clout, the Philippines do not have significant capacity for supporting democracy efforts in the international arena. It has no international development assistance program to speak of; the country remains a recipient of foreign aid. The Philippines has intentionally shunned a leadership role in ASEAN and other fora so as not to irritate its larger Southeast Asian neighbors. And it

has consistently made domestic concerns such as ending the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and Abu Sayaaf insurgencies and revitalizing the troubled economy its top priority. In his annual overview of Philippine Foreign Policy, for example, Interior Secretary Tesofisto T. Guingona Jr. listed the three broad objectives for Manila's foreign policy: national security, national development, and the welfare of overseas nationals. Notably, democracy was not mentioned anywhere in his speech.

It is unrealistic to expect that Manila will suddenly make democracy a significant focus of its foreign policy. However, it is entirely possible that the Philippines will continue to work within the ASEAN framework to contribute in modest ways such as assisting in election monitoring and limited peacekeeping in East Timor.

POLICY TOWARDS ENTRENCHED DICTATORSHIPS

Philippines has a consistently poor record when it comes to policy towards authoritarian regimes, several of which are members of ASEAN. Specific examples include ties with dictatorships in Burma, Laos, Vietnam, and, to a lesser extent, the People's Republic of China. The Philippines also had substantive, if sometimes cautious, relations with Indonesia's President Suharto before he was ousted. Then-President Ramos met with Burma's junta leader Than Shwe in 1996 and in 1998, when he expressed support for Than's "efforts towards democracy," despite significant NGO protest over the visit. Vietnam and the Philippines have engaged in joint explorations for natural resources and have taken limited steps toward cooperation in sea patrols and educational exchanges. The relationship with the PRC has been less cordial, mostly as a result of serious Philippine concerns about Beijing's intentions in the South China Sea and with regards to Taiwan. In the mid and late 1990s, Chinese military moves in the South China Sea resulted in the "capture" of territory claimed by Manila. Manila appears less concerned with the type of government with which it must deal than with the perceived threats to its security.

All this said, democracy is becoming more of an issue among NGOs and the media. There was substantial outcry before and after Than Swe's 1998 visit – something that would have been highly unlikely just a few years earlier. Despite this change, politicians have yet to respond in any systematic way, suggesting that it will still be some time before democracy abroad becomes an issue of great salience for the leadership of the Philippines.

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[1] The period 1992-2002 covers four different governments: Corazon Aquino's government from 1986-1992, which restored democracy after decades of dictatorship by Ferdinand Marcos; the Fidel Ramos regime from 1992-1998, which focused on the "four D's: devolution, decentralization, deregulation, and democratization"; Erik Estrada's short regime from 1998-2001, which marked a departure from Ramos' policies aimed at maintaining regional stability, regardless of democracy; and finally that of Gloria Arroyo, which has returned to a Ramos-esque view of stability and regional economic recovery as of utmost importance. During this period, Manila was silent about the violent ouster of the Indonesian opposition PDI party leader Megawati Sukarnoputri in 1996 as well as the continuing situation in Burma.

[2] For more on the doctrine of non-interference, see Acharya, Amitva Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order pg 47. Routledge Press

[3] Eng, Peter, "Transforming ASEAN" in *Washington Quarterly*, Winter, 1999, vol. 22 no. 1, pg 53. Eng further clarifies what he means by an "more interventionist and open ASEAN" on pg 54, where he states "noninterference has meant that ASEAN has generally avoided criticizing a member government for its domestic policies, including the way it treats its people, *especially in cases relating to democracy and human rights* [emphasis added]."

[4] See *RP Offers to Help Indonesia on East Timor Plebiscite*, Foreign Relations Press Release 2113, 29 April 1999. Taken from www.ops.gov.ph/archives/news/1999/04apr/11/election2113.html

[5] See *RP Voices Concerns over Bloodshed in East Timor, Calls for Implementation of People's Will*, Foreign Relations Press Release 0611, 6 September 1999. Taken from www.ops.gov.ph/archives/news/1999/09sep/17/foreign%20relations0611.html

[6] See *Palace explains RP Vote vs East Timor Inquiry*, Foreign Relations Press Release 2912, 29 September 1999. Taken from www.ops.gov.ph/archives/news/1999/09sep/17/foreign%20relations1912.html

Poland

Assessment: Good
Trend: ⇔
Capital: Warsaw
Type of Government: Republic
Head of Government: Prime Minister Leszek Miller (since 19 October 2001)
Minister of Foreign Affairs: Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz
Population: 38,633,912
Human Development Index Ranking 2002: 37

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Poland had a **good** overall record of supporting the democratic cause abroad, particularly in light of constraints stemming from modest influence and means. Although a coherent strategy for fostering democracy beyond Polish borders has not been among Warsaw's foreign policy priorities, the country has reacted to breaches of democratic procedures in electoral processes, to limitations on democratic freedoms and to other authoritarian or dictatorial practices. With the notable exception of hosting the inaugural Community of Democracies Ministerial, the focus of Polish attention to democracy-related issues has been largely limited to the region of Central and Eastern Europe.

Developments in four countries -- Belarus, Slovakia, Ukraine and Yugoslavia -- are particularly important in assessing Polish involvement in supporting democracy abroad. Polish authorities have frequently and publicly criticized leaders who have not respected democratic procedures in these countries. For example, Poland joined international efforts to isolate the Lukashenko and Milosevic regimes in Belarus and Yugoslavia, respectively. Poland has worked with other governments to help organize and monitor elections in the former Yugoslavia and in some countries of the former Soviet Union.

Poland's preference has been for collective rather than unilateral action in addressing democracy-related issues abroad. With respect to international promotion, ambitious projects other than symbolic ones have generally been beyond Poland's reach. Apart from collective actions of international organizations, Polish governmental activities have included unilateral measures, such as official government statements (executive and legislative branches) as well as bilateral measures. A separate, and quite important, vehicle has been the work of numerous Polish NGOs supporting democratic processes abroad. Myriad organizations, some with funding from the Polish government, have been engaged beyond Poland's borders with activities ranging from grassroots democracy promotion to specialized training for local government officials. Most of these Polish NGOs have been working in the former Soviet Union and in the Balkans.

Notwithstanding these substantive governmental and non-governmental efforts, the Polish record of supporting democracy abroad is deficient in some areas. For example, Poland has been quite reluctant to express its disapproval for notorious breaches of democracy and human rights in powerful countries such as China, with respect to Tibet, and Russia, with regard to indiscriminate use of force in Chechnya. Also, Poland has not had a good record concerning some 22,000 asylum seekers during the 1990s, with only 1,300 being granted the desired status.

FOREIGN RELATIONS BACKGROUND

During the 1990s, Poland's foreign policy goals could be defined as: 1) integration into Western security and economic cooperation structures, 2) maintaining and developing harmonious bilateral relations with its neighbors, and 3) strengthening its regional position through active participation in existing frameworks of regional cooperation.

As a result of Poland's primary role in triggering democratic changes that helped to bring down most of the communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, successive Polish governments have acknowledged the country's special responsibility to support democratization processes abroad, and have placed this goal squarely on the foreign ministry's agenda. This duty, however, has never found a clear and consistent formulation in the statements of senior government officials, and has not been translated into a precise strategy or been accompanied by the necessary means and tools to carry it out.

The return of the country to the European political and economic mainstream[1] and, specifically, Poland's accession to NATO and impending membership in the European Union, has been the principal focus of Poland's foreign policy and has largely shaped its international conduct between 1992 and 2002. This goal has enjoyed a broad political consensus and remained constant irrespective of changes of government, foreign ministers and presidents. After Poland became a member of NATO in March 1999, joining the European Union has been at the center of Polish diplomatic efforts.

In terms of bilateral relations, ties with the United States have remained the most important over the course of the 1990s, closely followed by relations with the EU and the European Commission. Next in order of importance came individual EU countries, most notably Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, followed by the Russian Federation.

Most of Poland's diplomatic efforts and resources, therefore, have been consumed by relations with the U.S. and the EU, leaving Polish regional policy suffering from neglect and sparse resources. Poland did undertake some initiatives to provide assistance in the region, but they were usually limited in objectives and scale.[2] Poland's potential impact in the region as a possible model for, and champion of, democratic transition could have been much greater, especially given its membership in NATO, promising candidacy for EU enlargement and comparative economic strength.

RESPONSE TO OVERTHROW OF DEMOCRATICALLY-ELECTED GOVERNMENTS

During 1992-2002 there were no cases of overthrow of democratically elected government in Central and Eastern Europe. As a routine exercise, Poland's foreign ministry has issued statements condemning coups d'etat all around the world during the past decade and supported sanctions imposed on the offending governments by the EU, UN, and other organizations. However, no unilateral action was pursued. Though Poland eagerly participated in operation "Desert Storm" in Kuwait in 1991, the principal motive behind this involvement was to enhance Polish relations with the U.S. and its allies, with whom Poland hoped to advance the case for NATO membership and Poland's integration into European security and economic structures more generally. "Desert Storm" should not, therefore, serve as an example of genuine Polish government will to foster democratic order beyond its borders.

RESPONSE TO MANIPULATION OF ELECTORAL PROCESSES

Between 1992 and 2002 Poland reacted to the manipulation of electoral processes abroad mainly by supporting the resolutions and collective actions of the Council of Europe, the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the UN, and by signing the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, managed under the auspices of the European Union. The Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), part of the OSCE and which is based in Warsaw, has been the main institution through which Poland participated in election monitoring and reported on flaws in electoral processes abroad. Poland served as OSCE chair in 1998, intensifying the country's involvement in promoting democracy, and spawning more efforts by foreign policymakers to boost Poland's engagement in democracy building in Eastern Europe and the Balkans.

Poland has called attention to, and strongly criticized, the manipulation of presidential and parliamentary elections in Belarus since Lukashenko came to power in 1994. Poland joined the international community in condemning the practices of the Lukashenko government, and in exerting pressure to move in the direction of democratic reform. But Poland also did not view isolation of Belarus as a viable strategy. Hoping to break the impasse and restore some degree of dialogue within the country, Poland made several attempts beginning

in the mid-1990s to organize a "round table" in Belarus, bringing together the government and opposition with assistance of Polish mediators. [3]

Another example of Poland's forceful objection to rigged elections was its participation in the international protest against the Milosevic regime. Poland joined with many of the Western countries in October 2000, when the dictator's reign in Yugoslavia was in doubt, in expressing its unequivocal support for the democratic forces and then in welcoming the new democratic president.[4] Poland enthusiastically supported the return of democracy in the whole of the Former Yugoslavia; the Polish Foreign Ministry issued several statements concerning elections in Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia.

Polish opposition also mounted in response to the electoral manipulation and authoritarian tendencies exhibited by Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma. Shortly after coming to power in 1994, Kuchma systematically increased his presidential power at the expense of the parliament and judiciary and undertook a number of actions designed to limit freedom of speech and association. Political opposition grew, and culminated in large street demonstrations in March 2001. Polish officials expressed sympathy with many opposition demands. A delegation of opposition political forces visited Poland and held highly visible consultations with Polish parliamentarians.[5] Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski offered his good offices to help resolve the impasse between Kuchma and his opponents and expressed his wish for the victory of democracy in Ukraine.[6]

PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRACY

Between 1992 and 2002, Poland displayed readiness to promote and support the democratic cause abroad, again, most often through collective initiatives. Poland has been especially active in the Council of Europe, OSCE, the Stability Pact, and in less institutionalized fora such as the Visegrad Group, Council of the Baltic Sea, and the Central European Initiative. Poland has contributed both civilian and military personnel, as well as some modest funds, to the mission of building democracy and strengthening democratic institutions carried out by these organizations, primarily in the Former Yugoslavia and the Former Soviet Union.

An assistance beneficiary for most of the 1990s, Poland has slowly emerged as a donor country. Poland's provision of aid to the new members in the Council of Europe well illustrates this evolution. Some of the projects managed and financed by Poland within the framework of the Council of Europe include an ambitious training program for local government activists from Albania, implemented by the Foundation in Support of Local Democracy, with the participation of the Polish Foreign Ministry, as well as training in Poland for judges from Ukraine, and more recently, from Kosovo.[7]

To further assist in the international promotion of democracy, Poland hosted the first Community of Democracies ministerial meeting, which was held in Warsaw in June 2000. Then Foreign Minister Bronislaw Geremek was personally committed to the initiative, noting that he hoped Warsaw would no longer be associated with the Warsaw Pact of Soviet times but with the Warsaw Declaration of the new democratic era.

POLICY TOWARDS ENTRENCHED DICTATORSHIPS

During 1992-2002 there were two clear cases of dictatorships or *de facto* dictatorships in Central and Eastern Europe: Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia and Alexander Lukashenko in Belarus, and both were successful in manipulating electoral processes to consolidate autocratic rule.

On many occasions, Polish officials criticized the practices of the Belorusian dictator. Since 1994, dozens of official statements were issued to condemn the conduct of the government in Belarus. Polish presidents, ministers of foreign affairs, prime ministers and parliamentarians all expressed their indignation over developments in Belarus.[8] In order to communicate disapproval and exert pressure on Lukashenko, the Polish government downgraded diplomatic ties with Belarus, accelerating the already worsening relations that are now limited to bilateral trade on a small scale.[9] Poland supported the EU and the Council of Europe sanctions against Belarus.[10]

At the same time, the Polish government's efforts to support the Belorusian opposition fell short of expectations in both countries. It seems that most of those opposing the Lukashenko regime have found shelter in neighboring Lithuania rather than Poland. The Republic of Poland joined the chorus of international criticism towards Lukashenko, but offered relatively little to his opponents.

The case of Yugoslav president-dictator Slobodan Milosevic is comparable to that of Lukashenko in Belarus. Milosevic came to power in

accordance with democratic procedures, but soon moved to eliminate all political opposition and consolidate power. Poland froze its relations with the Milosevic regime in 1992-1993 in compliance with UN resolutions, and only renewed them after the sanctions were lifted.[11] Then, in 1999, his campaign against Kosovars brought about a collective international intervention. Poland has frequently expressed its concern and outrage with Milosevic's ethnic cleansing operation in Kosovo.[12] As a member of NATO, Poland also participated in the military operation against the Milosevic regime in spring 1999, and joined UN and EU sanctions against the Former Yugoslavia. Since 2000, when the regime was finally ousted, Polish governments have joined all international efforts to restore peace and democracy in the Balkans.

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[1] This goal has been listed as a top priority of Polish foreign policy since the first free elections after the fall of communism in 1989.
[2] One such example is the Polish Know How Foundation, which assists several countries in Central and Eastern Europe, mainly through sharing Polish experiences related to successful economic transition.
[3] Exposé by Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland Bronisław Geremek to the Diet of the Republic of Poland on the Main Lines of Polish Foreign Policy, Warsaw, 5 Mar. 1998.
4 EU Official statements on the FRY elections. http://www.ceps.be/Pubs/SEEMonitor/Monitor15.php.
[5] Rzeczpospolita 14 Apr. 2001.
[6] Rzeczpospolita 24 Apr. 2001.
[7] Rybicki, Marek. "Poland's Ten Years in the Council of Europe." www.msz.gov.pl/english/polzagr/10_rybicki.htm
[8] Information by the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the Fundamental Directions of Polish Foreign Policy (presented at the 16th session of the Sejm on March 14 Mar 2002).
[9] Snyder, Tim. "Look East, Face West." Transitions Magazine (1998).
[10] The official web page of the Directorate General for External Relations of the European Commission: http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/belarus/intro/index.htm
[11] Czaplinski, Marcin. "Polish relations with the Countries of the Former Yugoslavia and Albania."
[12] Declaration of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning the military operation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Targeting the civilian population of Kosovo, Warsaw, 30 Mar. 1999.

Portugal

Assessment: Good
Trend: ⇔
Capital: Lisbon
Type of Government: Parliamentary Democracy
Head of Government: Prime Minister Antonio Manuel de Oliviera Guterres (since 28 October 1995)
Minister of Foreign Affairs: Antonio Martins da Cruz
Population: 10,066,253
Human Development Index Ranking 2002: 28

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Portugal has a **good** record of support for the promotion of democracy abroad throughout the period 1992-2002. Since its transition to democracy, Portugal has become more willing to condemn the overthrow of democratically-elected regimes, to promote free and fair elections, and to provide humanitarian assistance to countries struggling to resolve armed conflicts or establish democratic government. Portugal has used its membership in multilateral associations as the preferred method for executing its foreign policy, and has, in special situations, effectively formed coalitions to promote its interest in expanding democracy, particularly in the PALOP (African countries with Portuguese as the Official Language) and East Timor. However, a continued downward trend in Portugal's contribution to official development assistance combined with its precarious economic future, could undermine the country's ability to promote democracy abroad.

FOREIGN RELATIONS BACKGROUND

A major factor in understanding Portugal's efforts to promote democracy is its longstanding ties of history, language, and culture to its former colonies: Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, East Timor, Mozambique, and São Tome and Principe. Portugal is a significant bilateral donor to most of its former colonies, and uses this assistance more as a tool for political leverage than to promote democracy within the countries. Until recently, Portuguese bilateral development aid was directed almost exclusively to the PALOP countries -- all states with less than stable democratic structures. Respect for civil and political rights had no influence on whether Portugal designated a country eligible to receive aid, according to a London School of Economics study of aid politics of the 21-member Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).[1] Furthermore, a recent review of the records of the DAC shows that the underlying motive of Portuguese aid has been the preservation of Lisbon's influence through ongoing ties to its former colonies.[2]

Portugal's accession to the European Union (EU) in 1986 has gradually contributed to the country incorporating a broader European perspective on issues of foreign and security policy. At the same time, Portugal has used its presidential rotations within the EU to promote summit-level conferences with African countries in an effort to maintain and improve its post-imperial relations with them. Additionally, it has utilized cultural and linguistic coalitions to secure a sphere of influence within Europe and throughout the world. It has, for example, used the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP) as a platform from which to project its values, including that of democratic freedom.[3]

Portugal has made a significant contribution to conflict resolution efforts around the world. Its troops have participated in, or are presently engaged in, UN peace missions in Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, East

Timor, Guinea-Bissau, Kosovo and Mozambique, among others. According to the 2001 UN assessment of member contributions, Portugal's contingent of military personnel active in peacekeeping operations ranks 11th, ranking first among European countries and second among NATO allies.[4] Portugal is an active participant in the OSCE, the UN, NATO and the Ibero-American Summit process, and recently reaffirmed its commitment to these organizations and the effort to support the construction of a democratic Europe.

RESPONSE TO THE OVERTHROW OF DEMOCRATICALLY-ELECTED GOVERNMENTS

Portugal has a fair record of condemning military coups and the overthrow of democratically-elected governments. Its responses, which have been pursued through bilateral and multilateral channels, have been generally sympathetic towards the ousted regime. Portugal has been hesitant to impose general economic sanctions, however, and has instead consistently championed targeted sanctions against offending leaders.

Portugal's efforts toward democratic reforms in Guinea-Bissau helped to spur the former colony's first multi-party elections, held in 1994. Observers were sent by Portugal, Sweden, the Francophonie, the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP), and the Organization of African Unity to monitor these elections. In 1998, President Nino Vieira's dismissal of the chief of Guinea-Bissau's armed forces ignited a military overthrow and eleven months of civil war. The conflict was resolved in November, when the Abuja Peace Agreement calling for national unity was signed under the joint mediation of the CPLP and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Portugal played a pivotal and positive role during the conflict. It supported CPLP initiatives and its continued diplomatic presence in the field presented a strong signal to the warring factions of its support for peace. After Senegal's entry into the fighting, there was some speculation that the French and Portuguese governments were also at odds over the conflict, however both sides insisted that efforts would be cooperative and would first and foremost focus on humanitarian aid reaching the citizens of Guinea-Bissau.

Portugal had a lackluster response to the nullification of elections by the self-imposed military government in Burma. While its backing of UN resolutions against human rights violations in Burma was appropriate, Portugal straddled the fence by pushing for Burmese participation in EU-ASEAN trade deliberations.[5]

The January 2000 coup that occurred in Ecuador was one of the first international challenges to face Portugal as it took over the presidency of the European Union. After the events that resulted in the ousting of President Mahuad, the President of Portugal, on behalf of the European Union, issued a statement condemning the interruption of the democratic process. After the April 2002 coup in Venezuela, Portugal issued a statement of concern for the safety of the 400,000 Portuguese citizens living there and joined the EU statement calling for a quick return to civilian rule and democratic normalization.

RESPONSE TO MANIPULATION OF ELECTORAL PROCESSES

Portugal has a good record of condemning attempts to manipulate electoral processes. Portugal has been especially helpful to its former colonies in supporting their efforts to hold free and fair elections. Portugal has helped by monitoring elections, supporting non-governmental organizations and endorsing the use of targeted sanctions against recalcitrant regimes.

After more than two decades of brutal repression and genocide in which 200,000 East Timorese people died, Portugal's steadfast negotiations with Indonesia regarding autonomy for East Timor came to fruition. After having cut diplomatic relations with Indonesia in December 1975, immediately after the invasion, Portugal ardently defended its former colony's right to self-determination and transition to democracy. It further helped in this effort at the UN negotiating table, by negotiating the details of the entire transition process and by monitoring elections as a member of the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) monitoring group. Portugal also supported the creation of the East Timor Observation Mission which, in cooperation with several non-governmental organizations, monitored the transition process and the elections not only at polling stations within East Timor, but also at those set up around the world to accommodate extensive communities of East Timorese living abroad (including in Portugal, Indonesia, Australia, and Canada, among other countries).[6]

In August 1999, 98.5 percent of the East Timorese population turned out to exercise their

democratic right to vote. A majority supported independence, despite widespread intimidation and violence. The violence that followed elections provoked outrage in Portugal. With Portugal united behind the East Timorese cause, President Jorge Sampaio, Prime Minister António Guterres and Minister of Foreign Affairs Jaime Gama were instrumental in drumming up international support for a UN peacekeeping force. Not surprisingly, Portugal's most significant involvement in any UN peacekeeping mission occurred within UNTAET, the UN mission in East Timor.[7] In addition, Portugal supported an EU resolution to apply an arms embargo against Indonesia in September 1999 (though it was lifted in January 2000).[8]

The Portuguese response to the manipulation of the elections in Zimbabwe was largely guided by the positions and actions of the EU. The EU is committed to maintaining its humanitarian assistance to the people of Zimbabwe and to imposing targeted sanctions against the Mugabe government. However, there has been disagreement amongst EU member countries regarding whether to remove EU election observers from the country in order to avoid conferring external legitimacy on the process. Portugal argued in favor of keeping the thirty EU observers in Zimbabwe throughout the electoral process to deter further fraud, but its position did not prevail.

PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRACY

Portugal has a strong record of supporting measures that promote democracy throughout the world. Portugal's accession to the EU in 1986 enhanced its economic stability, helped to solidify its internal democracy and served as a portal through which the country has been able to demonstrate its commitment to international democracy and respect for human rights. Despite its small size, Portugal has had considerable influence in the development of the EU platform regarding development assistance and democracy promotion abroad. This, in turn, has been pivotal to Lisbon's relationship with new democratic societies. Portugal is also an active member of the Convening Group of the Community of Democracies, as well as one of the founding members of the International Criminal Court.

Portugal has embraced most of the pro-democratic "demarches" of the EU, from its resolutions on human rights and democracy to common EU positions on cases of gross violations of human rights or democratic governance. In accordance with Article VI of the Amsterdam Treaty, Portugal willingly joined the EU's threat to boycott Jorg Haider's far-right Freedom Party, which garnered 27 percent of the vote in Austria's October 1999 elections.[9] Haider had gained notoriety by espousing anti-immigrant policies and expressing sympathy with some elements of the Nazi regime. At the time, Prime Minister Guterres stated that if a political party that has expressed xenophobic views comes to power, it is a natural result that the European family will not be able to continue to support that regime. Guterres further stated that Portugal has come to understand that the real defense of its national interests lies in cultivating shared European values, such as respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, democracy and the rule of law. Subsequently, Portugal was one of the first EU countries to support repeal of sanctions against Austria after the removal of Haider as leader of the Freedom Party.

Portugal used its position as chair-in-office of the OSCE (2001-02) to emphasize its concern for strengthening democracy and human rights in Europe. Then Foreign Minister Jaime Gama lauded the announcement of municipal elections in Kosovo. He then insisted that the newly-elected assembly be granted the resources necessary to construct a consolidated governing body as a way to help Kosovo develop its democratic institutions. The OSCE also implemented a program to ensure that all people in Kosovo registered with the UN have the opportunity to vote on election day. In addition, the OSCE was instrumental in pushing for elections in southern Serbia -- an important watershed in the overall process of confidence-building in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Finally, the OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) was expected to deploy 800 observers for the parliamentary elections in Macedonia. This action was supported by the Portuguese, whose Foreign Minister, António Martins da Cruz, proclaimed that the future of democracy and stability in Macedonia are contingent upon elections that are free of violence, intimidation, and inflammatory rhetoric.

In Angola, the Portuguese government played a central role in negotiating the end to several decades of bloody civil war, thereby helping to pave the way for a democratic peace. The signing of the Bicesse Peace Accords in May 1991[10] subsequently led to UN-supervised presidential and legislative elections in September 1992. The results

of the presidential election, which were generally considered free and fair, favored Eduardo dos Santos, the candidate of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). UNITA, the opposition party led by Jonas Savimbi, did not accept the results, and after a period of violent events, the civil war resumed with intensified brutality. After the failed elections, Portugal, exerted its influence in the UN Security Council, and pushed for creation of a team of observers to negotiate a peace accord and press for the respect of democratic values. The Troika of Observers of the Peace Process in Angola was intended to be the key mediating mechanism between the MPLA and UNITA. However, some critics argued that it was flawed because Portugal, together with Russia, was seen as biased in favor of the Angolan government. Nonetheless, the Troika maintained a unified stance behind the UN Special Representative, which helped keep the process on track.[11]

POLICY TOWARDS ENTRENCHED DICTATORSHIPS

Portugal has a fair record with regard to its relationship with entrenched dictatorships. It has joined EU statements condemning dictators not only within Europe, but throughout the world, though it has avoided imposing overarching sanctions on authoritarian regimes such as China and Cuba, and has, in fact, fostered relations with them through symbolic diplomatic visits and trade agreements. Portuguese officials would contend that maintaining diplomatic relations with these countries is more a sign of historical friendship than an approval of anti-democratic institutions.

Portugal has clearly spoken out in favor of ending the United States' economic embargo on Cuba, and has joined a coalition of other Ibero-American countries to support the annual UN General Assembly resolution against the embargo.[12] At the same time, while critical of Fidel Castro's dictatorship, these countries have done little to discourage the Cuban leader's anti-democratic policies. At the ninth Ibero-American summit in Cuba in 1999, Portuguese Prime Minister António Guterres phrased the trade-off in the following way: "Our position is very clear. We are always in favor of human rights, but do not believe that the best way to achieve this is with embargoes." In March 2000, then Portuguese Foreign Minister Gama criticized the decision of the U.S. Senate to allow the sale of food and medicine to Cuba for failing to be all-inclusive. He continued, "It's a small step in the right direction. Portugal's position is that the right solution would be an end to the embargo on Cuba."

The economic embargo against Iraq in 1990 constituted one of the most comprehensive sanctions regimes in the history of the UN. As a member of the UN Security Council, Portugal has endorsed targeted sanctions, which are intended to avoid harming innocent civilians. In a 1998 symposium on targeted sanctions, Ambassador António Monteiro, as Chairman of the 661 Committee, concluded that sanctions imposed on Iraq had a conversely bigger impact on the general population.[13] Under the Chairmanship of the Portuguese Ambassador, the Security Council has taken a broader look at the issue of sanctions and how to improve them. The Security Council has expressed a preference for targeted sanctions, and has proposed a reformulation of the guidelines used in determining when and how to apply them. In addition, the Security Council has proposed undertaking periodic assessments and adjustments of sanctions to ensure that they remain effective.

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[1] Neumayer, Eric. "Do Human Rights Matter in Bilateral Aid Allocation?: A quantitative analysis of 21 donor countries." http://www.1se.ac.uk/Depts/geography/21donors.pdf.

[2] DAC 2001: Review of the Development Co-operation Policies and Programs of Portugal. DCD/DAC/AR (2001) 2/16/PART2.

[3] The CPLP was formed in Lisbon on 17 July 1996. Its members are Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Portugal, and São Tome and Principe.

[4] United Nations. Troop and Other Personnel Contributions to Peacekeeping Operations: 2001.

[5] United Nations. Commission on Human Rights Archives of the 2001 Session. UN Resolution L.20 on Human Rights Violations in Burma. 19 April 2001.

[6] Two Portuguese NGOs—the Commission for the Rights of the Maubere People (CDPM) and the ecumenical group *Peace is Possible in East Timor*—decided to set up the East Timor Observatory. The aim of the Observatory is to monitor East Timor's transition process, as well as the negotiating process and its repercussions at the international level, and the developments in the situation inside the territory itself.

[7] Military personnel in East Timor are drawn mainly from Australia, Bangladesh, Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan, Portugal, South Korea, as well as Thailand.
[8] For more, see: http://www.cnn.com/ASIANOW/southeast/9909/13/e.timor.02.
[9] The Treaty of Amsterdam is the result of the Intergovernmental Conference launched at the Turin European Council on 29 March 1996. It was adopted at the Amsterdam European Council on 16-17 June 1997 and signed on 2 October 1997 by the Foreign Ministers of the fifteen Member States. It entered into force on 1 May 1999. Article VI states that a member-state can be suspended if heads of government decide that it is in 'serious and persistent breach' of the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law.
[10] Besides its dimension and geographic location, Angola is also one of the richest countries in Africa. Gold, diamonds and oil are amongst its natural resources and are a critical factor of the UNITA-MPLA conflict.
[11] Hare, Paul. The Role of the Troika in Angola. Paper presented at the Maputo Conference on "Time for Renewed International Commitment to Peace in Angola: Lesson Learned and Ways Forward." June 2000. http://www.dw.angonet.org/Peacebuilding/Activities/MaputoConferenceWorkingGroup.htm.
[12] In November 2001, for the tenth consecutive year, the UN General Assembly reiterated its call for an end to the economic embargo. 167 countries voted in favor to three against (Israel, Marshall Islands, United States Islands), with three abstentions (Latvia, Micronesia, Nicaragua).
[13] "Symposium on Targeted Sanctions." Speech by Ambassador António Monteiro, Permanent Representative of Portugal to the United Nations. New York, 7 December 1998.



Russia

Assessment: Poor
Trend: ⇔
Capital: Moscow
Type of Government: Federation
Chief of State: President Vladimir Vladimirovich PUTIN (acting president since 31 December 1999, president since 7 May 2000)
Minister of Foreign Affairs: Igor Sergeyevich Ivanov
Population: 145,470,197
Human Development Index Ranking: 60

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Russia has a **poor** record of democracy promotion as evidenced by its willingness to ignore manipulation of electoral processes, to disregard violations of basic democratic norms, and to support decidedly undemocratic political forces in neighboring countries. In international organizations, Russia has voted for resolutions condemning abuses of democracy in countries that are peripheral to its national interests. In the case of countries deemed of strategic importance (mostly former Soviet Republics), Russia abstained from taking a principled stand in support of democracy.

Overall, with the notable exception of the first few years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia has been, at best, indifferent to the cause of democracy promotion abroad. Considerable weakening of its international power and status led Moscow to develop ties with many authoritarian regimes that could contribute to its economic advancement or help it restore the vanished aura of a great power. As a result, Russia's initial interest in promoting democratic development in the rest of the world was quickly subordinated to the goal of reasserting itself in the international arena as a consequential actor.

FOREIGN RELATIONS BACKGROUND

In the first euphoric years following the early 1992 break-up of the Soviet Union, Moscow's foreign policy was closely aligned with the West. Government discourse was supportive of promoting democracy beyond Russia's borders. In the view of most analysts, this period lasted from 1991 to 1993-1994.[1] It was dominated by Russia's attempts to adapt to the new international environment by unquestionably accepting basic foreign policy precepts of the West and Moscow's discarding its former ideological allies in Asia and Africa. But Russia's early rhetorical commitment to democracy promotion was not matched by actual policy behavior. Russian involvement in the separatist-minded TransDniester region of Moldova and later in Georgia and elsewhere belied official statements. To the extent Russia did exhibit modest interest in democracy efforts internationally, prospects for meaningful action were all but eclipsed by the economic crisis engulfing the country. Russian diplomacy and foreign aid flows were both adversely affected.

Even before the issue of NATO enlargement caused friction in Russia's relations with the West, Moscow was becoming increasingly frustrated by U.S. and NATO actions that it viewed as seeking to take advantage of Russia's weakened international position. NATO's military campaign against Yugoslavia's Milosevic regime exacerbated tensions. Moscow adopted a more assertive, less cooperative stance toward the West and tried to reclaim some of its lost influence notwithstanding the constraints facing Yeltsin Administration decisionmakers. Moscow focused more of its attention on the post-Soviet republics (the so-called "near abroad") as rhetoric and the need for democracy promotion abroad was pushed to the recesses of foreign policy thinking.

President Vladimir Putin's ascendance to power in 2000 marked the beginning of the third period in Russia's relations with the outside world. So far, it has been characterized by Moscow's more cooperative stance in dealing with the US and Europe and emphasizes pragmatism, making Russia a more reliable partner.[2] Putin's pragmatic approach leaves little if any room for the country's engagement in democracy promotion

efforts abroad. Violations of democratic norms in a foreign country would hardly merit Russia's attention as long as its economic, security and other strategic interests were being served.

Lingering neo-imperial ambitions, continued economic limitations and a goal of reintegrating the post-Soviet space have also contributed to the disappearance of international democracy objectives from Moscow's foreign policy lexicon.

Russia's official foreign policy strategy, adopted in July 2000, proclaims that the country is "a great power... one of the most influential centers in the world... responsible for maintaining security in the world both on a global and regional level." Seeking to reclaim its lost influence on the international stage and eager to challenge U.S. hegemony, at least rhetorically, Russia demonstrated a readiness to cooperate with some of the world's most repressive regimes, including Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Cuba and Belarus.[3] Moscow hoped that increased exports of oil and natural gas, together with deals such as the $800 million contract with Iran to build a light-water nuclear reactor, would revive Russia's economic fortunes and thereby remove a major obstacle to reclaiming its rightful place among the great powers.

Notwithstanding Russia's precipitous decline, the country remained an influential actor in the former Soviet republics, where it continues to maintain a number of military bases. It holds regular joint military exercises with some of the Central Asian countries and supplies arms and equipment to them. Russia also remains a major trading partner of all of the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and a critical energy supplier to the Western New Independent States. In an attempt to jumpstart economic reintegration of the post-Soviet republics, Russia organized a Customs Union with Belarus and three of its Central Asian allies. In October of 2000 this Union was upgraded to a Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC) with Russia exercising veto power on all policy issues. Moldova and Ukraine are now official observers.

Finally, the Russian government consistently provided unequivocal support to Moscow-friendly ruling elites in the former Soviet republics, disregarding their tainted human rights record, glaring violations of the electoral process, and overall indifference to democratic norms and principles. This helped to legitimize local elites' undemocratic accumulation of power, a development openly condemned by many Western governments and institutions. Russia's political backing was especially consequential in those countries with a large ethnic Russian minority, such as Belarus and Ukraine.

Overall, Russian policies towards the post-Soviet states serves as a litmus test of Moscow's commitment to promoting democracy abroad, since this is the region where Russia continues to exercise its greatest influence. Putin left little doubt about the region's importance to Moscow, remarking in his 2002 State of the Nation address: "Cooperation with the CIS countries is Russia's main foreign policy priority."[4] For Russia, the hard logic of geopolitics, accentuated by its neo-imperial ambitions and traditional security concerns, has overridden any tangential interest in promoting democracy and human rights internationally.

RESPONSE TO OVERTHROW OF DEMOCRATICALLY-ELECTED GOVERNMENTS

Russia has generally condemned the takeover of democratically-elected governments, but took few if any steps to help restore democratic rule and almost always opposed or abstained from application of sanctions against the offending regime, particularly when security or economic interests were seen to be at stake.

Russia's reaction to the military coup in Pakistan is representative of Moscow's policy. Immediately after the overthrow of civilian government, the Russian Foreign Ministry issued a communiqué emphasizing its serious concern about developments in Pakistan.[5] The document expressed the hope that Pakistan "will manage to avoid excesses and that constitutional and democratic norms will be restored." In addition, Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov voiced his hope that Pakistani nuclear arms would remain under reliable control.

Two weeks after the coup in an interview with the state news agency Itar-TASS, Russian Deputy Foreign Ministry Grigory Karasin said that "Russia has taken up a rather reserved and watchful attitude toward Pakistan's new military regime of General Musharraf."[6] He added that the future "will depend on concrete political actions" by the new Pakistani authorities, specifically a willingness "clearly to define time parameters for a transfer of power to a democratically elected

government." The Russian government was also concerned about the broader security environment in South Asia. As Karasin noted, "the advent of military to power in Pakistan has qualitatively changed the picture in the subregion and brought on very many misgivings, which are well known." Following a series of high-level discussions between U.S. and Russian diplomats focusing on events in the sub-continent, the two sides issued a joint statement calling on the military authorities in Pakistan "to take decisive steps to return the country to civilian, democratic and constitutional government, including the announcement of timetable."[7]

Russia did not break diplomatic relations with Pakistan nor did it take any active measures to encourage democratic restoration. Karasin emphasized that it is in Russia's national interests "to ensure the existence of a belt of neutrally friendly states along the perimeter of our borders."[8] The character of the Pakistani regime ultimately was a secondary consideration to stability, particularly once the new military regime proved to be a relatively predictable partner.

RESPONSE TO MANIPULATION OF ELECTORAL PROCESSES

Over the past decade, Russian governments have proven unwilling to condemn any electoral malpractice, which helped pro-Russian political forces maintain power. Worse still, Russia has helped to organize monitoring missions to some of the former Soviet Republics, seemingly with the aim of providing legitimacy to rigged elections. These missions reached conclusions about the electoral process that were invariably opposite to the findings of Western monitors and the OSCE. The Russian leadership has often provided tacit and even explicit support during election campaigns to undemocratic forces in the neighboring countries. This was done largely out of fear that if democratic forces were to gain power, they would be more likely to pursue a pro-Western foreign policy.

In the case of parliamentary elections in neighboring Belarus in October 2000, the Russian Foreign Ministry ignored overwhelming evidence to the contrary and pronounced the pre-election environment in compliance with internationally recognized norms. It dismissed US criticisms of the election campaign as "gross interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state, which is incompatible with the obligations of the U.S.A. as a member country of the OSCE."[9]

The day after the election, the chair of the Russian Duma's CIS committee, Boris Pastukhov, a parliamentary observer, said the group did not witness any gross violations during balloting, though did note "a number of technical failures." Russia's official recognition of the Belarusian election was confirmed in a telephone conversation between the leaders of the two countries. President Putin congratulated President Lukashenko on "the successful holding of free and democratic parliamentary elections."[10] At the same time, categorical statements by the U.S. and OSCE, calling the elections neither free nor fair were dismissed by the Russian Foreign Ministry as indicating, "a politicized and biased approach aimed at justifying the policy of international isolation of Belarus."[11] In Moscow's view, individual reports of irregularities "should not cast doubt on the overall results of the elections."[12]

Moscow adopted a similar stance in Belarus' 2001 presidential elections. Moscow's staunch ally, Aleksandr Lukashenko, had already taken the necessary steps to ensure victory at the polls. With the announcement from the decidedly partisan Belarus Central Election Commission that the incumbent received over three-quarters of the vote, President Putin called his counterpart to congratulate him on being re-elected.[13] A number of prominent Russian government officials issued congratulatory statements, as did several parliamentarians.

Meanwhile, the head of the OSCE observer mission in Belarus, Hans-Georg Wieck, provided details of widespread violations.[14] The OSCE monitoring team also found that the opposition was not given an equal share of media time and highlighted the government's attempt to outmaneuver opponents by hindering voter registration and banning rallies.[15] The report concluded that the election "failed to meet the OSCE commitments for democratic elections and the Council of Europe standards."

In contrast, a senior official of the Russian Central Election Commission, who served as an observer, stated that "no one has any serious reasons to doubt the results of the Belarusian presidential election...no one can assert that the Belarusian election campaign does not comply with the current international standards," adding that these standards are "ambiguous and outdated."[16]

The Russian government's response to comparable manipulation in presidential and legislative elections in Kazakhstan followed a familiar pattern. In the run-up to the January 1999 presidential election, Russia expressed unequivocal support for the incumbent and authoritarian leader, Nursultan Nazarbaev. A month before the vote, Russian Foreign Minister Primakov visited Kazakhstan and, while emphasizing that elections are "internal affairs," declared that "Russia and the Russian leadership feel great empathy for [President] Nazarbaev."[17] Primakov made special mention of Nazarbaev's support for Russian policy regarding CIS integration. Preliminary results from the flawed election having been announced, Yeltsin called his Kazakhstani counterpart to offer enthusiastic congratulations, wholly indifferent to transgressions of basic democratic principles and practices.[18] The Speaker of the Upper House of the Russian Parliament also congratulated Nazarbaev on his "sweeping victory" and expressed the hope that his leadership will contribute to the "consolidation of Kazakhstan's fraternal relations with Russia."[19]

Not surprisingly, the OSCE monitoring team reached a very different conclusion about the elections. The team leader had fallen far short of the organization's standards, citing such violations as the electoral commission's refusal to register opposition candidates, intimidation of opposition groups, and biased media coverage in favor of the incumbent.[20]

The story was virtually the same in the 1999 parliamentary elections in Kazakhstan. Moscow turned a blind eye to pre-electoral developments, to say nothing of the general repressive nature of the Nazarbaev regime, which made a free and fair election a virtual impossibility. The Russian government cooperated with the Kazakhstani authorities in carrying out the arrest -- on highly suspect charges -- in Moscow of Kazakhstan's leading opposition figure, former Prime Minister Kazhegeldin, who was later released but barred from participating in the campaign, prompting his party to boycott the elections. OCSE cited this and other serious problems in criticizing the Kazakhstani government and concluded that it had not lived up to an explicit commitment to conduct elections consistent with international standards.[21] Predictably, the Russian government uttered not a critical word about the flawed electoral process.

In Ukraine, Moscow did not hesitate to make clear its unqualified support for President Kuchma in his re-election bid in the fall of 1999, notwithstanding mounting evidence of high-level corruption, an increasingly heavy hand politically, and campaign-related malpractice.[22]

The OSCE observer mission concluded that in both the first and second round of voting "the law was violated along with Ukraine's commitments to the OSCE with regard to democratic elections."[23] It cited "comprehensive interference" in the campaign from the state apparatus including pressure on the media. A representative of the Council of Europe stressed that "the presidential election in Ukraine can hardly be called a free and democratic one."[24] Another member of the delegation noted that "Ukraine is in breach of its obligations under international law to secure the right to free elections for its people."[25]

None of this seemed to bother the Yeltsin team. Once again, the Russian leader offered his congratulations to Kuchma following his victory, as the international community voiced concern about the Kuchma government's commitment to democratic rule.

PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRACY

Russia has been, at best, a reluctant participant in international efforts to promote democracy abroad. Due to the low priority Moscow attaches to such efforts, its comfortable relations with numerous authoritarian regimes, especially in the former Soviet Republics, and limited financial resources, Russia has shown little interest in taking part in or funding democracy-building efforts beyond its borders. In international fora, including the UN General Assembly and the Human Rights Commission, it has been cool to attempts to condemn the human rights records of individual countries. Russia has sought to enlist the support of the international community in instances where it felt that ethnic Russian minorities faced legal or other discrimination as in the Baltic countries.

Foreign assistance, much diminished since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, is closely tied to traditional conceptions of national interest grounded in economic and geo-strategic calculations. It is worth noting that Western aid to Russia, while

predominantly linked to economic reform in moving to a market system, did include a significant portion for democracy building programming.

Yeltsin's and now Putin's Kremlin proved unwilling to use its influence with non-democratic states such as North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Belarus and countries of Central Asia to push them towards greater openness and democratic reform.

Moscow's contribution to international democracy promotion has been limited to peacekeeping operations in the Balkans, which arguably has permitted fledgling democratic regimes to consolidate their authority.

POLICY TOWARDS ENTRENCHED DICTATORSHIPS

Russia has not shied away from active engagement with dictatorial regimes but rarely attempted to use its influence to try to leverage change in the direction of democratic rule. From Moscow's vantage point, the introduction of democracy in these societies might actually be contrary to Russia's interest given the cordial relations the Kremlin has established with many authoritarian governments. Russia appears to place little priority on the internal character of the countries with which it deals. There is no evidence to suggest that democracy and human rights are part of Moscow's policy dialogue with any of the authoritarian regimes with which it maintains relations. A relatively weak civil society also has not pressed the Russian government to elevate the importance assigned to fostering democracy around the world. When relations with authoritarian regimes have deteriorated, as in the case of Uzbekistan, it is almost always a function of diverging strategic interests and not concerns on the part of Russian decisionmakers about the absence of democratic rule and lack of respect for human rights.

Over the past ten years Belarus became Russia's closest ally among the former Soviet Republics. President Lukashenko, head of a Stalinist-type regime, went so far as to declare his support for reunification with the Russian Federation, prompting the December 1999 Treaty on Creating the Union. While many knowledgeable observers at the time were skeptical that union would ever come to pass, Moscow exhibited few qualms about the highly repressive nature of the Belarusian government under an increasingly autocratic Lukashenko. Neither the Yeltsin nor Putin government, which all but scuttled the idea of unification, communicated publicly any concerns about the deteriorating political situation in Belarus, a country where Russia exerts enormous influence. Nor did Moscow establish any ties with the democratic opposition forces in Belarus. This overall approach toward Belarus prevailed at a time when Belarusian activists, Western governments, the OSCE and other institutions fully documented and loudly criticized Lukashenko's repressive rule.

That Belarus has been a compliant geo-political and strategic ally is the principal reason Russia shows no interest in generating friction with the Lukashenko government over its democracy-related failings, even if Moscow were so inclined to raise such issues. It also used active military cooperation with Belarus in response to NATO's eastward enlargement. Economically, Belarus was Russia's second largest trading partner. Finally, Belarus plays an ever-greater role in servicing Russian energy export to Western Europe. Minsk proved to be a reliable and disciplined partner, an attractive option for new transit infrastructure investments.

Relations between Russia and Uzbekistan since 1992 have been marked by competition for the leadership role in Central Asia. That Russia made considerable progress in erecting a democratic society while Uzbekistan traded its communist past for an equally repressive post-independence system under President Islam Karimov has not had much impact on the quality of relations. The Karimov regime's harsh treatment of real and imagined Islamic radicals does not appear to trouble the Kremlin, which has waged its own bloody conflict against the would-be separatist and Muslim-majority Republic of Chechnya. The jointly perceived threat posed by Islamic radicals is the main reason for a recent upturn in bilateral relations.

As in Belarus, the Government of Uzbekistan has been the object of severe criticism from many corners of the international democratic community as well as from courageous non-governmental local actors. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that tensions between Tashkent and Moscow have been a function largely of Uzbekistan's insistence that it is the rightful leader in Central Asia. Re-establishing Russia's sphere of influence in Central Asia and not the internal character of the Uzbekistani regime is of

consequence to Moscow. Were Russia to alter its policy approach and give attention to democracy promotion in Uzbekistan or elsewhere in the trans-Caspian region, it is almost certain to be for instrumental reasons rather than any genuine commitment to expand freedom for the region's citizens.

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Senegal

Assessment: Good
Trend: ⇑
Capital: Dakar
Type of Government: Republic under multiparty rule
Chief of State: President Abdoulaye Wade
(since 1 April 2000)
Minister of Foreign Affairs: Cheikh Tidiane Gadio
Population: 10,284,929
Human Development Index Ranking 2002: 154

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Senegal has a **good** record of support for democracy abroad. It has aspired to be a model of democratic political stability in Africa and as such has been vocal in its support of democracy in international fora and often intervened in international conflicts to promote peace and democratic principles.

Since independence from France in 1960, Senegal has maintained an international reputation as a relatively stable country, despite its uneven process of political liberalization. However, it has often held back its support of democracy abroad when it has perceived involvement as contrary to its own national interest or over-arching foreign policy goals. It has taken care to maintain strong ties with France and the United States, as well as to support democracy and stability within Africa -- whenever these goals have not come into conflict with other foreign and security policy interests.

During the past ten years, Senegal has faced its own challenges to democracy. Like many other African countries, Senegal was moving slowly from one party rule to a multi-party system of government. Along the way, several of its elections were declared flawed by outside political observers. Senegal, therefore, did not have the moral authority to intervene effectively in cases of electoral irregularities in other countries. Nevertheless, President Diouf (1981-2000) oversaw the consolidation of democratic practice in Senegal, and under his leadership Senegal gradually underwent progressive political liberalization, culminating in an historic change of government with the election of opposition leader Abdoulaye Wade as President in March 2000.[1] Since then, Senegal has built on its democratic credentials and enhanced its moral authority to promote democracy abroad.

FOREIGN RELATIONS BACKGROUND

One of Senegal's primary foreign policy objectives is to maintain its close relationships with Western powers, particularly the United States and France. This policy has enabled it to enjoy political support and high levels of foreign aid from the West.[2] In turn, this has led to relative political and economic stability, which has enabled it to assume a high degree of leadership in the sub-region and among francophone countries in West Africa. It has been a priority for Senegal's leaders to guard the country's international image, maintain its geopolitical significance to Western powers and preserve its leadership position within the region. Another key foreign policy objective is to maintain domestic and regional security, particularly with regards to the separatist movement in the Casamance region.

Senegal's international reputation has allowed it greater influence on the international scene than its demographic and economic weight might otherwise merit.[3] Its leaders are often called upon to mediate in international disputes, especially where Western countries are at odds with other African states. Senegal belongs to several international and regional multilateral organizations, through which it maintains a high profile as an advocate for political moderation and democratic values. The country has been a mediator in many inter-African conflicts including the Western Sahara, Liberia and Madagascar, and has made important

contributions to the Organization of African Unity (OAU). It has also played a pioneering role in setting up regional economic bodies in West Africa, and has been one of the initiators of La Francophonie, an association of French-speaking nations that seeks to promote democratic values among its member states. It has played an active role at the UN and UNESCO and was elected to the UN Commission on Human Rights in 1997.

Senegal's approach to achieving its foreign policy objectives has been both regional and more broadly international. In pursuing its objectives, Senegal has relied on a broad range of tools and activities. It has worked to project a positive international image, implemented domestic policy and institutional reforms, utilized traditional tools of diplomacy, assisted in mediating regional disputes, and participated in election-monitoring and peace-keeping activities. By undertaking economic and political reforms, it has been able to maintain its special relationship with the West and its international stature as a leader in West Africa. Through its participation in international organizations such as the UN and ECOMOG, it has assisted with election monitoring and peacekeeping missions.

Senegal has pursued friendly diplomatic relations with neighboring states in its efforts to maintain domestic and regional security and its assistance has been sought in easing tensions in several areas within the region. Senegal successfully negotiated an easing of border tensions with neighboring Mauritania. As a result of the volatile situation in the Casamance region of the country, where separatists have taken up arms against the government, Senegal has worked especially hard to support and maintain close relations with governments in Gambia and Guinea-Bissau. Senegal has intervened militarily in Guinea-Bissau to fortify an elected government threatened with a military takeover.

RESPONSE TO OVERTHROW OF DEMOCRATICALLY-ELECTED GOVERNMENTS

Senegal has condemned the overthrow of democratically-elected governments when doing so has coincided with its own national security and political interests. It also has a solid record of joining international diplomatic efforts to resolve such crises through mediation.

The 1999 overthrow of President Konan Bedie of Cote d'Ivoire was a shock for the region, and for the francophone countries in particular. Senegal's then-President Diouf appealed for a swift return to 'constitutional order.' For many years, Senegal and Cote d'Ivoire had been seen as francophone West Africa's two most stable states. The parallels in their circumstances went further. Both Bedie and Diouf faced elections in the coming year, and both had been accused of electoral manipulation in the past. It was in Diouf's interest, therefore, to condemn the coup in Cote d'Ivoire to help deter a similar fate for his own government. Indeed, the coup in Cote d'Ivoire may have accelerated Senegal's transition to greater democracy by encouraging Diouf to hold freer and fairer elections.

Senegal's policy toward coups in neighboring Guinea-Bissau has been influenced largely by its proximity to the unstable region of Casamance. For many years, Senegal protested that Guinea-Bissau was providing arms to the Casamance separatists in support of their fight against the Senegalese government. In 1998, Guinea-Bissau President Joao Vieira accused his army commander, General Mane, of allowing weapons to be smuggled to rebels in Senegal, and dismissed him. This triggered a mutiny in the army that led to a civil war in Guinea-Bissau. Senegal intervened militarily to prop up Vieira's government. After another coup, followed by two rounds of transparent presidential elections, Senegalese President Wade appealed for international aid for its struggling neighbor.

RESPONSE TO MANIPULATION OF ELECTORAL PROCESSES

During the Diouf era, Senegal had its own record of allegations of manipulation of electoral processes, and therefore did not have the moral standing to criticize other governments such as Zambia, Nigeria and Cote d'Ivoire. However, after the free and fair elections that brought President Wade into power, the government has been more willing to respond to such situations.

A clear opportunity arose with the 2002 elections in Zimbabwe. The presidents of Senegal and Ghana categorically condemned the manipulation of the elections in Zimbabwe, while the presidents of Nigeria and South Africa were perceived to be more sympathetic to President Mugabe. President Wade said he did not "consider the norms of the election democratic." The Zimbabwe case has become a litmus test for Senegal's Western allies, and Senegal was keen to show solidarity with the West, especially since there

was so little at stake, given the distance and relative insignificance of Zimbabwe to Senegalese domestic political interests. As a government which had long been in opposition, and which finally had come to power as a result of free and fair elections, Senegal was more inclined to go to some length to defend that principle.

Senegal played an important role in mediating the crisis in Madagascar following disputed elections in December 2001. The incumbent Didier Ratsiraka had sought refuge in France, while challenger Marc Ravalomanana had taken over the presidency. The peace-making role played by President Wade may have contributed to averting a civil war in that country.

PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRACY

Senegal's record of support for democracy internationally has been good. It has been a model of political stability for the region and has often intervened in international conflicts to promote peace and democratic ideals. However, there have been instances where the government has put short-term political considerations and the national interest ahead of the promotion of democracy.

Senegal has a solid voting record on pro-democracy resolutions in international fora. This is because Senegal has sought to maintain its prestige and international image as a promoter of democracy, and thereby earn the continued favor of Western donor governments. Senegal's capacity to support the democracy agenda in the international arena is considerable. Senegal is an active and valued member of many multinational organizations including the United Nations, La Francophonie, ECOWAS and the OAU/AU. Working in these fora, Senegal has been a leading voice for moderation and support of democracy. Senegal took a strong position in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks against the United States, and in October 2001 hosted an African anti-terrorism summit, which established an African Pact against Terrorism. Senegal is also an active participant in UN peacekeeping operations, and was the only African country to participate in the Gulf War against Iraq. Senegal's President Wade is currently the chairman of ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) and UEMOA (the West African Monetary and Economic Union).

A recent African initiative, in which President Wade is playing a leading role, is the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). It aims to promote African development through investments and assistance from richer countries, in return for commitments on democracy and good governance. Progress toward specific benchmarks would be evaluated through a 'peer review' mechanism described by Nigeria's President Olesegun Obesanjo as "a way for the enlightened leaders of Africa to put pressure on the old school to change their ways."

Senegal was elected to the UN Commission on Human Rights in 1997. In 2000, Senegal hosted a conference on war crimes that was jointly chaired by then-President, Diouf and the European Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid, Emma Bonino. This conference was part of the preparation for establishing the International Criminal Tribunal that was inaugurated in 2002.

However, when it came to assisting efforts to prosecute former Chadian dictator Hissene Habre, Senegal failed to meet its international obligations to protect human rights. Habré, who is reputed to have amassed a fortune from the Chadian treasury before fleeing the country, came to live in exile in Senegal, where he had considerable influence. Thus, when he was indicted two years ago on charges of torture and crimes against humanity, the Senegalese courts ruled that he could not be tried there. Human rights groups insisted, however, that Senegal had jurisdiction to try Habré as it is a party to all the relevant international treaties on human rights abuse and torture. Moreover, a Human Rights Watch report criticized President Wade for transferring one judge and promoting another in an effort to interfere with the verdict on Senegal's jurisdiction to try the case. Ultimately, following intense criticism, Wade first ordered Habré to leave Senegal, and then agreed to extradite him to a country that would be able and willing to try him -- but only after a personal appeal by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan.

POLICY TOWARDS ENTRENCHED DICTATORSHIPS

Senegal has maintained relations with dictatorships in a number of countries. In these cases, Senegal has again allowed its strategic national interests, or domestic political concerns, to supersede its commitment to the promotion of democracy. For example, Nigeria's economic domination of the region, resulting from its oil wealth, has made it difficult for smaller countries in the region, including Senegal, to condemn military governments there. In addition, when regional rebellions and civil wars have threatened to destabilize other countries in the

West African region, Nigeria has footed much of the bill for peacekeeping by the West African peacekeeping force, ECOMOG. Senegal has thus remained mute in the face of severe abuse of human rights in Nigeria under Abacha.

Senegal also strives to maintain good relations with Mauritania, her neighbor to the North, led by President Maaouiya Ould Taya, a military dictator-turned civilian president who has governed since 1984. President Taya's repressive regime limits freedom of expression and is accused of many other human rights abuses. Senegal's relations with Mauritania have long been very strained. Relations deteriorated sharply in 1989 following the killing of hundreds of Senegalese residents in Mauritania and the expulsion of several thousands more. A border war erupted the following year and diplomatic relations were suspended until 1992. More recently, tensions over water rights between the two countries have been eased through diplomacy. In order to avoid another eruption of the conflict (and, perhaps, also to prevent the Mauritanian government from supporting the Casamance separatists), President Wade sees the maintenance of friendly relations with Mauritania as a top foreign relations priority. He has therefore refrained from criticizing President Taya's oppressive policies and even paid a visit there in May 2002. During that visit, opposition groups delivered an open letter accusing Ould Taya of presiding over a political dictatorship, silencing his critics and censoring the media. Yet, President Wade declined to criticize his host and emphasized instead the need for closer ties between Senegal and Mauritania.

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[1]Fatton Jr., Robert. Predatory Rule: State and Civil Society in Africa. Lynne Rienner, 1992.

[2] Diamond, Larry, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds. Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy. Lynne Rienner, 1995, p. 523. According to Coulon, Senegal receives about three times the average for sub-Saharan Africa.

[3] Ibid.

South Africa

Assessment: Fair
Trend: ⇔
Capital: Pretoria
Type of Government: Republic
Head of Government: President Thabo Mbeki (since 16 June 1999)
Minister of Foreign Affairs: Nkosazana Clarice Dlamini-Zuma
Population: 43,586,097
Human Development Index Ranking 2002: 107

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

South Africa has a **fair** record of democracy promotion abroad, exemplified by its role in building norms of democracy in southern Africa, helping to forge a budding Africa-wide regime of good governance, and supporting some pro-democracy and human rights resolutions in international arenas. This record, however, has been sullied by South Africa's equivocation over democratic abuses in Zimbabwe and by its continued alliances with authoritarian regimes in Cuba, China, and Libya. In promoting democracy, South Africa has worked primarily through regional organizations such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU – now the African Union (AU), as well as through international organization such as the Commonwealth and the UN. South Africa views these organizations as a source of collective leverage for promoting democratic values abroad. Increasingly, South Africa has also used the SADC and the AU to take policy stances it is unwilling to take unilaterally or bilaterally.

This mixed record with regard to the promotion of democracy abroad stems from tension between South Africa's desire to be the beacon of democracy in Africa, and its limited leverage in influencing the course of democracy outside its borders. In addition, South African policymakers have continually tried to balance competing domestic demands from advocates of a foreign policy that focuses on adherence to democratic principles abroad, and those that favor a pragmatic policy aimed at sustaining South Africa's external alliances and economic interests. Although the ideals of democracy will continue to inform South Africa's domestic politics, translating them into consistent foreign policy positions will remain a major challenge for the government.

FOREIGN RELATIONS BACKGROUND

Since South Africa's multiracial democratic transition of 1994, the government led by the African National Congress (ANC) has embraced democracy as a central tenet of its foreign policy in the belief that foreign relations must mirror its deep commitment to the consolidation of a democratic South Africa. Although South Africa's negotiated settlement became the recipe for democratization and informed its foreign policy in Africa, the ANC also recognized that promoting democracy would, in some instances, undercut its adherence to the principles of territorial sovereignty and Pan-African solidarity.[1] The challenge for policymakers then became how to reduce the tension between the goals of democracy promotion and the long-standing principles governing Africa's interstate relations.

Conscious of the limits to its capacity to act unilaterally, Pretoria chose to work creatively within recognized regional and international fora. In southern Africa, the centerpiece of this policy was utilizing the reinvigorated structures of the SADC. In renouncing regional hegemonic ambitions, South Africa has drawn its neighbors into economic and security interactions based on partnership and interdependence. Apart from its economic components, the SADC created an Organ on Politics, Defense, and Security in 1997 to promote

regional security, the rule of law and democratic governance. From the outset, Pretoria also helped to define the founding principles of regional cooperation, including democracy as a core value.

Outside of southern Africa, South Africa pursued democracy promotion objectives primarily in the OAU-AU and the Commonwealth. Using diplomatic tools to promote democracy, South Africa has taken a leadership role in attempts to enshrine the values of accountability, transparency, and democracy in the new structures of the AU under the organizational rubric of the "African Renaissance." Likewise, the Commonwealth has afforded South Africa leverage to articulate new principles that advance human rights and democracy.

The global democratization trend has been the larger strategic context in which South Africa has pursued its foreign policy objectives. In addition to its successful domestic transition, South Africa has seized the opportunity of global changes to advance democratization in Africa. At the core of foreign policy decision-making are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the presidency. These institutions respond to wider pressures from civil society, trade unions, and business organizations. An equally significant factor in the foreign policy domain has been the change in presidential leadership from Nelson Mandela to Thabo Mbeki. Mandela's moral stature allowed him to adopt a more activist human rights agenda and endowed South African foreign policy with wider legitimacy. Although President Mbeki maintains a commitment to the norms of good governance and democracy, he has accorded human rights a secondary emphasis in South Africa's foreign policy.[2]

RESPONSE TO THE OVERTHROW OF DEMOCRATICALLY-ELECTED GOVERNMENTS

South Africa has condemned the overthrow of democratically-elected governments in Africa and has participated actively in diplomatic and military efforts to isolate regimes that seize power by force in southern Africa. South Africa's intervention in Lesotho following attempts to reverse democratic gains in 1994 and 1998 established the pattern of balancing diplomatic and military means for democracy promotion. Working within the multilateral framework of the SADC, South Africa mediated Lesotho's return to constitutional rule in 1994. When civil violence perpetrated by opposition groups resurfaced in 1998, South Africa collaborated with Botswana on a military intervention to shore up the elected government. After preventing the collapse of the government, South Africa and Botswana maintained a military presence in Lesotho until the elections of May 2002. They also assisted in creating more equitable electoral rules for the future.

The policy instruments in the Lesotho case varied from the extremes of diplomatic pressure to military intervention. In the initial phase of the conflict, South Africa was reluctant to take a hard-line stance against the Lesotho military because of its apartheid-era history of regional intervention. By opting for collective mediation, South Africa initiated a new era of diplomatic engagement with its neighbors in defense of democracy. When South Africa intervened militarily in 1998, the conflict had escalated to the point where Pretoria felt it could not stand aloof. Throughout the Lesotho intervention, South Africa contended that it was inspired by the SADC principles of responding to a neighbor facing threats to its democracy.[3]

Outside southern Africa, South Africa condemned the coup that led to the overthrow of democracy in Cote d'Ivoire in December 1999. When the military junta refused to relinquish power, South Africa joined a ten-nation OAU committee that sought to increase diplomatic pressure on the military to give up power. In October 2000, the committee met with all major actors in the conflict and demanded the resignation of the military and the formation of an inclusive government to organize elections.[4] However, in contrast to Cote d'Ivoire, there is no record of a South African position on the coup that overthrew a democratic regime in Niger in April 1999.

South Africa's response to the events in Cote d'Ivoire reflects its interest in playing a leadership role in Africa's quest for democratization and anti-militarism. For this reason, South Africa closely coordinated its policy on Cote d'Ivoire with Nigeria's Olusegun Obasanjo. As leading proponents of Africa's political and economic regeneration, Obasanjo and Mbeki saw mediation of the crisis in Cote d'Ivoire as an essential component in these efforts.

RESPONSE TO THE MANIPULATION OF ELECTORAL PROCESSES

South Africa has a poor record of responding to electoral manipulations abroad. Despite a rhetorical commitment to democratization, Pretoria has been slow to condemn egregious violations of democratic norms by foreign

governments. In addition, although South Africa has been active in sending election observers to African countries -- either independently or through the SADC -- it rarely censures pre-election manipulations abroad.

Pretoria's approach to electoral abuses in Zimbabwe in 2001 and 2002 illustrates this record. Prior to the parliamentary elections in June 2001, South Africa and SADC sent observers to monitor the polls, but remained largely silent in the face of the electoral violence and intimidation perpetrated by the Mugabe government. In the run-up to the presidential elections in March 2002, President Mbeki made veiled references to the dangers of a flawed election in Zimbabwe. Similarly, a task force made up of South Africa, Malawi, and Mozambique chastised Mugabe in September 2001 for the deterioration of the rule of law and the rise in political instability. Nonetheless, South Africa and SADC remained implacably opposed to the economic sanctions advocated by a growing domestic constituency and Western countries.[5]

South African and SADC election monitors went to Zimbabwe amidst Mugabe's introduction of draconian legislation that curbed the role of the media, restricted the campaigns of the leading opposition party, and disenfranchised a large part of the population. On the eve of the elections, Mbeki reiterated that South Africa and her neighbors would continue to do everything possible "to contribute to the victory of the struggle for a democratic, peaceful and prosperous Zimbabwe."[6] But this constructive diplomatic engagement did not prevent Mugabe from stealing the elections. More critically, after Mugabe's triumph, the SADC described the elections as "substantially free and fair."[7] In the same vein, the South African observer team endorsed this position, blaming the long lines of voters unable to vote on "administrative oversight."[8] It was only through pressure from his Commonwealth colleagues that Mbeki conceded to the one-year suspension of Zimbabwe from the organization. Subsequently, South Africa and Nigeria embarked on a new course to mediate between Mugabe and the opposition for a government of national unity, but Mugabe's recalcitrance and the opposition's demands for a new vote under international supervision have doomed these efforts.[9]

South Africa took a low-key approach in response to the 2000 Zambian constitutional crisis occasioned by former President Fredrick Chiluba's bid to change the constitution so that he could stand for a third consecutive term. Chiluba was forced to abandon this plan following a nationwide outcry and a serious split within his own party, the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD). The SADC sent election observers to the December 2001 elections in which Chiluba's successor, Levy Mwanawasa, won a narrow victory. But while opposition parties claimed that massive fraud and ballot rigging swayed the result, SADC and local observers were unable to provide any specific evidence of wrongdoing except to note that the elections were not conducted efficiently and successfully.[10]

In dealing with Zimbabwe and Zambia, South Africa primarily used diplomatic tools within the structures of the SADC and the Commonwealth, underscoring its preference for multilateral, rather than unilateral and bilateral, influence. Although civil society groups and opposition parties demanded more forceful action, particularly regarding Zimbabwe, and Mbeki himself gave interviews to foreign agencies criticizing the Mugabe government, South African policymakers deferred to the SADC task force on Zimbabwe. In the end, South Africa effectively squandered the opportunity to influence the electoral outcomes and seriously undermined its own efforts to project an image of a new Africa committed to improving respect for democracy and human rights. Further, in opposing demands for economic sanctions, South Africa, in part, emboldened the Mugabe regime, which has continued to consolidate its control and persecute political opponents.

PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRACY

South Africa has a good record of support for international democracy promotion, particularly in African organizations where it has influence. However, its voting record in defense of democracy and human rights in international institutions is riddled with inconsistencies.

Since 1994, South Africa has played an important role in efforts to integrate democracy promotion in the structures of African organizations. For example, during the OAU summit in July 1997, Mandela was instrumental in pushing for a strong OAU declaration in favor of democracy throughout Africa. At the Algiers summit of the OAU in 2000, President Mbeki actively supported the resolution that denounced coups and barred military leaders from future summits.[11] On the international level, South Africa has played a leading role in shaping the Community of Democracies, an intergovernmental association of established and emerging democracies

dedicated to promoting democracy.

In southern Africa, despite treading carefully to avoid the impression of hegemony, South Africa has used both governmental and non-governmental institutions as vehicles for a public discourse on democracy. These institutions have been the fulcrum for experiments with democracy building and tools for inculcating the values and practices of democratic governance. For example, South Africa has used institutions such as SADC's Parliamentary Forum and SADC's Electoral Commission Forum to underscore the importance of democracy for political stability.[12]

South Africa has also supported efforts designed to transform the Commonwealth into an institution that respects human rights, adheres to the rule of law, and shuns military regimes. Since 1995, these efforts have led to the Commonwealth policy of suspending the memberships of military dictatorships and to the emergence of the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG) as the core actor in policing human rights codes and the rights of political opposition. During the Commonwealth Heads of State meetings in Edinburgh in 1997 and Durban in 1999, South Africa was part of the group that expanded the mandate of the CMAG from dealing not just with military coups, but also with the protection and promotion of democracy.

POLICY TOWARD ENTRENCHED DICTATORSHIPS

South Africa has pursued pragmatic policies toward most entrenched dictatorships, opting to maintain economic and diplomatic links with them and failing to criticize their domestic policies. The only exception to this rule was Mandela's policy toward the Nigerian dictatorship of Sani Abacha. Although South Africa initially engaged the Abacha government in intense dialogue as a means of returning Nigeria to democracy, it later reversed this position and spearheaded diplomatic efforts to isolate the military government within the Commonwealth. These initiatives gathered momentum when Abacha, in defiance of world opinion, executed the leader of the marginalized Ogoni people, Ken Saro-Wiwa. Following Saro-Wiwa's death, Mandela rallied the Commonwealth to impose punitive economic sanctions and to expel Nigeria from the Commonwealth in 1995. South Africa also temporarily recalled its envoy from Lagos and withdrew an invitation to Nigeria to participate in a football tournament in Johannesburg. As a member of the CMAG, South Africa exerted diplomatic pressure on the government to move to release political prisoners and launch a genuine transition program. After Abacha's death in 1998, both Mandela and Mbeki played critical diplomatic roles in nudging the military to introduce democratic elections, release political prisoners, and recognize political parties.[13] In UN General Assembly votes regarding the human rights situation in Nigeria between 1995 and 1997, South Africa voted with countries that favored strong condemnation of the military regime.

Many entrenched dictatorships, including China, Cuba, Iraq, and Libya, were staunch supporters of the exiled-ANC in its struggle against apartheid. Despite pressure from opposition parties and civil society, the ANC government has shown reluctance to isolate these regimes either through soft measures such as condemnation of human rights abuses, or harsher ones such as economic sanctions or military blockades. The warm relations Pretoria maintains with most of these regimes exemplifies the deficit in South African promotion of democracy abroad.

For instance, Mandela employed quiet diplomacy towards Libya, a policy that its proponents credit with unlocking the impasse over Lockerbie when South Africa mediated the handing over of two suspects in the bombing to the Scottish courts for trial in 1999. Similarly, Mandela embraced Cuba, charging decades of victimization of the Fidel Castro regime by the United States. Furthermore, one of Mandela's first acts as president was to establish formal relations with Cuba, and, since 1994, South Africa has consistently voted against all UN General Assembly resolutions condemning human rights violations in Cuba.

South Africa established its immediate post-apartheid policy on China by severing diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Since then, with the expansion of trade relations, South Africa has been cautious in responding to human rights violations in China. Both Mandela and Mbeki have pursued pragmatic economic and cultural links; in addition, South Africa has abstained from key votes in international organizations that specifically condemn China's record on human rights.

Equally significant, despite voting for UN General Assembly reports condemning human rights violations in Sudan between 1994 and 1999, South Africa has been less willing to stand up against the Khartoum government in Africa. Instead it has supported regional peace efforts to find a settlement

to the civil war.

Given its limited influence in international institutions, South Africa's policy toward entrenched dictatorships is not surprising. Its ambivalent voting record on human rights and democracy protocols largely reflects the domestic tensions between policymakers who defend South Africa's Third World, nationalist, and non-aligned status and those who regard South Africa as a model of universal democratic values in Africa. For the most part, the policy on dictatorships represents the continuity of South Africa's non-aligned posture. On the other hand, defenders of the 'universal values' position decry South Africa's fence-sitting policies on dictatorships, preferring instead, policies that are more in tune with the new South Africa. Resolving these conflicts will be a major test for the future credibility of South Africa's democracy promotion policies.

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Spain

Assessment: Good
Trend: ⇑
Capital: Madrid
Type of Government: Parliamentary Monarchy
Head of Government: President Jose Maria Aznar (since 5 May 1996)
Minister of Foreign Affairs: Ana Palacio
Population: 40,037,995
Human Development Index Ranking: 21

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Spain has a **good** record of support for democracy abroad, as evidenced by its willingness to condemn non-democratic regimes, its support of election monitoring efforts, and its active participation in numerous international democratic fora. The Spanish Government has become a strong supporter of democracy within the EU's emerging common foreign policy, an organization within which Spain plays a prominent role. In recent years, Spain has begun to broaden its foreign policy focus beyond neighboring countries and traditional Latin American allies, to include the development of new ties to non-democratic regimes in Asia and the Middle East.

FOREIGN RELATIONS BACKGROUND

Since emerging in the late 1970's from the relative international isolation that endured under the dictatorship of General Franco,[1] Spain has become an active player in the international system. In the last decade, Spain's foreign policy has focused on the promotion and support of democracy and human rights, and it has condemned political regimes that deny citizens' freedom.[2] According to former Foreign Minister José Piqué, "the role that we have ahead is not easy, but efforts must continue without hesitance in order to achieve democracy, development and human rights."[3]

Spain's key foreign policy objectives are centered on promoting its national interests within Europe and specifically within the European Union (EU), maintaining close ties with Latin America, and sustaining its important bilateral relationships with France, Portugal, and Morocco. The Aznar Government has signaled that increasing Spain's profile and influence in the Asia-Pacific region will be a key foreign policy priority over the coming years, and a strategic plan has been formulated to coordinate these efforts.

Spain is the EU's fifth largest country in terms of both economic size and population, and as such it has played an increasingly prominent role in EU policy debates. In its early years of EU membership, Spain focused on promoting and defending the interests of the "southern" EU states, but its outlook has broadened in recent years. As its political and economic status and influence have grown, Spain has declared its desire to be considered a major actor within the EU, a position currently held by Germany, the UK, France and Italy. Spain held the EU's rotating Presidency from 1 January until 30 June 2002, during which time it emphasized such themes as promoting freedom, security, and justice on the continent,[4] as well as "consolidat[ing] the European Union's weight, visibility and credibility" at the international level.[5]

Spain's presidency of the EU coincided with a worsening of the conflict in the Middle East. Spain called for the revitalization of the Barcelona Process of mediation between the parties to foster collaboration and dialogue in the region. The Barcelona Process, adopted in 1995 at a conference of EU and Mediterranean Foreign Ministers, calls for extended multilateral and bilateral cooperation based on exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity.

Spain's close relationship with Latin America is based on its history as a colonial power, a common culture, language and religion, and in more recent years, by increasingly strong trade and investment ties. It

has sought to improve its relations with Latin America through the annual Ibero-American Summit, which aims to identify trade and investment opportunities, and to promote dialogue on issues such as human rights. Spain also played a major role in planning the inaugural EU/Latin America and Caribbean Summit held in Rio de Janeiro in July 1999. At the second such summit in Madrid in May 2002, European Union, Latin American and Caribbean leaders confirmed their commitment to reinforce democratic institutions and the rule of law throughout the region and particularly in Haiti.

Spain joined NATO in 1982, but its early years of membership were marked by controversy over its appropriate role within the organization and its claims of sovereignty over Gibraltar. With the appointment of a Spaniard, Javier Solana, as Secretary-General of NATO from 1995 to 1999, and the country's full integration into the NATO military command during 1998, Spain now plays a more active role in military activities sponsored by the Atlantic alliance.

RESPONSE TO OVERTHROW OF DEMOCRATICALLY-ELECTED GOVERNMENTS

Spain has strongly condemned military coups and the overthrows of democratically-elected governments. In doing so, it has generally acted under the auspices of the European Union, which during the 1990s became progressively more active in promoting democracy and strengthening good governance. Spain supported the EU declaration regarding the coup in Cote d'Ivoire in 1999, which voiced great concern about the situation and called for an immediate restoration of the democratic government. When Fiji (after the George Speight coup of June 2000) announced its intention to hold elections in 2001, Spain joined the EU in declaring its support for the restoration of democracy and efforts to reconcile Fijian society. In addition to rhetorical criticisms of interruptions of democratic rule, Spain has, on various occasions, broken off relations with countries that have overthrown democratically elected governments. In its response to the 1996 crisis in Niger, for example, Spain joined the EU in terminating cooperation with the country for six months.

Spain also has been willing to respond unilaterally to interruptions of democratic norms, as it did following Alberto Fujimori's *autogolpe (self coup)* in Peru in 1992. The Spanish government expressed its concern that the action would contribute to a worsening of the political situation in Peru, and then used its significant influence in the country to secure the release of a Peruvian journalist, who had been picked up for questioning shortly after the coup.[6] Similarly, in response to the coup d'etat orchestrated by a coalition of indigenous and military forces in Ecuador in 2000, the Spanish Foreign Ministry issued a communiqué that called on Ecuadorian leaders to resolve the crisis within a constitutional framework and with respect for the rule of law.

However, unlike virtually every other Latin American country, Spain refrained from explicitly condemning the attempted efforts to remove Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez from office in April 2002. Immediately following Chavez's forced resignation, Foreign Minister Josep Pique suggested that, considering the political and economic crises facing Venezuela, Chavez's position as president was unsustainable. While the government voiced its concern over the violence associated with the situation, and stated their support for the normalization of democracy, they did so in the form of a joint declaration issued with the United States, which had also refrained from characterizing the events as a coup d'etat. In the weeks afterwards, the Spanish government and the EU repeatedly called for respect for and a return to constitutional procedures, and supported the OAS handling of the crisis, though their failure to defend democracy more assertively was criticized by some opposition parties.

RESPONSE TO MANIPULATION OF ELECTORAL PROCESSES

Spain has condemned attempts to manipulate electoral laws and processes by foreign governments, and has supported election monitoring efforts directly and in cooperation with other actors.[7] The government publicly condemned the attempts of the governments of the former Yugoslavia (1996) and Nigeria (1998) to uphold the results of what Spain deemed to be flawed elections. The Spanish Government also helped monitor and report elections results in Algeria in 1997 and Cambodia in 2002. In both cases, Spanish observers concurred with the findings of other monitoring agents in finding few irregularities with the vote on the election day itself. While Spain viewed the 1997 Algerian parliamentary elections as a sign of the progress

the country was making in the reform process, their reserved response to events leading up to the elections can in part be attributed to Spain's important commercial interests in the country. Less than two months before the 1997 elections, the Spanish government expelled the spokesman for Algeria's banned Islamic Salvation Front, who was there to promote a new, democratic image for his party, for making public comments that conflicted with Spain's pragmatic engagement with the Algerian government.[8]

PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRACY

A primary goal of Spanish foreign policy is to promote democracy throughout the world, and it does so through a variety of means. In addition to frequently speaking out in support of democracy abroad, Spain has rapidly become one of the most important foreign aid donors in the international system (in 1999 it was ranked as the 12th largest donor country).[9] More specifically, a significant percentage of Spain's foreign assistance budget is devoted to democracy strengthening programs. Furthermore, Spain participates in international democracy fora and possesses a good record of ratifying international protocols and agreements that deal with respect for human rights and democratic values, including the Warsaw Declaration. Spain is also the eighth largest financial contributor to the United Nations, and currently has peacekeeping forces attached to the UN in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Central America; it also made a small contribution to the UN transitional administration (UNTAET) in East Timor.

In recent years, the Spanish government has focused its efforts on strengthening democratic institutions in Latin America and Asia, as well as in those countries in Europe that are applying for membership in the EU. Indeed, it has designated a sizable portion of its foreign assistance budget to these countries.

Spain has also become active in Africa, where the basic objectives of its foreign policy are to support the consolidation of democracy and to promote good governance. Spain has pursued these objectives by assisting in the establishment of independent national electoral commissions and supplying electoral observers, as well as by contributing to training and technical assistance programs. On the other hand, it is important to mention that in some specific cases, Spain has been inconsistent in its role as a defender of democracy in Africa, and has allowed its economic interests to take precedence over its concern for adherence to democratic principles or the protection of human rights. For example, in September 1996, then Spanish Foreign Minister Matutes visited Algeria on a trade promotion mission (Algeria was a principal trading partner in the North African region at that point in time 250.000 million pesetas per year), but is not known to have pressed the government on issues of democracy and human rights. Furthermore, in May 1998, at the second round of the Hispanic-Tunisian Summit, Spain focused solely on increasing their investments in the region, and President Aznar did not even mention the human rights violations that were taking place in the country.

POLICY TOWARDS ENTRENCHED DICTATORSHIPS

Over the past decade, the Spanish Government has supported pro-democracy actors in entrenched dictatorships and voted in favor of international resolutions that impose political or economic sanctions on such regimes, particularly those issued by the EU. The Spanish Government has also adopted policies of non-cooperation with non-democratic regimes, as in the case of Iraq, though recently it consented to allow humanitarian aid to enter that country.

Within Europe, Spain has joined multilateral military efforts to remove dictatorial regimes from power. President Aznar was a firm supporter of NATO's military actions against Serbia during the first half of 1999, and a small number of Spanish military aircraft took part in the NATO air attacks. Furthermore, Spain accepted over 1,000 Kosovar refugees, and later contributed a modest military contingent to the post-conflict settlement force in Kosovo (KFOR). Spain also maintains a substantial peacekeeping representation in Bosnia (682 soldiers) through Agrupación Táctica española (SPAGT XVIII), which has been located in the south of the former Yugoslavia since May 2002.

Despite pressure from the United States, Spain maintains strong relations with Cuba, though increasingly President Aznar has pursued a two-track policy of protecting Spain's economic interests on the island while speaking out publicly in favor of democratic reforms.[10] Overall, three important issues have shaped the Spanish-Cuban

relationship. First, Spain's historical colonial relationship with Cuba created strong cultural bonds. Second, the Spanish government has long believed that it was important to engage rather than isolate Castro whenever possible as the most viable way to promote democratic reform. Thus, Spanish foreign policy took a soft approach towards the Cuban government by making overtures about democracy but failed to follow-up with specific action. Spain even pushed for Cuba to be allowed to participate in the 1994 Summit of the Americas in Miami, despite objections by various countries that did not have official diplomatic relations with it.[11] Third, strong financial and trade ties have developed between the two countries as, beginning in the 1990s, Spain actively began to support Cuban economic reforms. By 1996, Spanish products controlled 15 percent of the market (second only to Portugal and more than Latin America or the EU). Spanish companies were the third largest investors in the country (after Mexico and Canada), and dominated the tourist industry.

Spain's efforts to promote economic relations with Cuba while simultaneously advocating improved respect for human rights have not been without conflict. In 1998 Aznar arranged for the first visit to the island by Spain's King, Juan Carlos I, since Castro came to power. King Carlos's visit was primarily for the purpose of attending the annual Ibero-American Summit, which coincidentally was being held in Havana that year, but he also used the occasion to speak out against human rights abuses on the island. Cuba's application for full membership in the new EU-ACP agreement in 2000 was strongly supported by then Spanish Foreign Minister Matutes, who argued that it would provide an institutional framework with Havana that could serve to contribute to economic, political, and social changes on the island. This agreement, which is an extensive trade and aid accord between the EU and African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) states (mostly former European colonies), is also based on respect for human rights, democratic principles, and the rule of law, with consultations designed to address violations of any of these principles. However, when several EU states, including Spain, voted in favor of the April 2000 UN Human Rights Commission resolution condemning Cuba for repressing political dissent and religious groups, Cuba withdrew its application to the multilateral trade and aid pact.

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[1] General Franco seized power following the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) and led a fascist regime until his death in 1975. During Franco's 35-year dictatorship, Spain was isolated by economic blockades, excluded from NATO and the UN, and crippled by economic recession.

[2] Felipe Sahagûn. "La política exterior española en 1999." Fundación CIDOB http://www.cidob.org.

[3] Government of Spain. DEepartment of Foreign Affairs. http://www.mae.es.

[4] Priorities of the Spanish Presidency, Program of the Spanish Presidency of the EU, 01-01-02/06-30-02.

[5] Spain 2002. Review of the six-month European presidency. http://www.ue2002.es/principal.asp?idioma=ingles.

[6] Gustavo Gorriti is one of Peru's most influential journalists who at the time of his detention was also the Lima correspondent for Spain's newspaper El Pais.

[7] Government of Spain. Department of Foreign Affairs. http://www.mae.es. 2000.

[8] Abramson, Gary. "Algerian Islamic activist is expelled by Spain." Associated Press Newswires 16 April 1997.

[9] Sánchez, Elvira. "Camino nuevo y sendero Viejo." Fundación CIDOB. < http://www.cidob.org>.

[10] Aznar has publicly proclaimed solidarity with the Varela Project campaign, which seeks to reform the political system peacefully within constraints of the Cuban constitution and laws.

[11] Remiro Brotóns , Antonio. "Política exterior y de seguridad de España 1995." Fundación CIDOB. http://www.cidob.org.

Sweden

Assessment: Very Good
Trend: ⇔
Capital: Stockholm
Type of Government: Constitutional Monarchy
Head of Government: Prime Minister Goran Persson (since 21 March 1996)
Minister of Foreign Affairs: Anna Lindh
Population: 8,875,053
Human Development Index Ranking 2002: 2

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Sweden has a **very good** record of support for democracy abroad, as evidenced by its emphasis on democracy and human rights in its foreign policy and in its generous development aid to developing countries. Sweden consistently condemns coups and criticizes the manipulation of elections abroad, and has increasingly supported regional and international responses to such threats to democracy.

FOREIGN RELATIONS BACKGROUND

Although Sweden has only a small population (9 million out of 376 million in EU-15), its history of armed neutrality during two world wars and extensive economic and trade interests abroad have allowed it to play a leading role in the international political arena. Its generous levels of development assistance also have given it impressive leverage for promoting certain policies abroad. Since 1968, Sweden has aimed to give one percent of its GNP in general foreign aid, a goal achieved in the 1980s before national economic problems led to a severe cutback to the UN-recommended level of 0.7 percent in the early 1990s. This turning point in Sweden's development program eventually led to a major overhaul and renewal of foreign aid, both in organization and in basic development policies.[1] As a result, the "new" Swedish development policy aims to return gradually to more robust aid levels (in 2004, foreign aid is supposed to reach 0.86 percent of GNP), and to make the promotion of democracy a higher priority of the foreign aid program.

It is an unspoken truth that the Social Democratic government -- formed by the party that has been in power almost without interruption since the 1930s -- was historically too uncritical when giving foreign aid to various socialist and communist regimes in Africa during the Cold War era.[2] Today, however, the promotion of democracy is considered one of the most important goals of Swedish foreign policy, accepted by all political parties. Indeed, when the Swedish government presented its foreign policy to the parliament (*Riksdag)* in 2001, Foreign Minister Anna Lindh stated: "The promotion of democracy is and remains a cornerstone of Swedish foreign policy."[3]

The key external challenge to Sweden during the period 1992-2002 was the emergence of new states in Sweden's neighborhood -- Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania -- following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. A greater proportion of Swedish aid is now given to Eastern Europe and particularly to the Baltic states. The *Riksdag* has set four goals for Sweden's cooperation with Central and Eastern Europe, one of which is "the promotion and deepening of a democratic culture."[4] It should be noted that the aid provided to the Baltic states is not financed with funds from the traditional budget aimed for developing countries.

Sweden has a close relationship with its immediate and regional neighbors. By history and tradition, there is a strong relationship among the Nordic countries (Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland, and Iceland). This cooperation has been institutionalized through the Nordic Council (composed of 87 parliamentarians from the five countries) and the Nordic Council of Ministers (meetings between governmental ministers). While the importance of these councils today is sometimes questioned, cooperation with regards to EU questions remains an important part of Swedish foreign policy.[5]

During the Cold War, Sweden's policy of neutrality allowed it to have an independent voice on foreign affairs issues. For example, Sweden criticized U.S. involvement in Vietnam, as well as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In 1995, Sweden's international relations changed dramatically when the country entered the European Union. Since then, Sweden increasingly has exercised its foreign policy through EU institutions, even though it remains a member of the Nordic Council, the OSCE and the Council of Europe. Now, Sweden is more likely to criticize and be able to influence other countries through the EU than on its own.

In spite of this opportunity to exert influence through the EU, the introduction of the euro and the development of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) have raised questions about the EU as a platform for Swedish foreign policy. Sweden is not part of the euro-currency zone, though a referendum on this matter might be held in March 2003. In addition, public opinion is divided about building a common defense capability within the EU framework, as has been proposed under the CFSP. A recent review of Sweden's security policy doctrine left it as one of three non-aligned EU members, the others being Ireland and Austria. Sweden is a member of the Partnership for Peace, but NATO-membership in the short-run is unlikely.

RESPONSE TO OVERTHROW OF DEMOCRATICALLY-ELECTED GOVERNMENTS

Sweden's response to the overthrow of democratically-elected governments has generally been good. Since gaining entry to the EU in 1995, it has consistently condemned coups and has attempted to coordinate all such responses with other EU members, rather than take any action on its own. The government supported EU declarations deploring the 1999 military coups in Pakistan and Cote d'Ivoire and calling for respect for human rights and civil liberties in those countries, as well as the restoration of democratic rule. When members of the right-wing Freedom Party (FPÖ) led by Jörg Haider joined the government of Austria in February 2000,[6] Sweden fully supported the sanctions imposed by the other 14 EU member states, which included a cessation of all official bilateral meetings between EU countries and the Austrian government.[7] Following the coup against Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez in April 2002, Sweden joined fellow EU Ministers in calling for new elections and underlining the importance of maintaining democratic principles, notably respect for human rights.

During the war in the Balkans, Sweden supported the NATO-led bombings aimed at toppling Serbian dictator Slobodan Milosovic from power. This led to some domestic criticism, especially when the government refused to disclose whether it had supported a German initiative to lift the sanctions against Serbia. In addition, two ministers of the Swedish Government, Anna Lindh and Ulrica Messing, encouraged Swedish sport associations to exclude participants from the Former Yugoslavia from any international events they organized.[8] Overall, Sweden has been one of the largest donors in the Balkans (especially to Bosnia-Herzegovina) and has channeled more than SEK 2 billion (roughly $200 million) to the region in the period 1991-1999.[9]

RESPONSE TO MANIPULATION OF ELECTORAL PROCESSES

Sweden has been very active in monitoring elections abroad and condemning electoral processes that do not comply with basic democratic standards. This has been true both for countries historically targeted for Swedish aid, such as many countries in Africa, as well as for post-Communist countries, such as Belarus, in Sweden's more immediate neighborhood.

Even before the most recent set of flawed elections in Zimbabwe, the Swedish government decided to reduce bilateral development cooperation with Zimbabwe by 45 percent for the 1999-2001 period. While support for programs for combating HIV/Aids continued, all other development programs carried out with Zimbabwe's government were to cease. This decision was motivated by the Zimbabwean government's lack of respect for democracy and basic legal procedures. The Swedish

government also declared that it would continue, together with the EU, the dialogue with the opposition in Zimbabwe, and sent election monitors there in November 2000.

In response to the flawed elections of 2002, Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lindh chastised Mugabe for running elections that were neither free nor fair and called on his neighbors to assume greater responsibility in resolving the impasse. "Mr. Mugabe has got the result he wanted but his election victory is not credible," she stated. "Zimbabwe has today a new president who cannot be regarded as popularly elected. The international community bears continued responsibility for Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe's neighboring countries must now shoulder their responsibility. They must stand up for the fundamental values represented by the democratic world."[10] Earlier this year, the Foreign Minister received a delegation from the largest opposition party in Zimbabwe, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC).[11]

Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lindh similarly condemned as "totally unacceptable" the procedures surrounding the elections in Belarus during the autumn of 2000. Before the elections, Sweden had provided significant aid to Belarus to support activities designed to foster democratic development and an independent media. As of September 2000, more than 100 Belarussian journalists had been educated in Sweden in an effort to help develop a free press.[12]

In Zambia, after the 1996 election process was found not to have met basic democratic standards, Sweden immediately suspended some foreign aid. Following the arrest of the former President Kenneth Kaunda, and the subsequent disturbances in late 1997, the Swedish government decided not to enter new long-term agreements with Zambia.

Sweden has been a regular contributor to election monitoring missions. In the period 1997-2002, it sent observers to 33 countries.[13]

PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRACY

Sweden has been a dependable advocate for strengthening democratic institutions and values, as evidenced by its high level of donations to democracy-building programs abroad and its consistent support for international protocols relating to democracy and human rights.

Sweden has a historic commitment to foreign aid. While development assistance spending was reduced to 0.7 percent of GNP as part of the reorganization of the foreign aid system in the mid-1990s, the promotion of democracy has grown more important. A white paper presented in March 1998 by the Swedish government states that "the promotion of democracy and human rights will be an essential feature of Sweden's co-operation [with developing countries]."[14] The *Riksdag* lists "democratic development" as one of six goals for the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), which in 1999 estimated that 65 percent of its total disposable foreign aid was channeled to activities that involved the promotion of democracy.[15] Sweden is also the host country for International IDEA, founded by 14 countries in February 1995, with the objective "to promote sustainable democracy worldwide."[16]

More recently, a Swedish parliamentary commission charged with investigating how Swedish policy on sustainable development should be further expanded, proposed that a rights-based approach should underlie the broadened global development policy area and stressed that this policy must be combined with support for democratic processes. The commission further proposed that the protection and promotion of human rights should be key criteria for transferring responsibility for the use of aid funds to the recipient country.[17]

Sweden has a strong record of voting for and ratifying international protocols dealing with human rights and democracy. The 1998 white paper committed Sweden to supporting "all relevant international agreements" pertaining to the protection of human rights. In particular it committed Sweden's support to UN conventions governing civil and political rights; economic, social and cultural rights; racial discrimination; torture and other cruel or inhuman punishments; the elimination of discrimination against women; and the rights of children.[18] During its presidency of the EU in 2001, Sweden championed an initiative to establish new rules regulating public accessibility to EU documents.[19]

POLICY TOWARDS ENTRENCHED DICTATORSHIPS

Sweden's record of relations with dictatorships has changed profoundly since the end of the Cold War. According to one estimate, 80 percent of Swedish development assistance to African countries in the period between 1980-1989 went to socialist and Marxist regimes, which often did not live up to basic democratic standards.[20] Since

the end of the Cold War this pattern has changed. Sweden today spends a much higher percentage of its development assistance on promoting democracy, and more readily suspends non-humanitarian aid when basic democratic norms are violated.

One example of the change described above is Swedish development cooperation with Cuba. The previous center-right government (1991-1994) terminated foreign aid to Cuba, but it was restarted again in 1995 by the Social Democratic government. However, according to the government's decision of 12 October 1995, this aid shall now aim at "systemic openings in Cuba's economic and political life" (i.e. market economy and democratic elections), a stipulation that the Social Democratic government would not have formulated in the 1970s.[21]

With more strategically important countries, such as North Korea and China, Sweden has sought a policy of "constructive dialogue." It has engaged these governments at the highest levels, and encouraged them to undertake market reforms and protect human rights. For example, Prime Minister Göran Persson led an EU delegation to North Korea during Sweden's Presidency of the EU. During discussions with Kim Jong-Il, Mr. Persson invited a North Korean delegation to the EU in order to study how market economies function. A delegation led by the Minister of Foreign Trade, Ri Gwang Gun, visited Belgium, Italy, Sweden, and Britain in March 2002. With regard to China, Sweden has focused on the issues of human rights and capital punishment. At the latest meeting of the EU-China dialogue, in March 2002, Foreign Minister Anna Lindh condemned the increased use of capital punishment in China. The Swedish Government has stated that human rights and capital punishment must be discussed at the summit between China and the EU in Copenhagen planned for September 2002.[22]

With regard to Belarus, the Swedish government has taken steps to support political opposition groups. For example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Stockholm called in the Ambassador of Belarus, Aleg Jermalovitj, to deliver a message condemning the verdicts against two leading opposition politicians in Belarus, which had taken place earlier the same week.[23] In addition, a delegation of opposition politicians was invited to Stockholm in March 2000 to meet with the Foreign Minister, the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs of the *Riksdag*, and Swedish NGOs working with Belarus.[24]

While Sweden has actively supported pro-democracy actors in undemocratic countries such as Belarus and Zimbabwe, it has developed a more cautious policy regarding sanctions. In an address to the *Riksdag*, Foreign Minister Lindh outlined the conditions under which the Swedish government would support the use of sanctions. First, there had to be a consensus in support of the sanctions within the international community, especially within the UN Security Council. The sanctions also had to be understood by the general public. Second, the sanctions had to be effective, targeted, and could not hurt innocent people or a third party. Third, sanctions could be used only when other diplomatic means had proven insufficient. A clear set of criteria had to be fulfilled before the sanctions could be lifted.[25] To advance these proposals, Sweden has sponsored with Switzerland and Germany a joint initiative to improve the international application of targeted sanctions. This effort is ultimately supposed to result in a handbook primarily intended for practical use in UN work. The Swedish initiative recommends using sanctions cautiously, in a targeted fashion, and only with wide support in the UN. Sweden itself has hesitated in applying sanctions and Foreign Minister Lindh has expressed frustration over the "blunt sanctions" in effect against Iraq. The government also expressed ambivalence about using EU-proposed economic sanctions in the case of Burma in 1997.[26]

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[1] OECD: "Development co-operation review of Sweden. Summary and Conclusions." For example, five autonomous entities (Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), BITS, SAREC, Swedecorp, and Swedish Centre for Education in International Development) were merged into a "new SISA"; the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) was also reorganized.

[2] For more, see: Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor, "Clarifying the Foreign Aid Puzzle: a comparison of American, Japanese, French, and Swedish Aid Flows."

[3] Regarding the '1 percent goal' and the six goals of Swedish foreign aid, see www.sida.se; Mrs. Lindh's speech can be found at www.ud.se. In 2002, Swedish foreign aid amounted to SEK 16 billion (0.74 percent of GNP).

[4] www.sida.se; "Country Profile 2002: Sweden", The Economist Intelligence Unit, p. 12.

[5] For information about the Nordic Council, see www.norden.org; "Country Profile 2002: Sweden", The Economist Intelligence Unit, p. 12.

[6] While the Austria example was not an overthrow of a democratically elected government, it raised serious challenges to democratic values in the EU.

[7] The sanctions came into effect on 4 February 2000, and the support of the Swedish government was confirmed in a press release the same day: "Minskade kontakter med Österrike", Pressmeddelande från Utrikesdepartementet, 4 February 2000.

[8] "Regeringen uppmanar till idrottssanktioner mot Förbundsrepubliken Jugoslavien", Pressmeddelande från Utrikesdepartementet, 29 April 1999. This action was part of a wider package of sanctions agreed on by the EU Foreign Ministers.

[9] The government's support of the bombings were for example criticized in far-left magazine *Riktpunkt* (see Issue 4:2000) but also by former members of the Social Democratic government. For information about foreign aid to the Balkans, see: www.sida.se/Sida/jsp/Crosslink.jsp?d=392.

[10] "Uttalande av Anna Lindh med anledning av valresultatet i Zimbabwe", Pressmeddelande från Utrikesdepartementet, 13 March 2002.

[11] The delegation from MDC also met with SIDA "Obs! Ny version: Oppositionen från Zimbabwe besöker Stockholm." Pressmeddelande från Utrikesdepartementet, 20 Mar. 2002.

[12] Fråga nr 2000/01:1677, "Skriftligt svar på fråga 2000/01:1677 om demokratisering av Vitryssland", 18 Sep. 2000.

[13] Serbia (1997), Bosnia (1997), Algeria (1997), Chechnya (1997), Guatemala (1997), Kosovo (1998), Latvia and Macedonia (1998), Russia (1999), Namibia (1999), Mozambique and Kazakhstan (1999), Sierra Leone (1999), Guinea-Bissau (1999), Georgia and Macedonia (1999), Indonesia (1999), Nigeria (1999), Azerbaijan (2000), Zimbabwe (2000), Tanzania (2000), Bosnia-Herzegovina (2000), the Ivory Coast (2000), Montenegro (2000), Peru and Guyana (2001), Moldova (2001), Sri Lanka (2001), Zambia (2001), Bangladesh (2001), Nicaragua (2001), East Timor (2001), Uganda (2001), and Cambodia (2002).

[14] Information from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, No. 4 March 1998: "Democracy and human rights in Swedish development cooperation."

[15] Svar på interpellation 1999/2000:397 om bistånd till Guinea Bissau, Anf. 21 Statsrådet Maj-Inger Klingvall.

[16] IDEA = The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. See: OECD: "Development co-operation review of Sweden. Summary and Conclusions."

[17] Globkom (Kommittén om Sveriges politik för global utveckling): "Executive summary", pp. 3-4 (available at www.globkom.net).

[18] Ibid. Sweden has been exceptionally fast in becoming a party of all the major international human rights treaties. It should, however, be noted that Sweden has not ratified some treaties, including one ending discrimination against women.. Moreover, Sweden has not –like all the other major industrial countries – signed the MWC. See: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights: "Status of ratification of the principal international human rights treaties as of 13 May 2002."

[19] Svar på interpellation 1999/2000:397 om bistånd till Guinea Bissau, Anf. 21 Statsrådet Maj-Inger Klingvall.

[20] Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor, "Clarifying the Foreign Aid Puzzle: a comparison of American, Japanese, French, and Swedish Aid Flows."

[21] Fråga nr 1996:97:518: "Skriftligt svar av biståndsminister Pierre Schori på fråga av Elisa Abascal Reyes (mp) om medicinskt bistånd till Cuba", 23 May 1997.

[22] Fråga nr 2001/02:1406, "Skriftligt svar av Anna Lindh på fråga av Sten Tolgfors om dödsstraff i Kina", 18 July 2002.

[23] "Sverige fördömer domar mot vitryska politiker", Pressmeddelande från Utrikesdepartementet, 22 June 2000.

[24] The delegation included politicians but also a trade union leader and the President of the Belarussian Association of Journalists. "Vitryska oppositionspolitiker besöker Sverige", ", Pressmeddelande från Utrikesdepartementet, 2 Mar. 2000.

[25] Fråga nr 1999/2000:1213, "Skriftligt svar av utrikesminister Anna Lindh på fråga av Sten Andersson om sanktioner mot Jugoslavien respective Kina", 31 July 2000.

[26] Fråga nr 1996/97:257, "Skriftligt svar av utrikesminister Lena Hjelm-Wallén på fråga av Eva Goës (mp) om bojkott av Burma", 7 February 1997.

Tanzania

Assessment: Fair
Trend: ⇔
Capital: Dar es Salaam
Type of Government: Republic
Head of Government: President Benjamin William Mkapa (since 23 November 1995)
Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation: Jakay Mrisho Kikwete
Population: 36,232,074
Human Development Index Ranking: 151

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Tanzania has a **fair** record of support for democracy abroad. This is particularly evident in the eastern and southern African sub-regions, a part of Africa where Tanzania traditionally has had widespread influence, especially during the struggle against colonial rule. Opposition parties were legalized in Tanzania in 1992 and open competitive elections conducted in 1995. Yet these improvements in democratic governance domestically have not been translated into support for democracy as an important foreign policy objective.

Although Tanzania has generally opposed unconstitutional changes of governments in the region, as demonstrated by its imposition of trade sanctions against the military regime in Burundi in 1996, it has accepted elections won through fraud and manipulation, as occurred in Zimbabwe, for example. Tanzania also has continued to support authoritarian regimes outside Africa, thanks to its socialist heritage and a long-standing relationship with China, its cold war ideological role model. Thus, despite the end of the cold war a decade ago, Tanzania still votes consistently against discussing the human rights situation in authoritarian states such as China, Cuba, Iran, Iraq and the Sudan. Tanzania has continued to hold onto the general view - common among many of Africa's political elite– that multi-party political systems are conflict-inducing and hence not appropriate for multi-ethnic societies.

FOREIGN RELATIONS BACKROUND

Shortly after independence in 1961, Tanzania identified its foreign policy priorities as the pursuit of racial equality, collective self-reliance and world peace. Yet Julius Nyerere, the country's first President, was well aware of the limited influence Tanzania could have in world affairs, admitting at the United Nations, "we small powers can have no…illusions. Only in an organization like the UN can we hope to make our voice heard on international issues."[1] At the regional and sub-regional levels, Tanzania actively supported liberation movements in Angola, Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe, using the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Front-Line States (FLS) organization as fora for pursuing de-colonization. Furthermore, the OAU decided to base the headquarters of its Liberation Committee in Dar es Salaam.

After 30 years of single-party rule, Tanzania held its first competitive elections in October 1995 under pressure from its international donors to accept economic reforms and allow political pluralism. Electoral controversies have diminished, but remain a major source of conflict on the federated semiautonomous island of Zanzibar.

With the death of Nyerere in 1999, the man whose name had been synonymous with the country's foreign affairs for three decades, Tanzania found itself facing new foreign policy challenges. Key among these have been the continuing conflicts in Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Democratization in Africa as such is not a foreign policy goal for Tanzania. Rather, Tanzania has joined ranks with other regional leaders and continued to criticize the West over pressures to democratize, charging neocolonialism and attempts to dictate the continent's future.

RESPONSE TO OVERTHROW OF DEMOCRATICALLY-ELECTED GOVERNMENTS

Tanzania has a good record of condemning the overthrow of constitutional regained power through a military coup that toppled the democratically-elected government of Hutu President Sylvester Ntibantunganya on 25 July 1996. Tanzania was the force behind the embargo adopted by Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Rwanda, at Arusha on 31 July 1996, and the first to enforce it. The communiqué read by then Foreign Minister Jakaya Kikwete stressed that the regime in Bujumbura should undertake "specific measures aimed at the country's return to constitutional order" and the immediate restoration of the national assembly and political party activities.[2] He added that the national assembly in Bujumbura was a democratic institution that derived its mandate from the people of Burundi. An important factor in Tanzania's strong response was the desire to stem a growing influx of refugees escaping the conflict.

Tanzania's response to overthrows of democratically-elected governments can also be seen in its actions within the Southern African Development Community (SADC), of which it is a member. At a meeting of SADC's Inter-State Defense and Security Committee (i.e. Defense Ministers), in Cape Town, South Africa in 1995, Tanzania endorsed SADC's decision to take collective action in cases of illegal attempts to remove governments by force. This commitment to respond collectively to unconstitutional regime changes led to a number of interventions in the region, including SADC's military intervention by South Africa and Botswana to restore democracy in Lesotho in September 1998, at the invitation of the Lesotho Government. When SADC met at its annual summit in Mauritius in 1998, Tanzania strongly supported calls to brand Jonas Savimbi a war criminal for walking away from elections and restarting the war in Angola. Tanzania also endorsed a 1997 OAU summit resolution condemning military coups as a method of changing governments.

As a member of the Commonwealth, Tanzania has consistently supported resolutions condemning military takeovers of governments. It endorsed the Harare Declaration adopted by the Commonwealth Heads of Government at its 1991 summit in Zimbabwe, and the establishment of the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG) in 1995 address serious or persistent violations of the Harare Declaration's fundamental political values, including democratic governance. Furthermore, Tanzania joined other countries in condemning the Abacha regime in Nigeria for executing Ken Saro-Wiwa and other minority-rights activists, which led to Nigeria's suspension from the Commonwealth. Tanzania also joined the Commonwealth consensus to suspend Pakistan after General Pervez Musharaf overthrew an elected government in 1999.

governments. In the case of Burundi, Tanzania went beyond condemnation and took the lead in imposing regional sanctions on the military regime of strongman Major Pierre Buyoya. Buyoya, a Tutsi, had lost democratic elections in 1993, but

RESPONSE TO MANIPULATION OF ELECTORAL PROCESSES

Tanzania has been less than willing to condemn electoral malpractices, particularly when the perpetrator regimes are its allies. This is due in part to its socialist legacy of one party rule, but also because like several African states, Tanzania perceives commenting on another country's electoral process as an intervention in that country's internal matters. Tanzania therefore did not condemn controversial elections held recently in Kenya, Zambia, Uganda, the Gambia, Benin, Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Togo and Madagascar.

In Kenya, for example, President Daniel arap Moi of Kenya was re-elected for a fifth term amid charges of rigging and politically-instigated violence in December 1997. Yet Tanzanian President Mkapa congratulated him, saying the pluralist elections were a "success" and that the manner in which the elections were conducted had given honor and respect to the entire African continent. "The success has shown clearly that Kenya and other African states do not need to be taught democracy, "[3] Mpaka stated. Mkapa's congratulations came in spite of the fact that the Moi regime had denied registration to Saba Saba, a political party allied to Kenneth Matiba, Moi's foremost political opponent in the 1992 multi-party elections.

Similarly, Tanzania did not defend democracy in Zambia in 1996 when, in an attempt to secure re-election, President Fredrick Chiluba amended the constitution to exclude as a candidate his only serious political rival, former President Kenneth Kaunda. Chiluba also insisted on a flawed voter registration process and persecuted

journalists and domestic observer groups that cried foul. After the voting, Kaunda was arrested on dubious charges of treason and imprisoned for several months. Tanzania remained similarly mute with regard to Uganda's "no-party" democracy, in which candidates are allowed to run only as individuals. President Yoweri Museveni has barred political parties in Uganda, arguing that they are tribally based.

In Zimbabwe, Tanzania joined SADC in rejecting the use of sanctions against Mugabe and his ruling party, the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), even before the elections were held. In a meeting of Commonwealth foreign ministers in London in March, 2002, Tanzania joined other African nations in voting as a bloc to support Zimbabwe, maintaining that the Commonwealth had no right to intervene in the southern African country's internal affairs.

While addressing a political rally in the Kilimanjaro region in mid-March 2002, President Mkapa assured Zimbabweans that Tanzania would continue to support them. He defended Mugabe against what he considered Western interference in the affairs of the people of Zimbabwe "As you have heard, about Zimbabwe and the EU's decision to impose sanctions, they want to divide Africa at Brussels in 2002 just as they did in Berlin in 1884...Africa must say no," Mkapa reportedly said, adding, "I want to tell the Zimbabweans that we are supporting them in this matter" and "an independent nation is independent, its leaders deserve respect and its people are free to make decisions on their own."[4]

While attending the Commonwealth Heads of Government summit in Coolum, Australia in March 2002, Mkapa publicly opposed any discussion of Zimbabwe, saying, "the scene is unfolding in Zimbabwe. It is not unfolding in Coolum."[5] He declared land reform the "core issue," but failed to mention Mugabe's law limiting freedom of the press, or the pre-election violence and government-orchestrated campaign of intimidation that disenfranchised thousands of Zimbabweans.

When Mugabe was declared the winner following the controversial presidential elections of 9-10 March, the 25-member Tanzanian election observers group declared that "the pre-election and election period was characterized by calmness and peace, and...the people of Zimbabwe were able to exercise their democratic right to choose their leader."[6] This group had been invited by Zimbabwe to observe the elections. Mkapa wrote to Mugabe, congratulating him and stating, "you have been firm defending the inalienable right of the people of your country to free, democratic and sovereign governance...your firmness was good for all of Africa".[7] Congratulatory messages were also sent by Tanzania's ruling party, *Chama Cha Mapinduzi* (CCM), and the SADC Ministerial Task Force, to which Tanzania belongs.

It should be pointed out that Mkapa's support for Mugabe came after Tanzania had rejected foreign offers to help implement a Commonwealth-brokered agreement between political parties in Zanzibar. An essential component of this agreement was reform of the islands' electoral commission. It is widely believed that Mkapa's party, the CCM, stole both the 1995 and 2000 elections from the island's largest opposition party, the Civic United Front (CUF).

PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRACY

While Tanzania has maintained a decent record in condemning unconstitutional changes of government and in opposing military regimes in Africa, its support for democracy and human rights at the international level has been disappointing. It has largely hewed to the line of non-interference in what it considers another state's internal affairs. Only under special circumstances has it deviated from this position, as in the cases of its intervention in Uganda (1979) and its imposition of economic sanctions on Burundi (1996).

Tanzania's reluctance to stand for democracy abroad is also seen in its voting record at the UN General Assembly. Over the last decade, it has consistently voted against international efforts to promote fair and transparent elections among new democracies. When the question was whether support for electoral processes constitutes a violation of the principle of national sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, Tanzania always voted "yes."[8]

POLICY TOWARDS ENTRENCHED DICTATORSHIPS

Despite its own abandonment of socialism, and its adoption of a more liberal political and economic system, Tanzania has continued to demonstrate mixed support for

authoritarian regimes at the UN. Like a majority of other African countries, Tanzania has generally abstained when human rights issues in authoritarian regimes, such as Iraq, have been brought up before the General Assembly -- presumably to avoid offending its Western donors. It also abstained from voting to condemn human rights violations in fellow African countries like the DRC and Nigeria, presumably for fear of revenge votes over its handling of the situation in Zanzibar. Furthermore, Tanzania has a mixed record with respect to human rights in the Sudan. It has abstained from voting 42 per cent of the time and voted to condemn human rights violations 58 per cent of the time.

Tanzania still maintains ties with communist Cuba, as well as with authoritarian Iran. Between 1994 and 2001, for example, Tanzania voted not to discuss human rights issues in Iran 62.2 per cent of the time. And when Cuba's human rights situation was brought up before the General Assembly, Tanzanian voted "no" a hundred per cent of the time.

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[1] Johns, David. "The Foreign Policy of Tanzania." in Olajde, Aluko, ed. The Foreign Policies of African States. 1977.
[2] Daily News, Dar es Salaaam 6 Aug. 1996.
[3] Daily News, Dar es Salaam 6 Jan. 1998.
[4] Africa News Service, Inc. 20 Feb. 2002.
[5] Sydney Morning News 4 March 2002.
[6] The Herald, Harare 15 March 2002.
[7] The Boston Globe 24 March 2002; The Daily News, Dar es Salaam 14 March 2002.
[8] The summary covers Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cuba, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kosovo, Iran, Iraq, Nigeria and Suda. < http://www.unbisnet.un.org>

Thailand

Assessment: Fair
Trend: ⇓
Capital: Bangkok
Type of Government: Constitutional monarchy
Head of Government: Prime Minister Chinnawat Thaksin (since January 2001)
Minister of Foreign Relations: Sathianthai Surakiat
Population: 61,797,751
Human Development Index Ranking: 70

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Thailand has a **fair** record of support for democracy abroad during the period of 1992-2002. A society undergoing its own democratic transition, Thailand's government has stated that democratic principles are a moral compass for Thai policy. It has demonstrated continued support for regional and international efforts to bring about peaceful democratic transitions in conflict areas like East Timor. However, Thailand has repeatedly tailored its approach to issues of democracy promotion abroad to conform to its national economic and security interests. While the administration of Chuan Leekpai (1997-2001) was a vocal advocate for democracy and human rights abroad, foreign policy under the current center-right government led by businessman Thaksin Shinawatra is primarily focused on economic cooperation. Overall, the Thaksin government has not demonstrated an interest in keeping democracy promotion as a foreign policy priority.

FOREIGN RELATIONS BACKGROUND

Prime Minister Thaksin, in an address to the Thai Parliament shortly after winning elections, stated that Thailand's general foreign policy objectives are to support the principles of security, development and international peace building, to promote a more proactive role for Thailand in the region, and to preserve and protect the country's rights and national interests.

In practice, promoting Thailand's international economic and trade interests has formed the cornerstone of its foreign policy, and the constant search for new economic opportunities and natural resources has strongly influenced relations with neighboring countries. The 1997 Asian financial crisis, which resulted in political and economic instability as well as a decline in Thailand's bargaining power, served to strengthen the economic dimension of its foreign policy.[1]

Thailand is located in the middle of the Southeast Asian peninsula bordering five non-democratic countries, with which it tries to maintain cordial relations. As a middle-ranking power in the region, Thailand has focused most if its attention on issues of concern to the peninsula and has not sought to distinguish itself as a leading advocate of democracy in Asia or in the world arena. It has relied on regional organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which has no mandate related to democracy and human rights, for diplomatic action. Its weaker economic and political position relative to other countries in the world does not equip Thailand with much leverage to influence or shape events in other countries.

RESPONSE TO OVERTHROW OF DEMOCRATICALLY-ELECTED GOVERNMENTS

Thailand's traditionally pragmatic approach to foreign policy is evidenced by its international organization with a binding commitment to defend democratic governments against illegal overthrows. It did not support international attempts to isolate the military junta in Burma and failed to take any action in response to the coup in Fiji in 2000.

Thailand's policy of accommodation towards Burma is based on a complex set of economic and security ties that result from existing conflicts, Burma's natural resources wealth, Thai economic interests in Burma, refugee flows, and a shared border almost 1500 miles long. Despite pressure from the United States and Europe to join efforts to isolate the Burmese junta, Thailand's strong economic interests in Burma compelled it to adopt a more pragmatic policy of continued engagement. Then-Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudth stated that the U.S. and European actions "will have no impact on Burma's bid to become a member of ASEAN...Thailand still maintains the policy of constructive engagement with Burma. There has been no change."[2] Nevertheless, the Chuan government did press for democratic freedoms in Burma, and advocated a policy of constructive engagement among the members of the ASEAN countries, which voted to admit Burma in July 1997. The Thaksin government has not made democracy a priority in its relations with the military junta, prompting critics to charge that Bangkok is overly conciliatory. In the 2002 annual military reshuffle, Thaksin appointed as Army Chief General Somtad Attanand, who supports a soft-line approach toward Burma; his predecessor was known for his hard-line stance towards Burma.[3]

In response to the overthrow of the elected cabinet in Fiji in July 2000, Thailand supported ASEAN's decision to continue economic relations with the island country. Thailand deflected overtures from India about imposing economic sanctions.

RESPONSE TO MANIPULATION OF ELECTORAL PROCESSES

Thailand has a fair record of response to the manipulation of electoral processes. As a member of various regional organizations, the Thai government has issued joint statements of support for electoral observation and has endorsed reports by independent monitors. However, Thailand has not interrupted diplomatic relations or independently campaigned for international response to the overthrow of democratically elected governments in Burma and Fiji. Even though Thailand at times has voiced support for democracy clauses introduced at regional and international fora, it does not belong to any isolation of a regime engaged in electoral malpractice. Thai governments have been willing to support election monitoring efforts, as evidenced by the government's permission for non-governmental organizations such as the Asian Network for Free and Fair Elections (ANFREL) to establish regional offices and organize international conferences in the country. An independent election monitoring team from Thailand also observed the Cambodian elections in 1998.

PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRACY

Thailand does not have an international assistance program, as it lacks adequate budgetary resources to provide foreign aid in most cases. It has, however, demonstrated its readiness to promote international democracy by cooperating and complying with international requests for other types of support to facilitate peaceful transitions to democracy. This includes assisting with peacekeeping operations and diplomatic negotiations. The country also has a good record of ratifying international protocols and agreements dealing with respect for human rights and democratic values. For instance, Thailand is a signatory in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and actively participates in the Asia-Pacific human rights forum. It is also a party to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women in 1985 and its protocol in 2000, the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1992 and consider to sign its two optional protocols, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1996, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 1999. Thailand also endorsed the Warsaw Declaration which promotes international and regional approaches to defend democracy.

At the regional level, Thailand and the Philippines first proposed the idea of "flexible engagement" which later became "enhanced interaction" among the ASEAN countries. The concept of "flexible engagement" sought to make the honored tradition of non-interference in ASEAN more elastic. Surin Pitsuwan, Thailand's Foreign Minister at the time, proposed that the principle of non-interference be submitted to "reality tests" because there are domestic problems that have a regional impact and in such cases

ASEAN members "should be able to express their opinions and concerns in an open, frank and constructive manner."[4] Since the principle of non-interference was consistently used as a shield to ward off external criticism of poor democratic or human rights performance, "flexible engagement" would have opened the door to promoting greater accountability from ASEAN members on these issues. Not surprisingly, the concept did not get a warm reception at the ASEAN Summit of 1998. ASEAN members compromised, announcing the concept of "enhanced interaction" which means the countries of ASEAN agree that when there is a transnational problem such as drugs, smuggling or piracy they will convene and discuss them.

The Chuan government pushed for the participation of Thai troops in the historic peacekeeping operations in East Timor under the auspices of the United Nations, and a Thai officer served as the Commander for the UN peacekeeping mission. In addition to peacekeeping operations, Thailand has also participated in activities to encourage local communities to practice sustainable development.

More recently, Thailand displayed its support for the peaceful settlement of internal strife in a neighboring democracy by agreeing to host the Sri Lankan peace talks. Through these negotiations, the Government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) hope to arrive at a political settlement to resolve the conflict in Sri Lanka.

Though its responses to democracy challenges overseas may not be impressive relative to other countries, the Thai government has continued to support democracy strengthening at home. The 1997 Constitution provides unprecedented guarantees for human rights, accountability, transparency and citizen participation in the political process. Even so, its role as a model of democratization in Southeast Asia is often undermined by its paramount focus on regional economic and security concerns.

POLICY TOWARDS ENTRENCHED DICTATORSHIPS

Thailand's policy towards entrenched dictatorships reflects the continued primacy of pragmatism over principle. The 1997 Asian financial crisis affected Thailand's relations with major international powers, and in particular its relations with China. Sino-Thai relations have continued to warm since 1975, and the two countries became even closer when China became the first country to help Thailand by pledging US$1 billion to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) bailout fund. The U.S. and Europe did not provide comparable assistance. Sino-Thai relations reached a new high in February 1999 with the signing of a joint statement on a "Plan for Action for the 21st century."[5]

Because of China's growing economy and potential market for Thai exports, Bangkok views China as a close friend and even a strategic partner.[6] Moreover, business in Thailand is dominated by Sino-Thais who view China as offering immense economic opportunities. Thus, China meets both the security and economic interests that most significantly shape Thai policy. Thailand has sought to engage China in regional affairs by encouraging Beijing's involvement in regional organizations and initiatives such as ASEAN Plus Three.[7] But it has avoided criticizing China's treatment of political dissidents at home

Despite China's growing influence in Thailand, Bangkok did not succumb to Beijing's efforts to interfere with Falun Gong practitioners who had planned to hold an international meeting in Thailand. Chinese officials had made it known that they wanted Thailand to ban the meeting. The Chuan government, in keeping with its stated commitment to human rights, decided to allow the meeting to go ahead, though they set conditions on the participants' activities. The Thaksin government, despite China's stepped up efforts to prevent the meeting, also agreed to permit it.[8]

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[1] Thailand. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Thai Foreign Affairs B.E. 2540-2543. Bangkok: 2001, p. 36.
[2] "Thai Prime Minister Shrugs Off U.S. Sanctions on Burma." Deutsche Presse-Agentur 23 Apr. 1997.
[3] Matichon Weekly Vol. 1147 (9-15 August 2002), p. 12.
[4] Thailand. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Thailand's Non-Paper on The Flexible Engagement Approach. No. 743/2541 Bangkok, 27 July 1998.
[5] Snitwongse, Kusuma. "Thai Foreign Policy in the Global Age: Principe or Profit?" Contemporary Southeast Asia No. 2 (August 2001), pp. 189-212.
[6] In 1994, Thailand declined a request from the United States to position U.S. Navy supply ships in the Gulf of Thailand. The reason for the decline was understood to have considered China's expected unfavorable reaction.
[7] This includes the 10 ASEAN countries plus China, Japan, and Korea. The first official meeting was held in July 2000 in Bangkok.
[8] Snitwongse, pp. 189-212.

Turkey

Assessment: Fair
Trend: ⇔
Capital: Ankara
Type of Government: Republican Parliamentary Democracy
Head of Government: Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit (since 11 January 1999)
Foreign Minister: Sukru Sina Gurel
Population: 66,493,970
Human Development Index Ranking 2002: 85

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Turkey has a **fair** record of support for democracy abroad. Between 1992 and 2002, Turkey participated in election monitoring missions and gave rhetorical support to democratic development in the region. On several occasions, Turkey made significant contributions to peacekeeping operations and post-conflict reconstruction efforts that were essential in preparing the ground for establishing democratic regimes. However, Turkey's performance has been rather poor when it comes to providing economic assistance to support democracy promotion abroad and to criticizing the policies of most undemocratic regimes.

The legacy of the Ottoman empire and its geo-strategic location at the crossroads of Europe and Asia make Turkey an important actor in several neighborhoods of varying degrees of democratic development, including: Europe, the Balkans, Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East. With limited economic resources and internal political problems, however, Turkey has not been a global actor in promoting democracy abroad. Turkey has consistently chosen to emphasize protection of its economic and strategic interests over democracy in these regions. Turkey has encouraged democratic development only when it did not compromise its vital interests.

FOREIGN RELATIONS BACKGROUND

Over the past decade, Turkey's major foreign policy objectives have centered around becoming a member of the European Union (EU) and expanding its influence in the Eurasian region. Other issues of primary concern for the Turkish foreign policy establishment have included resolving ethnic conflicts in the Balkans and the Caucasus, securing the export of Caspian energy resources through Turkey, protecting Turks in Cyprus and supporting the territorial integrity of the countries in the neighboring regions.

Since the end of the Cold War, Turkey has worked to establish closer relations with the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union. In the early 1990s, Turkey's secular, democratic political system and free-market economy were offered as a model to the newly independent states of Central Asia and Azerbaijan. In this context, the Turkish International Cooperation Agency (TICA) was established in January 1992 to coordinate and direct Turkish development assistance. However, very little of this aid was channeled to democracy-building projects. In international fora, Turkey has supported the membership of these Central Asian countries in the UN, the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) [1] and Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Yet, Turkey's limited economic capacity and political influence in the region hindered the Turkish model from being embraced fully by the leaders of these countries.[2] Besides energy politics and other economic interests, Turkey's foreign policy objectives also include preventing the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and balancing Russian and Iranian influence in the region. Support for democracy promotion is not high on the list of priorities.

With regard to the Balkans, Turkish foreign policy objectives have focused on bringing peace and stability to the region. Turkish media and civil society organizations called for greater involvement in

protecting Muslim populations in Bosnia and Kosovo. Turkey chose to act through multinational initiatives, rather than acting unilaterally, to safeguard these interests. It has contributed to peacekeeping operations as a NATO member and has supported the Southeast European Stability Pact. On several occasions, Turkey has emphasized that building pluralistic democratic regimes is crucial for preserving peace in the region. Through the OSCE framework, Turkey has also provided election-monitoring assistance in Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia. Countries such as Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia have also received Turkish economic assistance to help their reconstruction efforts.

Ongoing disputes between Turkey and Greece over control of Cyprus have continued to complicate Turkey's foreign policy. In 1974, the Turkish military intervened in Cyprus to prevent a Greek-led takeover of the island and occupied 40 percent of the territory, which was later declared the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus." Turkey's policy of demanding greater autonomy for Turkish Cypriots as a condition for Cyprus' accession to the EU has had a negative effect on Turkey's record of support for democracy promotion abroad. Ankara's support for the Turkish Cypriot leader, Rauf Denktash, and his preference for linking the island's EU accession to a negotiated solution, has been a source of international criticism. Moreover, there is growing concern, both in and outside of Turkey, that Mr. Denktash's policies don't actually reflect the general will of the Turkish Cypriots. As Turkey intensifies its own efforts to join the EU, influential NGOs, newspaper columnists and other second-track diplomacy groups have started to call for a more flexible foreign policy with regard to Cyprus. They hope such an approach would encourage a more democratic environment in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and allow the Turkish Cypriots to discuss their future more freely.

Over the past decade, the number of NGOs focusing on human rights and democratization in Turkey has grown. As these NGOs start to gain more ground in Turkey, an increased level of second track diplomacy could emerge and complement the traditional foreign policy tools, as already demonstrated in the cases of Turkish-Greek and Turkish-Armenian relations. An increased involvement of civic organizations in the making of foreign policy would benefit Turkey's record of support for international democracy.

RESPONSE TO OVERTHROW OF DEMOCRATICALLY-ELECTED GOVERNMENTS

Turkey has been reluctant to interfere with the domestic politics of foreign countries, and has avoided issuing strong statements with regard to unconstitutional overthrows of governments. In general, Turkey has issued statements that expressed regret in the face of such developments, but has not called for any concrete actions such as imposing sanctions or severing diplomatic relations.

With regard to the military coup in Pakistan (1999), Turkey cautiously disapproved of the move, but did not issue a strong condemnation. Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit's remarks at the time emphasized the historical "brotherly relationship" between the two countries and pointed out that these relations transcended the governments of the day. Turkey neither severed diplomatic relations nor called for sanctions. Nevertheless, it did call for an end to the interruption of democracy in a peaceful way as soon as possible.[3] During General Musharraf's official visit to Turkey in November 1999, shortly after the coup, he was advised to take the necessary steps to return to a democratic system.[4] And when Prime Minister Ecevit paid an official visit to India in April 2000, he turned down General Musharraf's invitation to extend his visit to Pakistan. Since then, Pakistani-Turkish relationship has continued to operate on a bilateral basis and through the framework of Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), even after the controversial referendum of April 2002, which confirmed Musharraf's position for another five years.

Turkey's muted reaction to anti-democratic developments in Pakistan can be explained by various factors such as the Turkish military's continued influence on the country's foreign policy as well as its expectations with regard to the future policies of General Musharraf, including the possible establishment of a relatively secular and democratic regime. Broader foreign policy concerns such as maintaining economic relations with Pakistan and securing Pakistan's support for its position regarding Cyprus have also been important in mitigating Turkey's reaction.

In the case of Azerbaijan, Turkey's fear of antagonizing Russia and Iran limited its intervention. Turkey took a passive stance when President Elchibey, who supported a pro-Turkey policy, was ousted from power in June 1993. The lack of strong condemnation of the military coup demonstrated the limits of Turkish influence in the

new Turkic countries. Moreover, allegations have surfaced that an attempted coup against President Aliev in 1995 had the fingerprints of certain Turkish intelligence agents. President Demirel helped President Aliev preserve his position by sharing the Turkish National Intelligence Agency dossier on the coup.[5]

RESPONSE TO MANIPULATED ELECTORAL PROCESSES

Turkey has participated in electoral monitoring activities through international organizations such as the OSCE and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Parliamentary Assembly. Turkey has shown particular interest in the elections taking place in Balkan nations, with large Muslim populations such as the former Yugoslavia, where Turkey has also been participating in peacekeeping operations. Turkish officials have stated on various occasions that they supported efforts to establish the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, and encouraged the holding of free and fair elections as a way to maintain the multicultural and multiethnic state, with its constituent nations and a pluralistic democratic society. Furthermore, Turkey made sure that Bosnian refugees in Turkey were able to vote in the September 1996 Bosnian elections. Turkey has also made efforts to protect the voting rights of the Kosovar Turks by asking the UNMIK to take the necessary measures to guarantee their rights as enshrined in the 1974 Kosovo Constitution.

Another region where Turkey has participated in election monitoring is the Caucasus. Members of the Turkish Parliament participated as observers in the November 2000 elections in Azerbaijan, and despite some irregularities determined the elections were generally successful. This was a distinctly minority view among international and domestic monitors. While the Turkish delegations called on the Azeri authorities to investigate these irregularities, reactions never reached a stage that would impair relations between the two countries. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs decided not to issue statements on the Azerbaijani elections, as this would constitute "interference into the domestic politics of a sovereign country."[6]

In the case of Algeria (1992), Turkey's official response to the military's intervention in the election process was also cautious and muted. Turley believes that the secular nature of the Algerian regime must be preserved. The botched elections of 1991-1992, however, prompted Turkey's own Islamist groups to organize protest rallies against the Algerian military and, as a result, rekindled the debate on Islam's compatibility with democracy. Even in this context, Turkey did not support or condemn the Algerian military's position with regard to the electoral process.

PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRACY

Turkey has generally supported the promotion of international democracy through major international organizations such as the UN, OSCE, the Council of Europe and NATO, and has endorsed the Warsaw Declaration of the Community of Democracies. Its record of ratifying key human rights conventions, however, is uneven. It has accepted the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the European Convention on Prevention of Torture, the European Social Charter, the Convention Against Torture (CAT) and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). Turkey has not ratified the Framework Convention for National Minorities or the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD).

Turkey's aspiration to join the European Union requires it to take important steps to improve its internal political reforms. Most recently, on 3 August 2002, the Turkish Grand National Assembly passed a package of human rights laws aimed at improving the protection of the cultural rights of minorities, as well as abolishing the death penalty in peacetime.[7] This reform package marks an important change and is a major step towards Turkey becoming a liberal democratic state. Achieving internal peace and stability by strengthening democracy at home could, in turn, translate into an enhanced willingness and capacity for advocating democracy promotion abroad.

Turkey has become a foreign aid donor country since the mid-1980s. Most of its foreign assistance, however, has been used to further strategic and economic interests in designated regions, rather than targeted to democracy building.[8] Providing foreign assistance has gained more importance since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. While Turkey provided only $5 million to developing countries between 1985-91, this figure jumped to $1.2 billion in 1992.[9] More recently, the distribution of aid among recipient countries has become more balanced; aid granted to the democratizing Balkan

states such as Albania, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina has begun to more closely approximate that given to the new Central Asian Turkic countries.[10]

POLICY TOWARDS ENTRENCHED DICTATORSHIPS

Given its location and strategic interests, Turkey has established cordial relations with most of the dictatorial regimes of Central Asia and the Middle East.

In the case of Iraq, Turkey has abided by the UN Security Council resolutions, suffering huge economic losses as a result. Yet, its strategic partnership with Washington has prompted Turkey, somewhat reluctantly, to support U.S. initiatives aimed at replacing the authoritarian regime in Iraq. Turkey has, however, voiced its concerns over the consequences of a possible military strike to force a regime change in Iraq, citing the possibility of the establishment of a federal Kurdish state in the Northern Iraq, a development Ankara strongly opposes.

Turkey has also maintained strong relations with Libya and Nigeria. Prime Minister Erbakan paid official visits to these countries in October 1996 with a view to establishing closer relations, drawing strong criticisms from opposition parties and the military staff. The attempt to improve relations with these isolated undemocratic regimes was, however, not at the heart of the criticisms. Rather, the critics questioned Mr. Qaddafi's calls for the formation of an independent Kurdish state. Despite this incident, Turkey refrained from actions that could jeopardize economic relations with Libya, where about 100 Turkish companies hold contracts worth billions of dollars.[11]

Securing Turkish economic and strategic interests in the Eurasian region by establishing close relationships with the autocratic Turkic states of Central Asia and Caucasus has been another priority for Turkey. This has not, however, prevented Ankara from providing support to opposition groups in Uzbekistan, which led to strains in Turkey's "brotherly relationship" with the Karimov regime. In retaliation, President Karimov recalled Uzbeki students who were studying in Turkey, claiming that they were in touch with Muhammed Salih, an Uzbek dissident leader who was granted asylum in Turkey.[12] Another crisis erupted in 1999, when Uzbek officials asked Turkey to extradite two of its citizens accused of involvement in an assassination attempt against the Uzbek president. Turkey agreed to extradite the suspects to Uzbekistan only after receiving formal guarantees that they would not face the death penalty. The delay in the extradition and Turkey's demands led to mutual recriminations and diplomatic protests. Relations between the two countries normalized after visits to Uzbekistan by Foreign Minister Ismail Cem and President Sezer in October 2000. The two governments signed a military cooperation agreement and pledged to work together to combat terrorism.

Turkey has sought to establish a closer, cooperative relationship with the authoritarian government of Turkmenistan, citing historical and cultural ties. Turkish business officials have been investing heavily in Turkmenistan over the past decade. Furthermore, the export of Turkmen natural gas through Turkey has been an important bilateral issue. Turkey signed a military cooperation agreement with Turkmenistan in March 2002, similar to that signed with Uzbekistan, with the aim of helping the Turkmen defense industry sector. Not surprisingly, Turkey has not devoted particular attention to democracy promotion in Turkmenistan.

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[1] The ECO membership comprises Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan.

[2] See Balci, Idris Turkey's Relations with the West and the Turkic Republics: The rise and fall of the Turkish Model for a detailed discussion on the Turkish model.

[3] Turkish Daily News, 14 Oct. 1999

[4] Milliyet, 9 Nov. 1999

[5] Turkish Daily News, 8 Dec. 1996

[6] Turkish Daily News, 15 Nov. 2000

[7] See EU General Secretariat's web page at <www.euturkey.org.tr> for a detailed analysis of the reforms. Among other things, the reform package addresses controversial issues such as broadcasting and education in mother-tongues, including the Kurdish language.

[8] According to the statistical information provided by the State Planning Institute, an overwhelming portion of the foreign aid provided between 1992-1996 was devoted to economic assistance category (80.5%), followed by humanitarian aid (14.2%), technical aid (4.3%) and cultural aid (0.9%)

[9] Devlet Planlama Teskilati (State Planning Institute), Report published in March 1998.

[10] For details on Official Turkish Foreign Grants see State Statistics Institute's report at <http://www.die.gov.tr/TURKISH/SONIST/UHYAS/07082001.html>

[11] Hellenic Resources Network 20 Feb. 1997.

[12] See Turk Dis Politikasi -Cilt II, p.386, for the number of Turkic students receiving education in Turkey. Detailed information is also available at Turkish Ministry of Education <www.meb.gov.tr>.

Ukraine

Assessment: Fair
Trend: ⇔
Capital: Kiev
Type of Government: Republic
Chief of State: President Leonid D. Kuchma (since 19 July 1994)
Minister of Foreign Affairs: Anatoliy Zlenko
Population: 48,760,474
Human Development Index Ranking 2002: 80

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Ukraine has a **fair** record of support for democracy abroad. As it struggles to overcome its own democratic shortcomings, Ukraine has made modest progress in promoting international democracy, primarily by adopting international conventions and treaties, and by participating in operations and missions of the UN and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). At the same time, Ukraine has responded poorly to overthrows of democratically-elected governments, has generally been reluctant to condemn the manipulation of electoral processes, and compiled a track record of cozy relationships with entrenched dictatorships.

The country's disappointing record with respect to support for democracy abroad is a function of a complex and evolving domestic environment, including severe economic decline, lack of civic democratic traditions, weak rule of law, and widespread corruption. A review of the past decade indicates that when economic interests are pitted against democratic principles, Ukrainian governments have most often stressed economic and other strategic considerations. Participation in UN peacekeeping missions, however laudable, was motivated more by a desire to integrate into Western structures rather than any commitment to democracy building abroad. Democracy promotion has not been an explicit goal of Ukrainian foreign policy.

FOREIGN RELATIONS BACKGROUND

One of the largest nations in Europe, Ukraine is a relative newcomer to international politics. It became an independent nation following a referendum in December 1991. As in the rest of Central and Eastern Europe, Ukraine's pro-independence movement consisted of a loose coalition of nationalists (People's Movement or *Rukh*), students, and labor unions (its own version of *Solidarity*). Together, these groups advocated national revival, democracy, and, following the 1986 Chernobyl disaster, de-nuclearization of the state. Unfortunately, Ukraine lacked strong democratic traditions, clear support from the West for its independence, and governing experience.

The new Ukrainian government faced a number of additional pressures, including the traditional split in Ukraine's population between the Russophile east and Russophobe west, Russian and Romanian calls for redrawing national borders, and intense U.S. pressure to give up nuclear weapons based on its soil. In response to these pressures, the novice Ukrainian government made internal cohesion, territorial integrity, and stability its top priorities.[1] It performed quite well on all these fronts, and drew praise from the European Union for its commitment to domestic and regional stability, for negotiating border agreements with all neighboring nations, and for becoming the first country in the world to voluntarily relinquish possession of all nuclear arms, in this case Moscow-controlled weapons in Ukraine following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Ukraine's solid international performance was not, however, matched by equally successful internal development. From 1991 to 1999 Ukraine's GDP fell by almost three-quarters as social problems deepened and multiplied. The privatization of state-owned assets was slow and, instead of creating a strong middle class, gave rise to a powerful group of industrial oligarchs. There was little progress on establishing the rule of law

or undertaking judicial reform, and rampant corruption earned Ukraine the sad distinction of being named one of the world's most corrupt countries by Transparency International.

Democratic political reform also lagged. After an initial "thaw," Ukrainian governments gradually tightened their grip on the media, and by 2000 the Kuchma Administration had made curbs on free expression a feature of everyday life. Many Ukrainians came to believe that Kuchma was linked to the gruesome murder of prominent, anti-corruption crusading journalist Georgiy Gongadze. OSCE observer missions monitoring Ukraine's 1998 parliamentary and 1999 presidential elections reported widespread irregularities accompanied by intimidation of candidates and abuse of public office. The European Union and influential groups such as Amnesty International criticized Ukraine's weak human rights record, and called attention to allegations of torture and ill treatment of persons in police custody.

Ukraine's vigorous efforts to integrate into trans-European political and security structures was sometimes impeded by struggles between the executive branch and parliament ("Verkhovna Rada") for dominance in setting foreign policy. Successive presidents pursued closer cooperation with NATO (through. Partnership for Peace), eventual membership in the EU,[2] and "pragmatic" (i.e. economically beneficial) relations with neighboring countries. But eagerness to join the West did not translate into a foreign policy that made promotion of democracy and human rights a priority.

RESPONSE TO OVERTHROW OF DEMOCRATICALLY-ELECTED GOVERNMENTS

Ukraine's reaction to the October 1999 overthrow of the democratically-elected government of Pakistani President Nawaz Sharif by General Pervez Musharraf was relatively mild. Two days after the coup, the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry issued a statement expressing the hope that events would develop in "a peaceful, democratic manner" and would not "undermine regional stability."[3] The Ministry did not categorically condemn the coup or call for downgrading political, economic, or cultural ties. Instead it emphasized that the "experience of cooperation in different fields acquired by the two countries will allow for further development of traditionally friendly relations between Ukraine and Pakistan."[4] In the absence of internationally-imposed sanctions, Ukraine saw no reason for destabilizing its relations with Pakistan. This reaction can be explained in part by Ukraine's financial interests. In 1996, Ukraine's state-run Malyshev industrial plant in Kharkiv won a contract from Pakistan to produce more than 300 modern battle tanks at a total cost of some $650 million. This was Ukraine's largest defense contract since independence, and promised to keep afloat both the Malyshev plant and associated enterprises.

RESPONSE TO MANIPULATION OF ELECTORAL PROCESSES

Ukraine's indifferent response to the manipulation of electoral processes abroad has reflected its own weak record on internal democracy. This is particularly evident in the cases of Kazakhstan and Belarus. Ukrainian monitors participated in observer missions for presidential elections in Kazakhstan that were described by OSCE as failing to meet international standards. However, the Government of Ukraine did not subscribe to the mission's conclusions. Instead, President Kuchma sent a telegram to his Kazakhstani counterpart, Nursultan Nazarbayev, congratulating him on his victory and lauding his contribution to the country's development, including democratization.[5]

The OSCE's Office for Democratic Institution and Human Rights (ODIHR) similarly faulted the October 2000 parliamentary elections in Belarus for being neither free nor fair. Ukrainian officials all but dismissed the finding, stating that Belarus' new deputies had the ability to carry out their traditional legislative function[6] and that the parliament's "legitimate authority should be acknowledged by both those who won and those who lost."[7] This response reversed more progressive sentiments expressed by the Foreign Ministry a year earlier, following clashes between democratic opposition and police in Minsk. Foreign Ministry officials were then quoted as saying, "Ukraine believes that under any circumstances the internal political problems should be solved by way of political dialogue, according to international obligations in the area of human rights and basic freedoms, in particular freedom of speech and freedom of assembly."[8]

By 2001, Ukraine's already poor record in not opposing electoral manipulation had deteriorated further. An OSCE/ODIHR team monitoring the September presidential elections in Belarus issued a report that bluntly criticized the inadequacies of the electoral process, weak legislative framework, censorship of the independent print media,

intimidation of political activists and a campaign environment seriously disadvantageous for opposition candidates. Yet, Ukraine's observers with the OSCE team openly disagreed with the mission's report. Indeed, Natalya Vitrenko, head of the Ukrainian monitors and the leader of the Progressive Socialist Party, called a press conference in which she said that President Lukashenko was "worthy of his electoral triumph," and that European institutions needed "protection from charlatans who pursue a policy of pressure, in particular against the former Soviet republics."[9] Her statements were echoed by President Kuchma, who described Lukashenko's victory as "convincing" and one that "cannot be dismissed," albeit adding that Ukraine would "take into account" the conclusions of the international community regarding the elections.[10] Both the U.S. and the OSCE called the vote a "sham" and refused to recognize the election results.[11]

PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRACY

Ukraine's overall record of promoting international democracy is appreciably better than its actions in the electoral sphere. Ukraine is a member of numerous international organizations, and on occasion has taken an active role in promoting democratic practices beyond its borders. In 1998, Ukraine hosted an international conference commemorating the 50th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and supported the creation of the International Criminal Court. It has also ratified or become a party to several major international human rights treaties[12] and abolished the death penalty.

Since independence, Ukraine also has been very active in UN peacekeeping missions aimed at creating and maintaining democracy, peace, and stability in various parts of the world. More than 8,000 Ukrainian military and civilian personnel served under the UN flag in Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, East Timor, Guatemala, Macedonia, Mozambique and Tajikistan. By 2001, Ukraine had become Europe's largest contributor to UN peacekeeping operations.

Ukraine has been a strong backer of the UN more generally. Despite its grave economic difficulties, Ukraine met its substantial assessed obligations. The country was elected to be a non-permanent member of the Security Council in 2000-2001. In addition, as a member of OSCE, Ukrainian officials have participated in election monitoring and other missions to Georgia, Yugoslavia, Croatia, Nagorno-Karabakh as well as Belarus and Kazakhstan.

The Ukrainian government has taken a positive stance in response to democracy-eroding developments in what it calls the "far abroad." In a series of communiqués and statements, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned violence in Sierra-Leone (1999, 2000), military skirmishes between India and Pakistan (1999), and the actions of extremist groups in East Timor (1999).[13]

Ukraine has also been the beneficiary of considerable assistance from the U.S. (fourth largest worldwide) and the EU. Some of this assistance is explicitly earmarked for programs intended to spur democratic reform in spheres such as rule of law, judicial independence, media freedom, and civil society building.

POLICY TOWARDS ENTRENCHED DICTATORHSIPS

Ukraine's policy toward entrenched dictatorships, such as those in Belarus and in the countries of Central Asia, has fluctuated between indifference and vocal support. Ukraine's relationship with the authoritarian regime of Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko has been largely pragmatic, based in part on geographic proximity and close economic ties. Although Kuchma congratulated Lukashenko on his controversial September 2001 victory, there is relatively little political cooperation between Minsk and Kyiv. Belarus' strong support for integration under Russian leadership of the former Soviet Republics conflicts with Ukraine's stated foreign policy interests.

Ukraine's policy toward Uzbekistan has been similarly driven by geo-strategic interests that leave little room for democracy-promoting considerations. Ukrainian governments have attempted to position the country as a regional leader rivaling Russia. Kyiv was one of the founders of GUUAM, a loose alliance composed of Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova, which emerged in 1996 and to which Uzbekistan was a party in 1999–2002.[14] The official goals of GUUAM have been to: establish a Europe-South Caucasus-Central Asia trade corridor and pipeline transit route; support its members against challenges to regional security and stability; and promote close relations with NATO. The unspoken aim of the alliance is to prevent Russia from exploiting Caspian Sea oil. As a de facto leader of the alliance, Ukraine has been careful not to criticize Uzbekistan's

abysmal democracy and human rights record. It has, instead, called the country "a reliable friend and a strategic partner," one with whom it has a "vital" relationship that must grow "stronger with every passing year."[15]

Similar pragmatic considerations also significantly influenced Ukraine's relationship with then-leader of the Former Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic. Concerns about regional stability and security, as well as strong economic interests, led Ukraine to try to prevent Western military action. The Ukrainian government expressed mild criticism of the Milosevic regime, urging it to respect principles of international law and not to engage in ethnic cleansing or other violence against civilians. Kyiv opposed NATO's use of force, calling for a peaceful settlement of the crisis. When in 1999 the Hague International Tribunal indicted Milosevic for war crimes, Ukraine viewed the measure as a possible impediment to ongoing diplomatic efforts. The government reiterated this sentiment when the Tribunal extradited Milosevic in 2001, stating that such a move could destabilize the entire region.

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[1] A statement by Borys Tarasyuk, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine from April 1998 through September 2000 and a key foreign policy-maker reads: "Under the conditions of radical changes which took place on the world arena in the period from late 80-ies to early 90-ies the people of the newborn Ukrainian state chose their own way of development, primarily aimed at creation of a democratic, legal and socially-oriented state where the rights and freedoms of man are honored and the force of law prevails. Ensuring state independence, territorial integrity and immunity of state frontiers became a priority means of internal revival and development of the Ukrainian state, protection of national political and economic interests on the world arena. On the basis of these priority tasks, the foreign policy of independent Ukraine and its key foreign political priorities are determined" . "Ukraine 2000: Ways of International Cooperation" CD-ROM, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine/UN Development Program (UKR/97/005).

[2] Ibid.

[3] *Commentary of the Press Service of the MFA of Ukraine*, October 14, 1999, http://www.mfa.gov.ua/information/card.shtml?mfa/1999/10/1403.html.

[4] Ibid.

[5] "ITAR-TASS Asian News-in-Brief for Tuesday, January 12," *ITAR-TASS News Agency*, January 12, 1999.

[6] "Ukraine official sees hope for legitimate Belarus parliament," *Deutsche Presse-Agentur*, October 31, 2000.

[7] "Plushch diplomatic on Belarus elections," *UNIAN*, October 17, 2000.

[8] *Statement of the Press Service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine*, October 18, 1999, http://www.mfa.gov.ua/information/card.shtml?mfa/1999/10/1801.html.

[9] "Ukrainian observers disagree with OSCE team over Belarussian elections," *Interfax News Agency*, September 11, 2001.

[10] "Ukrainian president calls Lukashenko's presidential victory 'convincing'", *Agence France Presse*, September 11, 2001.

[11] Ibid.

[12] The International Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1969), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1973), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1973), the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (1981), the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1987), the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1991), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1991), the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (2000), and two Optional Protocols to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (2000).

[13] All statements and communiqués of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine can be found on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, following the link http://www.mfa.gov.ua/information/?mfa.

[14] Uzbekistan has suspended its membership in GUUAM starting June 2002.

[15] Leonid Kuchma, Statement, October 21, 2000, quoted in the on-line news release *Uzbek TV Screens Programme on Ukrainian Head's Visit to Uzbekistan*, October 21, 2000, http://www.uzland.uz/2000/10_21.

United Kingdom

Assessment: Good
Trend: ⇔
Capital: London
Type of Government: Constitutional Monarchy
Head of Government: Prime Minister Tony Blair (since 2 May 1997)
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs: Jack Straw
Population: 56,647,790
Human Development Index Ranking 2002: 13

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Overall, Britain's record of support for democracy worldwide is **good**. It consistently criticizes those situations that compromise democratic values, and often acts upon its verbal condemnation with sanctions, as in the case of Burma, and sometimes even intervention, as seen in its support for ousting Slobodan Milosevic. Typically, Britain's record of support for democracy has been weaker toward countries with which it had or sought strong economic ties, as in China, and/or military ties. For example, it sold arms to Indonesia, which were then used to threaten East Timorese, and has sought to develop trade ties with Iran, despite the theocratic regime's continued blocking of democratic reforms.

While Britain may no longer be the great power that it once was in the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth century, it is still capable of serving as an example of how an advanced, democratic society should act in defense of democracy around the world. Given its leadership role at the United Nations, the Commonwealth, and other international bodies, Britain is in position to influence the international community's approach towards transgressors of international democratic norms, and on balance has exercised that influence decisively.

FOREIGN RELATIONS BACKGROUND

In previous centuries, Britain held a prominent place in world politics. Today, at the start of the twenty-first century, it still does. A country that occasionally "punches above its weight," much of Britain's influence rests in its close alliance with the United States, its position on the United Nations Security Council, its membership in the European Union (EU), and its legacy of empire. Indeed, Britain played a critical role in forming the United Nations at the end of the Second World War and in instilling the principles of democracy and human rights that help comprise its charter. The British support an enlargement of the EU to serve not only for the economic development of the former Soviet bloc, but also as a "buttress against extremism."[1] London is also a firm supporter of the International Criminal Court, and continues to try to use its special relationship with the United States to bring Washington solidly on board. Nonetheless, the British record is not perfect, and sometimes short-term economic interests have outweighed longer-term interests in promoting democratic values.

Britain underwent a major change in the political arena when voters elected the Labour Party into power in 1997 for the first time in 18 years. With the change in power came, at least ostensibly, a change in foreign policy. Just weeks after entering office, then-Foreign Minister, Robin Cook, issued a mission statement that supplied "an ethical content in foreign policy," recognizing that national interest "cannot be defined only by narrow realpolitik."[2] The goals within the statement were "vague and uncontroversial," as one

analyst noted, calling for the promotion of security and prosperity for Britain and for the enhancement of the quality of life.[3] The statement also pledged Labour to "work through our international forums and bilateral relationships to spread the values of human rights, civil liberties, and democracy, which we demand for ourselves."[4]

Blair argued, "people say you can't be self-appointed guardians of what's right and wrong. True, but when the international community agrees on certain objectives and then fails to implement them, those who can act, must."[5] Britain, as a country that is capable of acting to implement certain objectives, often has done just that. When it came to supporting democracy around the world, Britain overall has solidly defended it, in statements and often by deeds, both unilaterally and as a part of an international organization or coalition.

RESPONSE TO OVERTHROW OF DEMOCRATICALLY-ELECTED GOVERNMENTS

In general, Britain has spoken out against the overthrow of democratically-elected governments, whether by military coups or other means. For example, strong condemnations followed the coups in Cote d'Ivoire (1999) and Ecuador (1999). When the Venezuelan government returned to power after an attempted coup in 2002, London applauded the return to democracy. Indeed, in most cases studied in the survey, the British government issued at least some statement of concern and often led multilateral responses. In Nigeria, Britain went further by denying aid after the annulment of election results in 1993. London supported Nigeria's suspension from the Commonwealth following the 1995 executions of nine opposition leaders, and endorsed the suspension of Fiji from the Commonwealth after a coup in 2000.

While the British did not have a combative role during the Haiti crisis in 1994, they did offer two ships and 300 soldiers for a two-week period. Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind's rationale was that the new regime in Haiti was one "of particular cruelty and barbarism" and thus required such measures.[6] Yet for many observers, British action against Haiti was in response to its special relationship with the United States, "little more than a traditional reflex response to a request from Washington," was how some British officials saw it.[7] Whatever the reason, British resolve was strong, fully supporting both the decision to send American troops and the UN resolution to restore democracy in Haiti.

In Pakistan, immediately after the coup of 1999, Foreign Office minister Peter Hain said that the British government, leading the international condemnation of the coup, wanted to see that Pakistan was "penalized as strongly as possibly diplomatically." Indeed, London carried through on its threat to push for Pakistan's suspension from the Commonwealth. Just a few weeks after these harsh words, however, Britain switched its policy. London contended that General Musharraf and the armed forces had a case for staging a coup, calling the former regime under Nawaz Sharif a "corrupt, dreadful" one that "looted the country...."[8] The sudden shift can be attributed to the new regime's warnings that British criticism would drive it to associate itself with Islamic militants. What the British and Pakistanis did, then, was cut a deal: Hain agreed that "General Musharraf the coup leader will find us ready listeners and willing to play a constructive role as long as he gives uncompromising commitments to building a new democracy." Pakistan, in return, would cooperate with efforts to track down Osama bin Laden, sever links to the Taliban, and sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.[9] Britain has continued to follow political developments in Pakistan and expressed concern that the May 2002 national referendum, which gave Musharraf another five years as president, was a serious divergence from the path to democracy he had elaborated in August 2001.

RESPONSE TO MANIPULATION OF ELECTORAL PROCESSES

As with the overthrow of elected governments, Britain typically was quick to condemn the manipulation of electoral processes. Where Britain had more room to respond with harsher treatment (as with Commonwealth nations), it did. London led the Commonwealth decision to suspend Zimbabwe (2002) and went a step further by supporting the EU's targeted sanctions against Mugabe and his allies and by opposing "any access by Zimbabwe to international financial resources until a more representative government is in place." Foreign Secretary Jack Straw also stressed that Britain would continue to support the citizens of Zimbabwe through humanitarian assistance.[10] Moreover, even in the months prior to the election, the British government suspended the removal of

failed Zimbabwean asylum seekers from Britain until after the elections were held. Mugabe, however, has effectively turned the tables on Blair by charging that Britain's real concern is the remaining white farmers whose land has been confiscated as part of a long-delayed land reform program.

In Sierra Leone, a former British colony, Britain again went beyond mere condemnation. As the largest international contributor, Britain donated £3 million to support the March 1996 electoral process. London also sent five observers to monitor the elections. Britain's commitment to Sierra Leone continued after the elections -- it has committed millions of pounds in bilateral assistance to the country, and also has been working with the UN mission there in response to the rebel uprising to build new, democratically accountable armed forces. That commitment includes not only the training of troops but also an Amphibious Ready Group stationed off the coast.[11] After the rebels overthrew the government, Blair invited the President of the exiled government to the Commonwealth Edinburgh Summit, where he promised them help in restoring democracy. Some have complained, however, that Britain did not react adequately until the rebels reinvaded the capital and continued their gruesome practice of amputation.[12]

Elsewhere, Britain supported free and fair elections and chastised those that fell short. In Nigeria in 1993, it protested the annulment of the election, suspending some aid. Britain contributed observers to the OSCE's election monitoring in Belarus, which found that country's 2001 elections failed to meet international standards. Similarly, during Britain's presidency of the EU in 1998, that organization both sent election monitors and gave an $11 million package of electoral assistance to Cambodia in an effort to create conditions for free and fair elections.[13] With regard to Haiti's disputed elections in 2000, the British joined the EU in refusing to send either aid or observers because of the failure of the Haitians to retabulate votes from the previous election.

PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRACY

Britain has on balance a strong record when it comes to the practical support of international democracy. On occasion, however, the rhetoric of condemnations of military coups and botched elections was overshadowed by suspect arms deals and pandering to dictatorships. On the one hand, the British government supports the strengthening of democratic institutions abroad through the Westminster Foundation for Democracy, which provides assistance to a variety of programs and organizations. Likewise, Britain offered £200 million over the next five years to help rebuild Afghanistan and foster democracy there, but has promised only £650,000 in funding for human rights projects around the world that encourage free speech and freedom of expression. Britain has supported Angola and Ghana financially as well in their efforts to build a peaceful democracy.[14] Moreover, in its staunch support of the International Criminal Court and of an expansion of the European Union, Britain has further demonstrated its advocacy for a regional and global regime founded on democratic and human rights norms.

On the other hand, however, Britain also has sent arms to countries with troubling human rights records, including Saudi Arabia and Indonesia, which together account for 25 percent of British arms sales. This is in spite of eight policy pledges that the Labour Government produced during the 1997 election that outlined its view of a responsible arms trade. These pledges included issuing no licenses for arms to regimes that might use them for domestic or international aggression, and strengthened monitoring of end-use of arms. Britain also approved an EU code of conduct on arms exports making them conditional on respect for human rights.[15] And Robin Cook told the Labour Conference in 1999 that the government "rejected every license to Indonesia [from 1997 to 1999] when weapons might have been used for suppression." At the same time, however, Britain issued over 100 export licenses for military equipment to Indonesia, including aircraft spares, aircraft machine gun spares, body armor, and communications encryption equipment.

This episode demonstrates a disconnect when it comes to British policy and British practice. Indeed, in 1997, when asked about the sale of British Hawk aircraft to Indonesia, Cook responded with what seemed to indicate a tougher approach: "If we have evidence that any particular weapons systems—of which that is one—is being used for internal repression, we will not give an export license for it."[16] But just weeks later, London admitted that the Hawk sales would go on after all. The rationale was that Labour could not annul a contract entered into by a previous

government had entered; moreover, it would signal a lack of commitment to the British arms industry.[17] Finally, in 1999, the foreign secretary condemned the "appalling brutality" of the Indonesian regime in suppressing East Timor, and in September of that year suspended the planned sale of Hawk jets to Indonesia. Cook asserted that Britain would "support an EU arms embargo and will take national action to suspend further arms exports."[18] When it came time to send troops to East Timor to restore peace to the troubled region, Britain was among the contributors—in both troops and money.

In Austria, in the Joerg Haider case (1999), Britain and the other 14 member-states of the EU threatened diplomatic sanctions against any Austrian government that contained Haider's Freedom Party. His election fed a fear that democratic stability on the continent could be threatened by a rise of right-wing extremism, a concern reinforced by the growing popularity of anti-immigration politicians in France, Holland and Denmark. Britain and the other EU nations saw his rise to power as enough of a danger to democratic values that they saw fit to sanction a fellow member for the first time.[19]

POLICY TOWARDS ENTRENCHED DICTATORSHIPS

Britain's policy toward entrenched dictatorships has been mixed. While the ostensible purpose of British policy has been to promote democracy in such countries, other interests have been the primary driving force in favor of engagement.

Some positive actions include diplomatic protests (the removal of ambassadors) over the dictatorial policies of Belarus's President Lukashenko, and the condemnation of Cuba's human rights policies. Britain's disdain for Iraq's flouting of international law and failure to dismantle weapons facilities has resulted in air strikes by both the British and the Americans and support for a U.S.-led campaign to forcibly remove Saddam Hussein from power. Similarly, Britain's Labour Party dealt harshly with Slobodan Milosevic in the Balkans. Blair insisted that "we have learnt by bitter experience not to appease dictators," harkening back to the days of World War II to justify a more proactive approach.[20] Criticizing his Conservative predecessors for ineffectiveness in the Balkans, Blair lamented that "in Bosnia we waited for years before taking decisive action."[21] When dialogue between the West and Milosevic over Kosovo proved ineffective, Britain rejected further discussion and waged air strikes against targets throughout Serbia in an effort to bring the Serbian dictator to his knees. In addition, Britain has been a strong supporter of the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia as a means of bringing to justice Milosevic and his cronies in the Balkans crisis.

Towards other dictatorships, however, Britain has adopted a somewhat different stance. In line with others in the EU, Britain decided to strengthen diplomatic ties with North Korea in an effort to bring them out of global isolation. Likewise, Blair earlier this year announced the establishment of a special envoy for Sudan. Britain also reestablished diplomatic relations with Iran after the ascendancy to power of the moderate President Khatami, but only gingerly over the course of several years, and only after Iran promised not to execute the fatwa against British author Salman Rushdie. The UN, Amnesty International, and the U.S. State Department all have condemned the dire human rights situation in Iran, which included stonings, unfair trials, detention without trial and torture.[22] Britain's argument, however, was that the improvements made in Iranian society—political debate in the media, the appointment of female judges, and the holding of local elections for the first time since 1979 -- were worth encouraging.[23] The Iranian charge d'affaires suggested another reason for the new British government's rapprochement -- "its recognition of commercial realities." Diplomatic relations led to improved trade relations, as Britain adopted numerous measures to promote trade and investment there after the U.S. lifted the threat of sanctions.[24]

Britain's relations with China have followed a similar logic -- much of Sino-British relationship centers around business and trade, sometimes at the expense of democracy and human rights. When the two countries were arranging for the turnover of Hong Kong in 1997, negotiators sought to preserve Hong Kong's basic political freedoms and institutions, not only because the British respected these as important values to uphold, but also because the Chinese saw them as critical to the continued economic success of Hong Kong.[25] In general, the transition was deemed a success, as there were no disruptions. However, while Hong Kong's freedoms remain

essentially respected by China, there have been threats to its autonomy and judicial independence, as well as signs of censorship. Yet what was evident during the transition was a darker side to British diplomacy that raises concerns about Britain's commitment to maintaining solid business relations—Britain is the largest European investor in China—at the expense of democracy. For example, when elections were first held for Hong Kong's Legislative Council in 1995, Britain refused to let foreign observers in to monitor them, "in an attempt to stave off embarrassment and avoid China's anger."[26] Similarly, when Chinese Vice President Hu Jintao met with Blair in October 2001, talk focused on trade links and not such sensitive topics as Tibet.

In Latin America, Britain was in the thick of one of the most controversial human rights cases in recent years when former Chilean dictator General Augusto Pinochet was arrested in London in 1998. When then-Home Secretary Jack Straw decided to allow Pinochet to return to Chile for health reasons, he caused an uproar among human rights activists and the international legal community. In spite of the final decision, Britain took a major risk in straining relations with Chile by allowing his arrest in the first place; some in the region charged that London was engaged in "moral colonialism."[27]

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

United States

Assessment: Good
Trend: ⇓
Capital: Washington, DC
Type of Government: Federal Republic
Head of State: President George W. Bush (since 20 January 2001)
Secretary of State: Colin Powell
Population: 278,058,881
Human Development Index Ranking 2002: 6

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The United States has a **good** record of support for democracy abroad. As the world's most powerful democracy with unrivalled global reach and capabilities, the United States has enormous leverage to influence trends toward democracy. When it has chosen to reach out to others and matched its rhetoric with consistent action, it has contributed decisively to democracy's spread around the world. Yet as the world's dominant power, facing a complex array of interests and challenges, concern for democracy often has lost out to other motives.

During the 1990s, democracy promotion arguably became the most consistent rhetorical theme of U.S. foreign policy across issues and regions, and Washington dedicated more resources and institutional support in this area than ever before. But democracy promotion often took a backseat to more pressing strategic or economic interests – as demonstrated in the cases of Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Pakistan. Furthermore, it has lost some of its moral leadership by expressing support for preferred candidates in close elections and by pursuing anti-terrorism strategies at home and abroad that have emboldened authoritarian leaders intent on suppressing internal dissent, thereby undermining fragile democratization processes.

FOREIGN RELATIONS BACKGROUND

At least since the days of President Woodrow Wilson, democracy promotion has been an important principle of U.S. diplomacy, and it received new emphasis during the Reagan presidency (1981-89). But it was only after the fall of the Berlin Wall that many in Washington from both major parties began to argue that the spread of democracy had become *the* fundamental guiding tenet of American foreign policy.

"Beyond containment lies democracy," Secretary of State James A. Baker III pronounced in 1990, and soon he and President George H.W. Bush were heralding the opportunities for a "democratic peace," with freedom stretching "from Vancouver to Vladivostok." President Bill Clinton, during his eight years in the White House, placed almost every one of his Administration's decisions –invading Haiti, bombing Kosovo, enlarging NATO, promoting reform in Russia, passing the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and developing a policy of strategic engagement with China – within the context of promoting and defending democracy. President George W. Bush has similarly adopted the rhetoric of democracy promotion in the recently released National Security Strategy (September 2002), which states that the United States "will actively work to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world," including Russia and China, "because these are the best foundations for domestic stability and international order."

Under Clinton, "democratic enlargement" replaced his predecessor's "democratic peace," but they both meant the same thing: countries that choose their own leaders are more likely to be better neighbors, allies, and trading partners; their economies and societies will be stronger and more consonant with U.S. interests; and they will be more likely to solve problems peaceably. Promoting and defending democracy was explained as far more than just a moral necessity: it was alternately described as a security imperative, a vital national interest, or a key element for U.S. national defense.[1]

The decade between 1992-2002 witnessed perhaps the most dramatic upsurge of resources and effort dedicated to supporting global democracy in U.S. history. Between 1992-1999, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) funding for democracy nearly tripled, from $225 million to $637 million a year. During the 1990s, the U.S. spent almost $1 billion on programs it characterized as democracy assistance for the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact states alone. The Clinton Administration formally declared "building sustainable democracies" one of USAID's core goals (over the resistance of some USAID insiders), and in 1994 created the Center for Democracy and Governance to lead this effort. In 1999-2000, the United States took the lead in conceptualizing the Community of Democracies, an initiative that brought the world's established and newer democracies into a forum dedicated to democracy for the first time. And Washington proved that in select circumstances – such as the 1994 invasion of Haiti - it was prepared to accept the costs and risks of putting its military forces in harm's way to defend the principle that a freely-elected government, deposed by military fiat, must be restored.

While these substantive shifts in the U.S. approach toward democracy are real, few could argue that it matched the high standards set by U.S. rhetoric. For all the increases in money allocated to promoting democracy, the programs still comprise only 10 percent of the entire foreign assistance budget – which itself is only about one penny on the federal dollar. And even where the U.S. has placed a high priority on supporting democracy, some question whether its assistance programs have gone about it the right way.

Moreover, Washington's efforts to promote or defend democracy have suffered from deep inconsistencies. The United States has made democracy an essential condition of its relationship with some countries (like many in Eastern Europe and Latin America), yet elsewhere (in China, Pakistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and most of the Arab world), democracy is pushed down the ladder of interests or ignored outright. Where democracy ranks in the hierarchy of interests often has shifted to suit other purposes, even to the point of undermining a pro-democracy strategy. When in conflict, economic and security interests almost always have trumped concerns about democracy.

RESPONSE TO OVERTHROW OF DEMOCRATICALLY-ELECTED GOVERNMENTS

Whenever a democratic government has been overthrown, whether by military coup or extra-constitutional measure, the initial U.S. response has almost always been strong rhetorical condemnation. It has regularly sponsored or supported resolutions in regional or international fora to condemn the action and often was prepared to do more. In fact, this practice has been so consistent during the past decade that when U.S. policy has strayed from categorical condemnation – such as in the April 2002 coup in Venezuela – it draws wide attention and heavy criticism.

However, U.S. willingness to go beyond casting votes or making strong public statements has depended on the particular situation and the interests involved. Haiti stands out as the case where the full spectrum of American resources – from public condemnation and political isolation to sanctions and the threat of military force – was deployed. Working first through the OAS, and then through the United Nations, the U.S. tried to squeeze the military junta that had overthrown President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 1991. It allowed Aristide to live in exile in the United States. In July 1994, the U.S. succeeded in persuading the UN Security Council to authorize the use of "all necessary means" to restore Aristide to power – the first time the Security Council had ever called for international action and authorized military force to restore democracy. Two months later, 21,000 U.S. troops led a coalition of 28 other countries to occupy Haiti and return Aristide to office.

The recent case of Venezuela stands on the other side of the spectrum from Haiti. As the attempted coup against democratically-elected President Hugo Chavez unfolded in April 2002, the initial U.S. reaction was to blame Chavez for provoking the crisis. Instead of calling the overthrow a coup, the State Department issued a press release titled "Venezuela: Change of Government," and offered assistance to the new civilian government. Most major Latin American leaders, however, quickly denounced the coup, despite their outright criticism of Chavez's anti-democratic tendencies. Although the U.S. soon endorsed an OAS resolution condemning the coup, this vacillation damaged its credibility. The State Department's Inspector General has since investigated this episode and found that U.S. government officials properly discouraged

"undemocratic and unconstitutional moves." But some still argue that U.S. behavior undermined two decades of efforts to persuade Latin Americans that the United States respected regional norms designed to respond collectively when democratic governments were threatened.[2]

The Haiti and Venezuela examples reside at the extremes. Perhaps more typical is the U.S. response to the October 1999 coup in Pakistan. As in Haiti, the U.S. publicly condemned the extra-constitutional actions and imposed aid sanctions. During a visit to South Asia, President Clinton praised India's democracy while pointedly cutting short his visit to Pakistan to a brief airport meeting. But the response basically stopped there. It did not try to isolate the regime, and it did not sever its bilateral ties. Given Pakistan's status as a nuclear power hostile to India, with ties to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, and fundamentalist factions gaining ground at home, the U.S. decided to limit its response in order to safeguard other more immediate interests at stake. The post-September 11 war on terrorism and renewed tensions between India and Pakistan have reinforced the desire to not change this position – in fact, even the rhetorical pressure on the Islamabad leadership to adhere to democracy has abated.[3] Despite allegations of fraud from opposition parties and skepticism from Commonwealth members, the United States chose to view Pervez Musharraf's referendum in May 2002 to extend his presidency another five years as the beginning of a process leading to elections in October.

When confronted with unconstitutional overthrows of democratic governments elsewhere, the U.S. usually has been willing to consider penalties beyond rhetorical punishment, such as curtailing bilateral assistance (as it did against Cote d'Ivoire in 1999), or recalling its Ambassador (as it did in Fiji in 2000). In other cases, like Ecuador, the United States has been quick to issue timely threats to isolate a coup regime. Thus, while the U.S. consistently reacts, it doesn't always react consistently. Exactly how far it is willing to go to punish an insurgent regime depends on specific circumstances and competing interests. In this sense, one democratic overthrow is not the same as another.

RESPONSE TO MANIPULATION OF ELECTORAL PROCESSES

The United States' record of acting to prevent or punish electoral fraud is strong, but uneven. Most U.S. government officials and democracy advocates consider elections as the clearest benchmark of a democracy's health. American policymakers follow foreign elections very closely, and usually support international watchdog efforts by NGOs. Yet there are several prominent cases – Egypt and Russia in 1996 being two – where the U.S. endorsed election results even though strong evidence of fraud or manipulation existed.

As in its response to overthrows of elected governments, the U.S. is usually critical if proof of election fraud emerges. In the most egregious cases of election malfeasance during the past decade – from Burma to Nigeria to Peru and most recently Zimbabwe – the U.S. expressed its condemnation clearly and loudly, both bilaterally and in multilateral fora.

But again, what the U.S. did next was typically subject to situation, circumstance, and other interests involved. In some cases, the U.S. was willing to sanction the responsible regime and work toward political isolation; in others it was slow to do more than issue verbal condemnations. The more important a country is to U.S. economic or security interests -- and the more cooperative the dominant regime has been in support of those interests -- the less willing the U.S. has been to punish it for electoral fraud. For example, in Peru's first round presidential election during the spring of 2000, the U.S. described the result as "invalid" and pressured the government to hold a second round. But the U.S. did not suspend its aid or trade programs with Peru, it sent its Ambassador to President Fujimori's inauguration for a third term, and continued its military cooperation, which were explained as important for fighting the drug war.

In cases where economic and security interests are secondary, the U.S. insists that elections be "free and fair." For example, during the 2002 election turmoil in Zimbabwe, the U.S. did take steps to punish the regime for its actions. It suspended defense exports to Harare, and declared senior Zimbabwean officials ineligible for travel visas. It has also begun to work with human rights advocates, labor groups and pro-democracy organizations, both in Zimbabwe and throughout the region, to pressure and isolate President Robert Mugabe.

The same has been true in Belarus. After a decade of deeply flawed elections – the latest being the September 2001 presidential election of Lukashenko – the U.S. adopted a policy of "selective engagement," conditioning the bilateral relationship solely upon Belarus' behavior. In 2002, when the U.S. outlined the conditions that Belarus must meet to improve relations, the first was that it establish

legitimate election procedures.

Although often implemented inconsistently, promotion of fair elections was at the core of 1990s U.S. democracy policy. In fact, the U.S. government's faith in elections has been so strong that some believe it takes them too seriously. These skeptics explain that, especially during the last ten years, U.S. democracy assistance programs have become too focused on elections at the expense of securing other core democratic elements like a strong civil society or a free press.[4]

PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRACY

The United States usually has been consistent in speaking out forcefully and frequently in support of international democracy. It does so in both bilateral and multilateral settings. In the United Nations and key regional forums like the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Organization of American States (OAS), the U.S. has consistently worked to craft and pass resolutions defending democracy. Through the National Endowment for Democracy, the U.S. Congress also funds and supports nongovernmental organizations working to implement and monitor democratic reforms. In March 2002 the Bush Administration announced the creation of a "Millennium Challenge Account," a proposal to increase U.S. assistance to developing countries by 50 percent over the next three years, and targeting that assistance to countries that prove a commitment to upholding the rule of law, human rights, and open economies. Finally, by helping to conceptualize and develop the Community of Democracies initiative, the U.S. has proved willing to create a multilateral forum composed of like-minded states for international democracy advocacy and consensus-building.

That said, the U.S. foreign assistance budget is quite small relative to other large donors, and the percentage of funds devoted to democracy assistance even smaller. Although President Bush has promised to triple the foreign aid budget over the next three years, it still comprises only a small percentage of U.S. GDP. And even in countries in which U.S. officials stress that success of democracy is paramount, democracy assistance has decreased substantially. For example, of the $36 billion in U.S. assistance to Russia since 1992, less than two percent went to supporting democratic institutions.[5] Moreover, USAID has allowed undemocratic regimes, like Egypt, which receives $2 billion a year in U.S. assistance, to resist pressure for democratic reform by allowing Egypt to veto aid allocations to specific groups.

POLICY TOWARDS ENTRENCHED DICTATORSHIPS

U.S. policy toward a handful of stalwart anti-democratic states is probably the most controversial aspect of its approach toward democracy promotion. Many believe that Washington policymakers are excessively confrontational and simplistic, or too quick to use the blunt instruments of diplomatic isolation, sanctions and non-cooperation. Others believe that the U.S. is too lenient on dictatorships – particularly those in Central Asia and the Middle East – when they serve American economic and security interests.

Many criticize the U.S. approach towards regimes like Iraq, Iran, Cuba, North Korea, Libya, Sudan and Belarus for being all stick and no carrot. Countries mired in repressive dictatorships tend to get only a small portion of U.S. assistance for democracy promotion because U.S. officials believe that the standard template of American democracy programs cannot work in such closed systems. In these countries, the U.S. has instead focused on more basic goals like promoting the idea of democracy or developing civil society. For example, the U.S. transmits radio broadcasts into authoritarian countries, like Radio Free Asia, Radio Marti in Cuba, or the "ring around Serbia" initiative against Slobodan Milosevic during the 1999 Kosovo war. By funding organizations like the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), the U.S. Congress funnels support to indigenous human rights groups, free media outlets, exiled dissidents, and civic education. And the U.S. Congress has earmarked funds for pro-democracy programs in Cuba, Burma and Sudan.[6]

But the main thrust of U.S. policy toward such regimes – and the one that causes the most concern among allies – is isolation and shame. Although the U.S. makes some attempts to work within dictatorial societies to bring about democratic change, and may maintain a minimum level of relations necessary for the administration of humanitarian aid, external pressure has been its main tool of choice. The U.S. has consistently voted for international resolutions to isolate entrenched dictators or impose political and economic sanctions on their regimes. It exposes anti-democratic practices in its annual human rights reports. And it actively pursues non-cooperation in almost every

conceivable realm, whether economic, military, political or diplomatic. Washington also pressures its allies to do the same – almost always with words but sometimes with deeds. The U.S. Congress has gone so far as to pass legislation to levy sanctions against any third-party that does business with repressive states like Iran, Libya and Cuba.

Although the "with us or against us" approach to the war on terror has brought new attention to the concerns about such policies, Washington's strategy toward these countries has remained fairly consistent during the past decade. President George W. Bush calls such states "evil," President Clinton called them "rogue nations." Unlike some of its closest allies, the U.S. does not believe that engaging such states will bring about democratic change. Instead, it seeks to punish such regimes, leaving them weak, and poor, hoping that the combination of isolation and promise of improved relations might spark internal reform, or internal revolts. In the case of Iraq, the Bush Administration, with support of the U.S. Congress, has gone further. It is actively working with opposition groups in exile to lay out plans for a democratic Iraq, which would follow from a U.S.-led military attack designed to force Saddam Hussein from power. Many experts, however, contend that such a strategy would be seen by Iraqis as an externally-imposed regime designed to satisfy American desires to control strategic oil reserves in the Middle East.

The policy is less clear-cut in those countries that are undeniably undemocratic, yet because of size, resources or location (or in some cases all three), they remain members of the international community and are not treated as outlaws. China is the most obvious case here, although after September 11 more attention has been given to the undemocratic regimes in Central Asia and the Middle East that are U.S. allies, especially Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Because of the economic and military implications of these relationships, the U.S. approach has been little more than softly critical: just enough pressure to let its views be known, but not enough to rock the boat.

Since September 11, this hands-off strategy has been seriously questioned, and some shifts have already occurred. In August 2002, the Bush Administration announced that it would oppose any additional assistance to Egypt (above the $2 billion already allocated annually) to protest the Egyptian government's prosecution of human rights advocate Saad Eddin Ibrahim as well as its general anti-democratic practices. In addition, the Administration plans to conduct a comprehensive review of the effectiveness of $1 billion in U.S. aid to the Middle East, and to allocate at least $25 million to democracy education programs, training, election monitoring and related projects.[7]

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

Venezuela

Assessment: Fair
Trend: ⇓
Capital: Caracas
Type of Government: Federal Republic
Head of State: President Hugo Chávez (since 3 February 1999)
Minister of Foreign Affairs: Roy Chaderton
Population: 23,916,810
Human Development Index Ranking 2002: 69

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Venezuela has a **fair** record of support for democracy abroad. It has not been at the forefront of democracy promotion initiatives, but has participated in multilateral efforts to deter threats to democracy within Latin America. Since 1992, the Venezuelan government has distinguished between support for democracy and what it considers to be intervention in the sovereign affairs of neighboring states. For example, it has reacted strongly in clear cases of coup attempts, but has shied away from condemning fraudulent elections, as Venezuela views elections to be internal matters that should be decided by the citizens and institutions of the country in question. Like many other countries in the region, Venezuela has pursued a policy of engagement with dictatorships in the hemisphere and elsewhere.

Venezuela's sensitivity to coup attempts is derived from its own recent struggles with democratic rule. Until 1992, Venezuela counted itself amongst the oldest democracies of the Americas. The country had a consolidated democracy since 1958, with relatively stable civil-military relations. However, in the past ten years, Venezuela has suffered three coup attempts, one as recently as April 2002. The current President, Hugo Chavez, led two coup attempts against President Carlos Andres Perez in 1992, but was later released from jail by President Rafael Caldera and went on to win the presidency in free and fair elections in 1998.

FOREIGN RELATIONS BACKGROUND

Venezuela's stated foreign policy priorities include advancing democratization in the international community, promoting Latin American and Caribbean integration, consolidating and diversifying its international relations with other developing countries as well as increasing its contacts with other regions and, finally, strengthening Venezuela's position in the international economy to increase its exports, especially oil. Political and economic integration in South America have been of particular importance to the Chavez government, which has worked with its neighbors in such areas as energy integration.

Nonetheless, tensions have risen between Venezuela and Colombia due to ongoing border disputes between the two countries and Colombian allegations that the Chavez government is backing insurgents in its country. Further, Chavez has spoken out against the military aspects of "Plan Colombia," a U.S.-backed strategy which seeks to rid the country of armed guerrilla and paramilitary groups that have taken over large parts of Colombia, arguing that it threatens to "Vietnamize" the conflict.[1] Chavez aspires for a more "multi-polar world" as a counterweight to U.S. hegemony. "Interventionism," as his Foreign Minister has said, "is often motivated by good intentions but it cannot override the principle of national sovereignty."[2] His efforts to strengthen the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) also form part of this initiative.

Since the 1960s, Venezuela's response to crises of democracy abroad at times has been guided by the "Betancourt Doctrine" of refusing to maintain diplomatic relations with governments that came to power by force.[3] Current President Hugo Chavez's anti-American, anti-globalization and anti-liberalism stance has gained him much support among the poor of Venezuela, who elected him in the hopes that he could single-handedly eliminate corruption and restore the economy. His proclaimed "Bolivarian revolution" has led to

erratic and at times controversial foreign policy decisions. His suspected covert support for left-wing subversive groups in Colombia and other neighboring countries has weakened Venezuela's overt support of democracy.

RESPONSE TO THE OVERTHROW OF DEMOCRATICALLY-ELECTED GOVERNMENTS

Venezuela has regularly opposed the overthrow of democratically-elected governments in the region. However, the severity of its response has been inconsistent and driven by domestic considerations. In most cases, Venezuela has acted through the OAS and other multilateral bodies to express its support for the restoration of democracy in the threatened country, and apart from the Peruvian case, it tended not to use bilateral mechanisms in this effort.

During the *autogolpe* (self-coup) crisis in Peru in 1992, Venezuela was the only country in the Americas to cut diplomatic ties with the Fujimori regime. On 16 April 1992, all Venezuelan diplomats were asked to return home leaving only consular personnel behind. This was a very prompt and abrupt response, which other Latin American governments considered excessive. Further, the Venezuelan government was unsatisfied with the position taken by the OAS at the *ad hoc* meeting of Foreign Ministers. The OAS "profoundly deplored the events in Peru and expressed its most serious concern" while the Venezuelan Foreign Minister went much further and called for an all out condemnation of Fujimori.[4] Venezuela also supported the exclusion of Peru from the Rio Group and was not anxious to have it return to the group even when Argentina, with the backing of Uruguay and Ecuador, called for its return.[5] Venezuela further voted in favor of freezing approved loans by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) to Peru.[6]

Venezuela's strong response to events in Peru can be explained by its own internal struggle with democratic rule. President Perez had suffered an attempted coup d'etat only two months earlier on 4 February 1992, and dissension within the military was continuing to destabilize his presidency. The Perez government, therefore, had a clear interest in pursuing a tough line against Fujimori's auto-golpe, as a way to deter threats to his own rule, refusing to renew diplomatic relations even as members of the Venezuelan legislature, along with a former President, were urging him to do so.[7] It must be remembered that the *autogolpe* in Peru was supported by 70 percent of the Peruvian population,[8] a factor that influenced other Latin American nations' preference to work quietly through the OAS and the Rio Group to restore democracy in Peru.

Outside of the Peruvian case, Venezuela has acted within the framework of the OAS and the Rio group to support democracy in the Americas. Venezuela's response to the Guatemalan *autogolpe* in May of 1993 was somewhat less forceful than in the Peruvian case. The government condemned the actions of President Serrano and supported the application of Resolution 1080 by the OAS, which authorized the Secretary General to undertake a special mission to Guatemala to negotiate the restoration of democracy. Venezuela called back its ambassador for questioning but did not sever diplomatic ties. During an *ad hoc* meeting of Foreign Ministers at the OAS, the representative for Venezuela called on the OAS to support members of civil society in Guatemala who were trying to restore democracy to the country. In Guatemala, unlike in Peru, the majority of the population opposed the suspension of democracy, and civil society groups and the media decried the government's actions. Venezuela supported the call for sanctions against the Serrano government, and through a declaration by the Rio Group on 26 May 1993, called on the Serrano government to conform to its international obligations.[9]

The September 1991 coup in Haiti led to an international regime of sanctions and a trade embargo, which Venezuela supported in a letter to the OAS Secretary General.[10] As of October 1991, the Venezuelan government also unilaterally suspended the supply of oil to Haiti.[11] When the Haitian government prevented the reinstatement of President Aristide in 1993, Venezuela was one of the first Latin American nations to support the return to power of the ousted Haitian leader, who spent part of his exile in Venezuela. Through the Rio Group, Venezuela declared that the non-compliance of the Haitian government would lead the Group to support the reinstatement of economic sanctions in conjunction with the United Nations.[12]

During the short-lived coup attempt of 16 April 1996 in Paraguay, Venezuela, along with its OAS counterparts, declared its support for the democratically elected government of Paraguay. Then President Rafael Caldera, in a show of

support for Paraguayan President Juan Carlos Wasmosy, celebrated the consolidation of democracy in a speech before the National Congress of Paraguay in September 1996.[13]

In contrast to the relatively strong record set forth above, the Chavez government did little when a coalition of indigenous groups and military officers led a short-lived coup which ultimately forced the resignation of the President of Ecuador in 2000, calling only for democracy to be restored through dialogue and negotiation. Then Foreign Minister Jose Rangel made no reference to Venezuela's position regarding the ousted President, Jamil Mahuad, and said only that it supported the decisions taken by the Ecuadorian people and its institutions.[14] Allegations of close ties between Chavez and Col. Lucio Gutierrez, the coup leader, have fed speculation that the Chavez government encouraged the unconstitutional overthrow.[15]

RESPONSE TO MANIPULATION OF ELECTORAL PROCESSES

Venezuela has a weak track record for the support of free and fair elections abroad. It has been reluctant to involve itself in the electoral issues of its neighbors and views elections as the domain of citizens and domestic institutions. In both Peru and Haiti in 2000, the Chavez government kept a low profile.

When Peru's elections were deemed fraudulent by international observers in May 2000, Venezuela energetically rejected the United States' call for sanctions and condemnation of the Peruvian election and rebuffed Washington's attempt to invoke Resolution 1080. Venezuela declared that the government and the people of Peru should be the ones to decide whether their elections were fraudulent. The Venezuelan Ambassador to the OAS testified that all the Andean countries were united in opposition to any kind of intervention and that others like Uruguay, Mexico and Brazil were also opposed.[16]

The Haitian elections in 2000 were widely viewed by the international community to be less than free and fair. However, Venezuela took the same position as in the case of Peru. It supported multilateral investigations into the elections, but was clear to express its belief that only the Haitian people and their institutions could declare whether the elections were legitimate, and said little else.[17]

PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRACY

The promotion of international democracy through organizations such as the OAS and the Rio Group has figured prominently on the foreign policy agenda in Venezuela. Further, as a member of the Andean Community, Venezuela has affirmed the need for democracy as a requirement for the consolidation of sub-regional integration. However, since President Chavez assumed office, his regime has been accused of promoting ties between his government and left-wing insurgents in other neighboring countries. In particular, he has been accused of undermining democracy in Colombia by protecting Colombian FARC insurgents, which has provoked serious tensions between the two neighbors.

As a member of the OAS, Venezuela has supported electoral observation missions in other countries. Moreover, it has received electoral observers on its own soil. Electoral observation missions have been especially important in the past three years. In December 1998, the Presidential elections were delayed because it was apparent that the National Electoral Council was not adequately prepared to hold them. Venezuela has received observers from such bodies as the OAS, the International Republican Institute, the National Democratic Institute and the Carter Center.[18] Its cooperation with these bodies indicates a high level of support for democratic elections in Venezuela, and serves as an example to its neighbors.

POLICY TOWARDS ENTRENCHED DICTATORSHIPS

Over the past ten years, Venezuela has preferred a policy of engagement towards the Castro regime. Venezuela downgraded its relations with the island when the Cuban government started to support communist insurgents within Venezuela. Cuba's interference in Venezuelan affairs led to its expulsion from the OAS in 1962. However since the 1970s, Venezuela has become a principal advocate for lifting sanctions against Cuba, and the two countries reestablished diplomatic relations in 1974.

Under the government of Hugo Chavez, the two countries have become very close friends. When Hugo Chavez left jail in 1995 after serving his sentence for an attempted coup

in 1992, he visited Cuba and was received with great honors as a revolutionary leader. Both Fidel Castro and Chavez have found common ground in their revolutionary zest. Additionally, Venezuela has helped to alleviate Cuba's serious oil shortage. Venezuela now supplies 60 percent of Cuban oil needs and does so on highly advantageous terms.[19]

Chavez's policy towards entrenched dictatorships extends beyond the region. He has personally sought improved relations with Iraq's Saddam Hussein and Libya's Moammar Qadafi and as a member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), has worked closely with authoritarian regimes from the Middle East. Chavez however, has gone out of his way to showcase his ties to dictators like Hussein and Qadafi as a way to gain domestic support by challenging American foreign policy, a theme that resonates among many of his supporters. Since Chavez's government itself suffered a coup attempt this past April 2002, it is unclear whether he will reduce his antagonist stance towards the United States and slow down the pace of rapprochement with known dictatorships.

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[16] Bauman, Everett. "Caracas defiende soberania de Lima." El Universal 1 June 2000.
[17] Rafael Quevedo, Current Political Representative in the Venezuelan Embassy to the United States, Washington, DC, 29 May 2002.
[18] Maria-Teresa Romero, Professor at the School of International Studies, Universidad Central de Venezuela in Caracas.
[19] "Venezuela Generals Tap Businessman to Lead; Fall of Chavez Means Castro Gets No More Oil." The Washington Times 13 April 2002.

SURVEY METHODOLOGY

Defending Democracy: A Global Survey of Foreign Policy Trends 1992-2002 evaluates how sovereign states promote and defend democracy beyond their borders. The project is a key component of the Democracy Coalition Project's goal of assessing states' adherence to a central provision of the Warsaw Declaration, which over 100 governments endorsed at the Community of Democracies conference in Warsaw, Poland in June 2000. The Declaration commits signatories to *"work together to promote and strengthen democracy"* at home and abroad. The survey examines the extent to which states have lived up to this commitment.

Scope

This inaugural survey examines the foreign policies of a representative sample of 40 states worldwide over a ten-year period, beginning in 1992 and ending in 2002. The 40 surveyed countries include 9 Sub-Saharan African states (Benin, Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania); 8 states from the Americas (Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Mexico, Peru, United States, Venezuela); 7 from Asia (Australia, India, Indonesia, Japan, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Thailand); 10 from Europe (France, Germany, Hungary, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom); 3 from the Middle East/North Africa (Jordan, Morocco, Turkey); and 3 states from the former Soviet Union (Georgia, Ukraine, Russia).

All but one of these states (France) endorsed the Warsaw Declaration. However, France is included in this survey as it is one of the world's leading democracies and a powerful force in world affairs. While the Warsaw Declaration dates to June 2000, the time frame for this inaugural survey goes back ten years to cover seminal democracy-related events that have occurred since 1992. This time period was selected in order to provide a richer picture of the evolving norms and practices of the international community that began to take hold as the democratic wave unfolded with the end of the Cold War. The ten-year time frame will also help establish a baseline for subsequent surveys.

Survey Concepts and Questions

The survey seeks to answer one broad question: how have states promoted and defended the ideals of democracy through their foreign policies since 1992? Such a complex issue involving states' behavior and underlying motivations does not lend itself to simple quantitative analysis. At the same time, any solid qualitative study must be carried out in a systematic way so as to avoid or greatly minimize subjective judgments of individual researchers, particularly because the survey seeks to draw some general conclusions across cases.

To balance these concerns, DCP designed what we think is an innovative methodology that combines a sensible qualitative research framework with a common yardstick for assessment. The end product is a straightforward, accessible evaluation of each state's record of promoting democracy abroad. The analysis takes into account states' varying capacity to influence international politics. The survey is also designed to capture the country-specific context in which foreign policy is formulated. Each essay was written based on a common framework that specifies research guidelines and a set of seminal cases for reach region against which the policy responses of all the states of that region are assessed.

Conceptually, the treatment of the question "*how have states promoted and defended the ideals of democracy through their foreign policies?*" is tackled by examining four subject areas: (a) a state's response to the overthrow of democratically-elected governments abroad; (b) a state's response to the manipulation of electoral processes abroad; (c) the degree of state support for international democracy efforts, including through foreign assistance; and (d) the nature of a state's policy towards entrenched dictatorships.

The Warsaw Declaration deals with the first three of these issues. The fourth (policy towards entrenched dictatorships) was not mentioned directly. However, DCP felt strongly that how a state deals with dictatorial regimes is often a good indicator of the value it places on democratic norms and practices in constructing its foreign policy.

Response to the overthrow of democratically elected governments

The Warsaw Declaration highlights the disruptive impact of coups d'etat and other forms of unconstitutional overthrows of democratically-elected regimes and commits states to "*cooperate to discourage and resist the threat to democracy posed by the overthrow of constitutionally elected governments.*" This survey probes how the 40 states in our sample responded to such overthrows in neighboring countries or in countries where the surveyed state has interests and /or wields some leverage. The survey assesses states on the basis of their *willingness* to demonstrate disapproval of such overthrows, and the degree of *support* they give to international and regional attempts to isolate the new regime and restore democratic rule.

Response to manipulation of electoral processes

The survey also assesses how each of the forty states reacted to attempts by foreign governments to manipulate electoral processes in order to hold on to power, impose a handpicked successor or to prevent a particular individual from seeking office. The Warsaw Declaration underscores citizens' right to "*choose their representatives through regular, free and fair elections with universal and equal suffrage, open to multiple parties, conducted by secret ballot, monitored by independent electoral authorities, and free of fraud and intimidation.*" Though the responsibility for conducting free and fair elections lies primarily with domestic governments, the international democratic community increasingly has taken on an obligation to help ensure fairness through election monitoring and to respond in the event of election-related malfeasance by foreign governments.

Support for international democracy

Efforts by democratic nations to help foster democratic norms and practices are essential to strengthening democratic governance worldwide. The Warsaw Declaration charges governments to "*collaborate on democracy-related issues in existing international and regional institutions, forming coalitions and caucuses to support resolutions and other international activities aimed at the promotion of democratic governance.*" This survey evaluates states' commitment to this task as evidenced by their efforts in multilateral fora and in bilateral relationships, including the provision of development assistance. An important indicator of the degree of support for international democracy is the priority given to democracy-strengthening in overall assistance strategies, in some cases measured by the total amount and percentage of aid dedicated to democracy programs. Similarly, the extent to which a recipient government seeks foreign assistance for building democratic institutions is a relevant factor.

Policy towards entrenched dictatorships

Entrenched dictatorships not only violate their citizens' rights as enumerated in the Warsaw Declaration and many other international instruments, they can also become the source of regional instability and breeding grounds for terrorist activity capable of threatening

democracies nearby and further afield, as the events of 11 September 2001 demonstrate. There is little doubt that dictatorships such as those in Afghanistan under the Taliban, Cuba, Uzbekistan, Belarus, Zimbabwe, the Sudan, China and Burma, pose security threats to their democratic neighbors and constitute a challenge to supporters of international democracy. States heeding the Warsaw Declaration's call to *"help create an external environment conducive to democratic development"* should therefore devise ways to support democratic forces working within such countries. To the best of their ability, supporters of democracy should employ a combination of positive and negative inducements to encourage political liberalization and evolution toward democratic governance in these closed societies.

Each of the four issue areas outlined above carry approximately the same weight in assessing a state's overall record of promoting democracy abroad, although the overall score also factors in a state's historical circumstances and capacity to effect change beyond its borders.

The Research Team

The research team for this survey consists of three main groups that worked together as a unit. A small team of experts assisted with the conceptual development of the project. A second team of skilled researchers and writers collected and analyzed information on states' foreign policy records in essay form. A third team of regional specialists and functional experts read the essays and provided feedback that was then incorporated in subsequent drafts. Technical experts then took charge of general processing tasks such as editing, fact checking, and standardization. Each of the groups consisted of experts in their respective fields: social science, journalism, law and others with country-specific expertise and field research experience, and technical editing.

DCP's research unit maintained general oversight of the project. It produced the essay guidelines, organized the research team and exercised final authority over quality control and standardization. The survey benefited enormously from the extensive input from our outside expert reviewers.

The Review System

A review team was formed, composed of both peers (researchers) and external experts. They formed part of an elaborate system of quality control designed to ensure that each essay presented an accurate interpretation of the material, and that the survey standards established in the guidelines were uniformly applied across all forty surveyed states.

The initial drafts of each report were subjected to a rigorous peer review process. Each researcher was asked to read and comment on one other essay from his/her region of specialization. They were asked to determine whether the research guidelines had been applied accurately, and to comment on the factual information in the case studies. Since these reviewers were reading papers about their own regions of interest, they were able to exchange information about findings and sources with one other. To encourage the reviewers to be as vigorous as possible in critiquing their peers, comments were passed on to the writers anonymously, unless the reviewer wished to be named. In several instances reviewers did, in fact, request that their identities be disclosed to facilitate the exchange of information and further collaboration.

The external review process involved over 80 foreign policy and democracy experts from academia, the non-profit sector and diplomacy. Several officials of the Open Society/Soros Foundation network were also asked to review the country reports. Each expert reviewer was selected for his or her professional and research interest and experience in the assigned country. Expert reviewers were specifically asked to provide a thoughtful critique that addressed substantive issues and, most importantly, to determine whether the author had presented an

accurate and unbiased analysis. They were also invited to comment on the methodology. All comments were passed on anonymously to the writers. These comments proved extremely helpful in the extensive revision process. Several reviewers agreed to review more than one essay, which had the added benefit of providing a comparative perspective for assessing research quality.

Research and Reporting

The development of guidelines for the project was a comprehensive process that drew input from a team of technical advisors with relevant experience in the subject matter. DCP circulated the draft work plan and essay guidelines and solicited comments on feasibility and methodology. Based on the feedback, key aspects of the project were revised to improve operationalization of key concepts. Researchers also were asked to comment on the work plan and guidelines prior to orientation meetings hosted by DCP. A point-by-point discussion of the survey concepts with the researchers identified some issues requiring further clarification.

Essay Guidelines

The essay guidelines provide a general description of what the researcher should consider in assessing a state's performance on any particular issue. It poses pointed questions to guide the study, and suggests examples of what would constitute "good policy responses" to the various challenges discussed in each of the four categories. To enhance standardization, the responses of each state to a set of seminal cases were evaluated. This provided a common denominator for assessing the policy responses of all states in a given region. The seminal cases were selected from a larger list of potential cases that presented significant opportunities for the surveyed states to defend democracy abroad. Seminal cases were those deemed to be of such importance that all the surveyed states in the given region should have responded to developments in that country.

In the first category, *response to the overthrow of democratically-elected governments*, for instance, the essay guidelines pose the following questions:

- How did the government respond to military coups or other forms of overthrow of democratically-elected governments in neighboring states, or in states where it has interests and/or influence?
- Did the state do all it could to signal its disapproval of such practices?
- Did it support regional and international attempts to isolate regimes that gained power via such illegal routes?
- Did it support "democracy clauses" introduced at regional and international fora?

To help the researchers in their assessments, the following examples of "good" responses were suggested:

- strong condemnation of military coups and overthrows of democratically-elected regimes;
- willingness to sever diplomatic ties with such regimes;
- willingness to impose economic sanctions on such regimes;
- willingness to support regional and international efforts to facilitate a transition back to democracy through diplomatic initiatives, political isolation, economic sanctions, etc; non-cooperation (culturally, economically, militarily and diplomatically) with such regimes;
- supporting a democratic government in exile – diplomatic, legal, economic, military.

Seminal Cases:

Sub-Saharan Africa: Cote d'Ivoire (1999), Niger (1996);
Asia: Pakistan, Indonesia, Philippines, Fiji;
Europe: former Yugoslavia, Austria, Haiti, Cote d'Ivoire;
Former Soviet Union: Pakistan;

Latin America: Venezuela (2002), Ecuador (1999), Peru (1992), Guatemala, Paraguay, Haiti (1994);
Middle East/North Africa: Nigeria, Niger, Pakistan;
United States: Venezuela, Pakistan, Haiti.

In the second category, *response to the manipulation of electoral processes*, the following questions were posed to guide the research:

- How did the state respond to attempts by foreign governments to manipulate electoral processes or to uphold fraudulent election results?
- What did it do to pressure such government to remedy the situation?
- How willing was the government to monitor elections or to fund independent election monitoring missions to such states?
- Did it endorse the report produced by such independent monitors?
- Did it support international action against regimes that sought to manipulate electoral laws and processes for the benefit of retaining power or preventing a particular candidate from seeking office democratically?
- Did the state support the imposition of international sanctions against regimes that have gained power by such illegitimate means?

Suggested examples of "good" policies include:

- willingness to condemn strongly attempts to manipulate electoral processes by foreign governments;
- willingness to monitor foreign elections;
- willingness to fund independent election monitoring efforts and to endorse the reports of such missions;
- willingness to condemn attempts by foreign governments to uphold the results of flawed elections;
- willingness to sever diplomatic ties over such flawed electoral processes;
- willingness to freeze the assets of the officials of regimes that perpetrate electoral fraud;
- willingness to campaign for international isolation of a regime that engages in such electoral malpractice;
- willingness to suspend cooperation in key areas such as economic relations, military, sports, diplomatic and cultural exchanges.

Seminal Cases:
Sub-Saharan Africa: Zimbabwe (2002), Zambia, Nigeria, Cote d'Ivoire;
Asia: Malaysia (1999), Cambodia (1998);
Europe: Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Belarus, Peru, former Yugoslavia;
Former Soviet Union: Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine;
Latin America: Peru (2000), Haiti (2000);
Middle East/North Africa: Algeria, Egypt;
United States: Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Haiti (2000), Peru (2000).

The following questions were posed regarding states' willingness to promote international democracy:

- What is the government's policy on the promotion of international democracy?
- Does it regard democracy in other states as an important foreign policy goal?
- Was it willing to devote a significant percentage of its foreign assistance budget to projects that strengthen democracy abroad (for donor countries alone)?

- Was democratization a priority area in the search for funds abroad (for aid-receiving states)?
- What did the state do to promote democratic values in foreign countries?
- Did it actively promote democratic values in regional and international fora?

Suggested examples of "good" policy include:
- devoting a fairly large percentage of the foreign assistance budget to democracy support (for donor states);
- solicitation of donor assistance for democratization programs (for recipient states);
- active and meaningful participation in international democracy fora;
- solid ratification record on international protocols and agreements dealing with respect for human rights and democratic values;
- willingness to vote in favor of international resolutions that condemn undemocratic trends in all countries;
- willingness to speak out forcefully and consistently in support of democracy abroad;

The final category, *policy towards entrenched dictators*, examined the nature of the state's relationship with authoritarian regimes and what it did to help promote democracy.

Suggested examples of "good" policy responses include:
- willingness to impose a credible sanctions regime or a policy of constructive engagement to encourage democratic change;
- willingness to support pro-democracy actors in undemocratic countries;
- a good record of voting to support international resolutions that isolate entrenched dictators;
- a good record of voting in favor of international resolutions that impose political and/or economic sanctions on such regimes;
- willingness to provide asylum to democracy activists exiled by dictators;
- a record of non-cooperation (culturally, economically, militarily and diplomatically) with such regimes.

Seminal Cases:

Sub-Saharan Africa: Sudan, Nigeria;
Asia: China; Burma
Europe: former Yugoslavia, Belarus;
Former Soviet Union: Belarus, Uzbekistan;
Latin America: Cuba;
Middle East/North Africa: Iraq, Libya;
United States: China, Cuba, Sudan, Iraq

THE RATINGS

The survey employs a four-tiered rating scale to evaluate the overall record of each state in promoting democracy abroad. The scale comprises the following values:

Poor (no effort / minimum effort);
Fair (medium / mixed effort);
Good (strong effort);
Very Good (exceptional effort).

It must be stressed that the rating is based on an assessment of the *effort* that a country makes to promote and defend democracy beyond its borders and not the *effectiveness* of its policy actions. Each surveyed state is awarded an overall score (the *Defending Democracy Abroad* Rating) that is a composite of its performance in each of the categories. It is intended to measure how much a state was willing to do, taking into account its capacity and influence.

The *Defending Democracy Abroad Rating* awards the highest rating of *Very Good* to states that work exceptionally hard to promote and defend the values of democratic governance abroad. The rating of *Good* is awarded for a solid record of achievement regarding democracy promotion opportunities beyond one's borders. A *Fair* denotes a mixed record in promoting and defending democracy abroad. The minimum rating, *Poor,* is awarded for little or no effort with respect to strengthening and defending democratic norms abroad or in condemning the violation of such norms by foreign governments.

FACT SHEETS
ON REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

African Union (formerly Organization of African Unity) (AU)

Created: Organization of African Unity (OAU), 1963
African Union (AU), July 2001

Purpose:
OAU: To promote unity, solidarity and international cooperation among the newly independent African states.
AU: To harmonize the economic and political policies of all African nations in order to improve pan-African welfare, and provide Africans with a solid voice in international affairs.

Member States:
Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sahrawi, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Commitments to Democracy

- In 1997, the Organization of African Unity approved the *Harare Declaration,* which condemns coups d'etat. This resolution was approved at the OAU Summit in Harare.

- In 1999, the OAU approved the *Algiers Resolution.* This resolution barred from the Lome Summit in 2000 those member states whose governments had been deposed since the Harare Summit and had not held credible elections.

- The *Constitutive Act of the new African Union* (AU) was adopted in Lomé in July 2000. This act includes as an objective of the AU the promotion of "democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance." The founding principles of the AU include "condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of government." Article 30 of the Act states that "governments which shall come to power through unconstitutional means shall not be allowed to participate in the activities of the Union." The Lomé Declaration compiles a series of mechanisms to deal with the interruption of democratic rule such as sanctions to be invoked in the event of an interruption of constitutional rule including suspension from the AU. These sanctions include denial of visas to coup plotters, commercial restrictions, and restrictions on government contacts. The AU agreements provide for six months of consultation to enable a national government to restore constitutional rule before any sanctions would be applied.

Caribbean Community (CARICOM)

Created: 1973

Purpose:
Economic cooperation through the Caribbean Single Market and Economy; coordination of foreign policy among the independent member states, and common services and cooperation in functional matters such as health, education and culture, communications and industrial relations.

Member Countries:
Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas (Bahamas is a member of the Community but not the Common Market), Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Surinam, Trinidad and Tobago.

Observers:
Aruba, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Mexico, Netherlands Antilles, Puerto Rico, Venezuela.

Associated:
Anguilla, British Virgin Islands, Turks and Caicos Islands.

Affiliations with other regional organizations:

Most CARICOM nations are members of the Organization of American States (OAS) and they also share status as members of The Commonwealth. CARICOM nations are also members of the United Nations (UN). Within the UN they have joined other small island states to form the Association of Small Island States (AOSIS).

Commitments to democracy:

- In 1992, CARICOM nations signed the Protocol of Washington in which they committed themselves, along with the rest of the OAS members, to the promotion of democracy in the hemisphere.
- In 1993, the countries of CARICOM signed the Declaration of the Regional Meeting for Latin America and the Caribbean of the UN World Conference on Human Rights emphasizing the Latin American and Caribbean communities' regard for peace, democracy, development and social welfare as essential for the realization of human rights.
- In 2001 Jamaica, Guyana and Haiti, as members of the UN General Council, voted for the promotion and consolidation of democracy worldwide. This vote is considered an example of CARICOM's dedication to the task.
- On 11 September 2001, within the framework of the OAS, CARICOM nations endorsed the Inter-American Democratic Charter.
- During the 1990s, the group's focus widened to encompass the promotion of democracy, including those social issues such as human rights, poverty alleviation and crime prevention that enhance democratic society. During this period, CARICOM members also participated in election monitoring missions led by the OAS.

Examples of CARICOM responses to threats to democracy in the region and internationally:

- CARICOM's response to the overthrow of democratically-elected governments in the region has been mostly consistent with the OAS position.

- CARICOM members supported the OAS' denouncement of Alberto Fujimori's self-coup of 1992 and monitored the 1993 elections for a Constituent Congress in Peru, which was Fujimori's solution to the organization's denouncement of his coup.
- In response to the coup that deposed Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the democratically-elected president of Haiti, CARICOM nations supported the OAS invocation of Resolution 1080 and the United States' military endeavors to foster political stability. Trinidad and Tobago contributed personnel to the Multinational Force in Haiti.
- CARICOM did not sever economic or diplomatic ties with either Peru or Haiti as a result of the events that unfolded.
- Furthermore, in the case of Haiti, the OAS recognized the inefficacy of economic sanctions against a country afflicted by such dire poverty. Following debates in which it was not possible to reach a consensus among members about sanctions, the organization opted for softer measures that in the end produced mixed results and failed to loosen Raul Cédras' hold over the country.
- CARICOM nations supported the OAS' condemnation of the overthrow of democratically-elected President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela on 11 April 2002. Ambassador Lisa Shoman of Belize, representing CARICOM, accompanied the Secretary-General of the OAS, Cesar Gaviria on his fact-finding mission.

CARICOM has responded consistently to the manipulation of electoral processes within the region.

- In the presidential elections of 2000 in Peru, there were mixed proposals among CARICOM members. At the OAS, Jamaica and Bahamas voiced their opinion that Resolution 1080 was not applicable in the case of Peru, while Saint Kitts and Nevis, Barbados and the Dominican Republic had no opinion as to the relevance of the Resolution to the elections crisis in the Andean country. On the other hand, the representative of Antigua and Barbuda proposed that Fujimori hold new elections immediately. Ultimately, Canada's proposal for the formation of a high-level mission to assess the situation and generate recommendations prevailed.
- The 2000 electoral monitoring mission to Haiti was led by a Barbadian. In the aftermath of the troubled elections, an agreement by Prime Minister Owen Arthur of Barbados, Chairman of the Conference of Heads of Government of CARICOM, and OAS Secretary General Gaviria established a Joint OAS/CARICOM Mission to Haiti. The Joint Mission made further attempts at a resolving the political problems that confronted Haiti after the elections of 21 May 2000.

- CARICOM countries have taken no significant stand against the Castro government in Cuba. In fact, as in the past, there are many supporters of Cuba's government among the leading CARICOM nations. At a 1998 OAS-CARICOM summit, Cuba featured prominently in a speech given by CARICOM Secretary-General Edwin Carrington, calling for Cuba's return to the inter-American community and declaring that Cuba cannot be ignored when talking about Caribbean development. This support was reiterated in 2000 when CARICOM leaders signed a trade treaty with Cuba in defiance of the United States. Under the trade agreement, CARICOM was granted duty-free access to the Cuban market and committed itself to the development of joint projects in areas such as tourism.

CARICOM's record on the promotion of democracy is accompanied by its commitment to regional initiatives designed to address common social and political problems, such as poverty and drug trafficking.

The Commonwealth

Founded: 1971 (Declaration of Commonwealth Principles)

Purpose:
The Commonwealth is a voluntary association of 54 independent sovereign states that consult and cooperate in the common interests of their peoples, and seek to promote international understanding and world peace.

Member States:
Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Botswana, Brunei, Cameroon, Canada, Cyprus, Dominica, Fiji, Ghana, Grenada, Guyana, India, Jamaica, Kenya, Kiribati, Lesotho, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and The Grenadines, Swaziland, Tanzania, The Gambia, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Kingdom, Vanuatu, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Commitments to Democracy:

The Commonwealth has no constitution or charter, but members have committed themselves to a series of statements of beliefs, all of which make references to democracy:

- In their 1971 *Declaration of Commonwealth Principles*, Commonwealth members expressed their commitment to the liberty of the individual, equal rights for all citizens regardless of race, and to citizens' inalienable right to participate by means of free and democratic political processes in framing the society in which they live.

- In the 1991 *Harare Declaration,* Commonwealth members reaffirmed the values they had set forth in 1971. In this declaration, Commonwealth members pledged to work together to promote fundamental political values and to focus their work on the democratic process, the rule of law, independence of the judiciary, and honest government.

- The 1995 *Millbrook Commonwealth Action Programme* further clarified the Harare Declaration. This program specified the requirements that governments wishing to join the Commonwealth for the first time would have to meet. These included compliance with Commonwealth values as well as with the principles and priorities set forth in the Harare Declaration. At this time it was also declared that, should a state be perceived to be in clear violation of the principles outlined in the Harare Declaration, appropriate steps should be taken to encourage the restoration of democracy within a reasonable timeframe.

- In 1995, the *Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG)* was established to deal with serious or persistent violations of the Harare Declaration. CMAG was charged with assessing the nature of perceived violations and with recommending measures for collective action by the Commonwealth to achieve the speedy restoration of democracy and constitutional rule. The Secretary General was given the power to initiate a process of inquiry into a possible violation by any given country.

New Economic Partnership for African Development (NEPAD)

Created: 2001 as a merger of the Millennium Partnership for the African Recovery Programme (MAP) and the OMEGA Plan.

Purpose:
Spearheaded by African leaders, NEPAD was created to address issues such as escalating poverty levels and underdevelopment of African countries and the continued marginalization of Africa.

Member States:
Members of the African Union.

Commitments to democracy

- The *African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)* is "the mutually agreed instrument for self-monitoring" of political and economic commitments by member states. It is open to all AU member states. Accession to this mechanism is achieved by adopting the *"Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance,"* and informing the Chairman of the Implementation Committee. Participation binds member states to accept and facilitate reviews. The APRM is planned to operate in the following manner:

- There are four types of review:
    a. Upon accession, each state proposes an action plan for implementation of the Declaration and submits to a base-line review.
    b. Periodic reviews follow every two to four years.
    c. States may request additional ad hoc reviews for themselves.
    d. The Heads of State Committee may also institute a review upon witnessing "Early signs of impending political or economic crisis in a member country."

- The review process operates as follows:
    a. A study of a country's governance and development environment is conducted based on background materials provided by the APRM Secretariat and other sources.
    b. Fieldwork, including consultations with government, civil society, and private sector sources is carried out.
    c. A report is prepared which includes feedback from the government under review.
    d. The Heads of State Committee analyzes the report.
    e. Tabling of reports in key regional and sub-regional bodies.

- Following the review, the following actions or responses can take place:
- If the state under review is willing to fix the problems noted by the report, NEPAD must assist and facilitate these reforms. If it is not, NEPAD may adopt the following approach:
    i. Engage the government in a constructive dialogue and offer technical assistance;
    ii. Failing that, to place the government 'on notice' that collective action is being considered according to a specified timeframe.

- The Review Panel will ensure the political independence of the reviews. This Panel will be composed of seven 'eminent persons' chosen by the Heads of State Committee.

Organization of American States (OAS) and Summit of the Americas

Created: 1948

Purpose:
To achieve an order of peace and justice, to promote solidarity, to strengthen collaboration, and to defend sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of the states in the region.

Member States:
Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela.

Commitments to democracy

- The *OAS Charter* states that representative democracy is indispensable for the stability, peace and development of the region. One of the stated purposes of the OAS is the promotion and consolidation of representative democracy, with due respect for the principle of nonintervention.

- In 1990, the OAS created the *Unit for the Promotion of Democracy* (UPD) to support member states "in preserving and strengthening their political institutions and democratic procedures." The activities of the UPD have been directed towards the development of solid, transparent and efficient political institutions, and the promotion of democratic procedures, practices and values, including electoral observation missions and participation in national reconciliation processes.

- In 1991, the OAS adopted the *Santiago Resolution* on Representative Democracy (Resolution 1080), which established procedures for reacting to threats to democracy in the hemisphere. Resolution 1080 has been invoked four times: in Haiti (1991), Peru (1992), Guatemala (1993) and Paraguay (1996).

- The *Protocol of Washington*, adopted by the OAS in 1992 strengthens representative democracy by giving the OAS the right to suspend a member state whose democratically-elected government is overthrown by force. The protocol was ratified in 1997.

- At the *Third Summit of the Americas* in April 2001 in Quebec City the OAS adopted a Democracy Clause, which states that any unconstitutional alteration or interruption of the democratic order in a state of the hemisphere will prevent that state's government from participating in the Summits of the Americas process

- On 11 September 2001, the OAS adopted the *Inter-American Democratic Charter* in Lima, Peru. The Charter explicitly conditions relations between and among states of the hemisphere on the existence of a democratic government. It consecrates the *"right to democracy"* and provides for the design of mechanisms to respond to the erosion of democratic conditions before the onset of a crisis.

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)

Founded: 1975

Purpose:
To improve and intensify relations between member states and to contribute to peace, security, justice and cooperation, as well as to rapprochement among themselves and with the rest of the world.

Member States:
Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uzbekistan, Yugoslavia.

Commitments to Democracy:

- In its founding document, the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, the OSCE declared its founding principles to include "respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms including thought, conscience, religion, or belief."

- At the 1990 Paris Summit, all OSCE members recognized democracy as their common and sole system of government.

- The OSCE has adopted/approved more than 15 declarations or agreements outlining expectations of democracy in practice and codifying specific democratic principles.

- In 1999, the OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) created the Grassroots Program. This program was established "to encourage the development and implementation of national and local initiatives to promote human rights and democracy through low-cost, high-impact micro projects."

Other Organizations

Andean Community

Created: 1997 (Derived from the Andean Pact of 1969)

Purpose:
To promote the balanced and harmonious development of the member countries under equitable conditions; to boost their growth through integration and economic and social cooperation; to enhance participation in the regional integration process with a view to the progressive formation of a Latin American common market, and to strive for a steady improvement in the standard of living of their inhabitants.

Member States:
Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela.

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC)

Created: 1989

Purpose:
To advance Asia-Pacific economic dynamism and sense of community.

Member economies:
Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, People's Republic of China, Hong Kong (China), Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Republic of the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Chinese Taipei, Thailand and United States, Vietnam.

Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)

Created: 1967

Purpose:
To accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region through joint endeavors in the spirit of equality and partnership in order to strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of Southeast Asian nations, and to promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship among countries in the region and adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter.

Member States:
Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam.

Council of Europe

Created: 1949

Purpose:
To protect human rights, pluralist democracy and the rule of law; to promote awareness and encourage the development of Europe's cultural identity and diversity; to seek solutions to problems facing European society (discrimination against minorities, xenophobia, intolerance, environmental protection, human cloning, AIDS, drugs, organized crime, etc.); to help consolidate democratic stability in Europe by backing political, legislative and constitutional reform.

Member States:
Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malta, Moldova, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom.

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

Created: 1975

Purpose:
To promote economic integration in all fields of economic activity, particularly industry, transport, telecommunications, energy, agriculture, natural resources, commerce, monetary and financial questions, social and cultural matters.

Member states:
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo.

European Union

Created: 1992

Purpose:
To establish European citizenship; to ensure freedom, security and justice; to promote economic and social progress, and; to assert Europe's role in the world

Member Countries:
Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Finland, Sweden, United Kingdom.

International Organization of the Francophonie (OIF)

Created: 1996 (adoption of the charter of the Francophonie)

Purpose:
To prevent conflicts within the French-speaking world; to consolidate the rule of law and democracy; to promote human rights in the French-speaking world.

Member States:
Albania, Belgium, Benin, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Canada- New Brunswick, Canada- Quebec, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, France, French Community of Belgium, Gabon, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Haiti, Laos, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Moldavia, Monaco, Morocco, Niger, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Sao Tome e Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Switzerland, Togo, Tunisia, Vanuatu, Vietnam.

League of Arab States

Created: 1945

Purpose:
To strengthen ties among the member states, coordinate their policies, and promote their common interests.

Member States:
Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.

Mercado Común del Sur (South American Common Market) (Mercosur)

Created: 1991

Purpose:
The integration of member states, through free movement of goods, services and production factors; the establishment of a common external tariff and the adoption of a common trade policy; the coordination of macroeconomic and sectoral policies and the harmonization of legislation in relevant areas to strengthen the integration process.

Member States:
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

Created: 1949

Purpose:
To create an alliance of nations committed to each other's defense.

Member Countries:
Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States.

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)

Created: 1961

Purpose:
To strengthen economies in member countries, improve efficiency, stimulate market systems, expand free trade and contribute to development in industrialized as well as developing countries.

Member Countries:
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, European Communities, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States.

Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC)

Created: 1969

Purpose:
To pool the resources of the member states together, combine their efforts and speak to safeguard the interests and secure the progress and well-being of their peoples and of all Muslims in the world.

Member States:
Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Comoros, Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrghyzistan, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal,

Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Surinam, Syria, Tajikistan, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Yemen.

Rio Group

Created: 1986

Purpose:
To expand and systematize political cooperation among the member states; to examine international issues which may be of interest and coordinate common positions on these issues; to promote more efficient operation and coordination of Latin American cooperation and integration organizations; to present appropriate solutions to the problems and conflicts affecting the region; to provide momentum, through dialogue and cooperation, to the initiatives and actions undertaken to improve inter-American relations; to explore jointly new fields of cooperation which enhance economic, social, scientific and technological development.

Member States:
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Venezuela, Uruguay, and a representative from the Caribbean Community.

South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)

Created: 1985

Purpose:
To promote the welfare of the peoples of South Asia and to improve their quality of life; to accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region and to provide all individuals the opportunity to live in dignity and to realize their full potential; to promote and strengthen collective self-reliance among the countries of South Asia; to contribute to mutual trust, understanding and appreciation of one another's problems; to promote active collaboration and mutual assistance in the economic, social, cultural, technical and scientific fields; to strengthen cooperation with other developing countries; to strengthen cooperation among themselves in international forums on matters of common interests; and to cooperate with international and regional organizations with similar aims and purposes.

Member States:
Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka.

Southern Africa Development Community (SADC)

Created: 1992

Purpose:
To build a region in which there will be a high degree of harmonization and rationalization to enable the pooling of resources to achieve collective self-reliance in order to improve the living standards of the people of the region.

Member States:
Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Toward a Community of Democracies
Ministerial Conference
Final Warsaw Declaration
Warsaw, Poland, June 27, 2000

We the participants from*
Republic of Albania, People's Democratic Republic of Algeria, Argentine Republic, Republic of Armenia, Australia, Republic of Austria, Azerbaijani Republic, People's Republic of Bangladesh, Kingdom of Belgium, Belize, Republic of Benin, Republic of Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic of Botswana, Federative Republic of Brazil, Republic of Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Republic of Cape Verde, Republic of Chile, Republic of Colombia, Republic of Costa Rica, Republic of Croatia, Republic of Cyprus, Czech Republic, Kingdom of Denmark, Commonwealth of Dominica, Dominican Republic, Republic of Ecuador, Arab Republic of Egypt, Republic of El Salvador, Republic of Estonia, Republic of Finland, Georgia, Federal Republic of Germany, Republic of Guatemala, Republic of Haiti, Hellenic Republic, Republic of Hungary, Republic of Iceland, Republic of India, Republic of Indonesia, Ireland, State of Israel, Italian Republic, Japan, Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Republic of Kenya, Republic of Korea, State of Kuwait, Republic of Latvia, Kingdom of Lesotho, Principality of Liechtenstein, Republic of Lithuania, Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Republic of Madagascar, Republic of Malawi, Republic of Mali, Republic of Malta, Republic of Mauritius, Mexico, Republic of Moldova, Principality of Monaco, Mongolia, Kingdom of Morocco, Republic of Mozambique, Republic of Namibia, Kingdom of Nepal, Kingdom of the Netherlands, New Zealand, Republic of Nicaragua, Republic of the Niger, Federal Republic of Nigeria, Kingdom of Norway, Republic of Panama, Papua New Guinea, Republic of Paraguay, Republic of Peru, Republic of the Philippines, Republic of Poland, Portuguese Republic, State of Qatar, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Lucia, Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe, Republic of Senegal, Republic of Seychelles, Slovak Republic, Republic of Slovenia, Republic of South Africa, Kingdom of Spain, Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, Kingdom of Sweden, Swiss Confederation, United Republic of Tanzania, Kingdom of Thailand, Republic of Tunisia, Republic of Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Eastern Republic of Uruguay, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Republic of Yemen,

in the Community of Democracies Ministerial Meeting convened in Warsaw, 26 - 27 June 2000:

Expressing our common adherence to the purposes and principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

Reaffirming our commitment to respect relevant instruments of international law,

Emphasizing the interdependence between peace, development, human rights and democracy

Recognizing the universality of democratic values,

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* Following the Warsaw Meeting, the governments of Honduras, Suriname, Guyana, and Yugoslavia signed the Declaration.

Hereby agree to respect and uphold the following core democratic principles and practices:

- The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government, as expressed by exercise of the right and civic duties of citizens to choose their representatives through regular, free and fair elections with universal and equal suffrage, open to multiple parties, conducted by secret ballot, monitored by independent electoral authorities, and free of fraud and intimidation.
- The right of every person to equal access to public service and to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives.
- The right of every person to equal protection of the law, without any discrimination as to race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
- The right of every person to freedom of opinion and of expression, including to exchange and receive ideas and information through any media, regardless of frontiers.
- The right of every person to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.
- The right of every person to equal access to education.
- The right of the press to collect, report and disseminate information, news and opinions, subject only to restrictions necessary in a democratic society and prescribed by law, while bearing in mind evolving international practices in this field.
- The right of every person to respect for private family life, home, correspondence, including electronic communications, free of arbitrary or unlawful interference.
- The right of every person to freedom of peaceful assembly and association, including to establish or join their own political parties, civic groups, trade unions or other organizations with the necessary legal guarantees to allow them to operate freely on a basis of equal treatment before the law.
- The right of persons belonging to minorities or disadvantaged groups to equal protection of the law, and the freedom to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, and use their own language.
- The right of every person to be free from arbitrary arrest or detention; to be free from torture and other cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment; and to receive due process of law, including to be presumed innocent until proven guilty in a court of law.
- That the aforementioned rights, which are essential to full and effective participation in a democratic society, be enforced by a competent, independent and impartial judiciary open to the public, established and protected by law.
- That elected leaders uphold the law and function strictly in accordance with the constitution of the country concerned and procedures established by law.
- The right of those duly elected to form a government, assume office and fulfill the term of office as legally established.
- The obligation of an elected government to refrain from extra-constitutional actions, to allow the holding of periodic elections and to respect their results, and to relinquish power when its legal mandate ends.
- That government institutions be transparent, participatory and fully accountable to the citizenry of the country and take steps to combat corruption, which corrodes democracy.

- That the legislature be duly elected and transparent and accountable to the people.
- That civilian, democratic control over the military be established and preserved.
- That all human rights -- civil, cultural, economic, political and social -- be promoted and protected as set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other relevant human rights instruments.

The Community of Democracies affirms our determination to work together to promote and strengthen democracy, recognizing that we are at differing stages in our democratic development. We will cooperate to consolidate and strengthen democratic institutions, with due respect for sovereignty and the principle of non-interference in internal affairs. Our goal is to support adherence to common democratic values and standards, as outlined above. To that end, our governments hereby agree to abide by these principles in practice, and to support one another in meeting these objectives which we set for ourselves today.

We will seek to strengthen institutions and processes of democracy. We appreciate the value of exchanging experiences in the consolidation of democracy and identifying best practices. We will promote discussions and, where appropriate, create forums on subjects relevant to democratic governance for the purpose of continuing and deepening our dialogue on democratization. We would focus our deliberations on our common principles and values rather than extraneous bilateral issues between members. We resolve jointly to cooperate to discourage and resist the threat to democracy posed by the overthrow of constitutionally elected governments. We resolve to strengthen cooperation to face the transnational challenges to democracy, such as state-sponsored, cross-border and other forms of terrorism; organized crime; corruption; drug trafficking; illegal arms trafficking; trafficking in human beings and money laundering, and to do so in accordance with respect for human rights of all persons and for the norms of international law.

We will encourage political leaders to uphold the values of tolerance and compromise that underpin effective democratic systems, and to promote respect for pluralism so as to enable societies to retain their multi-cultural character, and at the same time maintain stability and social cohesion. We reject ethnic and religious hatred, violence and other forms of extremism. We will also promote civil society, including women's organizations, non-governmental organizations, labor and business associations, and independent media in their exercise of their democratic rights. Informed participation by all elements of society, men and women, in a country's economic and political life, including by persons belonging to minority groups, is fundamental to a vibrant and durable democracy.

We will help to promote government-to-government and people-to-people linkages and promote civic education and literacy, including education for democracy. In these ways we will strengthen democratic institutions and practices and support the diffusion of democratic norms and values.

We will work with relevant institutions and international organizations, civil society and governments to coordinate support for new and emerging democratic societies.
We recognize the importance our citizens place on the improvement of living conditions. We also recognize the mutually-reinforcing benefits the democratic process offers to achieving

sustained economic growth. To that end, we will seek to assist each other in economic and social development, including eradication of poverty, as an essential contributing factor to the promotion and preservation of democratic development.

We will collaborate on democracy-related issues in existing international and regional institutions, forming coalitions and caucuses to support resolutions and other international activities aimed at the promotion of democratic governance. This will help to create an external environment conducive to democratic development.

Final, June 27, 2 p.m.

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2002

UNDP

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX

The HDI measures a country's achievements in terms of life expectancy, educational attainment and adjusted real income

High human development

HDI rank

1 Norway
2 Sweden
3 Canada
4 Belgium
5 Australia
6 United States
7 Iceland
8 Netherlands
9 Japan
10 Finland
11 Switzerland
12 France
13 United Kingdom
14 Denmark
15 Austria
16 Luxembourg
17 Germany
18 Ireland
19 New Zealand
20 Italy
21 Spain
22 Israel
23 Hong Kong, China (SAR)
24 Greece
25 Singapore
26 Cyprus
27 Korea, Rep. of
28 Portugal
29 Slovenia
30 Malta
31 Barbados
32 Brunei Darussalam
33 Czech Republic
34 Argentina
35 Hungary
36 Slovakia
37 Poland
38 Chile
39 Bahrain
40 Uruguay
41 Bahamas
42 Estonia
43 Costa Rica
44 Saint Kitts and Nevis
45 Kuwait
46 United Arab Emirates
47 Seychelles
48 Croatia
49 Lithuania
50 Trinidad and Tobago
51 Qatar
52 Antigua and Barbuda
53 Latvia

Medium human development

HDI rank

54 Mexico
55 Cuba
56 Belarus
57 Panama
58 Belize
59 Malaysia
60 Russian Federation
61 Dominica
62 Bulgaria
63 Romania
64 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
65 Macedonia, TFYR
66 Saint Lucia
67 Mauritius
68 Colombia
69 Venezuela
70 Thailand
71 Saudi Arabia
72 Fiji
73 Brazil
74 Suriname
75 Lebanon
76 Armenia
77 Philippine
78 Oman
79 Kazakhstan
80 Ukraine
81 Georgia
82 Peru
83 Grenada
84 Maldives
85 Turkey
86 Jamaica
87 Turkmenistan
88 Azerbaijan
89 Sri Lanka
90 Paraguay
91 St. Vincent and the Grenadines
92 Albania
93 Ecuador
94 Dominican Republic
95 Uzbekistan
96 China
97 Tunisia
98 Iran, Islamic Rep. of
99 Jordan
100 Cape Verde
101 Samoa (Western)
102 Kyrgyzstan
103 Guyana
104 El Salvador
105 Moldova, Rep. of
106 Algeria
107 South Africa
108 Syrian Arab Republic
109 Viet Nam
110 Indonesia
111 Equatorial Guinea
112 Tajikistan
113 Mongolia
114 Bolivia
115 Egypt
116 Honduras
117 Gabon
118 Nicaragua
119 São Tomé and Principe
120 Guatemala
121 Solomon Islands
122 Namibia
123 Morocco
124 India
125 Swaziland
126 Botswana
127 Myanmar
128 Zimbabwe
129 Ghana
130 Cambodia
131 Vanuatu
132 Lesotho
133 Papua New Guinea
134 Kenya
135 Cameroon
136 Congo
137 Comoros

Low human development

HDI rank

138 Pakistan
139 Sudan
140 Bhutan
141 Togo
142 Nepal
143 Lao People's Dem. Rep.
144 Yemen
145 Bangladesh
146 Haiti
147 Madagascar
148 Nigeria
149 Djibouti
150 Uganda
151 Tanzania, U. Rep. of
152 Mauritania
153 Zambia
154 Senegal
155 Congo, Dem. Rep. of the
156 Côte d'Ivoire
157 Eritrea
158 Benin
159 Guinea
160 Gambia
161 Angola
162 Rwanda
163 Malawi
164 Mali
165 Central African Republic
166 Chad
167 Guinea-Bissau
168 Ethiopia
169 Burkina Faso
170 Mozambique
171 Burundi
172 Niger
173 Sierra Leone

DEMOCRACY
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